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Introduction
It was already clear to contemporaries that the Dutch enthusiasm for the
Boers during the South African War (1899-1902) was to be seen in the con-
text of the history of modern imperialism. In his book The Psychology of Jin-
goism, the journalist J. A. Hobson drew a parallel between the Dutch depic-
tion of the conflict and the situation in Great Britain, where he argued that
the public had been manipulated by a small group of South African capital-
ists and mining magnates. Sneering at jingo propagandists, he wrote that:
[they] must admit that it is likely that the Dutch nation in Holland, draw-
ing nearly all their information from Dutch South African sources, are ani-
mated by a bias similar to, though not so strong as, ours [the British], have
received a mass of evidence directly contradictory to ours, and that their in-
tellectual judgement has been formed in a fashion similar to ours.1
Despite Hobson’s dislike of the jingoist views on the South African War, he
was certainly not of the opinion that propagandists who supported the Boer
republics were any better. In another book, he described Willem Leyds, the
most important diplomatic representative of the Transvaal in Europe, as an
‘evil genius’ behind ‘[t]he notion of an unqualified Dutch political supremacy,
with a complete dominance of Dutch language and ideas [in South Africa]’.2
Historians point out that Hobson’s ideas about the capitalist conspiracy
behind the prejudiced press coverage of the South African question were bi-
ased themselves, based on his own ideas about Britain’s duty in the world and
the role of the growing mass media. Still, his observations have shown their
value for the historical study of the imperial press.3 If anything, Hobson’s
writings show that contemporaries not only considered imperialism to be a
process that only took place outside Europe, they also saw a close connection
with public opinion in the metropole. His comparative remarks about the
coverage of the South African War suggest that this was not only the case in
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Britain but also in the Netherlands and that propaganda was seen as an im-
portant aspect of the struggle between the British Empire and the Boer re-
publics. In later historiography about modern imperialism too, the South
African War is considered to be an important topic. This book aims to exam-
ine contemporary notions about the concept of imperialism by taking the re-
sponses of Dutch propagandists to the South African question as a case study,
comparing them with secondary literature about imperial culture in Britain.
Historical comparisons between the two countries on either side of the
North Sea are nothing new. There is a series of conferences during which
Dutch and British historians exchange views on different issues. The initia-
tors of the first Anglo-Dutch historical conference emphasised that British
history and Dutch history ‘are closely related’ and hoped that it would serve
as a source of inspiration to scholars from both countries.4 In later years, the
conferences focussed on specific topics such as Protestantism, Liberalism and
mass society. The history of overseas expansion has been recognised as an im-
portant field too. In 1967, the editors of a volume of papers on Britain & the
Netherlands in Europe and Asia expressed the wish that ‘English and Dutch
historians will one day be able to confer on their cultural and institutional en-
vironments, so much akin as the world goes and yet so strangely and subtly
diverse’.5The Anglo-Dutch historical conference in 2000 focussed on aspects
of the two colonial empires between 1750 and 1850. A broad comparison
yielded that overseas ambitions of both countries focussed on Southeast Asia
in that period, but that there were differences as well because of the fact that
the Netherlands lost the dominant position that it had held in the seventeenth
century, while Britain came to ‘rule the waves’ during that period.6 In the
1980s, another series of conferences held in Leiden, Cambridge, Delhi and
Yogyakarta brought together scholars to discuss aspects of the colonial state
in India and the Indonesian archipelago in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies. Many of the papers presented at these occasions explicitly aimed to
draw comparisons between topics such as colonial administration, economic
structures and the relationship with indigenous groups.7
Looking at these precedents, a comparison between the depictions of the
British and Dutch empires in Asia might have been more straightforward, ex-
cept that there are some differences that make such an exercise problematic.
First of all, the Indian subcontinent is a single large landmass, while the In-
donesian archipelago consists of a huge number of islands. Indian culture is
therefore divided into much larger cultural groups than Indonesian culture,
whichmade the colonial experience there inherently different. Another possi-
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blymore serious problem is the difference in chronology. British territorial ex-
pansion in India largely took place before 1860while – except for Java – the
extension of the Dutch sphere of influence in the Indonesian archipelago real-
ly took off in the 1870s.8 This is a significant disparity, because the Western
perspective on overseas expansion shifted considerably during the nineteenth
century. After 1870, the universalistic belief in progress gave way to more
rigid ideas about racial hierarchies, derived from Social Darwinism.9 These
intellectual shifts make a comparison between the British and Dutch debates
about colonial expansion in Asia problematic, which is not the case with the
respective depictions of the South AfricanWar because these took shape in re-
sponse to the same events and at times even interacted with one another.
Of course there were significant differences between the Netherlands’ and
Britain’s relations with South Africa. The most obvious of these is that the
whole region eventually became part of the British Empire, while at the end
of the nineteenth century the Netherlands was not in any position to make
territorial claims on that part of the world. Also, the economic significance of
South Africa to the British was far greater than to the Dutch. It can therefore
be maintained that these relations cannot be called imperial.10 Nevertheless,
it has been convincingly argued that the ties between the Netherlands and the
Boer republics at the end of the nineteenth century were an ‘informal’ and
‘cultural’ form of imperialism because there was a structural attempt to gain
influence in the region.11 The most tangible result of the Dutch sympathy for
the Boers was the emigration of several thousand Dutch to the republics
(mainly the Transvaal) at the end of the nineteenth century, contributing to
the development of modern state institutions in Southern Africa.
In secondary literature, it has been shown that British contemporaries also
considered such issues to be important because they believed their domi-
nance in South Africa to be far from self-evident, even after the whole region
had officially been incorporated into the British Empire. Throughout the first
half of the twentieth century, colonial administrators considered the region a
weak spot in the imperial system because of the presence of a distinctive
group of colonial competitors – the Dutch-speaking Afrikaners. In order to
improve their grip, they set out to ‘Anglicise’ the white population after 1902,
but these attempts failed.12 In the light of this cultural struggle, the pro-Boer
propaganda campaign in Europe can be characterised as nothing less than a
war of words. The question is, however, how one should assess the historical
significance of this phenomenon. The following review of historiography
will explore how this complex question can be approached.
Introduction 11
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Historiography: Britain
In recent decades, historians who study British imperialism have engaged in a
debate about the extent to which the imperial experience shaped the ways in
which people in Britain viewed the world and viewed themselves. In the
1980s, John MacKenzie put forward that the empire had a great impact on
popular culture on the British Isles, which from the 1870s onwards led to the
emergence of an ‘ideological cluster of monarchism, militarism and Social
Darwinism’ that captured all social classes.13 A different group of scholars,
including Antoinette Burton and Catherine Hall, has mainly been influenced
by the work of post-colonial authors. They argue that the imperial experi-
ence inspired specific views on gender and race, forging a set of hierarchies
that shaped British society to a large extent.14
There are academics like Bernard Porter who reject the claims of these so-
called ‘new imperial histories’. He argues that the British Empire only attract-
ed the attention of a small elite that benefited directly from imperial expan-
sion and were simply interested in firm control and effective exploitation of
overseas dependencies.15 It has been pointed out, however, that this narrow
definition fails to grasp the full complexity of the concept of ‘Empire’, which
was already a hotly debated issue amongst contemporaries.16 Therefore, a
number of historians, despite their critical stance towards claims that Britain
itself was deeply influenced by the process of overseas expansion, have been
attempting to put imperial culture into firm historical context in order to in-
vestigate the meaning (or meanings) of the concept of imperialism.
One of the most fruitful exercises in this sense has been a new approach to
what can be called the ‘geographies of the British Empire’.17 From the onset
of the imperialism debate, concepts of space have played an important role,
highlighting differences between the ‘periphery’ and the imperial ‘core’. In
their classic theory of expansion, which held sway between the 1950s and
1980s, Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher argued that, although the gov-
ernment in London preferred informal means of control, the British had no
other option but to expand formal rule in response to crises taking place on
the fringes of their sphere of influence. As such, imperialism can be seen as an
‘excentric’ process because the initiative for expansion came from the periph-
eries rather than from the centre. In this model, ‘men on the spot’ and local
‘collaborators’ were important intermediaries who influenced the ‘official
mind’ of decision-makers in London.18 In the early 1990s, another model for
British imperialism was presented by P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, who
war of words12
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coined the concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’. They argue that territorial ex-
pansion was driven by a group of aristocratic financiers in London who were
in search of new opportunities for investments. In this view, the incentive for
expansion was clearly ‘metropolitan’.19
A few years before Cain and Hopkins presented their theory, David Field-
house already argued for a more middle-of-the-road approach. He empha-
sised the ‘interactions’ between the core and its peripheries, whereby Britain
was affected in the fields of economy, foreign policy and armed forces, while
the (former) colonies inherited, amongst other things, administrative sys-
tems, commodity structures and state boundaries.20This premise was further
elaborated on in an important article by John Darwin, in which he presents
the concept of ‘bridgeheads’ to explain ‘the dynamics of territorial expan-
sion’. According to Darwin, earlier models tended to overlook the diversity
of both British society and the regions where expansion took place as a result
of the fixed focus on either the ‘periphery’ or the ‘core’. Instead, he argues
that it was the ‘bridgehead […] the hinge or “interface” between the metrople
and a local periphery’ that determined ‘[w]hether British influence grew, or
was transformed into formal or informal empire’.21 Viewed in this way, the
Victorian Empire was not a monolithic entity but a complex hotchpotch of
different territories around the world, ranging from tropical dependencies to
self-governing dominions in the temperate climate zones, all with their own
relationship to the metropole. This ‘webbed conception of imperial space’, ar-
gues Alan Lester, narrows the gap between the ‘traditional’ empirical ap-
proach to imperialism as presented in the integrated models of expansion and
the ‘new imperial histories’ that focus on the cultural aspects of empire.22 If
anything, the idea of bridgeheads recognises the importance of domestic pub-
lic opinion in addition to high politics and economics as a factor that played
into the process of expansion.23
Following similar lines of argument, an ongoing series of international
conferences under the heading of the ‘British World’ investigates issues con-
cerning the imperial diaspora such as culture and identity. Mapping out this
transnational space, the main focus has been on emigration to the so-called
‘white’ parts of the British Empire: the dominions. There, inhabitants recreat-
ed institutions of the motherland and retained a sense of belonging, which
can be called ‘Britishness’.24 Although it can be argued that the focus on the
‘white’ character of dominions ignores issues of exploitation and suppression
of the indigenous populations,25 studies presented at these conferences have
yielded important insights into identity formation in different parts of the
Introduction 13
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British Empire. The swift process of decolonisation after the Second World
War led to the commonly held view amongst academics that imperialism and
nationalism were two opposite and contradictory concepts. As a result, the
histories of the British nation-state and those of the countries that emerged
out of its colonies were made into separate fields of study.26 Looking at the
British world, however, a more complex picture emerges: despite obvious ten-
sions, ‘colonial nationalities’ and ‘imperial Britishness’ did not rule each oth-
er out but complemented each other and at times even overlapped.27 Such
feelings were supported by multiple overarching institutions and networks
that survived two World Wars, although they were fatally weakened by the
second, and have left a cultural legacy that survives even today in some parts
of the world.28
One way in which historians have attempted to put notions of British iden-
tity into a global context is to investigate how information travelled around
the empire. Lester shows how during the first half of the nineteenth century,
different groups of British settlers in the Eastern Cape actively lobbied in the
metropole to promote their particular views on colonial rule.29 Zoë Laidlaw
argues that during the same period, patronage relations between local admin-
istrators and politicians in London greatly determined how policy took
shape.30 In his study of the imperial press system, Simon Potter analyses how
such networks developed during the late nineteenth and first half of the twen-
tieth century. Great technological and social change such as the advent of in-
tercontinental underwater telegraph cables and the rise of mass media in-
creased the exchange between the metropolitan press and newspapers
throughout the empire, particularly in the white settler colonies. Fleet Street
in London became the undisputed centre of journalism in the British world
from which news was distributed. At the same time, it provided a model for
colonial editors, which led to a homogenisation of the imperial press.31
More recently, Potter has published an interesting essay in which he warns
against the pitfalls of anachronism in this ‘webbed’ notion of the British Em-
pire as an interlinked set of networks. He takes issue with scholars who put
the developments at the end of the nineteenth century on a parwith the digital
revolution a century later, for example by branding telegraph cables as a ‘Vic-
torian internet’. It should not be forgotten that contemporaries ran into tech-
nological and commercial problems that limited the flow of free information
because institutions were needed tomanage the infrastructure of the imperial
mass media. Potter therefore distinguishes between ‘networks’ – which can
be characterised as ‘informal, open, multiple, competing and dynamic’ – and
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‘systems’ that were ‘dominated by a restricted number of powerful organisa-
tions, whose interest together dictate more formal, entrenched, and limited
patterns of interconnection’. Throughout the history of the British Empire,
Potter argues, informal networks continued to exist, but imperial connec-
tions must be interpreted in the light of their institutional framework – in oth-
er words as a system – in order to properly assess their historical meaning.32
What, then, was the impact of such imperial hardware on British society?
Andrew Thompson has done thorough research in this field. In his study of
imperial lobby groups, he shows that such organisations were able to put im-
perial issues on the political agenda by mobilising public opinion and as such
contributed to metropolitan political culture. In line with the notion of the
British World, he argues that the ‘white’ dominions, at that time known as
‘Greater Britain’, attracted most of the public’s attention, more so than the
tropical dependencies or even India.33 In more recent work, Thompson at-
tempts to assess the wider impact of the empire on British culture. Although it
is very difficult to gather a set of quantitative data in order to come up with a
foolproof answer to this question, he investigates a range of social groups in
Britain and comes to the conclusion that they all had some sort of interest in
one part of the empire or another. Exactly because of this great diversity, both
in the metropole and in the peripheries, the imperial experience was far from
univocal: imperialism meant different things to different people.34 Following
a similar line of argument, Potter argues against sweeping generalisations by
both the ‘new imperial histories’ and their critics who claim that imperialism
either completely formed British society or did not at all. In order to get a bet-
ter understanding of the centripetal effects of imperialism, he calls for ‘de-
tailed research into particular examples’ that are nonetheless ‘part of a broad-
er, collective endeavour’. He concludes that ‘the work of different historians
on different parts of the canvas can, when viewed at a distance, help us to see
the outlines of what the painting might eventually look like’.35
In order to investigate the wider meaning of imperialism, much attention
has been given to the South African question, which from the end of the nine-
teenth century has been an important topic in the debate about the British
Empire. Some argue that the South African War – which was the largest of all
colonial wars Britain ever fought and, indeed, the largest conflict the world
had seen since the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) – was the first sign that
Britain’s international dominance was waning.36 The costs to Britain were
certainly high, both in human lives and in money, and several academics have
argued that this was the reason that support for the empire amongst the pub-
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lic evaporated, if it had previously existed in the first place. In this view, the
outbursts of public enthusiasm during the earlier stages of the conflict, such
as the famous celebrations after the relief of Mafeking (May 1900), were only
superficial bouts of mass hysteria.37 In the light of the historiographical devel-
opments mentioned above, however, historians have come up with other
ideas on the matter. One of the first to do so was MacKenzie, who asserts that
the South African War did not break the imperial spirit. In his view, imperial-
ism remained deeply entrenched in popular culture up until the 1950s, which
demonstrates its long ‘shelf life’.38 Significantly, several studies that investi-
gate the ‘British World’ adhere to a similar chronology and argue that the in-
fluence of imperialism reached far into the twentieth century.39 Although the
South African War was a serious challenge, provoking many questions about
how the British Empire functioned, it was certainly not the beginning of de-
colonisation. ‘The old order had bent a little: it had not broken.’40
This, however, does not answer the question regarding the extent to which
the South African War affected the British Empire as a whole. Although some
advocates of imperial reform in Britain took the opportunity to put forward
their plans, the tangible results of this campaign were rather limited. On the
other hand, it can be argued that the wider effects of such lobby groups on
public opinion and political culture were significant.41 Moreover, in some
specific areas the conflict clearly did act as a catalyst. The coverage of events
in South Africa, for example, raised fundamental issues concerning the func-
tioning of the press, which were related to the rise of modern communication
technology and mass media.42 In this sense, the South African War was a ‘me-
dia war’.43 No less than two hundred correspondents working for British
newspapers were present when the war started, and although media atten-
tion did decline after June 1900, popular writers such as Rudyard Kipling
and Arthur Conan Doyle continued to publish about the conflict. Jacqueline
Beaumont shows that the war had an important influence on the careers of
several journalists.44 Focussing on the authorities, she points out how the sig-
nificant media attention was also noticed by prominent figures in the military
high command and civil administration, who tried to enlarge their control
over the coverage of events taking place in South Africa. The South African
War was therefore an important phase in the development of modern censor-
ship.45 Looking at the institutional aspects, Potter identifies the conflict as a
watershed in the transference of information throughout the British Empire.
Faced with the shortcomings of the existing institutions, reformers sought to
improve the imperial press system – with considerable success, he argues.46
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War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 16
The South African question also had more diffuse effects like its effect on
the thinking about British identity. Shortly after his appointment as high com-
missioner of the Cape in 1897, Alfred Milner lamented that South Africa was
the ‘weakest link in the imperial chain’. With this remark he did not refer to
shortcomings in infrastructure but mainly to the presence of a group of colo-
nial rivals that threatened British dominance in the region – the Dutch-speak-
ing Afrikaners. In order to secure the region for the British Empire, the self-
confessed ‘race patriot’ and his supporters attempted to break down not only
the political and military might of the Boer republics but also their cultural in-
fluence so that English would prevail as the dominant language used.47 In
Britain, there was a group of outspoken critics of this onslaught who opposed
the war because they thought that the Boers, as white settlers, were entitled to
an independent existence. Paula Krebs points out that the fact that their
views conflicted with the advocates of expansion did not mean that these Lib-
eral authors challenged the ideological presumptions of their adversaries.
Looking at the writings from both parties, she concludes that the public dis-
course about the South African War in Britain was greatly influenced by com-
mon notions of gender and race.48
One noticeable feature of the use of the term ‘race’ in this context was that
it not only referred to differences between black and white people but also to
differences between English-speaking and Dutch-speaking colonists. To con-
temporaries, language and heritage were the two most important markers
that distinguished the two so-called ‘white races’ in South Africa.49 This po-
larisation was not absolute, Thompson argues, referring to the ‘languages of
loyalism’ that were prevalent amongst certain groups of Afrikaners.50 Also
on the British side, the divide was not experienced as sharply as might seem at
first sight. Many British officers had genuine admiration for their adversaries,
who they considered to be ideal soldiers. Others disliked the harsh methods
that were used against the Boers.51 Even the Milner administration not only
used sticks to ensure British sovereignty but also held out carrots to the
Dutch-speaking population. One of the most significant compromises he
made during the peace negotiation in 1902was the suspension of the vote for
black people, which was a demand of the Boers and which ensured white po-
litical supremacy in the region for decades to come. This shows that the ‘race
question’ in all its facets was a central theme in the contemporary debate
about South Africa and touched upon the fundamental question of how – us-
ing the terminology of the time – one might ‘civilise’ that part of the world.
Bill Nasson has therefore argued that the South African War was in essence ‘a
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European war fought in Africa over how best to get on with the colonial or-
der, and what its dominant terms of reproduction should be’.52
In this sense, the conflict had a distinct international component too. Sever-
al groups in other parts of the British Empire expressed their sympathy for ei-
ther one of the sides. For example, the authorities in Canada and Australia
sent troops to a war outside their own region for the first time in their history,
which should be seen as an important precedent for their support of Britain
during the two World Wars. By contrast, dissident groups such as French-
speaking Quebecois in Canada and republicans in Ireland admired the Boers
for their plucky fight for independence. Likewise, there was much sympathy
for the Boer republics amongst the public on the European continent.53 Al-
though some of these sentiments were a source of concern for the British gov-
ernment – such as the proposal by several hotheads in Russia to invade north-
ern India in retaliation – public agitation in favour of the Boers did not have
serious diplomatic consequences because all the great powers remained neu-
tral.54 We must therefore ask ourselves whether the pro-Boer propaganda
campaign had any effect. This is something that has occupied historians in the
Netherlands, the countrywhere sympathy for the Boerswasmostwidespread
because of feelings of racial kinship. The following section will describe how
they have written about Dutch imperialism, the ties between the Netherlands
and South Africa and how this work relates to British historiography.
Historiography: the Netherlands
The word ‘imperialism’ has only been introduced into the historical debate
about Dutch overseas history relatively recently.55 One of the first to do so
was Maarten Kuitenbrouwer in his 1985 thesis on colonial policy in the
Netherlands. Comparing his findings to the work of R. F. Betts, he argues
that despite its smaller size, Dutch territorial expansion (which mainly took
place in the Indonesian archipelago) resembled British imperialism in several
important ways.56 In his later work, he embraces the ‘metropolitan’ model of
Cain and Hopkins and argues that the initiative for expansion came from
wealthy financiers that belonged to the civic elites, the so-called ‘regents’.57
Other authors writing about the Dutch East Indies also refer to British mod-
els of expansion. Both Cees Fasseur and Hendrik Wesseling adopt the periph-
eral models of John Galbraith and Robinson and Gallagher respectively, em-
phasising that Dutch officials were even more reluctant than their British
counterparts to expand the formal empire.58 Elsbeth Locher-Scholten explic-
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itly refers to Fieldhouse’s work in her thorough case study on the annexation
of a sultanate on Sumatra.59 Drawing from these examples, it is safe to say
that there is a respectable tradition in historiography about Dutch imperial-
ism which seeks to link in with the debate about British imperial history.
It is therefore quite remarkable that there has been no serious attempt by
Dutch historians to join the debate about the cultural aspects of the British
Empire. The most significant study of Dutch imperial culture, by Martin
Bossenbroek, contains only a few references to the work of MacKenzie in
some footnotes, even as he provides conclusions that merit comparison: he ar-
gues that events taking place in Indonesia and South Africa at the end of the
nineteenth century were depicted in a wide range of genres, attracted atten-
tion from virtually all social classes and had a marked influence on Dutch na-
tional identity.60 Also studies about more detailed aspects of imperial culture
in the Netherlands – such as colonial lobby groups and the work of ethnogra-
phers – contain no references to other countries.61 Others such as Susan
Legêne and Marieke Bloembergen do consider the international context.
They both discuss the work of Edward Said in their books about the cultural
aspects of Dutch imperialism.62 But they, too, do not provide a profound re-
flection on the large body of secondary literature in Britain that is available
on this topic and its possible relevance to the debate in the Netherlands.
Such an exercise can have significance for the historical understanding of
imperialism – on both sides of the North Sea. The historical debate about the
culture of the British Empire has brought up fundamental questions about
the meaning of the concept of imperialism, which puts it into firm historical
context by taking into account contemporary ideas on the matter. This book
aims to contribute to this debate with a case study of Dutch-South African re-
lations before, during and after the South African War, which will be com-
pared with the historiography about the ‘British World’. A further review of
existing secondary literature on this topic shows that there are some interest-
ing parallels that make such a comparison worthwhile.
It is widely acknowledged that the Transvaal War (1880-1881) aroused
much enthusiasm amongst the public in the Netherlands for the white Dutch-
speaking population of South Africa, particularly those living in the two Boer
republics – the South African Republic (sar) also known as the Transvaal,
and the Orange Free State (ofs). This was in sharp contrast to the decades be-
fore when there was hardly any attention for the Boers, after the British occu-
pied the Cape Colony in 1806, and after they formally annexed it in 1814.
But during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, with a climax dur-
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ing the South African War, the ties between the Boers and the Dutch were ac-
tually celebrated. The successful fight by the Transvaal burghers to regain
their independence from the British Empire after the annexation of 1877was
for many people on a par with the revolt of the Dutch against the Spaniards in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Also in other ways, the Boers were
seen as worthy descendants of their ancestors, the pioneers of the Dutch East
India Company who had settled in the Cape in 1652. Memories of the so-
called Golden Age of the seventeenth century were thought to give vitality to
the Dutch race and so became a source of national inspiration. Another con-
nection with the ‘cousins in South Africa’ was that High Dutch was the offi-
cial written language in the republics, although the spoken dialect differed
significantly. Such feelings of racial and cultural kinship were phrased by the
term stamverwantschap – which, like ‘Britishness’, is virtually impossible to
translate.63
Although historians do not question the existence of these sentiments,
there are different views as to how they should be interpreted. Like the British
debate, the concepts of nationalism and imperialism are essential in this re-
spect. In general, it is acknowledged that the pro-Boer movement had a con-
siderable effect on Dutch nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century,
serving as a mirror for the nation. The heroic conduct of the Transvaalers re-
minded people of the prestige of the Netherlands during the Golden Age,
which in the view of many had been lost over the course of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Moreover, the Boers’ victory over the mighty British Empire in 1881
showed that there were still opportunities for small nations at a time when
great power politics was at its height. Niek van Sas argues that in the early
days of Dutch modern politics, which led to the formation of political parties
and other social structures along ideological lines – the so-called process of
pillarisation – sympathies for the Boers transcended the emerging divides
and, together with symbols such as the monarchy, contributed to a unified
Dutch national identity.64 Even amongst groups that initially criticised the
Boers, there was a measure of sympathy for them, such as amongst Catholics
(who objected to their strong Calvinism) and Socialists (some of whom
thought the republics were still in a state of feudalism).65
Despite these outward signs of unity, however, there were more problemat-
ic aspects to the relationship between the Boer movement and the process of
pillarisation, because some political groups claimed exclusive rights to the
notion of stamverwantschap. This was especially the case with orthodox
Protestants, who under the charismatic leadership of Abraham Kuyper be-
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came a significant force in Dutch politics. Chris van Koppen has written the
most extensive account of his involvement in the pro-Boer movement to date.
Because of his bravado, he soon came into conflict with other prominent
members of the movement and alienated himself from the leadership of the
Boer republics. Although he continued to reflect on South Africa in his per-
sonal writings throughout his life, after 1884 he was never again a member of
an official pro-Boer organisation.66 Henk te Velde, in his study of Liberal na-
tionalism, has noted that the feelings of sympathy for the republics amongst
this group also were shrouded in ambivalence. There were great concerns
amongst the Liberals about the rise of modern politics in the Netherlands,
which they feared would divide the nation along party lines. The idealised im-
age of the Boers served as a way of overcoming this fragmentation and
drowning out doubts about the way in which modern society was developing.
In this way, Te Velde argues, the pro-Boer movement in the Netherlands was
detached from events in South Africa, projecting a set of constructed values
on the outside world. He therefore concludes that the discourse should be
seen in the light of domestic political culture only and not in terms of Dutch
foreign policy.67
Others have put forward another view on this matter. Although they do
not deny the impact of the pro-Boer movement on nationalism in the Nether-
lands, both Gerrit Schutte and Maarten Kuitenbrouwer argue that it was a
form of imperialism too: in their view, nationalism and imperialism were two
sides of the same coin. In the South African context, Dutch contemporaries
used the word ‘imperialism’ exclusively to refer to the British Empire, but
they pursued similar goals and structurally tried to extend their influence in
the region. Some opinion makers even dreamed of a ‘New Holland’ in South
Africa where the cream of the nation could go to in case of a German invasion
of the Netherlands; but these territorial fantasies were exceptional. Rather,
there were attempts to enlarge the cultural influence in the region by emigra-
tion to the republics and to help the Boers to develop themselves. This, it was
hoped, would open up regional markets – which were growing rapidly be-
cause of the booming mining industry – to Dutch commerce. These ambi-
tions became known under the guise of de Groot Nederlandse gedachte (the
ideal of Greater Netherlands), which can be seen as an ‘informal’ and ‘cultur-
al’ form of imperialism.68
Despite these ambitions, to what extent they actually had an effect remains
an open question. One essential issue in this respect is public opinion, which
is illustrated by the fact that pro-Boer organisations in the Netherlands priori-
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tised ‘propaganda’ from the very beginning. At the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, this word had a more neutral meaning than it has gained since the two
World Wars: propagandists wanted to inform the public in order to mobilise
support for their plans and to provide an alternative to the descriptions of the
situation in South Africa by British authors. As such, it should be considered
in the context of the emerging mass media at the end of the nineteenth centu-
ry. As was the case in other Western countries, the press in the Netherlands
grew due to technological developments and the abolition of taxes. Although
there is widespread consensus on this point in secondary literature, virtually
no studies have been devoted to the difficult question of the extent to which
this had an impact on the reception and formation of opinions.69 This lacuna
in historiography makes it hard to assess the impact of the pro-Boer move-
ment on Dutch society, as there is little data available that gives insight into
how public opinion in the Netherlands as a whole functioned at the turn of
the twentieth century.
In historiography, however, it is suggested that there were several factors in
the Netherlands that limited the influence of pro-Boers. The role of govern-
ment was severely restricted due to the policy of neutrality, which was charac-
teristic of ‘the imperialism of a small power’.70 As a result, official responses
to the South African question were reserved. At the time of the Transvaal War,
the boundaries between the Dutch East Indies and the British Empire in
Southeast Asia were being demarcated. In government circles there were
widespread fears that the British would decide to annex parts of the Indone-
sian archipelago in retaliation if the Netherlands were to officially become in-
volved in South Africa. Although many prominent policymakers and even
Queen Wilhelmina herself had strong personal sympathies for the Boers and
on several occasions expressed these views, they prioritised the vested inter-
ests in Asia. Even when the emotions of the public at home ran high during
the South African War, the government continued to adhere to the principle
of neutrality and was careful to avoid open involvement in the pro-Boer
propa ganda campaign. Another limiting factor that seems to have been con-
nected with the international position of the Netherlands was the underdevel-
oped state of its global lines of communication. In contrast with the British,
there was no independent Dutch network of undersea telegraph cables,
which made the press dependent on information from foreign agencies.71
These restrictions were apparent to contemporaries, who actively dis-
cussed them, raising questions about the relationship between pro-Boer or-
ganisations and the general public. The South African War, during which
war of words22
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 22
sympathy for the Boers was widespread, can be seen as the climax of the pro-
Boer movement. It is therefore remarkable that Dutch historians have paid
relatively little attention to the people and organisations involved in the
propa ganda campaign between 1899 and 1902. Significantly, two foreign
studies that address the international impact of the pro-Boer agitation, writ-
ten by Ulrich Kröll and Lynette van Niekerk, emphasise the central role of
Dutch in the international network that distributed propagandistic material
in support of the embattled republics’ cause.72 In the assessment of the pro-
Boer propaganda campaign, the nature of this network will be taken into con-
sideration. If anything, the source material indicates that, at the dawn of the
age of mass media, Boer supporters actively reflected on the importance of
public opinion, which makes this study relevant for Dutch historiography.
A second topic to consider in the light of the overall effect of the pro-Boer
movement is Dutch-South African relations, and in particular the possible in-
fluence that Dutch have had on Afrikaner nationalism. Schutte shows that
from the beginning of the pro-Boer movement there was a ‘love-hate relation-
ship’ between Dutch and their ‘cousins’ in South Africa. In the 1880s and
1890s, some 6,500 people from the Netherlands went to South Africa (partic-
ularly the Transvaal) to offer their services to the Boers there. Considering the
total white population in the region (at the time approximately one million),
this was not an overwhelming number. Moreover, these so-called Hollanders
were not always appreciated by their new compatriots and there were dis-
tinct anti-Dutch sentiments amongst certain groups of Boers. Likewise, many
of the emigrants, who originated from modern Western society, considered
the inhabitants of the republics to be rather underdeveloped and were disillu-
sioned by their experiences.73
Despite these limitations, Schutte and others note that Dutch emigrants,
many of whom were well educated, occupied important positions in the
Transvaal under the patronage of Paul Kruger, who was the president of the
republic from 1881 to 1900. They played a significant role in the develop-
ment of state institutions such as the railways and the education system, and
they contributed to the modernisation of Southern Africa.74 Moreover, the
Hollanders promoted the formation of a national identity in the Transvaal,
writing books about the history of South Africa that defended the independ-
ence of the Boer republics against propagandists who argued that they should
be incorporated into the British Empire.75 Such examples would suggest that
imperial dreams of stamverwantschap and the emphasis on Boer independ-
ence did not necessarily cancel each other out and that pro-Boer propaganda
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was mainly about the colonial future of South Africa. In historiography to
date, there is no overview of these sources and their contents, which shed
light on the relationship between the pro-Boer movement in the Netherlands
and Afrikaner nationalism. This too will be a topic of discussion in the fol-
lowing chapters.
A final point of consideration is chronology. Historians who argue that the
pro-Boer movement had a limited impact on Dutch history point out a great
discontinuity after the absolute climax of public enthusiasm for the Boers dur-
ing the South African War. They maintain that the Dutch public was greatly
disappointed by the end of the conflict in June 1902 and the peace treaty,
which formalised the annexation of the republics by the British Empire. All
dreams of a viable Dutch bridgehead in South Africa were shattered, and sev-
eral historians argue that sympathy for the Boers thus disappeared as sudden-
ly as it had emerged two decades previously.76 In his study of Dutch-South
African relations after 1902, Bart de Graaff writes that, in addition to these
frustrated ambitions, there were also developments in South Africa that
widened the gap between the Dutch and the Afrikaners.With the rise of mod-
ern Afrikaner nationalism and the second Taalbeweging (Language move-
ment),which sought tomakeAfrikaans an independent language, therewas a
growing dislike of meddling from the Netherlands, he argues. In his view, no-
tions of stamverwantschap were no more than a ‘myth’. This would suggest
that theNetherlandswere detached from the rise ofmodernAfrikaner nation-
alism, which ultimately resulted in the system of apartheid after 1948.77
This is a sensitive topic in historiography, especially given the political situ-
ation in South Africa during the second half of the twentieth century, when
the apartheid regime was ostracised by the international community. Dunbar
Moodie argues that Kuyper’s Dutch orthodox Protestant movement served
as a model for radical Afrikaners, who after the South African War forged a
‘civil religion’ of Christian nationalism that formed the intellectual basis of
the apartheid system.78 Schutte opposes this view and states that there were
fundamental differences between the nature of Calvinism in the Netherlands
and that in South Africa, which made the relationship more complex.79 He
does not deny, however, that there was a lingering sympathy for the Afrikan-
ers amongst the Dutch public, which only ended in the 1960s when the
Netherlands became one of the forerunners in the protests against the
apartheid regime. Schutte argues that this complete swing in public percep-
tion of the Afrikaners should not obscure the fact that there was an ongoing
feeling of involvement with events taking place in South Africa, and he even
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calls the Dutch anti-apartheid policy of the 1980s a form of cultural imperial-
ism that showed a strong continuity with the ideal of stamverwantschap.80
Literary scholars also argue that the shelf life of Dutch Africana stretched
beyond 1902. These ideas were already apparent in the works of G. Besselaar
and Elizabeth Conradie, two Afrikaner academics working in the Low Coun-
tries who wrote books on this subject in the 1910s and 1930s. Although they
noted differences between literary circles in the Netherlands and in South
Africa, it was clear to them that there was a significant overlap too, and they
argued that the nascent Afrikaner Taalbeweging did benefit from the ties
with the cultural motherland.81More recently, new generations of academics
have also pointed out that this relationship continued after 1902. Siegfried
Huigen argues that Afrikaans only became a separate language in 1925 and
that the ongoing interaction had a marked influence on the development of
Afrikaner nationalism.82 Wilfred Jonckheere shows that the view of nine-
teenth-century writers on South Africa was reproduced in popular novels
and poetry in the Netherlands up until the 1960s.83
These three issues – the organisation of the pro-Boer movement in the
Netherlands, its relationship with the Afrikaners and the question of whether
1902 really marked such a great discontinuity – will be leading themes in this
book. In this way, it provides an analysis of the pro-Boer movement in the
Netherlands before, during and after the South African War. A comparison
with related themes in the secondary literature about the British World will
deepen our understanding of the subject. This is all the more significant be-
cause, as will appear in the following chapters, Dutch contemporaries them-
selves thought it important that the British coverage of events in South Africa
be countered. At times, the tone of such publications was quite agitated, but
there continued to be a genuine admiration for the Liberal tradition on the
other side of the North Sea. Although contemporaries did signal the existence
of ‘anti-British’ sentiments, these should be seen in the context of the South
African question and not as feelings of outright contempt.84
Outline
The question of the impact of the Dutch pro-Boer movement will be ap-
proached from two angles, assessing both its institutional framework and the
contents of the propaganda it produced. First of all, the organisations and in-
stitutions that were connected with the interface between the Netherlands
and South Africa will be analysed. Which groups were involved in the trans-
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fer of information from South Africa to the Netherlands? What was the na-
ture of the institutions that constituted this channel of communication? How
did it develop during and after the South African War? Significantly, such
questions were actively discussed by contemporaries, which says something
about their importance and the need to include a description of this network
in a conceptual history of imperialism. A second issue is the contents of publi-
cations that came forth from this transfer of information. How did Dutch au-
thors depict the nineteenth-century history of South Africa and the relations
between the British and the Boers? In what ways did these views play a role in
the coverage of the South African War? How did these publications relate to
what was written by English-speaking authors? And last but not least, how
did they affect views on the war after it had ended? Here too, the sources re-
veal that contemporaries themselves attached much importance to this sort
of material in order to provide an alternative to the British coverage of events
and to show the injustice that had been inflicted on the Boer republics by the
British Empire.
This approach resembles the historiography of the British World and impe-
rial culture. First of all, it feeds into notions of space. What were the relations
between the metropole (in this case the Netherlands) and the peripheries (in
this case South Africa, and in particular the Boer republics)? As with the
British debate, nationalism and imperialism are fundamental concepts to this
debate. Were the notions of national identity in the Netherlands and the rise
of Afrikaner nationalism separated? Or was there some sort of interaction
along the lines of communication that facilitated an exchange of certain ideas
on the South African question? This would suggest that notions of stamver-
wantschap existed side by side with more narrow feelings of belonging re-
stricted by national borders, and that there was possibly even some measure
of overlap. To properly assess the historical meaning of such networks, it is
important to take into account, as Simon Potter reminds us, the structure of
the institutions along with the contents of the debate.
A second fundamental issue that is central to the rethinking of British impe-
rialism is chronology and the idea that the South African War was not the be-
ginning of the end for the empire. Although there was a marked discontinuity
in the relations between the Netherlands and South Africa after 1902, a com-
parison with the British Empire opens up interesting perspectives. One of the
most important features of the work of MacKenzie is his assessment that pop-
ular imperial culture had a long shelf life that lasted up until the 1950s. In the
Netherlands there has been little research on this matter. In the most substan-
war of words26
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 26
tial study of this subject to date, Bossenbroek draws the line at 1902, using
the rather peculiar metaphor of the ‘hop-skip-jump’: the run-up to the enthu-
siasm of the Dutch public started in the 1870s and 1880s, the jump took
place in the 1890s and first two years of the new century, after which there
was an inevitable ‘landing’.85 But several literary scholars show that certain
views on South Africa were more persistent in Dutch literature than this rudi-
mentary chronology suggests. Another important question is whether there
was an ongoing interaction between Dutch pro-Boer organisations and
Afrikaner nationalists. During the 1970s and 1980s, this was a sensitive issue
because it raises the question of whether the Netherlands was in any way as-
sociated with the rise of the ideology that led to the system of apartheid. Now
that white minority rule in South Africa is assigned to history itself, this might
be a good time to revisit this issue.
On the following pages, these questions will be dealt with in three clusters.
The first part will discuss the beginnings of the interface between the Nether-
lands and South Africa – what can be called the ‘principles of propaganda’.
Chapter one will describe how the pro-Boer institutions came into being in
the years after 1880 and the role that Dutch emigrants played in South Africa
in the period up until 1899. Chapter two will describe how Dutch authors
wrote about South Africa at the time and in what ways their work related to
the writings of Afrikaner and English authors. The second, and largest, part
will look at the propaganda campaign during the South African War. Chap-
ters three and four will focus on the development of the institutions of the
pro-Boers during the conflict. Chapter three looks at how information was
transferred from South Africa to the Netherlands and which groups were in-
volved in this. The next chapter will describe how pro-Boer organisations in
the Netherlands related to this supply of information and how they were in-
volved in the propaganda campaign. Chapters five and six deal with the con-
tents of the propagandistic material: the former deals with the period be-
tween the outbreak of war (October 1899) and the occupation of Pretoria
(June 1900); the latter looks at the coverage of the guerrilla phase, which last-
ed two years, up until June 1902. Finally, part three is about the aftermath of
the pro-Boer propaganda campaign. Chapters seven and eight explore the ef-
fects in South Africa and the Netherlands respectively.
The research for this book was conducted both in the Netherlands and
South Africa, which in itself is an illustration of the reciprocal nature of the
ties of stamverwantschap. One important source has been the archive of
Willem Leyds, the Dutch-born state secretary of the Transvaal between 1890
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and 1898, who subsequently served as minister plenipotentiary of that repub-
lic in Europe until 1902. In the latter function, he played a central role in the
pro-Boer propaganda campaign during the South African War. Apart from
several books on the history of South Africa, his paper legacy includes a per-
sonal archive that is kept in the Dutch national archives in The Hague and a
much larger official archive that is kept in Pretoria. Leyds published four vol-
umes of documents from the latter one, but the archive still holds many files
that have barely been researched, including the correspondence of one of the
most important pro-Boer institutions – the press office of the Algemeen Ne -
derlandsch Verbond (General Dutch Alliance, hereafter anv). Before the cul-
tural boycott of South Africa in the 1980s, Kröll used this archive in his study
of Leyds’s propagandistic work, and Schutte has also looked at files from his
days as state secretary in the Transvaal. Moreover, the collection has been
used as a source by several South African historians. The author who has
most extensively studied the collection is Van Niekerk, who wrote a biogra-
phy of Leyds that appeared in 1985. Since the cultural boycott ended in the
early 1990s, no European researchers have visited this rich archive, which
contains much information about the organisation of the propaganda cam-
paign, which has been used in chapters three and four. Moreover, the collec-
tion contains a large amount of material on the period after 1902, which has
not been described by historians at all. In fact, the reason why Leyds sent his
official archive to South Africa was to provide the Afrikaners with cultural
ammunition for their political struggle against British domination. In this
way, the archive itself was part of the ongoing war of words that will be as-
sessed on the following pages. This issue will be discussed extensively in chap-
ter seven.
The Zuid-Afrikahuis (South Africa House) in Amsterdam contains the
archives of the most important pro-Boer organisations in the Netherlands
and of several individuals who were involved in them. These documents have
mainly been used in chapters one, three and four. In addition to these papers,
the library also contains an extensive collection of publications from the peri-
od 1880-1902, ranging from books to pamphlets and photos. In order to get
an overview of these publications about South Africa, I resorted to secondary
literature. For the period up to 1899, the books by Besselaar and Conradie
were particularly useful. These findings will be presented in chapter two. In
order to get an idea of the amount of publications about the South African
War – the topic of chapters five and six – I have looked at the catalogues of
the Zuid-Afrikahuis and a collection of printed material that Leyds donated
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to the University of Stellenbosch in the 1930s.86 I am also very grateful to
Henriette Latsky from the University of Witwatersrand for allowing me to
use her unpublished bibliography of Dutch publications about the South
African War.87 From these sources I have distilled a list that counts 358 titles
that appeared between 1899 and 1902, many of which can be found in the
Zuid-Afrikahuis.
Another interesting find in that library was the A. Welcker collection, a se-
ries of scrapbooks with complete coverage of the South African War between
October 1899 and June 1902 from the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant
(nrc), an important national newspaper in the Netherlands. Originally this
collection was kept in the library of E. G. A. ten Siethoff, a medical doctor in
Scheveningen. He – together with Welcker, a student at Leiden University –
wanted to write a history of the war, but this plan was never executed. After
the library was moved to a storage in Amsterdam, the newspaper collection
ended up in the Zuid-Afrikahuis.88 The nrc was a prominent Liberal news-
paper at that time and does not provide a representative section of public
opinion in the Netherlands, because the press was also segmented during the
process of pillarisation. Nevertheless, it is an important source because many
of the articles contain letters from South Africa – either excerpts or complete
texts – that show that the pro-Boer network extended into the national press.
The Welcker collection has been extensively used in chapters five and six,
which focus on the coverage of the South African War in the Netherlands.
Notes on vocabulary
Some comments are due about translations. This study has been written in
English but mainly draws on primary sources in the Dutch language as it ex-
isted a century ago. To improve the readability I have translated quotations
in the text, with the original excerpts in the footnotes. A few terms such as
stamverwantschap and Hollander could not be translated and have been
used in their original form, as are the names and abbreviations of Dutch or-
ganisations and periodicals.
Another difficulty was to phrase the words that were used to refer to the
different groups of Dutch-speaking people. Contemporaries were certainly
aware that people in South Africa spoke, and sometimes wrote, a dialect that
was different from the official language in the Netherlands, but this was not
formalised until 1925. Authors were therefore not consistent in the ways in
which they described these differences. For the sake of clarity, I have intro-
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duced some terms that are meant to provide a better categorisation. In refer-
ence to the local Dutch dialects in South Africa, the word ‘Afrikaans’ is used;
for the official language in the Netherlands, the term ‘Hoog-Hollandsch’ or
‘High Dutch’ is used. The term ‘Dutch’ is used in two ways: referring to some-
one from the Netherlands or, in the South African context, to people who ei-
ther spoke Afrikaans or High Dutch, or both. About the words ‘Boers’ and
‘Afrikaners’: the former has been used to refer to white Dutch-speaking in-
habitants of the Transvaal and the ofs between the 1840s and 1902, the lat-
ter to the white Dutch-speaking population in the Cape Colony and, more
generally, to the white Dutch-speaking population all across South Africa.
Finally, some remarks on other aspects of semantics. As the title of this
book suggests, the war of 1899-1902 between the British Empire and the
Boer republics has always been a hotly debated issue, which is reflected in the
variety of names that have been used to refer to the conflict. For a long time it
was known amongst Afrikaners as die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog (the Second
War for Freedom), whereas British authors used more neutral terms such as
the Second Transvaal War. Eventually the term Boer War, or Anglo-Boer War,
came to be used. This name, which suggests that the war only affected the
white population, has received much criticism in recent decades. Several stud-
ies, including books by Peter Warwick and Bill Nasson, have shown that
black people were also involved, which led to the introduction of the more in-
clusive name ‘South African War’.89 Despite the historical evidence of black
involvement, one should take care not to overemphasise the multicultural na-
ture of the war. In his later work, Nasson argues that it was essentially a con-
flict between groups of white settlers about which colonial model was best
suited for South Africa. In this sense, black people were the great losers be-
cause the peace between the British and the Boers in 1902 effectively put an
end to their political franchise for nine decades.90Nevertheless, I have chosen
to use the name South African War, which allows it to link in with the imperi-
alism debate in Britain, where this term is commonly used.
This books deals with the ways in which the events that were unfolding in
South Africa were depicted in contemporary Dutch sources and thus does not
reflect my own views. The authors who wrote about these issues at the end of
the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century had outspoken opin-
ions on South Africa, largely coloured by racism, which was common in their
day. I will mainly focus on their ideas about the relations between the ‘white
races’ and the way this fitted into a European literary tradition. Depictions of
black people are only dealt with indirectly, and it goes beyond the scope of
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this study to unravel their voices. In citations, derogatory words such as ‘kaf-
fer’ have been left in, in order to give a sense of the tone of contemporary
sources. Having grown up in the Netherlands at a time when the anti-
apartheid movement was at its height, it was sometimes difficult for me to
grasp that such views were in vogue just a century ago. And also the contem-
porary sympathy for Afrikaans as a poetical language was intriguing to me,
as that was absent from my own education.
At the time I write this, roughly two decades after the birth of the ‘rainbow
nation’, the relationship between the Netherlands and South Africa has once
again shifted significantly. In 1996, Queen Beatrix signed a new cultural
treaty, replacing the old one that was unilaterally terminated by the Dutch
government in 1981 after it had been suspended in response to the Soweto ri-
ots (1976) and the death of Steve Biko (1977). Since the end of the boycotts,
tourism has grown enormously and many Dutch travellers are intrigued by
the flowery names of Cape vineyards that sound familiar yet exotic. This
leads to new ideas about their relationship with the white Dutch-speaking
population of South Africa; a topic of reflection in many weblogs. In addi-
tion, several artists such as Stef Bos and Herman van Veen have performed in
South Africa and have written songs in Afrikaans. On television, the position
of the Afrikaners is being reinvestigated – whether in the documentary by
Adriaan van Dis or in the drama series Stellenbosch, both filmed in South
Africa. These developments make it interesting to revisit the historical ties be-
tween the Netherlands and South Africa and to critically assess both the (in
our perception) positive and the negative sides of this history. The aim is not
to provide sweeping statements about their impact but rather to fill a small
corner of the canvas that depicts Dutch identity in a global context, and so to
contribute to the international debate about modern imperialism.
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part i
Principles of propaganda (1880-1899)
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chapter 1
‘New Holland’ in South Africa? Building a bridgehead
between the Netherlands and the Boer republics
Historians agree that several groups in the Netherlands suddenly (re-)discov-
ered the Boers after the Transvaal War (1880-1881). Drawing on ideas of
racial kinship, or stamverwantschap, there was much sympathy and enthusi-
asm for the so-called ‘cousins in South Africa’, which were expressed in many
ways. The meaning of the pro-Boer movement, however, is subject to discus-
sion, which is a reflection of its complex nature. On the one hand it can be ar-
gued that the Boers served as an example to people in the Netherlands, who
took pride in their heroic struggle and saw it as a sign that the Dutch race had
found new élan. As such, the ideology of stamverwantschap played a marked
role in society at the end of the nineteenth century, which can be charac-
terised as the ‘climax of civil culture’ in the Netherlands.1 But there were also
overseas aspects to the pro-Boer movement. The main goal of the organisa-
tions that were established was to recruit emigrants for South Africa in order
to assist in the development of the Boer republics and to strengthen their posi-
tion against the British Empire. On the other hand, as many hoped, the exis-
tence of an independent state in South Africa where Dutch was spoken would
mean that the influence of the Netherlands in that region would grow and
lead to lucrative economic ties. Such sentiments were clearly reflected in a
public letter written in 1886 by a number of intellectuals who asserted that
the ties between the people in the Netherlands and the Boers were mutually
beneficial.2 Looking at the pro-Boer movement as a whole, its domestic and
international aspects prompt the question how it was related to ideas of impe-
rialism and nationalism.
Some historians put much emphasis on the domestic aspects of the pro-
Boer movement. Henk te Velde holds that the idealised image of the Boers
had little to do with the principles of Dutch foreign policy but was instead a
sign of the transformations taking place in domestic society and the changing
political culture. In his study of Liberal nationalism, he argues that protago-
nists from this group were in search of unity and stabilisation at the dawn of
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the age of modern politics in the Netherlands, which was associated with in-
creasing rivalry amongst the emerging parties.3According to this view, the en-
thusiasm for the Transvaal was mainly a way to strengthen the self-image of
certain groups within the Dutch nation-state.
It cannot be denied that this domestic dynamism was present and that the
pro-Boer movement was linked to the formation of political parties. Certain
groups of Liberals hoped that the archaic Boers could inspire the Dutch peo-
ple to return to seventeenth-century values, which would result in a second
Golden Age in the nation’s history. Driven by this desire, many conservatives
embraced a modern form of nationalism that drew on ideas about national
self-determination and international law.4 Other political groups also em-
braced the South African issue. The orthodox Protestants, under the leader-
ship of jack-of-all-trades Abraham Kuyper (who aside from being a political
leader was also a professor and a journalist), saw the Boers with their fervent
Calvinism as a shining example and hoped that he could forge an exclusive
bond between his party and the Boer republics.5 Support for the Boers from
these two political currents was the most unambiguous, but others also
joined in, which indicates that these sympathies also contributed to a nation-
al sense of belonging. The Catholics, who at first sight had no religious ties
with the ‘cousins’ in South Africa, supported their battle for independence
wholeheartedly.6 And even a number of Socialists openly showed their sym-
pathy for the Boers. Their support was the most ambivalent though, as they
had to navigate between the Scylla of Boer conservatism and the Charibdys
of British high finance. Moreover, domestic issues such as the improvement
of working conditions for labourers were of greater priority to the Socialist
movement at the time.7
Nonetheless, it can be argued that there was more to the pro-Boer move-
ment than domestic politics. Initially, the feelings of sympathy for the re-
publics were seen by scholars in terms of the development of international
law, which was associated with the tradition of neutrality.8 Several histori-
ans consider the South African question to be a part of the history of Dutch
imperialism. Gerrit Schutte and Maarten Kuitenbrouwer both describe the
pro-Boer movement as a structural attempt to expand Dutch influence in
South Africa, something that can be considered an ‘informal’ and ‘cultural’
form of imperialism.9 It should be remembered that the Netherlands was a
small nation and that its size had limiting effects on these ambitions in the
context of international power relations. In addition, the measure of influ-
ence that Dutch emigrants could yield in South Africa – particularly in the
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Transvaal, which was the most popular destination – also needs to be criti-
cally assessed.
Such views resemble the way in which historians have been writing about
the British World. As has emerged from this literature, concepts of imperial-
ism and nationalism did not always cancel each other out but could in fact co-
exist and at times even overlapped. Kuitenbrouwer and Schutte have shown
that both in the Netherlands and in South Africa, different groups emerged
that considered it to be in their interest that there was a form of independence
for the white, Dutch-speaking population in South Africa. Despite the ten-
sions that surrounded these feelings, this shows that nationalism and imperi-
alism were two sides of the same coin. It can be argued that a bridgehead
emerged between the Netherlands and South Africa consisting of people who
had the ambition of strengthening the ties of stamverwantschap between
these two parts of the world. This chapter aims to describe this interface and
its nature. As Simon Potter has argued, it is important to examine in what
way such a transnational space was organised and to place it in its historical
context. Therefore, the following questions will be addressed. What institu-
tions made up this network and how did they function? Which groups of peo-
ple were connected to these institutions and what were their interests? In this
respect it is important to look at not only the situation in the Netherlands but
to take into account the situation in South Africa too.
Another striking feature of the Dutch pro-Boer movement was that it fo-
cussed not only on the political and economic ties between the Netherlands
and South Africa but also on the cultural ties, which were arguably the most
important priority. In this way, the bridgehead acted as an information chan-
nel. Dutch publishers and journalists helped the Boers to propagate their
views on the future of South Africa and to legitimise the existence of their re-
publics. At the other end of the lines of communication, pro-Boer organisa-
tions tried to inform public opinion in the Netherlands in order to mobilise
support for their efforts to strengthen the ties of stamverwantschap. As ten-
sions mounted between the British and the Boers during the 1890s, such ac-
tivities were increasingly considered to be of importance. The dominance of
the British Empire was typified by its monopoly of undersea cables, which al-
lowed British coverage of colonial affairs to dominate. Dutch-speaking insti-
tutions, whether in the Netherlands or South Africa, did not have the means
to set up an alternative network of global telegraph lines. Still, people in these
circles started to think about ways to counter British propaganda and to pro-
vide the European public with an alternative view on the situation in South
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Africa. The pro-Boer movement in the Netherlands should therefore be seen
not only in terms of domestic politics but also in terms of its strong connec-
tion with modern imperialism and the emergence of mass media.
Pro-Boers in the Netherlands
The bonds between the Netherlands and South Africa were established in
1652, when Jan van Riebeeck set foot on the coast of the Cape of Good Hope.
He founded a permanent settlement with a refreshment station for Dutch
ships on their way to the East Indies. With the British occupation of the Cape
Colony in 1806 and the formal takeover in 1814, the ties were largely broken
off. In the 1830s and 1840s several thousands of descendants of the former
Dutch East India Company employees – the Boers – migrated into the interior
during the Great Trek, but this was virtually unknown in the Netherlands at
the time. Similarly, the formal establishment of two republics, the South
African Republic (sar) – also known as the Transvaal – and the Orange Free
State (ofs) in 1852 and 1854, did not arouse much public attention. South
Africa was far away, communication was slow and in the Netherlands there
was not enough willingness to invest in improvements. Although many trav-
ellers to the East Indies passed by the Cape along the way, almost none of
them visited the Boer republics. Up to 1880 an average of four publications
about South Africa appeared annually in the Netherlands, and no figures are
known about emigration in this period. Some individual philanthropists, mis-
sionaries and businessmen took initiatives to persuade people to settle in
South Africa, but because the journey was long and expensive, not many emi-
grants chose it as a destination. The few that did go sent back negative ac-
counts of the laziness and backwardness of the Boers. Another common com-
plaint was their harsh attitude towards the black population. Such criticism
in print contributed to the perception that the Boers blocked the advent of
Christianity and civilisation amongst the peoples of Africa.10
The annexation of the Transvaal by Britain in 1877 did not initially rouse
any interest outside the small groups of people who were interested in South
Africa. There were some protests, but these were largely ignored.11 During
the two years that followed, unease about the annexation grew slowly. The
Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 raised doubts with regard to the British policy to-
wards black Africans, especially amongst Protestants.12 There was also a
great deal of disappointment about the failure of the British Liberal govern-
ment to come to an agreement about self-government.13 The big turnaround
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came, however, when the Boers in the Transvaal took up arms to regain their
independence in 1880. This led to an enthusiastic response frommany groups
in Dutch society. Themost successful initiative tomobilise the public was tak-
en by a number of professors from Utrecht, headed by the biologist Pieter
Harting. On 23 December 1880, he published an open letter in a local news-
paper that called upon the British people and their sense of justice to end the
war and return independence to the Transvaal. Unlike previous protests, this
address to the British nation received much attention, was reproduced in the
national press and even published by some foreign papers. In the following
weeks, 6,082 people, including many influential individuals, signed the docu-
ment. Subsequently, a committeewas founded inUtrecht, chaired byHarting,
which aimed to co-ordinate the campaign for theTransvaal in thewhole coun-
try. In the meantime, committees had been set up in other towns and cities, of
which the one from Amsterdam was the most prominent. The most radical
group came into being in Purmerend, collecting 11,000 autographs for a peti-
tion toQueenVictoria. Somemembers even suggested that they establish con-
tact with Irish nationalists and form amilitia that could go and fight in South
Africa. Although this extreme plan was not realised, it caused great anxiety
amongst some of the more conservative groups that supported the Boers.14
In order to ensure more solid and lasting support for the Boer republics,
the leaders of the Amsterdam and Utrecht committees decided to join forces
in a central body, the Nederlandsch Zuid-Afrikaansche Vereeniging (Dutch
South African Society, hereafter nzav). A broad alliance of prominent Liber-
als and Protestants took up positions in the executive committee of the new
society that was founded on 12May 1881, with Harting as honorary presi-
dent.15 According to the statutes, its main purpose was to strengthen the ties
between the Netherlands and the Boer republics in South Africa. This was en-
visaged in two ways: firstly to establish closer ties with the Boers and, with
their consent, to create and develop institutions to stimulate agriculture,
trade, industry and other material interests and secondly to inform the public
in the Netherlands and in other European countries about the situation in
South Africa – which shows that the nzav considered propaganda a priority
from the very beginning.16 The organisation started off with 300members, a
number that rapidly grew to 1,000 in 1886, a fact that can be accounted for
by the nzav’s appointment of correspondents for the first time in that year,
who then became active recruiters. Until 1899, the membership steadily rose
to about 1,600members, with a temporary peak of 1,800 in 1896 as a result
of the Jameson Raid.17
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Despite the article in the constitution of the nzav that stated that it was a
non-political organisation, the harmony between the Liberals and the Protes-
tants in the executive committee did not last for long. Harting and the
Utrecht professor in international law, J. de Louter, two prominent Liberals,
thought that the Protestant faction headed by Abraham Kuyper had too
much influence. They tried to bypass their rivals by appointing a commission-
er who was to go to South Africa and take charge of affairs there. The candi-
date they had in mind, H. F. Jonkman, was a close ally of theirs. They staged
their coup during a meeting when many Protestant members of the executive
committee were absent. Afterwards, Kuyper protested vehemently and even-
tually cancelled his membership of the nzav, together with other Calvinist
members of the executive committee.18 Although the nzav was generally
seen as a Liberal bulwark after this incident, several Protestants remained ac-
tive in the organisation.19 This raises the question whether the pro-Boer
movement should be seen in the context of the so-called process of pillarisa-
tion, during which public life in the Netherlands was divided along ideologi-
cal lines. Although domestic political tensions clearly did have an effect on
the early years of the nzav, such considerations were certainly not the only
interests at stake, something that will be further discussed in this section.
The broad sympathy for the Boers in the Netherlands was seen by many
people within the nzav as an opportunity to strengthen the ties with them,
and in its early years many plans were formulated to achieve this. Some even
dreamed of a ‘New Holland’ (Nieuw Holland) that could serve as a colonial
refuge for the Dutch population in case of a German invasion of the mother-
land. Moreover, it was hoped that the new élan would push the Netherlands
back up amongst the great powers of the world and restore the prominent
place it had once held in the days of the seventeenth-century republic.20 His-
torians have rightfully questioned the realism behind these grand ideas. In
fact, the nzav was a heterogeneous organisation and it should rather be seen
as a platform where different visions on Dutch-South African relations were
discussed.21Aside from the tensions between people of different political per-
suasions within the organisation, there were also other problems. Many
members, for example, had different interests due to their professional back-
ground. The nzav could boast that it drew members from several influential
sectors of Dutch society such as politics, business, academia and the press. At
first sight it would seem that this variation was its strength, because it meant
that the pro-Boer network was broadly spread. But there were also disadvan-
tages to this. Although many people sympathised with the idea of a closer
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stamverwantschap, their responsibilities in daily life did not always allow
them to promote it to the fullest. The effectiveness of the pro-Boer movement
therefore was a central concern to its adherents, and the reason why the nzav
prioritised propaganda was to mobilise public opinion, which could lend
more weight to its plans. But this was no easy task. The diversity of interests
represented in the nzavmade it difficult to communicate a single agenda.
The biggest clash between the ideal of stamverwantschap and harsh reality
was in the field of foreign policy. Many prominent politicians were closely in-
volved in the founding of the nzav. Several leading figures from the Liberal
movement such as the future Foreign Minister W. H. de Beaufort and the fu-
ture President of the Upper House of Parliament (Eerste Kamer) A. van Naa-
men van Eemnes were active members in the early years (the latter even com-
bined his high function in Parliament with a place in the executive committee
of the society). Kuyper, who after his fallout with the nzav in 1884 remained
interested in the fate of the Boers, became first minister in 1901. These peo-
ple, however, kept their personal sympathies strictly separate from their re-
sponsibilities as statesmen. The nzav, for instance, did not receive any sup-
port from the government.22 Anglo-Boer rivalry was a delicate matter for
Dutch statesmen. On the one hand, sympathy for the Boers was a domestic
force to be reckoned with, especially because the issue was brought up in Par-
liament on several occasions and, as such, influenced the electorate. On the
other hand, the international situation would not allow overt support for the
Boer republics. In the light of the territorial safety of the colonial possessions
in the Dutch East Indies, the Netherlands simply could not afford a con-
frontation with Great Britain. Especially during the Borneo crisis of the
1880s, Dutch statesmen became aware of their country’s relative vulnerabili-
ty and feared that the British would annex parts of the Indonesian archipela-
go if they lost their temper over other issues. In this equation, Dutch interests
in South Africa were far less important than those in the East Indies.23
This reluctance on the part of the government became apparent as early as
February 1881, when a proposal from G. J. T. Beelaerts van Blokland – the fu-
ture consul-general of the sar in the Netherlands – for mediation between
Great Britain and the Boers was refused because it might have damaged diplo-
matic relations.24 The nzav also received aloof responses from state officials
on several occasions. In the 1880s, it campaigned for the establishment of
Dutch consulates in both the sar and the Cape Colony, which only succeed-
ed after much lobbying.25 At times, the reserved attitude of the government
was criticised in the press and in Parliament. However, many figureheads of
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the pro-Boer movement, such as academics who were closely linked to the po-
litical elites, recognised the difficult diplomatic situation of the government
and accepted its cautious policy of neutrality.26
A sector that at first glance seemed to have significant interests in the Boer
republics was the business community. Bossenbroek has shown that of the
1,300 directors of colonial companies, no less than 150were members of the
nzav. This meant that the society drew more people from that sector than
the two largest lobby groups promoting commercial interests in the Dutch
East Indies together.27 On paper, the prospects in South Africa looked very
promising indeed. Trade with white settler communities was lucrative, and it
was believed that the Boer population would prefer Dutch produce over
British goods.28 Moreover, the expanding economies of the Boer republics,
particularly the sar after the gold rush of 1886, were in dire need of invest-
ment. Demands for more infrastructure also opened up opportunities. Con-
temporary pro-Boers hoped that such considerations would provide an extra
incentive for investors, but in practice this was not the case. By 1900 around
fl. 25 million had been invested in the whole of South Africa by the Dutch
business community. This looks meagre compared to the capital raised for en-
terprise in the Dutch East Indies, which amounted to fl. 390 million.29 And
that sum is dwarfed by the £ 75million (at the time about fl. 900million) that
had been invested in the Transvaal gold mines up until 1899, mainly by
British capitalists.30
The Dutch business community’s reluctance to actually provide money for
projects that would promote the cause of stamverwantschap is well illustrat-
ed by the tedious process to raise money for the only successful Dutch compa-
ny in South Africa in that period, the Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche
Spoorweg Maatschappij (Dutch South-African Railway Company, hereafter
nzasm). In 1884, a Transvaal deputation visited the Netherlands after nego-
tiations in London. In Amsterdam, they granted the directors of the nzasm a
preliminary concession to build a railway line between Pretoria and Delagoa
Bay. Apart from the business opportunities, this railway was also important
to the strategic position of the sar. Dutch financiers, however, reacted reluc-
tantly. It would take three long years to raise the required fl. 14 million, the
majority of which came from Germany.31 Other plans such as the attempt to
gain access to the port of Delagoa Bay and establish a shipping service be-
tween Amsterdam and South East Africa in 1889were even more problemat-
ic. Although Boer supporters stressed the strategic advantages of a route to
Southern Africa that did not depend on British ports, not enough money
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could be found for the initiative for the time being.32
Another distinctive social group that was represented in the nzav were
members of Dutch academia. Of the 180 professors in the Netherlands, no
less than 81 had signed Harting’s address to the British nation in the early
weeks of 1881.33 Many scholars remained active in the nzav afterwards, in-
cluding R. Fruin, C. B. Spruyt, J. de Louter, J. P. Moltzer and J. W. Gunning,
who became members of the executive committee. Because neither of the
Boer republics had a university, these men wanted, amongst other things, to
improve the opportunities for South Africans to study in the Netherlands. In
1885, the nzav founded the studiefonds (study fund) that provided scholar-
ships for this purpose.34Moreover, it successfully protested against several re-
quirements that the education law set for exchange students, which were
abolished in 1887. This did not immediately lead to a great number of South
Africans coming to the Netherlands: until 1902 only 45 students participated
in the programme.35 Furthermore, the matter led to further tensions between
Liberals and Protestants. In general, the established universities were Liberal
institutions, but in 1880 Abraham Kuyper had founded the Free University,
which was explicitly Protestant. When plans were formulated for the ex-
change programme, Kuyper tried to persuade the sar government to allow
its citizens to attend his university only, because it would be the place where
they, as Calvinists, would feel most at home. This plea was ignored by the
Boers, however, much to the chagrin of the Protestant leader. Other universi-
ties in the Netherlands, especially the one in Utrecht, became more popular
destinations for Afrikaner students than the Free University.36
Higher education was not the only concern of the nzav. To ensure a more
intensive relation between the Netherlands and the Boer republics, language
was seen as an absolute requirement. High Dutch, or Hoog-Hollandsch, was
the official language of the Boer republics and later one of the official lan-
guages of the Union of South Africa until 1925. It was also noted, however,
that Afrikaans as a vernacular, which differed significantly from Hoog-Hol-
landsch on several points, was on the rise from the late nineteenth century.
Moreover, it was argued that the complicated grammatical rules made Dutch
far less popular at schools in the Cape than English, which students consid-
ered to be easier to learn. Many pro-Boers were therefore involved in an or-
ganisation that advocated the simplification of the Dutch language – the
Vereeniging tot vereenvoudiging van onze schrijftaal. It was argued that a
simpler form of High Dutch would benefit the ties with the ‘kinsmen’ in
South Africa. The professor of law Moltzer, who was also a member of the
1. ‘New Holland’ in South Africa? 43
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 43
Raad van State (Privy Council) and the executive committee of the nzav,
was one of the main protagonists of this organisation.37
Apart from scholars, many teachers were interested in this issue as well. H.
J. Emous (1848-1933), who was the headmaster of a Protestant school in
Amsterdam, was one of the most diligent activists in this field. In the 1890s,
he was a member of the school fund (schoolfonds) and the language fund
(taalfonds), two subcommittees of the nzav. In this capacity, he was in close
contact with Moltzer, although politically they were linked to opposing par-
ties.38 In addition, he was the editor of the periodical of the Vereeniging tot
vereenvoudiging van onze schrijftaal, which shows that the schemes for lan-
guage reform and the improvement of primary education in the Transvaal
were related, although it should be noted that there were different views on
the matter of spelling reforms.39 From the early days onwards, these subcom-
mittees of the nzav organised shipments of Dutch books to schools and li-
braries throughout South Africa.40 Another priority of these committees was
the recruitment of capable teachers for Dutch-speaking schools in the re-
publics.41As a member of the schoolfonds, which was mainly devoted to this
latter activity, and as the editor of the pedagogic periodical Christelijk School-
blad, Emous kept in contact with many of these teachers, and from 1897 he
published their letters from the Transvaal in this magazine.42
Another important sector of society for the pro-Boer movement in the
Netherlands was the press. Between 1880 and 1902, a vast amount of materi-
al was published on the South African question. It is difficult, however, to get
a good overall picture of the available material because few papers or individ-
ual journalists in the Netherlands have left archives. Another complicating
factor is that most authors at that time published anonymously or under a
pseudonym. These combined factors make it difficult to say something about
the organisation of the press coverage of South African affairs. Nonetheless,
there are indications that journalists played an important role in the early pe-
riod of the nzav. One of the founders of the Amsterdam Transvaal Commit-
tee in 1880was A. G. C. van Duyl, editor-in-chief of Het Algemeen Handels-
blad, an influential newspaper. He has been described as one of the ‘hotheads’
of the movement who actively tried to mobilise public opinion in order to put
pressure on the government.43 His successor at Het Algemeen Handelsblad,
Charles Boissevain, also became deeply involved in the pro-Boer movement
and was a member of the executive committee of the nzav in 1901 and 1902.
Generally, Boissevain is considered to be one of the greatest propagandists of
Dutch interests in South Africa, and many of his famous editorials contained
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passionate diatribes on this subject. In addition, during the South African
War he wrote several important pamphlets that reached an international au-
dience.44Abraham Kuyper, apart from being the political leader of the Protes-
tants and a professor at the Free University, was also the editor-in-chief of the
daily newspaper De Standaard until he was elected as first minister in 1901.
He wrote the majority of the editorials and had a personal column in which
the South African situation frequently featured. In addition, much attention
was given to the fate of the Boer republics in the regular articles of De Stan-
daard. Between February and April 1881, for instance, a special section was
reserved for the events in the Transvaal, placed in between domestic and for-
eign news.45
This last example shows that the attention of the Dutch press for South
Africa grew exponentially after the battle of Majuba Hill (1881). In subse-
quent years, events like the 1884 visit by the sar deputation to the Nether-
lands and the Jameson Raid continued to receive much coverage in newspa-
pers. In the weeks before and after the outbreak of the South African War in
October 1899, news from South Africa even dominated the press in the
Netherlands.46 In general, the nzav was satisfied with the attitude of Dutch
journalists, although there were some doubts about certain correspondents.
In the annual report of 1888-1889, it was mentioned that an increasing num-
ber of newspapers had contacts in South Africa who provided them with
news. ‘[N]ot everything that we get to see about this subject appears to us to
have been based on correct observations. In many cases, however, we can be
well satisfied about the light that is spread in this manner’.47
Although this remark shows that Dutch editors at the time were interested
in letters from South Africa (and particularly from the Transvaal), it is hard
to get an overview of the correspondents that contributed to their papers. It
must be kept in mind that, certainly when compared to other countries, the
Dutch press was rather unprofessional at the end of the nineteenth century.
There were no independent national news agencies nor international tele-
graph lines, so that Dutch newspapers had to depend on foreign press offices
such as Reuters (British), Havas (French) and Wolff (German) for the latest
reports about developments around the world.48 The establishment of pro-
fessional reporters in foreign countries was rare. In many cases the term ‘cor-
respondent’ referred to nothing more than an expatriate who wrote letters
about the developments in the country where he lived.49 This also seems to
have been the case in South Africa. Articles that appeared in the Netherlands
about the nzasm were generally written by the Dutch staff of that company
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such as M. E. de Wildt, who regularly contributed to the Nieuwe Rotter-
damsche Courant (nrc). Usually these articles tried to persuade Dutch to
join the railway company in the sar.50 The Dutch emigrant F. V. Engelen-
burg, proprietor of the newspaper De Volksstem, was also active as a corre-
spondent for European media. From 1896, he supplied the Havas news
agency with cables from the Transvaal, which he sent to the office of the com-
pany in The Hague.51 This company was a major supplier of news, and it is
therefore likely that Dutch journalists had access to these reports. Moreover,
papers in the Netherlands received South African periodicals by mail and
published reviews of these magazines.52
To summarise the previous paragraphs, it can safely be said that the South
African question did receive increasing attention after 1880, given the large
variety of social groups that supported the Boers in the Netherlands. The ten-
sions between the Liberals and the Protestants do show that domestic politics
played a role in this debate, but it should not be forgotten that there were oth-
er considerations as well. In the realms of foreign policy and business, the ide-
al of stamverwantschap had limited leverage due to the neutrality of the
Netherlands and the reluctance to invest in South African enterprises. There
were, however, also small successes for the pro-Boers such as the establish-
ment of diplomatic representations in the Boer republics and the Delagoa rail-
way line. An exchange programme for Afrikaner students was started in high-
er education. These projects were co-ordinated by the nzav, which acted as a
platform from which protagonists of such plans could propagate them. In
other words, propaganda was the core business of the society, and relations
with the press were considered to be of vital importance. In this respect there
were severe problems too. The underdeveloped state of the press in the
Netherlands made it hard to establish independent lines of communication
with South Africa, and much of the news was supplied by foreign agencies.
Still, a growing amount of information reached the Netherlands during the
last decades of the nineteenth century, which was not least the result of the
growing number of Dutch in the Boer republics. These distinctive groups of
emigrants will be dealt with in the next section.
Hollanders in South Africa
The most important goal of the nzav propaganda campaign in the 1880s
and 1890s, was to recruit emigrants to go to South Africa and so help to de-
velop the Boer republics. Aside from support to existing emigration organisa-
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tions, the nzav founded her own informatiebureau voor emigranten (infor-
mation bureau for emigrants) in 1888.53This bureau tried to persuade poten-
tial migrants to choose South Africa above other destinations, of which the
United States of America was the most popular. It was argued that Dutch
could more easily retain their identity amongst the Boers, would feel more at
home in a Calvinistic society and would support the ideal of stamver-
wantschap.54 In addition, a voorschotbank (lending bank) was established
that provided financial advances to people who wanted to settle in South
Africa.55 A central concern was to select suitable emigrants that could con-
tribute to the Boer cause. One group the recruiters tried to target were farm-
ers. But, although the Dutch agricultural sector was in dire straits and unem-
ployment had recently risen, not many farmers were keen on leaving because
of the limited prospects in Southern Africa for unskilled labour. This could
explain why most Dutch emigrants to the region were educated people, with
roots in the higher social classes and an urban environment.56
Their main destination was the Transvaal, where the gold boom of the
1880s and the benevolent attitude of the Kruger government towards so-
called Hollanders (the term used to describe people from the Netherlands)
provided the most opportunities. It should be kept in mind, however, that
they did not swamp the country. There is no official census material available
from the sar, but decades later one former administrator estimated that
there were approximately 226,000 white inhabitants in the republic, of
which 150,000 were born in South Africa.57 Others have established that
5,000 to 6,500 people from the Netherlands settled in the Transvaal between
1884 and 1899, which, given the size of the white population – let alone the
total population – was not an overwhelming number.58 Nor is it significant
when compared to the stream of other European immigrants to the mines of
the Witwatersrand, drawn by the enormous quantities of gold that were ex-
tracted there – the so-called Uitlanders. It is probable that of the 75,000 Uit-
landers in 1896, no less than 41,000were British.59
The small numbers of Dutch emigrants, however, should not obscure the
relatively important position they had in the sar between 1884 and 1899.
Contrary to many Uitlanders, who worked mainly as unskilled labourers,
Hollanders were often well educated and held high offices. Moreover, the
Transvaal government actively tried to keep the Uitlanders marginalised so
that the sar would remain under Boer control. Uitlanders mainly lived in Jo-
hannesburg, near the mines. There they could yield only limited political
power because they were denied full citizen rights, including the right to vote,
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which led to dissatisfaction amongst some of their leaders. Judging by the
lukewarm reactions of the majority of the Uitlanders, however, it does not
seem likely that many of them were interested in anything other than making
their fortune as quickly as possible.60 In contrast, many Hollanders lived in
the capital, Pretoria, and performed important government duties that, be-
cause of the limited opportunities for higher education in the sar, could not
be done by the Boers themselves. Even though President Kruger preferred ad-
ministrators who were born in the Transvaal, he chose people from the
Netherlands because he trusted them more than British immigrants or even
Afrikaners from the Cape, who he considered to have been spoiled by English
influences.61 This led to the establishment of so-called Hollander bolwerken
(Hollander bulwarks).62
The privileged position of the Dutch was not uncontested. Many groups in
Transvaal society carried a strong Hollanderhaat (hate directed against Hol-
landers). Much of this resentment was a result of the differing backgrounds
of many emigrants from the Netherlands and the Boers. Most of the newcom-
ers were born in an urban and cosmopolitan environment, while sar society
was predominantly rural, with conservative and patriarchal values. More-
over, many Dutch had adopted more moderate views on faith, if not having
completely abandoned it, while Boers were unshaken in their Calvinism.63
This explains why people from the Netherlands were at times appalled by the
rudeness and xenophobic attitude of the Boers, a complaint that can be found
in many letters home.64The distrust was mutual. Most inhabitants of the sar
did not like any foreign influences whatsoever, even if they came from a na-
tion that claimed to be closely related to them. In their eyes, many Dutch
were badly behaved, drinking too much and cursing in public. Finally, the
Boers accused immigrants of arrogance and contempt for the simple life led
in the republics.65 As will appear from the following pages, Hollanderhaat
manifested itself on specific issues that contemporaries associated with the
presence of influential Dutch emigrants. Apparently, the idea of stamver-
wantschap, although it was embedded in certain institutions in the Transvaal,
was not as popular in South Africa as many people in the Netherlands be-
lieved it to be. This is a reminder that this concept meant different things to
different people.
The most noticeable bulwark of the Hollanders in the sar was the bureau-
cracy. Already during the British occupation of the sar (1877-1881), 21 of
the 88 state officials came from the Netherlands. When national institutions
expanded rapidly in 1886 as a result of the gold rush, the number of Dutch of-
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ficials rose too, although their relative share declined. During the 1890s, on
average approximately 18% of all sar officials were born in the Netherlands.
In 1897, their number was 306, compared to 682 of their colleagues who
were born in the Transvaal and 478who came from the Cape colony.66Many
Hollander officials still had quite influential positions: in 1897, thirteen of
the twenty-three highest functions in the executive and judiciary branches of
government were occupied by people from the Netherlands. Some important
departments even had an almost entirely Dutch staff such as the state office
(which combined the prime minister’s office and the foreign office), the de-
partment of education and the departments involved with infrastructure.67
The most famous of the Hollander statesmen in the Transvaal was Willem
Johannes Leyds (1859-1940). In 1884, just after he had obtained a doctoral
degree at the University of Amsterdam, his tutors, one of whom was Moltzer,
introduced him to the sar deputation that visited the Netherlands. Leyds
was persuaded by his professors and Kruger to accept the post of state attor-
ney and left for the Transvaal with his young bride. In 1888, he was elected as
state secretary but only took up the position a year later because he had not
yet reached the required age of 30. He was re-elected twice and resigned in
1898, when he became the most important diplomatic representative of the
Transvaal in Europe. Although Leyds, who in his student days had been a
well-known figure in cultural circles in Amsterdam, had a totally different
background from the boorish Kruger, who had been born during the Great
Trek, the two worked closely for more than a decade, an indication of how
well their personalities complemented each other.68 During his career in the
Transvaal, Leyds lived through dynamic times due to the transformation that
took place after the gold rush of 1886. Although he had both strengths (his in-
tellect and charm) and weaknesses (his vanity and stubbornness), his biogra-
pher Lynette van Niekerk is of the opinion that his work made an important
contribution to the development of modern South Africa.69
Two particular groups in sar society reacted against the political influence
of Hollanders and Leyds in particular. First, there were the Uitlanders, who
associated the Dutch immigrants with the Kruger regime that kept them mar-
ginalised and disenfranchised. Despite their demands for more political
rights, the influence of this group remained limited because they were effec-
tively barred from both the government and the most important assembly,
the Volksraad.70 A second group were the so-called ‘progressives’ who sup-
ported closer union with the Cape and the newly founded Afrikaner Bond,
which argued for a South African federation. This idea stood in sharp con-
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trast to Kruger’s policy of keeping the sar independent. Moreover, the presi-
dent had an innate distrust of Cape politicians like Jan Hofmeyr, whom he
thought to be too conciliatory towards British statesmen like Cecil Rhodes.71
The party of the ‘progressives’ in the Transvaal, under the leadership of Gen-
eral Piet Joubert, was politically active because it consisted of people who
had been born in the sar and thus had the vote. In the election campaign of
1893, they put the recruitment policy of Kruger high on the agenda, openly
attacking Leyds, who was seen as the most important exponent of Hollander
influence.72 This campaign stirred up a lot of controversy, and the election re-
sults were close. Kruger nevertheless managed to secure victory, and the im-
pact of Hollanderhaat on the political landscape of the sar should therefore
not be overestimated.73
Another (in)famous Hollander bulwark was the nzasm. Although Dutch
investors did not provide much of the finances, most of the directors and over
half the skilled employees were of Dutch origin. In total, 1,700 people from
the Netherlands were employed by the company in the Transvaal.74 The
main project was the railway between Pretoria and Delagoa Bay, which was
finished in 1895. Afterwards, the nzasm became responsible for running it.
Up until the South African War, which marked the end of the Dutch company,
the line was rather profitable under the management of Gerard Middelberg
(1846-1916), who was its director in Pretoria from 1891 to the beginning of
1899. Moreover, the railway opened up a window to the rest of the world for
the sar. In this way, as Robert de Jong has argued, the nzasm contributed to
the development of the Transvaal as a modern state.75 In addition, the De-
lagoa Bay line was an important strategic asset, making the sar less depend-
ent on trade routes that went via the Cape. There was therefore much politi-
cal controversy in 1888, when the concession (which had been granted in
1884 by the sar deputation in Amsterdam) was put to the Volksraad for rati-
fication. The opposition in the sar preferred closer federation with the Cape
and therefore proposed an alternative, a line to Kimberley, which would tap
into the railway network of the colony. British companies were interested in
this project too and tried to influence the decision. Nevertheless, Kruger
stood his ground and eventually the nzasm concession was approved.76As a
result, the company was seen by many critics as an important symbol of what
in their eyes was the nefarious Hollander influence and nepotistic nature of
the Kruger regime.77
Another controversial aspect of Kruger’s policy was his habit of granting
monopolies on certain products to befriended businessmen, which fed allega-
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tions of corruption. One of the most infamous examples was the dynamite
monopoly, which was attacked by the Rand miners because they claimed that
it seriously impeded their work.78Here too, Hollanders were associated with
this practice, and Leyds, as a representative of the Kruger government, was
often accused of taking bribes. Van Niekerk has argued that the state secre-
tary, who personally believed in laissez-faire economics, was against the es-
tablishment of monopolies in principle and certainly did not accept illicit
money in the dynamite case. Nonetheless, he thought that this policy served a
political purpose by keeping the power of the Uitlander mining magnates at
bay and thereby protecting the national integrity of the sar.79 Leyds was also
involved in the Selati affair, which arose over a controversial concession for a
railway line to gold mines in the north-eastern Transvaal. In this case too,
Van Niekerk exempts Leyds from wrongdoing but thinks his personal inter-
est was due to his vanity, because a town was named after him in the region.
When it appeared that some of the people involved in this project had com-
mitted fraud, Leyds himself initiated a trial in Pretoria.80
Other Hollanders seemed to have fewer qualms about the existence of mo-
nopolies. D. H. Schmüll, an entrepreneur from Amsterdam who was in-
volved in the establishment of the nzav, settled in the Transvaal in 1885.
There, he tried to get hold of concessions for copper and iron mining but end-
ed up with the exclusive rights for the production of matches.81 Schmüll’s
broad business interests were surpassed by his colleague G. R. Ockerse, who
was not satisfied with applying for concessions such as for pottery and min-
ing only but came up with more creative ideas, such as a scheme to extract oil
from groundnuts. Eventually he got his hands on a health spa on the Trans-
vaal Highveldt.82 The work of the historian P.J. van Winter, from the 1930s,
provides the best overview of these entrepreneurial adventures, which more
often than not ended in bitter disappointment. Many businessmen were
blinded by the pro-Boer atmosphere in the Netherlands during the 1880s and
1890s and thought that Dutch enterprise would be welcomed with open
arms. On arrival in the Transvaal, however, these hopes turned out to be false
because the Dutch were relatively inexperienced in vital sectors such as min-
ing. Moreover, the commercial demands of the Boers were rather different
from those of the public in the Netherlands.83 In addition, Van Winter argued
that these initiatives failed to contribute to closer bonds between South
Africa and the Netherlands because the Dutch businessmen did not co-oper-
ate with each other. ‘[Concerning trade and industry] the Dutch volksgeist
found its expression in personal development, rather than the creation of im-
portant national power centres’.84
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People with more spiritual inclinations went to the sar as clergymen. Mis-
sionary work in the region had been a longstanding tradition, and the majori-
ty of Dutch travellers that went to the Boer republics before 1880 had a reli-
gious background. Orthodox Protestants (Gereformeerden) in particular
thought they could get a strong foothold in the Transvaal. Likewise their reli-
gious competitors, the reformed Protestants (Hervormden), developed plans
to enlarge their influence amongst the Boers. The tensions between these de-
nominations already surfaced in 1859, when the Dutch minister D. Postma
forced a schism in the Transvaal religious community by leaving the Neder-
duitsch Hervormde Kerk, which was the most common denomination
amongst Afrikaners. His new Vrije Gereformeerde Kerk was the rallying
point for the so-called Doppers, people with ultra-orthodox persuasions.85
This schism probably contributed to the growing mutual distrust between
Kruger, who was a prominent Dopper, and the Afrikaner Bond in the Cape,
which was dominated by people who remained loyal to the Reformed
Church.86
Although the impact of Hollanders on the religious landscape in South
Africa was substantial, whether it had any wider consequences for the poli-
tics of the Transvaal is open to debate. Not all Hollanders had an unfaltering
faith, and particularly Leyds’s religious beliefs were openly questioned by his
critics, who on separate occasions accused him of being an atheist, a Jew and
a Catholic.87 Even though he repeatedly proclaimed that he believed in God
and considered himself to be Protestant, these speculations indicate that reli-
gion did not receive his unconditional devotion. Leyds himself, however,
claimed that this did not obstruct his good working relationship with Kruger,
who was famous for his deep religious conviction.88 It seems that the presi-
dent did not allow faith to interfere much with matters of state. As has been
mentioned, Kuyper hoped that the shared tradition of Calvinism would
mean that he and his followers could build up a special alliance with the
Transvaal. But his hopes turned out to be false when it became apparent that
the Boer leaders, even the most devout, chose to base the relationship with
the Netherlands on raison d’état rather than on religious sympathies.89
Another important sector of society where Hollanders had a marked im-
pact was education. The old system in the Transvaal, which mainly focussed
on spelling out the Bible and singing hymns, became redundant with the
quick social transformations that took place after 1886. The Hollander Nico-
laas Mansvelt (1852-1933), who had arrived in South Africa in 1874 to teach
modern languages at Victoria College in Stellenbosch, was recruited to initi-
i. principles of propaganda (1880-1899)52
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 52
ate the necessary reforms. In 1890, he was appointed superintendent of edu-
cation in the sar. He professionalised the school system by introducing in-
spection and improved secondary education. Mansvelt was shocked by the
poor quality of the teachers, many of whom were barely literate themselves.
Together with Leyds, he set out to raise the standards by recruiting capable
people from the Netherlands. As a result, in 1898more than 300 out of 836
teachers in the sar were of Dutch origin.90
In their personal lives, several teachers experienced Hollanderhaat from
the Boer population, who often treated them with hostile mistrust, and many
letters home were filled with complaints about this behaviour.91 Neverthe-
less, most of these men and women clung to their ideals and did not abandon
their work. As has been mentioned, many people who supported the ideal of
stamverwantschap agreed with the sar government, considering education
to be of vital importance for the future independence of the republic. If the
curriculum retained its Dutch character, it was argued, the schools could
serve as a bulwark against the growing influence of English. In this context
the teachers’ influence on the youth was crucial, and as such they played an
important role in strengthening national identity in the Transvaal.92Kruger’s
opponents were also aware of this, and it became one of the grievances of the
Uitlanders, who demanded that English also become an official language and
part of the programme at state schools.93
Another institution that was vital to the Kruger government was the press.
The Uitlander agitators had taken over several newspapers in the sar with
the help of mining capitalists, particularly in the Johannesburg area. British
journalists with jingoist inclinations were recruited to work for these papers
and chastise the sar government.94Although they denounced these practices,
the Krugerites on their part also tried to influence newspapers. In 1897, a
press law was passed that gave the sar government the power to suppress
any paper that was ‘in conflict with public morals or dangerous to the order
and peace of the Republic’.95 In addition, the government spent £ 6,000-
7,000 a year on advertisements, which served as a covert subsidy. The lion’s
share of that sum went to pro-government newspapers such as The Standard
& Diggers News and De Volksstem.96
The latter, a steadfastly loyal newspaper, was run by Hollanders from
1888. Its most famous editor was F. V. Engelenburg (1863-1938), who came
to the sar in 1889 and started to work as a journalist in the same year. In the
1890s, he acquired the majority of shares in De Volksstem and ran the paper
until 1924, with a short break between 1900 and 1902. Despite some reserva-
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tions against certain aspects of Krugerism, such as the practices surrounding
the monopolies, De Volksstem often took a stance against critics from the
‘progressive’ party and the Uitlanders on issues like state bureaucracy, the
nzasm and education. This led to several polemics, most notably with the pe-
riodical Land en Volk, in which the regular contributor ‘Afrikanus’ scolded
Hollander influence in his articles.97 In this way the Hollander press in the
Transvaal was caught up in the political turmoil of the 1890s and Engelen-
burg became a prominent opinion maker and a well-known public figure in
Pretoria.
Publishers were another group in Dutch society with a keen interest in the
South African market. In the late 1890s, at least four different companies 
became active in the export of books and magazines to the region. The Hol-
landsch-Afrikaansche Uitgevers-Maatschappij (Dutch-African Publishing
Company, hereafter haum) was established in 1897 and had offices in Cape
Town and Amsterdam.98 It focussed mainly on the publication of Afrikaner
authors. One of their most successful writers was J. F. van Oordt, whose his-
torical novels sold well both in South Africa and the Netherlands.99 P. A.
Nierstrasz, a former artillery officer in the German army who travelled
around South Africa in 1896, set up a publishing house called ,,Nederland”
based in The Hague and Pretoria. This company focussed on patriotic publi-
cations such as the weekly Hollandia, which was a magazine for Dutch over-
seas. During the South African War, Nierstrasz became involved in the pro-
Boer propaganda campaign in Europe and was in close contact with the
diplomatic representatives of the sar, even years after the war.100
Established publishing houses were also involved in the pro-Boer move-
ment. J. H. de Bussy went to Pretoria at the end of 1896 and opened a Dutch
bookshop there. Although the nzav warned against a surplus of such enter-
prises, which could have led to a saturation of the market, the society ap-
proved this project, and a year later even provided the financial means to help
open Dutch kiosks at train stations so that travellers would not have to de-
pend on English reading matter on their journeys.101 In addition, the firm got
much work from the nzav, printing their annual reports and most of the cir-
culars. It also published many other pro-Boer publications of various kinds.
Another publisher with warm sympathies for the Boers was J. A.Wormser,
a prominent member of Kuyper’s orthodox Protestant movement. He also
travelled around South Africa in 1896 and opened two shops in the Trans-
vaal: one in Pretoria – which was run by his son – and one in Potchefstroom,
the intellectual centre of the Doppers. Wormser expressed his sympathies for
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Afrikaners in a book about his trip and a series of lectures.102 These activities
made him a well-known figure amongst pro-Boers in the Netherlands. The
fact that he was closely linked to Kuyper, both as a publisher and an impor-
tant figure in the Anti-Revolutionary Party, did not prevent him from being
an active member of the nzav; he even served on the executive committee be-
tween 1900 and 1907.103 His enthusiasm for the Boer cause might have ob-
scured his assessment of the potential risks for his company as he made large
sums of money available for his South African activities. In 1898, he invested
substantially in the Pretoria branch in order to boost the Transvaal market
for books. Less than a decade later he had to conclude, however, that the ‘fate-
ful’ war of 1899-1902 had put an end to these plans because supply routes
were disrupted and demand plummeted. According to him, the economic de-
pression in post-war South Africa and the attitude of Afrikaner leaders, who
were reluctant to spent money on Dutch education, effectively meant the end
of his business there. Because he had invested somuchmoney in South Africa,
Wormser’s whole company went bankrupt in 1907, which led to a personal
crisis later that year, after which he retreated from public life.104
It cannot be denied that the Hollanders were a noticeable group in South
Africa during the 1880s and 1890s. Especially in the sar, which rapidly un-
derwent enormous changes after the gold boomof 1886, they contributed sig-
nificantly to the development of modern state institutions. Politically, the
Hollanders were allied with the Kruger government, but this should be seen
as a marriage of convenience, because there remained a great deal of mistrust
of the Boers towards influences from the Netherlands. Several of the emi-
grants were aware of this Hollanderhaat, which influenced their actions. On
the one hand they were convinced of their duty to help the rough Boers enter
themodern age; on the other hand theywere aware of the limitations of the in-
fluence they could yield in the republic. VanWinter has argued that such real-
istic people, for example the nzasm director Middelberg, were the most suc-
cessful.105 This shows that the interests of Hollanders and Boers at the time
were perceived to be mutually beneficial by certain individuals, and the rela-
tion between the two communities became increasingly intense after 1880.
The Dutch bridgehead in the Transvaal that came into being at the end of
the nineteenth century was directly linked to the question of colonial rule in
South Africa and which group of settlers was to become dominant in the re-
gion: the white Dutch-speaking population or the white English-speaking
population. Despite the tensions that existed between certain groups within
the Boer community, most Hollanders thought that the Dutch race should
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take the lead in the process of ‘civilising’ the region and that it was at least en-
titled to an independent state outside the British Empire where this dream
could take shape. Such ideas corresponded with the views of Kruger, who
wanted to ensure Transvaal independence as a guarantee against British inter-
ference. In this way, his narrow form of nationalism overlapped with the im-
perialist dreams of the proponents of stamverwantschap in the Netherlands,
and they became allies. One result was that Hollanders ran certain institu-
tions that had a marked effect on developments in the region. At the other
end of the line, the public in the Netherlands was mainly informed about the
situation in South Africa via the bodies that supported the Krugerite fraction,
and as such saw the independence of the Transvaal as a key issue. Events tak-
ing place in the 1890s reinforced these views and the need to make them pub-
lic, but at the same time posed questions about the reliability of these lines of
communication in case of an emergency.
The Jameson Raid: a catalyst for pro-Boer propaganda
The mounting tensions between the Boer republics and the British Empire
during the 1890s did not go unnoticed in the Netherlands. The Jameson Raid
on New Year’s Day 1896 in particular led to much commotion amongst the
Dutch public, which condemned the so-called ‘buccaneers’ of the mounted
column of the British South Africa Company and celebrated the Boer com-
mandos that stopped and captured them.106 In many ways, the reactions to
this incident foreshadowed what was to come during the war that started in
1899. In this respect, the situation in South Africa was connected to wider
questions about the position of theNetherlands amongst the colonial powers.
At the end of the nineteenth century, rapid territorial expansion – not only in
Africa, but also in Southeast Asia – aroused fears that (parts of) the Dutch
colonial possessions in the Indonesian archipelago could be taken by rivals. In
the 1880s, treatieswere concludedwith Britain andGermany on the demarca-
tion of the spheres of influence on Borneo (1884) and NewGuinea (1885) re-
spectively. Still, the issue remained a predicament because the Netherlands
lacked the military strength to defend these islands had one of their powerful
neighbours decided to take them.107 There were even persistent fears that the
Germans would try to annex the Netherlands if given the chance.108
The delicate balance in the East was the reason that the Dutch government
could not afford to provoke the British, and so a strict policy of neutrality re-
mained in force with regard to events taking place in South Africa around the
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New Year of 1896. In contrast with the emotional reaction of the German
emperor, who immediately sent a controversial telegram to Kruger in which
he pledged his support to the Boers, The Hague only sent a discreet message
to Pretoria a week after the raid.109This prudent attitude did not change over
time, which became clear in 1899 during preparations for the Hague Peace
Conference that took place between May and July of that year. After a British
threat that it would boycott the meeting if the Boer republics were represent-
ed, both the ofs and the sar did not receive an invitation. In Parliament,
Abraham Kuyper attacked the Liberal Foreign Minister, W. H. de Beaufort
on this issue whom he accused of having no sympathy for the Boers – a rather
bold statement considering that both men had been closely involved in the
founding of the nzav. It therefore has been suggested that the motives of the
Protestant leader for this remarkable performance was electoral gain. Al-
though several Dutch diplomats condemned Kuyper’s rash action, it had no
serious repercussions, and the invitation list of the peace conference was ap-
proved by Parliament.110
It would be wrong, however, to see the Dutch response to the growing cri-
sis between the British Empire and the Boer republics in terms of domestic
politics only. There were wider considerations that touched upon the role of
public opinion in the context of international affairs. In this respect too, the
South African question was linked to the debate about colonial possessions
in the East. The fact that the British had far better access to the lines of com-
munication with South Africa and thus controlled the coverage of events
there was a stark reminder that the Dutch did not possess independent under-
sea cables to the Dutch East Indies and that they depended on the British net-
work.111 As a result, the Dutch were not in a position to influence the cover-
age of events taking place in the archipelago in the foreign media, something
that was considered harmful to national prestige by government officials.112
Groups that wanted to improve the relationship between the Netherlands
and the Boers in South Africa also paid attention to such issues. They did not
consider the ties of stamverwantschap to be solely a question of politics or
economics but also emphasised the importance of other issues such as the im-
provement of infrastructure, education and the press. The growing pressure
on the Boer republics provoked discussion as to how these institutions could
be improved in order to protect Boer independence and thus keep the dream
of a Greater Netherlands alive. Public opinion was considered to be of vital
importance in this respect, and the focus was placed on the existing institu-
tions that were connected to the lines of communication between South
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Africa and the Netherlands and how they functioned. Just as the emergence
of pro-Boer feelings in the Netherlands during the Transvaal War of 1880
had been a complex process, the public reactions to later crises in South
Africa varied as well.
The Jameson Raid caused a great public outcry, and at first sight the nzav
did seem to benefit from this greater attention. Although the society made it
clear that it did not try to capitalise on the public dismay about the careful re-
sponse of government to the events in South Africa, membership jumped
from 1,300 to 1,800 within a short period after the Jameson Raid.113 This
had a direct impact on the organisation, because for the first time the nzav
was in a position to rent an office where the increased amount of paperwork
could be handled.114 Moreover, the raid led to several new initiatives within
the society to once more strengthen the ties with South Africa. The most no-
ticeable of these was the foundation of the taalfonds (language fund) by sever-
al prominent members such as Robert Fruin, the famous professor of history
from Leiden, as well as Moltzer and Emous. This fund collected fl. 60,000 in
its first year, which was spent on prizes for schoolchildren in the sar who ex-
celled in the Dutch language and on subsidies to schools. There was also
more money available for grants to emigrating teachers and financial support
for the publishing house De Bussy to open bookshops in the sar.115
Despite these successes, the executive committee complained that only a
small proportion of the public with an interest in South Africa were members
of the nzav. This was illustrated by the fact that the media were flooded with
letters from people outside the society who had great plans for the develop-
ment of bonds between the Dutch and Boers. Many of these ideas, concern-
ing emigration, the establishment of a shipping line to Delagoa Bay or in-
creasing the number of exchange students from South Africa, also circulated
amongst members of the nzav themselves. The executive committee thought
it would be a good idea to discuss these plans collectively and argued that the
society could serve as a platform. This was considered necessary with an eye
to the future of the Dutch presence in South Africa. ‘We Dutch can only do so
little, even when we are united. What, then, can be expected of divided ef-
forts?’116 Although the complaints about fragmentation continued to exist,
the nzav also found likeminded spirits in other organisations, which result-
ed in close co-operation.
One of the most substantial initiatives after the Jameson Raid was the
foundation of the Algemeen Nederlandsch Verbond (General Dutch Alliance,
hereafter anv). This organisation aimed to promote the idea of a Greater
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Netherlands with a special focus on the Dutch language. This initiative can
therefore be seen as a clear manifestation of the concept of stamver-
wantschap.117 Historians give several accounts of the exact origins of the
anv, which in the beginning had a Flemish branch under the leadership of H.
van Meert from Ghent and a counterpart in the Netherlands led by H. J.
Kiewiet de Jonge (1847-1935), a headmaster from Dordrecht. After the two
branches merged, the anv in Dordrecht dominated and the headquarters
were moved there.118 This new organisation attracted wide attention within
Dutch society, which is illustrated by the fact that it was actively supported
by N. G. Pierson, Abraham Kuyper and H. J. A. M. Schaepman, political
leaders of the Liberals, Protestants and Catholics respectively. Only the So-
cialists remained outsiders.119
The situation in South Africa was one of the most important driving forces
behind the foundation of the anv, which immediately established a Trans-
vaal branch and asked Kruger to become its honorary president.120 In 1898
and 1899, the anv branches in South Africa had the largest increase of new
members.121 This international success is remarkable when compared to the
nzav, which mainly drew its members from the Netherlands. By the start of
the South African War, the number of members in both organisations were
comparable.122 Bossenbroek has suggested that the anv was much more rad-
ical than the established body of pro-Boerism in the Netherlands, the
nzav.123 This is, however, not supported by historical evidence. Two impor-
tant individuals in the early anv – professor H. Kern from Leiden, who be-
came the first president and Kiewiet de Jonge, the first secretary – were active
members of the nzav.124 The latter even joined the executive committee of
the association in 1900.125 Moreover, despite some dissonant notes in the an-
nual report of the nzav that argued that two organisations propagating
stamverwantschap would clash in such a small country as the Netherlands,
the anv was seen as a useful ally rather than a competitor. Soon it was an-
nounced that the executive committees of the two organisations were in cor-
respondence with each other and that the anv had announced that it fully
supported the goals of the nzav. In addition, nzav members were encour-
aged to join the anv.126
As shall be shown in later chapters, co-operation between the nzav and
the anv increased during the South African War, especially in the field of
propaganda. By then, as a result of overwhelming public enthusiasm, the or-
ganisations were dealing with several problems that made it hard to control
the distribution of information.127 In addition, another aspect of the propa-
1. ‘New Holland’ in South Africa? 59
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 59
ganda campaign became more urgent, namely that of getting information
from alternative sources to counter the British coverage of events in South
Africa. Already before 1899, however, the influence of the jingo press was a
concern for people associated with the network that extended between the
Netherlands and the Boer republics. In this context too, the Jameson Raid
was a signal for them to take action and prepare for what was to come.
When visiting Europe in 1895-1896, Willem Leyds was shocked by the
negative light in which the Boers were depicted in German and particularly
French newspapers. In his view, this was due to the fact that the British press
had a monopoly on the coverage of South African affairs and propagated
views that were harmful to the Boer cause.128 When he returned to the sar,
he offered to resign as state secretary and go to Europe as a minister plenipo-
tentiary to try and change the public mood and to consolidate the diplomatic
ties between the sar and the continental powers. The plan was initially met
with much scepticism because of the high costs involved and because Leyds
had been re-elected in 1897. When the consul-general in the Netherlands and
Belgium – G. J. T. Beelaerts van Blokland – died, however, Leyds was allowed
to go and set up a legation in Brussels, from where he would co-ordinate his
activities in Europe.129Most governments on the continent received him well
and accepted his letters of credence. By contrast, British diplomats received
strict orders not to meet Leyds officially, because London viewed this as be-
ing a violation of the London convention of 1884, on the basis of which
Britain claimed ‘suzerainty’ over the Transvaal.130
Public opinion in France, where Rhodes’ press conglomerate owned sever-
al papers, was one of Leyds’s primary concerns. Therefore, a press office was
set up in Paris which, under the leadership of the French journalist Edgar
Roëls, offered material to newspapers that provided an alternative vision on
the situation in South Africa. In the following year, the image of the Boers im-
proved considerably, and when war broke out in October 1899, most jour-
nalists supported the republics. It is, however, debatable to what extent
Roëls’ press office was responsible for this.131 Public opinion in the Nether-
lands was less of a problem for Leyds, as the Boer cause was already very pop-
ular there. When he visited Amsterdam in February 1896, he was enthusiasti-
cally welcomed at the train station by a delegation from the nzav, and dur-
ing a reception that was attended by hundreds of people, he was warmly ad-
dressed by several well-known speakers such as his former professor,
Moltzer.132 This clearly shows that Leyds was well acquainted with Dutch
opinion makers and, because of the growing interest of the press in the sar,
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he even became a public figure. As will be discussed in later chapters, these
Dutch contacts would prove to be essential in the pro-Boer propaganda cam-
paign.
The ofs did not pursue such an active policy of public relations but did
have a diplomatic representative in the Netherlands. The Rotterdam mer-
chant Hendrik Muller (1859-1941) had become acquainted with Africa as
the director of the Oost-Afrikaansche Compagnie (East Africa Company),
which focussed on trade with Mozambique. In that capacity he travelled
throughout south-eastern Africa extensively in 1889. Muller published his
travelogue and several ethnological articles about that region, which earned
him a doctorate at the University of Leipzig in 1894.133Apart from his knowl-
edge of the situation in Southern Africa, Muller was also an active Boer sup-
porter and affiliated with the nzav from the beginning.134 These qualifica-
tions made him the most suitable candidate to succeed H. A. L. Hamelberg,
who died in September 1896, as consul-general for the ofs.
The government of the ofs was careful not to provoke Great Britain by
conducting an all-out diplomatic campaign on the European continent, be-
cause President Steyn feared that it could work like ‘the red flag to the British
bull’.135 In practice, this meant that Muller did not get full diplomatic status,
so that his authority was limited. Moreover, the annual budget for the post
was just £ 50. Some contemporary commentators thought that the sar was
far more popular in Europe than the ofs as a result of this cautious policy.136
This did not seem to temper Muller’s enthusiasm for the Boer cause, and he
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Willem Leyds. Portrait by Jan Veth, 1896.
Source: nzav-fotoarchief, Amsterdam.
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was more than prepared to supplement the meager stipend from the ofswith
his own money. In addition, he was a prolific author defending the Boer cause
against the British, which resulted in several books and many articles in the
domestic and foreign press.137His outspoken ideas and the confusion that ex-
isted around his precise diplomatic status were a source of controversy, how-
ever. In addition, Leyds greatly distrusted him and the two representatives of
the Boer republics could not stand each other personally, which was already
apparent the first time they met in 1898,when Muller visited South Africa.138
Tensions continued to mount between the two, which led to open hostility in
later years.139
The examples mentioned above show that the Jameson Raid and its after-
math were in many ways forebodings of the responses to events between
1899 and 1902. Both after the failed coup and during the South African War,
fundamental questions were raised about the organisation of the pro-Boer
movement in the Netherlands and how it could support the Boer republics in
their efforts to defend their independence. The attempt by British imperialists
to topple the Transvaal government caused an outcry in the Netherlands be-
cause it was seen as a confirmation of the fears that these men would settle for
nothing less than complete dominance over South Africa. This was perceived
as a threat to Dutch national interests because the bridgehead in the region
would be lost, and also because it could serve as a dangerous precedent for
great powers to bully small nations, which raised concerns about the territori-
al integrity of the Netherlands and its colonial possessions. But the concerns
were not limited to the political or economical situation: public opinion was
also seen as an important issue in the context of modern imperialism. The
British dominance of the lines of communication between Europe and South
Africa bothered Dutch pro-Boer organisations and representatives of the re-
publics, who tried to provide alternatives for the coverage of South African
events. Their attempts, however, had limited success because of the fragment-
ed nature of the pro-Boer movement in the Netherlands, which was a contin-
ual source of frustration.
Conclusion
The issues discussed in this chapter show that the pro-Boer movement in the
Netherlands was not simply an expression of a narrow form of nationalism
that was detached from international relations. Although contemporaries
were aware of domestic restraints, their main focus was on ties with the Boer
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republics in South Africa (and particularly the Transvaal) in the light of the ri-
valry for colonial dominance with the British Empire. Several groups in the
Netherlands thought they could benefit from closer ties with their ‘kinsmen’
in South Africa. In addition, despite the strained relations with different
groups of Afrikaner nationalists, Hollanders were seen by the Kruger govern-
ment, albeit reluctantly, as important allies, and at times their interests clearly
overlapped. It has been argued that in this way a Dutch bridgehead was estab-
lished in South Africa that was an informal form of imperialism, which con-
temporaries phrased in terms of stamverwantschap. These ideals, however,
were heterogeneous, and it should be remembered that this concept of Dutch
racial kinship in an international sense meant different things to different
people. Seen from this perspective, the network of stamverwantschap
showed similarities to the webbed space of imperial Britishness. Both cases
show that the assumption that concepts of nationalism and imperialism were
separate by definition is fundamentally incorrect and that historians today
need to reassess such terms in order to grasp their historical meaning.
Despite this important similarity, there were also differences between the
British and Dutch bridgeheads in South Africa. The main one seems to have
been the size and strength of the institutions that bolstered these relations.
Much to the disappointment of contemporaries, Dutch trade and emigration
figures remained relatively low. To this should be added that the organisa-
tions that propagated the ideal of stamverwantschap had severe flaws com-
pared to those of British imperialists, which again led to much frustration in
the Netherlands. Bearing in mind Simon Potter’s remarks about the structure
of the global lines of communication, this says something about the nature of
these institutions. He has characterised the infrastructure of the British Em-
pire as a solid ‘system’ of information: a distinctive community of journalists
and other authors travelling easily throughout the dominions and keeping in
contact via a grid of intercontinental telegraph lines.140 By contrast, the
Dutch counterpart in South Africa can probably best be characterised as a
‘network’, mainly because it lacked such hardware and thus depended on
British communication lines for the latest news. The Dutch pro-Boers certain-
ly did try to bolster their institutions, but this proved to be difficult because of
the reluctance of the government and the business community to support
such initiatives. Notwithstanding these severe limitations, it shows that for
people in the Netherlands too, the phenomenon of modern imperialism was
connected with both public opinion in the metropole and global lines of com-
munication.
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Importantly, many contemporary authors reflected on such issues, and the
difficulties that have been mentioned in this chapter are evident from the pri-
mary sources. Such remarks serve as a means of getting a deeper sense of the
ambivalences that characterised the movement. But there was more to it than
that. The next chapter will argue that the Krugerite views, which reached the
Netherlands via the network that was set up at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, greatly influenced the depiction of South Africa in Dutch literature. In
these publications, both good and bad aspects of the Boers were mentioned,
as were their tensions with Hollanders. Such nuances to a large extent seemed
to fall away, however, when looking at the bigger picture and the question of
which group of white colonists should dominate South Africa: English-speak-
ing or Dutch-speaking. Publications in the Netherlands about this issue pro-
vided a particular interpretation of the recent history of South Africa, which
was intended to show that the Boer republics were equally, if not better,
equipped to ‘civilise’ that part of the world, as contemporaries liked to call it.
This clearly shows that pro-Boer propaganda was firmly connected to events
taking place in South Africa in the context of the struggle for colonial domi-
nance. As such, this corpus was the most significant result of the network be-
tween the Netherlands and the Boer republics that came into being during the
last two decades of the nineteenth century.
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chapter 2
‘Blacks, Boers and British’: 
South Africa in Dutch literature
The (re-)discovery of the Boers by the Dutch public at the end of the nine-
teenth century was accompanied by a great increase in the number of publica-
tions about South Africa that appeared in the Netherlands.1 Many authors
from that time were well aware that they stood in a long literary tradition dat-
ing back to the journal that Jan van Riebeeck kept after landing at the Cape
of Good Hope in 1652.2 But this had been quite different during the greatest
part of the century. After the handover of the Cape Colony to the British in
1806, the production of books about South Africa dwindled, and in general
those that were published were quite negative about the Boers. The interest in
the Boer republics after the Transvaal War brought about a radical change:
not only did the number of publications about South Africa grow but the
tone about the ‘cousins’ in that part of the world became far more positive.
Dutch Africana included many genres such as travelogues, memoirs, ethno-
graphic studies, novels, children’s books, poetry, history and journalism. In
addition, the authors had many different backgrounds, which affected their
views on the situation. People who had lived in South Africa were often influ-
enced by their personal experiences and their political allegiances. But not all
authors were familiar with the local situation. There were even writers who
had never set foot in the region and took their information from what they
read about the country and its inhabitants.
Literary scholars, both in the Netherlands and South Africa, have written
interesting studies about Dutch Africana. These books have been used as
guides for this chapter, which does not aim to give a complete overview of
this corpus but rather provide an outline of some of the themes that it fea-
tured. Before the Second World War, academics such as G. Besselaar and Eliz-
abeth Conradie pioneered the field, describing the literature up until the early
twentieth century. Both of them were of Afrikaner descent and their work
should be considered in the light of the development of Afrikaans as a sepa-
rate language, which they saw as a desirable and logical development.3More
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recently, some authors have argued along similar lines, describing language
as an important feature of Afrikaner nationalism and a means to preserve its
identity against foreign (English) influences.4 Other literary scholars such as
Siegfried Huigen, Wilfred Jonckheere and Ena Jansen critically re-appraised
earlier work, describing a more complex and less univocal process that
shaped Afrikaans.5
One central theme in Dutch publications about South Africa at the end of
the nineteenth century was the dynamic relation between Dutch as it was
written and spoken in the Netherlands and the development of Afrikaans.
Some authors emphasise the differences, but Huigen points out that the liter-
ary circles of the Netherlands and the Afrikaners in South Africa were closely
intertwined at least until 1925, when Afrikaans became an official language.6
The primary sources I have used for this chapter, which is about the period be-
tween the Transvaal War and the South African War, support that view.
There was certainly awareness of the tensions between the emerging Afrikan-
er movement and the literary establishment in the Netherlands, but it was of-
ten hard for contemporaries to categorise them and distinguish between
these groups, particularly in the context of the rivalry with the English lan-
guage in South Africa. This indicates that, although the contents were highly
biased and there was a variety of different views in the Netherlands about
this subject, the debate about South Africa was linked to the political situa-
tion there and was fed by the channels of information that were being set up
in the period between 1880 and 1899.
As a result, another important topic in Dutch-South African literature
from that period was the so-called ‘race question’: the relationship between
different ethnic and cultural groups in that part of the world. During the nine-
teenth century the region that is now South Africa was an intricate battle-
ground where conflicts took place between several ethnic groups, both black
and white. At the beginning of the century, the Zulus under King Shaka and
the Matabele under King Moselekatse pushed down from the north into pres-
ent-day Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Gauteng during the Mfecane.
From the 1830s, Boer pioneers left the Cape Colony during the Great Trek
and waged many wars with African ‘tribes’ in those regions before establish-
ing their own republics there. Then from the 1870s, the British began expand-
ing their colonial territory northwards from the Cape during the Scramble
for Africa, clashing both with the Boers and black Africans.
Although it was certainly no fixed outcome, by the end of the nineteenth
century it became clear that colonists of either British or Dutch descent
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would dominate the region. It can therefore be argued that the South African
War, which was the largest of the conflicts, was fundamentally about the
question of which of these two groups of white settlers would prevail and
shape the colonial order.7 It should be borne in mind, however, that many of
the views that were put forward in pro-Boer propaganda during the South
African War were already evident in Dutch publications about South Africa
before 1899. To contemporaries, such issues did not only have to do with the
‘hard’ tools of power such as military force and capital but also with less tan-
gible aspects such as national identity, cultural heritage and, last but not least,
language. At the time, the British and the Boers were commonly referred to as
two ‘white races’,8 which indicates that the meaning of race in South Africa
was not only tied up with skin colour but also had a strong cultural compo-
nent.
Nonetheless, relations between black and white played a large role in the
debate about which form of colonial rule was best for South Africa. Although
black people were increasingly marginalised throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury, the rise of white settler supremacy did not lead to a great demographical
decrease of the non-Western population, as happened in other areas that
many Europeans emigrated to, such as Australia, Canada and the United
States of America; in fact, at the beginning of the twentieth century the black
majority outnumbered the white minority by approximately four to one.9
Contemporaries were aware of these figures, and there was a constant fear
amongst the white colonists that the black majority would seriously imperil
social order and was even capable of destroying it. Therefore, at the time the
attitude towards ‘natives’ or ‘kaffers’, as black people were referred to in Eng-
lish and Dutch sources respectively, was perceived as one of the most impor-
tant rupture points between the British and the Boers.
The following pages will not be so much about the historical realities of
these complex processes but rather the way in which they were depicted in
Dutch literature about South Africa between 1880 and 1899. It was argued
in the previous chapter that the Dutch emigrants who went to South Africa,
and particularly to the Transvaal, served as mediators between the Boer re-
publics and the public in Europe during the last two decades of the nineteenth
century. This chapter will analyse the writings that were disseminated via this
network. Many of these publications were available both in the Netherlands
and South Africa, where several Dutch publishers set up branches. In this
way, accounts of South African history written by Dutch authors became
part of the Afrikaner canon,10 while literary critics in the Netherlands be-
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came acquainted with early texts written in Afrikaans. Because of the com-
plex interaction, the contents of this literature were not monolithic. Authors
did not shy away from mentioning the differences between people from the
Netherlands and their ‘cousins’ in the republics, and although their opinions
about the Boers were far more positive than in the decades before, there was
certainly still a lot of ambivalence.
To complicate matters, there was also a direct link between Dutch
Africana and publications about South Africa written in English. Propagan-
dists who supported the expansion of the British Empire in that region wrote
several notorious accounts about the Boers in which they were portrayed as
backward and cruel oppressors who were not capable of responsible govern-
ment. These views were reflected in the coverage of South African affairs by
the British press during the 1890s, which was increasingly influenced by re-
ports from correspondents who were associated with pro-expansionist pres-
sure groups such as the South African League (sal) and the Imperial South
Africa Association (isaa).11Dutch authors saw such writings as an imminent
threat to the existence of the Boer republics and therefore thought it impor-
tant to publish alternative accounts of South African history, in order to lend
legitimacy to Boer claims to independence. There were also English-speaking
publicists who criticised the propagandistic onslaught on the republics, how-
ever. These works were occasionally translated and were quite popular with
Dutch authors. This shows that, aside from the complex relations between
people from the Netherlands and the Afrikaners, there was also interaction
with the English cultural sphere, which was rather ambiguous too.
This survey of South Africa in Dutch literature at the end of the nineteenth
century is intended to place this diverse corpus in its historical context. To a
large extent the contents were shaped by the channels of information be-
tween the Netherlands and South Africa as described in the previous chapter.
The very existence of this network was the result of an alliance between dif-
ferent groups that supported independence of the Boer republics for a variety
of reasons. Although their views on specific topics differed significantly, their
publications generally supported the existence of an independent Dutch enti-
ty in South Africa and reflected on the relations between the different ethnic
groups in that region: in short, the racial triangle of ‘Blacks, Boers and
British’.12 This highlights the fact that this kind of literature did not stand by
itself but was clearly related to the development of colonial rule in that part
of the world. On the following pages, this relationship will be further ex-
plored.
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Adventurers and armchair scholars
In many ways, the Transvaal War of 1880-1881was a turning point in public
perception of the Afrikaners in the Netherlands. Before that period, there had
only been limited interest in the fate of the Boers. Only a few publications a
year appeared on South Africa, mostly by travellers or other people who had
been there. In general, their opinions of the Boers were quite negative. Several
of the few settlers who went to South Africa before 1880wrote home to com-
plain that their dreams had fallen into pieces: apart from practical problems
they encountered such as high prices and low wages, they considered the
Boers to be backward, hostile to outsiders and abusive towards black people.
More criticism was expressed in the writings of British missionaries, who
also accused the Boers of mistreating black Africans in addition to allegations
that they inhibited the spread of Christianity. These English texts became
available in the Netherlands, where several were translated into Dutch and
used as a source for pamphlets.13
In the 1870s, some of the Hollander administrators who had come to the
sar still published negative accounts of the Boers. These men had been re-
cruited by President François Burgers (1872-1877), who was an outspoken
reformer. This Afrikaner, who had been born in the Cape and who studied in
the Netherlands at the University of Utrecht, had far-reaching plans for the
future of the republic. Many people in the Transvaal were distrustful of these
schemes, much to the chagrin of the progressive Hollanders. In 1879, two
years after the temporary annexation of the sar by the British, Burgers’s sec-
retary T. M. Tromp published his memoirs in which he described the Boer
character as follows, thereby probably summing up the general opinion in
the Netherlands before 1880: ‘In addition to being cowardly, they are false,
hypocritical, prone to perjury, unreasonable, inhospitable, lazy, dirty and un-
grateful.’14 However, public opinion changed rapidly after Tromp’s work ap-
peared. Burgers’s image was tarnished following allegations that he had
made a deal with the British; he had allegedly resigned as president and prom-
ised not to return to the Transvaal in exchange for a pension and a large farm
in the Cape Colony.15Meanwhile, others in the Transvaal became increasing-
ly dissatisfied with the situation, which resulted in the war that made them so
popular in the Netherlands and that led to a reappraisal of the Boer character
by the Dutch.
After 1881, several publications appeared, written by Dutch authors who
had lived in South Africa before the annexation, that indicated this shift. Al-
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though they were far less dismissive than Tromp’s account, they did vary in
tone, which can be explained by the personal experiences of the authors with
the Boers. One of the most influential of these books was by Frans Lion Ca-
chet, a Calvinist minister who arrived in the region in 1858 and worked in
Natal and the sar. Throughout his career he was known as a polemist, and
during a stay in the Netherlands in the 1870s he established contacts with the
Protestant leader Abraham Kuyper whose newspaper, De Standaard, he used
as a platform.16 His most famous work, a bulky history of the Afrikaner peo-
ple up till the end of annexation called De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, was
widely read outside Calvinist circles and played a large role in the shift in pub-
lic opinion in the Netherlands in favour of the Boers.17 Lion Cachet did ac-
knowledge that he wrote from a personal point of view; to give a negative de-
scription of the Boers was impossible for him, ‘by the nature of the matter’.18
Some aspects of the book were not uncontroversial, such as his open praise
for orthodox Boer leaders and an all-out attack on Burgers, who had been
quite popular amongst Liberals.19
This points to there being a direct link between Lion Cachet’s opinions
about South Africa and his Calvinist principles, a point that has been argued
by Chris van Koppen.20 Also the alliance with Kuyper, who was one of the
few to praise De worstelstrijd as an ‘objective’ account, suggests this.21How-
ever, the idea that Calvinism had a large impact on the Boer character was cer-
tainly not a prerogative of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, and the idea was
generally shared by writers of the day. Moreover, Lion Cachet seems to have
derived much authority from the fact that he had lived in Africa for so long.
This can clearly be detected in his description of the Boers. Apart from his be-
lief that divine providence had favoured the Afrikaners, he also praised their
racial qualities such as their ‘stubbornness’ which had enabled them to hold
out against British tyranny, secure dominance over the black population and
establish civilisation in the wilderness of the African interior.22 This shows
that Lion Cachet not only made propaganda for the Boer cause out of reli-
gious conviction but that he was also genuinely interested in the ‘race ques-
tion’ in South Africa. And so, while Kuyper lost touch with the Boers in the
1880s, Lion Cachet continued his influential propaganda campaign with arti-
cles in De Standaard and sermons throughout the country. He died while on
the job, preparing to lead a prayer meeting against the South African War in
the town of Bergen-op-Zoom in November 1899. The following year the
third edition of his famous book appeared posthumously.23
Several Liberal writers were less outspoken in their praise for the Boers
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than Lion Cachet. A good example of this are the memoirs of E. J. P. Jorissen,
one of the Hollanders who were recruited by Burgers but who remained in
service of the sar after his previous employer had left the political arena. His
book, which appeared after his return to the Netherlands in 1897, was con-
sidered to be an authoritative source on the events before, during and after
the Transvaal War in which he acted as a negotiator. Jorissen, who had a
background as a philosopher and liberal minister, became the state attorney
without any previous experience in that field.24 In his somewhat conceited
memoirs, Jorissen hinted that his lack of political experience was no problem
and that his capacities had been much appreciated by both Burgers and the
orthodox Boers. In fact, he was asked by Kruger and Joubert to help them for-
mulate their protests against the annexation, and he was also a member of
several deputations that negotiated with the British during the turbulent peri-
od up to 1881. Contemporaries were therefore most interested in his descrip-
tion of the negotiations because they considered it to be a valuable account of
an insider.25
Jorissen was not modest about his accomplishments, which points to the
controversy that surrounded his career in the sar. His apparent arrogance
was often mentioned as one of the reasons why he was not popular with the
Transvalers.26 In several passages in his monograph he claimed to have been
the mastermind behind the restoration of independence, which, so he com-
plained, was not always fully recognised by his new compatriots.27Moreover,
Jorissen’s outward support for the Krugerite fraction in the sar was ambiva-
lent, to say the least, considering his opinions on the president. Jorissen him-
self emphasised that, despite the fact that they had fundamentally different
views, there was a mutual respect between him and Kruger that ensured a
good working relationship. This did not stop him, however, from writing a
somewhat disdainful passage in which he described the old Boer as a simple
and unworldly man with the outlook on life of a Calvinist from the sixteenth
century. ‘In his eyes, the sun revolves around the earth.’28 In addition to these
taunts, Jorissen was known for his involvement in various political controver-
sies in the Transvaal, which caused contemporaries to question his dedica-
tion to the Boer cause. This view appeared to be supported by the fact that af-
ter his return to the Netherlands, he spent his days in obscurity and, unlike
many other Hollanders who had returned from the republics, did not join the
propaganda campaign against the South African War.29
Another genre of Dutch publications were travelogues about South Africa,
and these also contained varied accounts of the Boers. One of the most noto-
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rious of these was by the explorer Daniël Veth, who in 1884went to Umpata
in South-West Africa to examine the possibility of founding a Dutch colony
there. The expedition was a complete failure and Veth died of fever. Before
his death, he wrote an account of his findings, which were extremely nega-
tive, particularly about the Boer pioneers in the region, whom he bitterly de-
scribed as ‘idle, greedy, rude and coarse’.30
Visitors who suffered less during their journeys produced more positive
views of the Boers. The businessman Hendrik Muller, the future consul-gen-
eral of the ofs in the Netherlands, travelled from Mozambique to the Cape
in the late 1880s, and his travelogue appeared in 1889. Muller was also
known for his work as an ethnographer, and the volume contains many ex-
tensive yet vivid descriptions of the various people he encountered: Boers,
British and blacks.31 Although he was far better disposed towards the Dutch
element in South Africa than Veth, his descriptions of the Afrikaners he en-
countered did vary in tone. With patriotic pride Muller emphasised the influ-
ence of the Dutch East India Company on the institutions in the Cape and the
Boer republics in areas such as language, law and architecture.32 Passages
about less developed parts of the Transvaal, however, contain amusing obser-
vations of Boers living on the Highveldt, whom he thought rather peculiar,
with a childlike sweet tooth and bad table manners.33
The publisher J. A. Wormser also wrote down his impressions after an eight-
 month business trip throughout South Africa in 1896 and 1897. He was
more explicitly positive about the Boer lifestyle, which undoubtedly had to
do with his Protestant background. He praised them for possessing a perfect
mix of fear of God and love for freedom, which in his eyes made them an ex-
ample to Christians in the Netherlands.34 However, Wormser’s elated views
on the Afrikaners probably also had much to do with the political situation in
South Africa, because he travelled there during the aftermath of the turbulent
Jameson Raid. The author made no secret of his admiration for the men who
stopped the British invasion, praising their patriotism and excellent skills on
the battlefield.35
Not every Dutch author who wrote about South Africa had actually been
there, but such people were nonetheless influential in the dissemination of
knowledge about the region. An important figure in this respect was C. B.
Spruyt, a professor of philosophy in Amsterdam, who was the secretary of
the nzav between 1884 and 1897, in which capacity he wrote many articles
on South Africa. Henk te Velde regards Spruyt as a clear example of an arm-
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chair scholar, who projected his views on South Africa and the Boers in order
to cope with the domestic political situation in the Netherlands at that
time.36 It is true that Spruyt never set foot in Southern Africa, and in some
ways he seems to have idealised the Boers in an attempt to cure the ills of
modern society, which becomes apparent in his introduction to a collection
of his essays on South Africa from 1897. He explicitly hailed the calm and
steadfast character of the Boers in the Transvaal as an antidote to the appar-
ent ‘fevered excitement’ in Europe during the confusing days of the fin-de-
siècle.37
But this view on Spruyt’s work disregards the fact that he was well posi-
tioned in the network between the Netherlands and the Boer republics and as
such was an important propagandist for the ideal of stamverwantschap. He
was well informed about the publications that appeared about South Africa
at that time, and his articles – several of which appeared in the prestigious lit-
erary magazine De Gids – cited them extensively. In 1891, for example, he
published a long review of Muller’s travelogue in which he praised the book
as an important contribution to knowledge about South Africa in the Nether-
lands.38 Moreover, as a member of the executive committee of the nzav, he
corresponded regularly with prominent figures in the sar such as Nicolaas
Mansvelt, whom he greatly admired.39 The respect was mutual, as is shown
in an obituary by Mansvelt after Spruyt died in 1901. The deceased was
praised as a relentless activist for the dissemination of the Dutch language in
South Africa and also for his thorough knowledge of the region, even though
Mansvelt did not agree with all of Spruyt’s views.40
Not all the publications on South Africa by Dutch authors were as high-
brow as Spruyt’s. Martin Bossenbroek has rightly pointed out that it is hard
to draw distinctions between high and low culture in the depiction of South
Africa.41 Several people that were connected to the network surrounding the
nzav and the Hollanders in the sar actively tried to make a link with popu-
lar culture. One of them was the geographer H. Blink, a member of the nzav
in The Hague.42 In 1889, he published a short overview of South Africa in
which he sketched the region’s history from Van Riebeeck onwards and gave
a description of the situation in the Transvaal. In the introduction, he men-
tioned that he drew most of his information from well-known authors like
George McCall Theal, Spruyt and Lion Cachet.43 The executive committee
of the nzav welcomed it as a useful booklet and recommended it to future
emigrants, who did not have access to these sources.44 Blink was also the edi-
tor of the popular magazine Vragen van den Dag that regularly contained ar-
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ticles about South Africa and during the South African War published a spe-
cial issue about the historical background of the conflict.
In other ways too, information and images of South Africa were made
available to the general public. This is illustrated by Wormser’s travelogue,
which gave occasion to an evening lecture full of entertainment for a crowd
of 3,000 people in Amsterdam. The vivid lecture in which he recounted his
experiences was accompanied by lanternslide projections of beautiful land-
scapes and heroic Boers. The audience also enthusiastically sang along to the
patriotic ballads that were performed.45 Muller’s book also had noticeable
sensationalist aspects. The Afrikaner literary critic Besselaar thought that his
account of a shipwreck near Durban – based on a true story – was very ap-
pealing. The pictures of a voluptuous naked Zulu girl that are scattered
throughout the book, however, could not carry his approval, and he thought
it was ‘no picturebook for a Dutch nursery’.46 Nevertheless, Muller’s travel
account was turned into an adventure book for schoolchildren – needless to
say without the titillating images. One teacher was of the opinion that the
text contained so many instructive descriptions of the land and the people
that he adapted it into an inspiring story of a young man who is shipwrecked
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Source: H.P.N. Muller, Zuid-Afrika. Reisherinneringen (Leiden, 1889). Collection Zuid-
Afrikahuis, Amsterdam.
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near Durban, travels throughout South Africa during the upheaval of the
Transvaal War, settles as a cartwright in Pretoria and marries a local Afrikan-
er girl.47
This mix of fact and fiction is typical for many books about South Africa at
the end of the nineteenth century. The most famous writer of pro-Boer adven-
ture books in the Netherlands was Louwrens Penning (1854-1927).48 In his
autobiography he described how he wanted to emigrate to the Transvaal in
the early 1880s and, although the tears in his mother’s eyes stopped him from
leaving, that he never lost his devotion to the Boer cause.49 His two brothers
did settle in South Africa and, until his death in the 1920s, they kept in regu-
lar contact via letters, which provided him with material for his books. In ad-
dition, he was well acquainted with Dutch Africana.50 His first books ap-
peared after the Jameson Raid, which infuriated him so much that – after he
had taken a cold shower to regain his composure – he decided to do his bit for
the pro-Boer movement.51As a result he wrote a series of three historical nov-
els about the Great Trek, the annexation of the Transvaal and the raid itself.
The chapters of these books alternately told stories of fictional characters
and provided descriptions of events that actually took place, making it a form
of popular history. Penning made few references to the sources he used, but
the times he did so prove that he drew his information from well-known pub-
lications.52 Jacques van der Elst has argued that in this respect, Penning’s
books largely reflected contemporary biases in the Netherlands.53 There was,
however, also contemporary scepticism about Penning’s early work, and the
famous Lion Cachet even warned him that he would make a caricature out of
the Boers because he did not have personal experience of South Africa.
Nonetheless, Penning himself thought his connections were sufficient to pro-
vide him with enough knowledge and he continued writing – with huge suc-
cess.54
This illustrates how there was a distinct overlap between publications in
the Netherlands and South Africa. By the end of the nineteenth century, the
Dutch public had access to several sources from which they could draw infor-
mation about the Boers. Accounts of emigrants and travellers naturally had a
certain degree of authority because they wrote about their own experiences.
There were also authors who had never been to South Africa but nonetheless
became known as specialists because of their connection with the channels of
information from the republics. In this way, a heterogeneous corpus of litera-
ture came into being, which is also reflected in the variety of views that
emerged from it. The following section will explore such ambivalences, look-
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ing at accounts describing the history of the Dutch-speaking people in South
Africa and their relations with their ‘kinsmen’ in the Netherlands.
The ambivalences of stamverwantschap
Although their opinions differed significantly, there was one certainty for all
Dutch authors who wrote about this topic: the history of South Africa started
with Van Riebeeck’s landing in 1652. The white colonists near Cape Town, it
was argued, developed into the Afrikaner people. It was acknowledged that
non-Dutch blood was mixed in because of the arrival of Huguenot settlers
from France and also German colonists, who were recruited by the Dutch
East India Company. In 1902, the historian H. T. Colenbrander did extensive
research in the Company’s archives in The Hague and argued that about
50% of the Boers in the republics had Dutch ancestry, 27% German and
17% French.55 From these figures he drew the conclusion that the Boers were
a ‘new race’ because Dutch blood was blended significantly with ‘foreign’ ele-
ments.56 He emphasised that this miscegenation mainly occurred amongst
white peoples and that less than 1% of the Afrikaners had black forefa-
thers.57
There seems to have been widespread agreement in the Netherlands on this
point, and many authors asserted that the Boers were an independent ethnic
group, while racially akin at the same time. Still, there were different views as
to what degree these foreign influences had affected the ‘Dutchness’ of the
Afrikaners. Looking at the surnames of influential Boers, for example, many
people noted that French Huguenots left a substantial mark. Lion Cachet
was of the opinion that the ‘short-temperedness’ of the Afrikaners was anoth-
er French legacy.58 Nevertheless, he described how the Huguenots voluntari-
ly assimilated into the Dutch colonial way of life, an opinion that was shared
by Muller.59 Colenbrander also stressed that their historical influence had of-
ten been overemphasised, particularly in Britain. ‘It seems that people over
there preferred to be embarrassed by the “chivalrous” Frenchman than the
coarse Dutchman.’60
Contemporaries did not consider genetic make-up to be the only factor
that was relevant to the relationship between the Boers and the Dutch; they
also noted how the colonial context played a role in the unique development
of the inhabitants of the republics. It was not denied that there were already
tensions between the Netherlands and the colonists in the Cape during the
eighteenth century, caused by trade restrictions and corruption amongst offi-
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cials of the Dutch East India Company. Lion Cachet explicitly noted that this
was a reason for Afrikaners to move away from the area around Cape Town
and to settle in the Graaff-Reinet district.61 He argued that this strategy of
trekking to avoid metropolitan meddling played an essential role in the nine-
teenth-century history of the Boers, during which they constantly tried to
avoid British interference.62
This urge for freedom and independence was partly seen as a Dutch trait.
In many sources, the struggle of the Boers against the British Empire was
linked to the war of independence by the Dutch against the Spanish that took
place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In reference to the pre-
 modern freedom fighters, the Boers were known as ‘the gueux of the nine-
teenth century’.63 In addition, it was thought that the increasing isolation of
the Boers who went inland meant that they preserved several characteristics
that the first colonists brought with them from seventeenth-century Holland,
of which a deep-rooted faith in the word of God was probably the most well
known. There were many differences between Liberal and Protestant ob-
servers in the Netherlands and how they valued the staunch Calvinism of the
Boers, but they did agree that the Dutch Authorised Version of the Bible,
which was written in seventeenth-century Dutch, was the most important
book for them and one of the most tangible legacies from the Netherlands in
South Africa.64
Despite these markers of Dutch identity, many observers noted how fron-
tier life had led to a growing gap between people in the Netherlands and the
Boers. The struggle for existence during the journeys into the interior and the
confrontations there with wild animals and ‘savage’ black Africans suppos-
edly hardened the pioneers. Lion Cachet’s vivid descriptions of these so-
called Voortrekkers are exemplary. In the ox-wagon camps, or laagers, every-
body joined the daily effort of preparing food and other essentials, only tak-
ing time off to pray and to read the Bible.65 In a fictitious paragraph, he
crawled into the skin of a Boer, standing on top of the Drakensberg, overlook-
ing the majestic landscapes of Southern Africa, which emphasised the spiritu-
al link of the Boers with the land they colonised.66 Spruyt was sceptical about
Lion Cachet’s assumption that the pioneers were living the life as described in
Genesis. He nevertheless characterised the lifestyle of the Voortrekkers as ‘pa-
triarchal’ and thought it continued to influence the nature of daily life of the
republics.67 In this way, an elevated and heroic image came about concerning
the Great Trek and the foundation of the republics.
One noticeable aspect is that such heroism drew strongly on notions of
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gender in which particular qualities of each sex were celebrated. Men were
mainly praised for their physical qualities and courage, which they needed to
survive in the ‘wilderness’ of South Africa. Wormser characterised the male
Voortrekkers as ‘the real Boers; broadly shouldered, long bearded, rounded
straight fellows, who bring forth a breed as brave and stout as they are them-
selves’.68 Their favourite pastime – so many authors thought – was hunting,
which explained their excellent shooting and riding skills, which boys al-
ready learned during early childhood.69
Boer women were considered at least as heroic as the men but in their own
way. In his description of the Great Trek, Lion Cachet noted how they were
not spared the hardships of frontier life, for instance suffering attacks from
black Africans.70 Moreover, they played an essential role in organising the
laager, taking care of the household when the men were out hunting or scout-
ing.71During battles, women were occupied by nursing the wounded, casting
bullets, and there were even stories of women who handled rifles them -
selves.72 But the Boer women were mostly admired for their patriotism. At
critical moments in the history of their people, such as after the attack by the
Zulus in 1838 and the Transvaal War, they convinced their husbands and
sons to go out and fight.73 The retired army officer J. H. Rovers, who had
been in the Transvaal in 1881, argued that in this way women guarded the
moral integrity of the Boers in the ‘wilderness’ of the South African interior.74
Consequently, the simple lifestyle of the Boers was considered to be inter-
twined with the nuclear family, which was reflected in the political culture of
the republics. In descriptions of the Transvaal, it was noted that the adminis-
tration of the region was small-scaled and decentralised, which made it a
communal concern for all Boer citizens and ensured good social order.75 In
the Transvaal Parliament, the Volksraad, the president acted as a primus inter
paribus, a true father of the nation, which illustrated the informal nature of
the political system.76 Both Muller and Wormser described how easy it was
to approach Kruger, who sat on his porch every morning, willing to talk to
anyone who passed by.77
Despite the praise for the simple lifestyle of the Boers, observers from the
Netherlands also saw disadvantages. Some were of a rather practical nature.
Housing, for example, was considered to be downright primitive. Wormser
complained extensively about the low standard of accommodation in Preto-
ria and other towns, where hotels provided no clean towels, had lousy service
and served awful food.78 Staying at a farm in the Transvaal, Muller noted
with disgust how his hosts – father, mother and son – washed their faces and
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feet with water from the same bowl. ‘The people here certainly possess many
virtues, but not really that of cleanliness.’79
Another problematic feature of the Boer character was perceived to be
their pugnaciousness and their strong partisan tendencies. During the early
history of the sar there were many internal conflicts, which even led to an
armed conflict between different fractions of Voortrekkers. This political
strife, which was intertwined with ecclesiastical issues, was generally consid-
ered to be a black page in the history of the Transvaal. Lion Cachet, who as a
Calvinist minister and polemist was deeply involved in these matters, did not
find it opportune to mention them in his account of Boer history because he
did not want to stir up painful memories.80 Jorissen also mentioned party ri-
valry as one of the weak spots of the sar but, aside from some bitter com-
ments about his own dismissal, did not describe in any detail the political
feuds that took place in the 1880s and early 1890s, which he witnessed from
close by.81
It was noted, however, that the internal bickering was nothing compared
to the distrust towards external intervention that the Boers had developed
during the Great Trek and which had led to a degree of isolation.82 These
qualities, which had protected them from meddling by the British, also halted
progress and alienated them from the modern world, several authors noted.
Muller was explicitly worried about the underdeveloped state institutions of
the Transvaal. In his view, the gold boom of the late 1880s had propelled the
archaic Boers into the age of high capitalism, which caused great social prob-
lems. He therefore noted with satisfaction that Kruger had been so wise as to
appoint Hollanders to help him reorganise the state.83 In general, commenta-
tors thought the lack of a good education system in the Transvaal was partic-
ularly dangerous because it made the Boers, many of whom were illiterate,
vulnerable. Such authors often mentioned that it was in this field that emi-
grants from the Netherlands could contribute most significantly.84
Despite the tempting prospects, people who were interested in emigrating
were extensively warned not to take it too lightly. It was often noted how
Dutch emigrants in the past had given the Netherlands a bad reputation in
South Africa. Considering the mistrustful nature of the Boers, it was general-
ly stressed that emigrants to the Transvaal had to be well-behaved because
vices like alcohol abuse, swearing and arrogance were frowned upon. And if
they were not religious themselves, they had to at least show respect for the
church. Moreover, emigrants had to be educated and experienced profession-
als who were motivated to contribute to the well-being of the Dutch race.85
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Despite these warnings, hate against Hollanders was a sensitive issue in
Dutch sources, more so because it was tied up with internal rivalry in the sar
between the Kruger government and the opposition. It seems that most au-
thors wanted to avoid controversy and did not express their personal views
on such matters. There was one exception though: as will be examined in the
following section, S. J. Du Toit, who was known as the main opponent of
Hollander influence, was widely derided by critics in the Netherlands.
In Dutch publications about South Africa at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, both the similarities and the differences between the Hollanders and the
Boers were mentioned. Looking at the genealogy of the Boers, their Dutch de-
scent was apparent, but authors also pointed out the influence of French
blood. Likewise, many writers thought that the history of the Great Trek
showed that the Boers possessed markers of Dutch identity such as an urge
for independence and freedom. On the other hand, they pointed out that the
pioneering life had developed some peculiar traits in the Boer character. Some
of these, such as their outdoor skills and patriotism, were applauded, where-
as others, such as stubbornness and partisanship, were lamented. These am-
bivalences show that the image of the Boers in the Netherlands was not uni-
vocal, but they should also not be overemphasised. In the light of the colonial
competition between the two ‘white races’ in South Africa – the British and
the Dutch – many of the ambivalences seemed to fall away. Most of the au-
thors who have been discussed put forward the ideal of an independent
Dutch South Africa and called upon their audience to contribute to achieving
that goal. Racial unity, in the form of stamverwantschap, was considered the
best panacea for the expanding British Empire. One issue in which these con-
siderations were paramount was the language question, which will be dis-
cussed next.
The language question
For contemporaries, language was closely linked to the political context. At
the end of the nineteenth century it seemed, depending on the viewpoints of
individual authors, as if Dutch was either on the rise or under pressure in dif-
ferent parts of the globe. It was noted, for example, how in the United States
of America emigrants from the Netherlands had lost knowledge of their
mother tongue; this was a sign that they had completely assimilated into
American society, and it was accepted as a fait accompli.86 The situation in
Belgium, where the Flemish campaigned to get Dutch recognised as an offi-
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cial language with the same status as French, was considered to be more con-
tentious.87 At the end of the nineteenth century, however, the struggle for the
Dutch language was considered to be the most urgent in South Africa because
it was linked to the question of whether British or Dutch influence would
dominate in that region. In this respect it should be seen as a crucial aspect of
the development of two different white identities in the region, and as such it
played an important role in colonial politics. This was also a concern for the
British, and there was great anxiety amongst administrators during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the Afrikaners would not sub-
mit to their rule because they kept their own language.88
At the same time, observers on the Dutch side were afraid that English cul-
tural influence would swamp the republics and destroy their independence.
The law from 1825, in which English was proclaimed to be the only official
language of the Cape was mentioned as an early example of this hostile atti-
tude.89 For contemporaries, the struggle for colonial dominance between the
Boers and the British was therefore not only fought out on the battlefield but
also in the press, in books and in classrooms. This sense of cultural strife was
clearly shared by the protagonists of stamverwantschap in the Netherlands,
and the sources on this topic contain many allusions to war. In 1896, for ex-
ample, Muller called upon teachers to go to South Africa and help the Boers
to preserve their identity: ‘In fact, the struggle for the language is a struggle
for the race.’90 Like other aspects of the relations between the Netherlands
and the Afrikaners, there were many different views on this matter and vari-
ous strategies were developed to counter English influences and British colo-
nial influence. At times, this led to great tensions between different groups of
Dutch-speaking people.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Afrikaners in the Cape started to
organise themselves in order to promote the emancipation of the Dutch lan-
guage in that colony. This can be considered to be the start of the process that
led to the establishment of Afrikaans as an official language in 1925.91A radi-
cal thinker from this so-called Taalbeweging (Language Movement) was S. J.
du Toit. In 1876, he founded the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners (Society
of True Afrikaners), an organisation that promoted the development of
Afrikaans as a written language, with its own spelling and grammar. At the
time, Du Toit was known as the most prominent opponent of Hollander in-
fluence in the sar, where he became superindentent for education after the
annexation had ended.92 One of his most notorious polemics was with Joris-
sen, who was fired as state attorney in 1883, something the Hollander him-
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self thought to be the result of a campaign against him in the press and the
Volksraad orchestrated by his opponent.93 This incident made Du Toit in-
creasingly unpopular in the Netherlands. In addition, he stirred up much con-
troversy as a member of the Transvaal deputation that visited the Nether-
lands in 1884, and he was alienated from many people that had admired him
at first, such as Kuyper.94 When he left the sar in 1890 after a fallout with
other members of the Kruger government, Du Toit was accused of dancing to
the tune of Cecil Rhodes in many Dutch publications.95
One Afrikaner from the Cape in whom people from the Netherlands put
more trust was Jan Hofmeyr, the founder of the Afrikaner Bond (1881). This
political organisation came into being during the aftermath of the Transvaal
War and campaigned with success for the recognition of Dutch as an official
language in the Parliament and courts of the Cape. Although English was still
dominant in daily life, this was generally seen as the greatest success of the
Afrikaners in the colony.96 Hofmeyr also seemed to be better disposed to-
wards Hoog-Hollandsch than Du Toit. In 1890 and 1897, conferences were
organised by the Taalbond, a branch of the Afrikaner Bond, to discuss the de-
velopment of a local form of Dutch in South Africa. In general, this organisa-
tion was considered to be quite conciliatory towards influences of High
Dutch, something that was appreciated in the Netherlands.97 But Hofmeyr’s
initial political alliance with Rhodes, who became prime minister of the Cape
in 1890, was frowned upon, and it was widely believed that he had been
charmed by the charismatic empire-builder. It was only after the Jameson
Raid that the two men drifted apart, which gave many people in the Nether-
lands hope that all white Dutch-speaking inhabitants of South Africa would
form a united front against British imperial expansion.98 Nevertheless, there
remained a measure of distrust of Afrikaner nationalists in the Cape.
Critics in the Netherlands were more optimistic about the development of
Dutch in the two Boer republics, where both the Bible and official documents
– the two main pillars of society – were written in High Dutch, which to con-
temporaries emphasised their independence from British rule. But there were
also concerns. The ofs in particular was seen as a potential weak spot in the
front line against English culture. Muller described how British settlers
played an important role in the intellectual life of the republic and dominated
education.99 Although the headmaster of the prestigious Grey College in
Bloemfontein, J. Brill, was Dutch, the school had been founded with a grant
from the former high commissioner of the Cape after whom it was named.100
Despite these problems, the subsequent Presidents J. H. Brand, F. W. Reitz
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and M. T. Steyn were seen as people who upheld the Dutch element and resis-
ted British pressure.101
Notwithstanding these hopeful developments in the ofs, the sar was gen-
erally considered to be a more important bulwark of Dutch influence. Initial-
ly there had been concerns about the educational reforms initiated by Du
Toit, whose policies to attract teachers from the Cape were seen as a way for
English to get in through the backdoor, as these men and women could barely
speak Dutch themselves.102 The appointment of the Hollander Nicolaas
Mansvelt as superintendent of education in 1890was therefore welcomed as
a great improvement. In practically all publications that appeared in the
Netherlands on this subject, Mansvelt was described as a great mediator, be-
cause he had been in South Africa from 1874 and at the same time kept
strong ties with his mother country. Under his guidance, the schools in the
Transvaal were reformed and he attracted teachers from the Netherlands to
ensure a solid curriculum of Hoog-Hollandsch.103 In eulogies of his work,
Mansvelt’s efforts to promote the Dutch language were admired. Wormser,
for example, emphasised how important this was for the future of the Dutch
influence in the light of British cultural expansion.
May the Afrikaner people understand, the sooner the better, that the Eng-
land, that can be driven away using Henri-Martins [sic] rifles, is a hundred
times less dangerous than the English influences, that men like Dr Mans-
velt have devoted their lives to combating.104
Several commentators in the Netherlands felt connected to the development
of Afrikaans. There are clear indications that several publications by Afrikan-
er nationalists were read and discussed by Dutch intellectuals. Hofmeyr’s
magazine Ons Land was available and probably also Di Patriot, edited by
Du Toit.105 Writers in South Africa with roots in the Netherlands such as J. F.
Van Oordt (better known under his pseudonym d’Arbez) and Jan Lion Ca-
chet (brother of Frans) contributed extensively to these magazines and exper-
imented with new forms of spelling.106 This highlights the fact that it is hard
to make a distinction between literary circles of the Netherlands and South
Africa around the turn of the twentieth century.107 Early literature in (hap-
hazard) Afrikaans spelling mainly consisted of poetry and heroic stories
about the past, mainly the Great Trek and related events.108
Besselaar has argued that poetry was the post popular genre in Afrikaans
in the Netherlands.109 One of the most prolific authors of that time was 
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F. W. Reitz (1844-1934). Originally born in the Cape Colony, he had a long
political career in the Boer republics. In the 1870s, he was appointed as high
court judge in the ofs and in 1889, became president of that republic. Ill
health forced him to retire in 1895, but in 1898 he succeeded Leyds as secre-
tary of state in the Transvaal, a post that he would occupy until the end of the
South African War. Apart from his political achievements, which earned him
the reputation of being a good patriot whose policies benefited the Dutch ele-
ment in South Africa, Reitz was also known as a dedicated poet. In 1888, he
edited a volume with fifty selected poems from Di Patriot, several of which
were written by himself. A second extended edition, which was published in
1897 by Wormser, contained sixty-two poems.110 The topics ranged from
doggerel about daily life in South Africa to emotionally charged verses about
the struggle between the Boers and the British, in particular the Transvaal
War. Other Afrikaners were also inspired by this conflict and wrote victory
songs and patriotic ballads. Another politicised issue was the struggle to pro-
mote the Dutch language in the Cape and the clear and present danger of Eng-
lish at schools. These literary products were welcomed as examples of true
patriotism by critics in the Netherlands.111 Besselaar noted that such rhymes
were taught at schools in the Netherlands and so helped to bolster national
identity there as well.112
While there was appreciation for some aspects of nascent Afrikaner na-
tionalism, there were also concerns about the disparity between the official
written language – Hoog-Hollandsch – and the popular language spoken in
daily life – Afrikaans. Several linguists in the Netherlands described how,
over time, the vernacular of the Afrikaners had changed under the influence
of other languages introduced by French Huguenots in the Cape and
Malaysian slaves who had been brought from Asia by the Dutch East India
Company.113 As has been mentioned, Du Toit’s efforts to develop Afrikaans
into a language in its own right was frowned upon by many people. Jan te
Winkel, a professor of linguistics, was one of his most outspoken critics. He
considered Afrikaans to be an amusing dialect, like Flemish or Amsterdam
slang, but if it was to become a separate language, he predicted, it could never
hold out against English in South Africa. ‘He [Du Toit] could arouse some
sort of literary life amongst Hottentots with it [Afrikaans], [but] civilised peo-
ple would turn away from it.’114
Most commentators from the Netherlands were not as blunt as Te Winkel,
but it was a commonly held idea that the development of Dutch in South
Africa should be closely linked to Hoog-Hollandsch. This was the premise of
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Mansvelt’s education policy that was very popular amongst Dutch authors
who wrote about it.115However, Mansvelt himself had experienced the reluc-
tance amongst Afrikaners to learn Hoog-Hollandsch, he told an audience of
prominent pedagogues in a speech after his return to the Netherlands in
1900. He recalled how, while lecturing at Stellenbosch, he had to work hard
to win over his students by giving animated classes which eventually aroused
their interest in the Dutch language.116 In the sar he also tried to sugarcoat
his policies by supporting the establishment of bookshops so that Transvalers
could discover for themselves how much beautiful literature there was in
Dutch.117
Another method to promote Dutch amongst Afrikaners was the simplifica-
tion of the language conventions. Mansvelt complained about the difficult
spelling and grammar rules of High Dutch that made it unpopular with stu-
dents in the Cape, who preferred English because it was considered to be far
easier.118 He found many likeminded people amongst Afrikaners in the Taal-
bond, of which he himself was also a member. People like professor P. J. G. de
Vos from Cape Town argued in favour of language reforms and a simplifica-
tion of the rules and tried to persuade the literary establishment in the Nether-
lands of the necessity of these measures.119 In the sar, the Hollander journal-
ist F. V. Engelenburg was an enthusiastic supporter of such ideas, introducing
simplified spelling in his newspaper De Volksstem.120 In 1897, he wrote an
article for De Gids to mobilise support for these initiatives in the Nether-
lands. He complained about rigid linguists who wanted to keep the grammar
pure, which complicated the use of the language as a unifying agent amongst
people of Dutch descent in South Africa. Failure to do so led to the danger
that ‘the growth of the Dutch language in this part of the world is greatly
harmed’.121
These proposals were met with some positive response in the Netherlands
and were discussed by intellectuals. There was a lobby group called the
Vereeniging tot vereenvoudiging van onze schrijftaal, which called for the re-
form of Dutch spelling and grammar using a model developed by R. A. Kolle -
wijn. As has been mentioned, several influential figures from the pro-Boer
movement such as J. P. Moltzer and H. J. Emous were members of this organ-
isation.122Even a purist like Te Winkel, who was outspokenly conservative in
this matter, acted as a spokesman for a group of Afrikaner and Dutch ac-
tivists who wrote a letter in which they presented several proposals for possi-
ble reforms to a conference about the Dutch language in Dordrecht. Al-
though Te Winkel did not support these plans, he found it important to dis-
2. ‘Blacks, Boers and British’ 85
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 85
cuss them because he did not think spelling rules should come between the
Dutch and the Afrikaners.
We feel ourselves to be one with the South African, because we know he is
blood of our blood, because his ancestors went out from our country, be-
cause his character is closer to ours than that of any other people, because
we understand what he writes in his own language, even though we have
not consciously learned it, because we understand him completely when he
comes to us and greets us as his brother in his own words.123
Despite this apparent goodwill, no official reforms of the Dutch language
took place around 1900.124 As was the case with many initiatives that were
undertaken by the protagonists of stamverwantschap, these plans failed to be
realised and at times the debate was quite heated. But there was more to it. It
has been argued in this section that the language question should be seen as
part of the overarching struggle for colonial dominance in South Africa. In
the light of the competition with British influence, many of these ambiva-
lences faded to the background, and according to some contemporary au-
thors it was better for practical considerations to override grammatical prin-
ciples in order to make Dutch a viable language in South Africa. Literature
was also an important factor in the colonial question in other ways. Many
English books about South Africa that were published during the second half
of the nineteenth century were extremely negative about the two republics
and argued that the Boers were not capable of responsible government. In the
Netherlands, such publications were seen as harmful and several authors
thought it necessary to put forward alternative views on South Africa to
counter such allegations. On the other hand, texts by English-speaking writ-
ers with more positive ideas about the Boers were embraced and served as a
source of inspiration. This shows that Dutch literary critics not only reflected
on sources about South Africa that were written in their own language but
also on those written in English.
Dutch views on English Africana
In many publications it was stressed that the development of Dutch influence
in Southern Africa was not uncontested. In this sense, pro-Boer propaganda
can be considered to be a direct reaction to what was seen as a British on-
slaught on the republics in the context of the expansion of their empire. One
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of the dangers was considered to be the ongoing media campaign by certain
groups that wanted to discredit the Boers in Europe and legitimise expansion-
ist policies in South Africa. One such group that was seen as an exponent of
‘perfidious Albion’ were British missionaries, particularly those from the
London Missionary Society (lms), who were active in the region from the
first decade of the nineteenth century. Their leaders, which included Dr
Phillip and Reverend Van der Kemp, accused the Boers of mistreating black
people and using them as slaves. They sent such reports to the government in
London, and these allegations reached the wider public via the humanitarian
lobby groups based at Exeter Hall. These texts were also available in the
Netherlands and contributed to the negative perception of Boers before
1880.125
After the Transvaal War, opinion on these sources changed dramatically,
which was reflected in several publications by authors from different politi-
cal currents such as P. J. Veth, Robert Fruin (both Liberals), Lion Cachet and
Abraham Kuyper (both Protestants).126These men accused British missionar-
ies of tarnishing the Boers’ reputation with false stories about cruelties com-
mitted against black people. In this connection, one of the men who had a
particularly bad reputation amongst Boer supporters in the Netherlands at
the end of the nineteenth century was David Livingstone. Lion Cachet assert-
ed that the legendary missionary/explorer, who died in 1873, had despised
the Voortrekkers and had systematically spread lies about them, which to
him showed how ‘small a great man can be’.127 It was said that much of Liv-
ingstone’s resentment was aroused during an expedition by a Transvaal com-
mando against chief Setyeli (1852). He accused the Boers of plundering his
home while he was absent, using Setyeli as an eyewitness. According to the
Boers, however, it was Setyeli who had plundered the settlement and lied
about it. After textual evidence became available that supported the Boers,
Livingstone was posthumously scorned on this point in numerous Dutch
publications.128
In addition, certain British policymakers were seen to be acting out of
Machiavellian motives. These men were accused of deliberately spreading
untruths about the Boers in order to legitimise their plans for imperial expan-
sion in Southern Africa. The archetype of this group was Theophilius Shep-
stone, the man who was considered to be the mastermind behind the annexa-
tion of the Transvaal in 1877. One of the principal reasons for intervention
that he mentioned to the government in London was that the republic was a
failed state on the verge of collapse. He claimed that the Transvaal was about
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to be invaded by the Pedi ‘tribe’, who would destroy the white population liv-
ing there. Several Dutch authors were of the opinion that Shepstone was well
acquainted with the situation, which they thought to be far less dramatic, and
that he had deliberately given an incorrect account so that he would get the
go-ahead to proceed with the annexation.129
But even after the British occupation of theTransvaal had ended, itwas not-
ed how this ‘sordid’ and ‘corrupt’ diplomacy continued. Imperialists from the
1890s, including the likes of Cecil Rhodes, Alfred Milner and Joseph Cham-
berlain, were seen as the main protagonists of a plot to destroy the independ-
ent Boer republics and establish a South African federation under the aegis of
the British.130 It was argued that these men influenced the press coverage of
South Africa, and many people in the Netherlands thought that they wilfully
manipulated the public in Britain in order to generate more support for their
plans. The Rhodes conglomerate owned many influential newspapers, and
Milner andChamberlainwere deeply involved in propagandist organisations
like the Imperial South Africa Association (isaa) and the South African
League (sal). In the Netherlands, the journalist Charles Boissevain was the
most prolific author to write about the ‘corruption’ of the British press in
South African affairs. It was a recurring theme in his commentaries in his
newspaper Het Algemeen Handelsblad.131 In the run-up to the South African
War and during it, he also wrote several pamphlets in English in which he ex-
pressed his hope that the British people would cast off the lies of the imperial-
ist press and would pressure the government into a policy shift.132
Notwithstanding these examples, it should not be forgotten that there was
also genuine respect for British politics at the end of the nineteenth century.
Prominent Dutch opinion makers, particularly of the Calvinist creed, ad-
mired the venerable statesman William Gladstone, who was seen as a strong
leader and the embodiment of Christian morality in politics.133 Much of his
popularity amongst pro-Boers seems to have been derived from his stand-
points on the South African question, which was perceived as the antithesis
of jingoism. During the famous Midlothian speeches in the run-up to the
1880 elections, he explicitly condemned the annexation of the Transvaal,
and although initially he had been reluctant to give in to the demands of the
Boer deputation when he became prime minister, it was thought by many that
Gladstone ensured the rapid British retreat after the battle of Majuba Hill.134
Likewise, there was much praise for authors who were against the annexa-
tion policy in the early 1880s. Sometimes it was an isolated excerpt that was
referred to, such as a passage from J. A. Froude’s Oceana in which he asserted
i. principles of propaganda (1880-1899)88
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 88
that the Afrikaners in the Cape were oppressed by the British at the beginning
of the nineteenth century and that this was the reason for the Voortrekkers to
leave the colony.135 On the other hand, parts of the book in which Froude ex-
pressed the hope that the Boers would become loyal subjects of the British
Crown, were not mentioned.136 Other authors such as the former editor of
Natal Witness, Reginald Stratham, who wrote several books and many arti-
cles about South Africa, were appreciated for their entire oeuvre, in which
they argued that the republics had a definite right to exist.137 He and also the
Liberal MP G. B. Clark, who wrote several pro-Boer pamphlets and acted as
consul-general for the sar in London between 1884 and 1892, kept in con-
tact with Boer supporters in Europe during the years that followed, even dur-
ing the South African War.138
Other British authors that opposed the imperialist policy in South Africa
had a more problematic relationship with the pro-Boer movement. J. A. Hob-
son, for instance, certainly cannot be seen as an admirer of Kruger, and he
even described Leyds as the ‘evil genius’ behind the polarisation between the
Boers and the British.139Although Hobson’s arguments concerning the jingo-
ist conspiracy were widely known in the Netherlands, particularly through
Boissevain’s writings, no reference can be found to his criticism on the propa-
ganda campaign by the republics, and it seems that the contact between the
English journalist and pro-Boer organisations was limited.140 William Stead
was another publicist who openly took sides against the British politics of ex-
pansion in South Africa. Remarkably, he was a great admirer of Rhodes, but
after the Jameson Raid he became radically opposed to the increasing pres-
sure on the republics. In his eyes, the British element in South Africa would
not be able to withstand the combined forces of a pan-Afrikaner movement,
which shows that for him dominance of the Anglo-Saxon race remained the
main goal.141Despite these considerations, he stood in close contact with sev-
eral pro-Boer leaders such as Leyds and co-ordinated the translations of sev-
eral Dutch pamphlets into English and vice versa.142 Looking at the contents
of his writings it appears that Stead’s protests were more vocal than Hobson’s
and that he did not shy away from populism, declaring ‘War against the War’.
This sensationalism made him controversial in Great Britain but popular in
the Netherlands, where he was praised for his efforts to make his compatriots
see the wrongs of the imperialist policy in South Africa.143 Decades later, he
was still remembered in a Dutch textbook as ‘the conscience of his people’
during the South African War.144
The most influential English-speaking author for pro-Boers in the Nether-
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lands was the historian George McCall Theal (1837-1919). Theal was born
in Canada and arrived in the Cape in 1859, where he had an adventurous ca-
reer as journalist, teacher, diamond digger and finally administrator for the
native affairs department. On his journeys throughout the colony, he studied
the languages and habits of different black communities, about which he
wrote his first books.145At the end of the 1870s, he became increasingly inter-
ested in the archives in Cape Town. Meanwhile, Theal started writing on the
history of South Africa, which resulted in a huge oeuvre.146 The History of
South Africa is known as his magnum opus, which he continuously revised
from the late 1880s to his death.147 During the 1890s, he was known as the
most prominent historian in South Africa, and as such, Rhodes provided him
with funds to do research in European archives to find material about the
colonial history of South Africa.148 Despite these close connections with the
Cape administration, Theal himself claimed that he was an ‘objective’ histori-
an because, as an outsider, he only rendered a factual account.149
Christopher Saunders has argued that Theal’s views on South Africa are
nonetheless characterised by a clear narrative, which is the racial superiority
of white settlers over the black majority. Theal called for harmony between
the colonists in Africa, both of Dutch and British descent, to face the black
menace threatening them.150 He was also against metropolitan meddling by
both the imperial government and humanitarians who, in his eyes, threat-
ened the unity of the two ‘white races’ in their policies. Despite Theal’s explic-
it criticism of British imperial expansion and his pro-Dutch views, he himself
cannot be considered to be an Afrikaner historian, according to Saunders.151
This did not prevent his work from being appropriated by contemporary pro-
Boers, however. In the 1930s, the Afrikaner Izaak Bosman wrote a doctoral
thesis about Theal at the University of Amsterdam, which still reflected many
of these ideas. Bosman argued that the historian had much sympathy for the
Afrikaner people and their lifestyle.152 In addition, Theal took their side on
the important issue of relations between black and white and argued that seg-
regation was better than pretentious and naïve theories about the equality of
races, as advocated by British policymakers.153 The combination of Theal’s
descent, his thorough knowledge of South Africa and apparent pro-Boer
views made his work an ideal source for the propagandists of stamver-
wantschap in the Netherlands because it lent their arguments scholarly
weight and an aura of objectivity. In many Dutch publications about the his-
tory of South Africa, his books were mentioned as the most authoritative
publications available on this topic.154 Theal was even asked by the nzav to
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write a textbook about South African history that could be used in Transvaal
schools, but the historian declined because he was too busy.155
Just as the image of the Boers in Dutch publications was not univocal, nor
was there a monolithic view on British involvement in South Africa. Certain
groups such as missionaries and statesmen were seen as agents of imperialism
who deliberately slandered the Boers in order to legitimise their expansionist
plans. Nonetheless, there was also genuine appreciation for those who were
considered to be adversaries of such ruthless empire-building and who
showed respect for the territorial integrity of the republics. Theal’s work in
particular became influential amongst Dutch-speaking authors, both in
South Africa and in the Netherlands. His research contributed to the creation
of a vision on the colonial past in which the ‘race issue’ was considered the
dominant leitmotiv. In pro-Boer literature, two themes from this history
were highlighted: firstly the so-called ‘native’ question, and secondly the in-
creasing pressure by the British Empire on the republics. The depiction of
these two issues, which were intertwined in the view of contemporaries, will
be discussed on the remaining pages of this chapter.
The ‘native’ question
The British takeover of the Cape in 1806was considered to be the beginning
of the struggle for dominance in South Africa. Dutch authors did not deny
that there were tensions between the Dutch East India Company and the
Afrikaner colonists, but the new British rulers, it was argued, were far more
intrusive.156 In general, the main point of rupture between the two white
groups in the Cape was considered to be the ‘native’ question, or how to treat
black subjects. In this view, the Afrikaners considered themselves to be inher-
ently superior to the indigenous inhabitants of the Cape, the Hottentots
(Khoikhoi), who were seen as exceptionally backward creatures. Although
they were considered to be a little more developed, the Bantus of the interior
were also depicted as uncivilised children. It was argued that the colonists’
view was based on centuries of experience in South Africa and had been rein-
forced during conflicts that had taken place during the Great Trek. Feelings
of white racial superiority were therefore considered to be of fundamental im-
portance to both Afrikaner nationalists in the Cape and the Boers in the re-
publics.157
It was mentioned how the British, by contrast, had less consistent attitudes
towards the black population. On the one hand, groups such as the LMS
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preached equality between the races and managed to persuade the govern-
ment in London to implement legislation that provided Hottentots with the
same political rights as white people.158 At the same time, the imperial
hunger for land resulted in great conflicts between the British and black
‘tribes’ living on the borders of the empire.159
Authors in the Netherlands believed that Boer attitudes towards black peo-
ple were the most sensible. In addition, Theal, who wrote much about
ethnography, expressed his scepticism about the idea that black people could
develop rapidly.160 Several authors were therefore of the opinion that the
seemingly backward Boers had modern ideas about the ‘native’ question that
were backed by scientific evidence and more effective than the hypocritical
‘love for negroes’ of British humanitarians.161This attitude of racial superior-
ity, based on historical experience and what was thought to be common
sense, made Afrikaners the most suitable colonisers in the eyes of pro-Boers
in the Netherlands. Some of them even considered them to be a race of white
‘aristocrats’.162
To contemporary writers, the nineteenth-century history of South Africa
revealed that the differences of opinion on the ‘native’ question had become
the most important rupture point between the Afrikaners and the British af-
ter the transfer of power in 1806. In many ways, the new administration
favoured black people over the white population, it was argued. One notori-
ous incident took place in 1815 when an Afrikaner was put on trial after he
had flogged his black servants in the Graaff-Reinet region. The local white
population there was already disgruntled with the British regime, and this in-
dictment led to a revolt. Lion Cachet and Theal wrote that this escalation was
partly the work of some local hotheads, but both condemned the brutal re-
sponse by the British authorities. Five rebels were condemned to death at
Slachtersnek, and when the gallows from which they were hanged collapsed,
they did not receive mercy even though the attending crowd considered it to
be a sign that God did not want the execution to happen.163
In the decades that followed, tensions rose in the outlying regions of the
Cape, where black ‘tribes’ such as the Xhosa attacked farms of Afrikaner set-
tlers. Initially, the British undertook expeditions to restore order, but under
pressure from the missionary lobby, such expeditions were ceased. At the
same time, Afrikaners complained that after their disarmament they could
not defend themselves against gangs who stole cattle, destroyed farms and
killed farmers.164 For many, the abolition of slavery throughout the British
Empire in 1834 was the last straw. In principle, the pro-Boer authors were
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not so much against this measure, emphasising that it was supported by the
Afrikaners, who even proposed plans for gradual abolition. What they did
condemn was the rash way in which it was implemented by the administra-
tion, so that farmers did not get a chance to secure enough labour. Moreover,
the system for financial compensation was inadequate, and the Afrikaners
complained that they only received a fraction of the sum they were entitled
to.165 In pro-Boer literature, it was asserted that these factors caused the
Afrikaners to leave the Cape and embark on the Great Trek in 1836. Lion Ca-
chet added another reason:
the sixth sense of the Boers. […] But with the conviction, conscious or un-
conscious: We Afrikaners must trek, so that Africa can be civilised and the
heathen nations won for Christianity: if we do not trek, South Africa will
not become civilised.166
The Voortrekkers went north and east, looking for places to settle. At the be-
ginning of the century the Zulus and Matabeles had invaded these lands, con-
quering the local population and killing scores of people. In the eyes of late
nineteenth-century authors, the upheaval during the Mfecane lent legitimacy
to the Boers occupying the land. It was argued that they had been in South
Africa longer than the black newcomers who had invaded from the north.
Moreover, much of the land had been depopulated and was there for the tak-
ing, because it was considered to be unoccupied. Finally, many of those who
had been conquered were said to have asked the Boers to chase away the cru-
el kings that oppressed them.167Nonetheless, the advent of the Boers in these
lands resulted in violent confrontations with the Zulus and Matabeles. In de-
scriptions of these wars, their leaders, Dingane and Moselekatse, were por-
trayed as cruel and cunning men who wanted to obliterate their white oppo-
nents. The most notorious incident was the so-called ‘treason’ of the Zulus in
Natal, where a deputation of the Boers was killed during a ritual dance in
1838. This was followed by attacks on laagers, during which women and
children were not spared. Many publications described with much gusto how
the Boers regrouped and sent out an expedition that wiped out the Zulu army
at the battle of Blood River.168 Likewise, Moselekatse and his men were also
defeated on the battlefield and retreated northwards.
Pro-Boer authors who wrote about these wars believed that such violence
was legitimate and that the Voortrekkers had won the land fairly, paying for
it with their own blood and that of their loved ones. Eventually, the Boers set-
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tled in the interior, where they founded the Transvaal and the ofs, which
were officially recognised by the British in the treaties of Zandrivier (1852)
and Bloemfontein (1854). In these documents, the ‘native’ question featured
prominently. The Boers promised that they would not allow slavery in their
republics, while the British promised not to interfere in black and white rela-
tions north of the Orange River, including a ban on the arms trade. Despite
these conventions, the British were repeatedly accused of meddling in the con-
flicts that took place between the Boers and surrounding ‘tribes’. Cape ad-
ministrators were blamed for siding with black chiefs in land disputes if it
benefited them.169 Moreover, the British were accused of using black troops
during several armed confrontations with the Boers, and the governments of
the republics complained repeatedly about the supply of firearms to black
people.170 This latter point in particular was considered to be a scandal be-
cause it caused white rule in the region to be threatened. Spruyt described
how black people in South Africa were as ‘numerous as the sand of the sea
and fertile as rabbits’, and he was afraid that they would engulf and destroy
colonial settlements if they had the chance.171
At the end of the nineteenth century, the history of the ‘native’ question
was also used to defend the Boers against ongoing accusations of cruelty
against the black population of the republics. It was often emphasised that
there was no slavery in the Transvaal, as was suggested in many English texts
about South Africa.172 Also the numerous expeditions that were undertaken
by the Boers against surrounding ‘tribes’ were perfectly justifiable, according
to Dutch authors, because the republics had every right to defend their terri-
torial integrity. Moreover, these wars were of a limited scale, only meant to
punish warmongering kings in order to prevent conflicts in the future.173
This was contrasted with the British expeditions of that time, which were por-
trayed as being the result of a ruthless desire for expansion. This led to enor-
mous bloodbaths, such as during the Zulu War (1879) and the First Matabele
War (1893). The latter conflict in particular, conducted by Rhodes’s bsac un-
der the command of the infamous L. S. Jameson, became known for the ex-
cessive use of violence, and some Dutch observers even saw it as a ‘war of ex-
termination’.174
In addition, it was stressed how the effects of the Boer policy of segregation
had been beneficial for both whites and blacks. Travellers noted how well-be-
haved black people in the republics were compared to those in the British
colonies. This was considered of paramount importance, given the mobilisa-
tion of labour. Muller wrote extensively about what he thought to be the in-
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nate laziness of black people, which made strict discipline from their white
masters a necessity.175Another threat to social order was considered to be the
insatiable sexuality of black people. Authors generally emphasised that
Afrikaners, both in the Cape and the republics, condemned all intimacy with
people with a different skin colour. European settlers who recently arrived in
Africa were considered to be much more lax in their morals. As a result, a
breed of half-castes came into being in the Cape who were seen as pitiful crea-
tures, caught between civilisation and barbarity.176 For contemporaries, a
more threatening aspect of this kind of frivolity was that black people in the
British territories became unruly. Wormser described the rape of white
women by black men, which in his eyes was an abhorrence, as the ‘curse of
Natal’.177
In the depiction of the history of the ‘native’ question, late nineteenth-cen-
tury Dutch authors clearly juxtaposed the ways in which the British and the
Boers dealt with the issue. The former were accused of hypocrisy and incon-
sistency, which was due to their lust for expansion, it was argued. Depending
on their own short-term interests, they were either too soft or too harsh to-
wards the black population, which led to social disorder and terrible blood-
baths respectively. By contrast, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Boers
were generally praised for their strict but just treatment of black people.
Their strong belief in white superiority, it was argued, constituted the reason
why they had left the Cape and founded their own republics. To contempo-
raries, this view on the ‘native’ question legitimised the existence of an inde-
pendent Dutch entity in the region, because the Boers had done more to pro-
mote ‘civilisation’ than their rivals. At the end of the nineteenth century, how-
ever, British imperialists tried to undermine the republics in order to expand
their sphere of influence. During the 1880s and 1890s, Dutch contempo-
raries were increasingly alarmed by this menace and tried to expose it in their
publications.
The Uitlander question
A recurring theme in pro-Boer literature was the host of political and legal
tricks employed by British statesmen to expand their control over the Boers.
The annexation of Natal (1842) and the Kimberley diamond fields (1872)
were seen as early examples, but the most flagrant incursion was considered
to be the annexation of the Transvaal (1877). In the two most authoritative
Dutch accounts of this episode, by Lion Cachet and Jorissen, it was empha-
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sised that the British reasons for annexation were false and that Shepstone
had manipulated President Burgers.178 Initially the Boers, under the leader-
ship of Kruger and Joubert, tried to restore independence through negotia-
tions, which the two authors interpreted differently. Jorissen thought that the
people of the Transvaal were not unified enough to muster armed opposition
against the British.179LionCachet saw the reluctance to fight as a typical char-
acteristic of the Boer lifestyle. According to him, they were forced by the
British to take up arms for the cause of ‘freedom and justice’.180Nevertheless,
both authors agreed that the arrogance of British statesmen led to the escala-
tion of the conflict. Time after time, cunning diplomats like High Commis-
sioner Bartle Frere dodged the demand for independence put forward by the
Boers, believing they could easily outwit the simple people of the Trans-
vaal.181 In the eyes of the pro-Boers, thewar of 1880-1881 proved that British
arrogance was inappropriate. The famous battle at Majuba Hill, where a
small commando repelled the British army, was considered a prime example
of this. Lion Cachet (and many others with him) thought that it showed that
the Boers were not inferior to the British in any way.182
After Majuba, the Gladstone government decided to cease hostilities and
to restore a form of independence in the sar. In the peace treaty of 1881, this
was called ‘suzerainty’, which meant that the British claimed a form of para-
mount authority over the republic as well as the right to intervene in foreign
and ‘native’ affairs. In 1884, the treaty was revised and although the word
suzerainty was not removed from the text, the possibilities for interfering in
the sar administration were scaled back. This compromise led to tensions in
the following decades, however. Jorissen, who was a prominent negotiator in
1881, was quite sceptical about the role of Transvalers in this matter, and he
did not think they cared much about the exact meaning of the treaties.183 By
contrast, other specialists on the Dutch side such as professor of international
law J. de Louter argued that the sar had regained full independence with the
1884 convention.184
Nevertheless, in the run-up to the South African War, the Salisbury govern-
ment, in the person of Joseph Chamberlain, asserted that Britain still had a
form of suzerainty over the Transvaal. In the eyes of Dutch contemporaries,
the renewed interest of the British in the sar was linked to the discovery of
vast gold deposits on its territory in 1886. This further aroused the greed of
the imperialists, so it was thought, and British capitalists and statesmen tried
everything they could to gain control over the mines. One particular threat
caused by the gold boom was perceived to be the huge influx of white immi-
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grants who came to the mines, the majority of whom were of British descent:
these were the so-called Uitlanders. Johannesburg, a town that was founded
to accommodate miners, became a symbol of this menace. It was described as
a den of iniquity, where vices such as prostitution and alcohol abuse were
widespread. The Boer government, however, was applauded for doing a
good job of isolating these depravities so that the population outside Johan-
nesburg would not be affected.185 But there were graver problems with this
group of foreigners. Although he travelled in the sar barely two years after
the discovery of gold, Muller already noted how the Uitlanders were danger-
ous because they had come to the sar in great numbers and so threatened to
outnumber the Boer population, which would make them politically domi-
nant. This meant that the sar’s hard-won independence was at stake, be-
cause it was likely that the Uitlander leaders would forge close ties with the
British colonies.186
The sar government therefore undertook measures to restrict the political
influence of immigrants by extending the period before which they were al-
lowed full citizens’ rights, including the vote, from two to fourteen years. To
compensate for this, a toothless second chamber was installed in the Volks -
raad that was reserved for Uitlanders. These measures, in addition to the sec-
ondary status of the English language in schools and the existence of state
monopolies, gave rise to grievances that were expressed by leading Uit-
landers, united as the Reform Committee. The Dutch language press in the
sar severely criticised this group, and similar opinions were expressed in pro-
Boer literature in the Netherlands.187 Generally, Dutch observers thought
that the Kruger government did a good job of managing the rapid modernisa-
tion of the Transvaal and thought it legitimate to limit British influence.188 It
was also asserted that the Reform Committee did not represent the general
Uitlander population, who only came to the sar to make money and did not
care about whether they were ruled by the Boers or the British.189 In addition,
the Uitlander leaders were accused of manipulating the press and forging pe-
titions to create the impression that their viewpoints were widely support-
ed.190 This sort of agitation was considered to be a serious danger because it
increased the division between the British and Dutch elements in South
Africa, and authors even argued that these feelings were a form of ‘racial ha-
tred’.191
In addition to these internal troubles, a second threat lurked outside the
borders of the republics: Cecil Rhodes. This man was considered to be the
embodiment of imperialism, combining high capitalism with a sense of supe-
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riority of the British race. Several Dutch authors admired him and his ener-
getic efforts to dominate Southern Africa. He tried to achieve this not only
through the relentless amalgamation of mining companies and territorial ex-
pansion but also by spreading English culture through institutions like the
University of Cape Town.192Others were more cynical and described Rhodes
as a wolf in sheep’s clothing and ‘the Napoleon of South Africa’.193 Despite
these differences in tone, observers agreed that Rhodes’s rampant expansion-
ism was a threat to Boer independence and hoped that the republics, particu-
larly the Transvaal, would be able to stop this onslaught. In this sense, Kruger
was described as the antithesis of the Rhodes doctrine.194
Many authors thought that the stubborn Boer resistance forced Rhodes to
adopt more radical measures. The most notorious example became the Jame-
son Raid, an invasion of 600 Rhodesian police officers, which was supposed
to trigger a revolt amongst the Uitlanders in Johannesburg. The expedition
ended in failure when the column was intercepted by a Boer commando and
surrendered on New Year’s Day of 1896. In the Netherlands, the ‘invasion by
Buccaneers of the Transvaal’ was seen as a confirmation of the unscrupulous
methods of the British to gain dominance in the region. Although there was
no hard evidence for it, Rhodes was widely regarded as the main instigator of
this plot.195At the same time, the swift and decisive response of the Boers was
praised as a great victory that renewed trust in the Transvaalers and their abil-
ity to defend themselves. The aftermath of the raid was considered to be even
more typical. As a show of good faith, Kruger extradited Jameson and his
men to Great Britain to be tried there. Even the Uitlander leaders, guilty of
high treason, were let off with light sentences. Several commentators in the
Netherlands thought this to be a prime example of the kindheartedness of the
Boers.196 By contrast, they described the British attitude in this matter as ut-
terly corrupt and petty. Jameson did face trial but received a light sentence
and was released soon after, which for many was a sign that his actions were
widely approved in Britain. Moreover, the results of a parliamentary inquiry
into the role of Rhodes in the matter were swept under the carpet, which gave
rise to the speculation that not only he but also senior members of govern-
ment such as Chamberlain had been involved in the conspiracy.197
The Jameson Raid further deepened the crisis between the British and the
Boers. The Kruger government started preparing for large-scale war, import-
ing vast quantities of arms and ammunition. Also, ties between the sar and
the ofs were strengthened, and President Steyn pledged to help the Trans-
vaalers in times of need. Even the Afrikaners in the Cape seemed to be better
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disposed towards the republics. Engelenburg saw this as a positive develop-
ment. If the Dutch element in South Africa were to unite, he argued in an arti-
cle that appeared in the Netherlands shortly after the Jameson Raid, surely
they could withstand the British Empire.198 Meanwhile, it was noted with
great concern how the British imperial elites continued their machinations. In
South Africa, Rhodes was forced into the background after the defeat of
Jameson, but he was soon replaced by others. The most prominent of these
was Alfred Milner, who became high commissioner in the Cape in 1897. He
took up the Uitlander grievances and with the help of journalists in Johannes-
burg, communicated these grievances to Britain via the press in order to mo-
bilise public support for a possible war with the Boers. Likewise, Chamber-
lain continued his campaign. Boissevain considered the death of Gladstone in
1898 to be symbolic, as the British public was captured by a hysterical form
of jingoism at the same time.199Many authors in the Netherlands were there-
fore not surprised when war started in October 1899; indeed, they had been
writing about the antagonism between the ‘two white races’ in South Africa
for nearly two decades.
Conclusion
On the previous pages, it has been shown how information about the South
African question was appropriated in Dutch literature at the end of the nine-
teenth century. It is important to remember that there were different sources
available, written by different groups of authors. To begin with, there were
the accounts of emigrants and travellers from the Netherlands who wrote
about their personal experiences in South Africa. There were also authors
who had never set foot there but were closely connected with the information
channels that had been set up from the 1880s onwards. Although in hind-
sight their opinions might seem inauthentic, such authors played a significant
role in the knowledge formation about and popularisation of South Africa in
the Netherlands. In addition, not all sources were written in the same lan-
guage. Writings in early forms of Afrikaans were available in the Netherlands
and seriously discussed, but these linguistic experiments were not uncontro-
versial. In addition, publications about South Africa in English were also
known. The majority of works in this latter category were rejected as ‘slan-
der’ that was aimed at discrediting the Boer cause and supporting British ex-
pansion. There were, however, also authors writing in English who openly
supported the republics. Their work, and particularly that of the historian
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George McCall Theal, was welcomed by Dutch authors as an ‘objective’
analysis of the situation in South Africa and as such became quite influential.
Just as the range of sources varied considerably, their contents were hetero-
geneous as well. Although ‘kinship’ between the Boers and people from the
Netherlands was a prevalent theme on the pages of many Dutch publications
after the Transvaal War, differences between them were mentioned explicitly,
which indicates that there were clear ambivalences. On the one hand, there
was admiration for the simple lifestyle of the Boers in the republics but on the
other hand, they were considered to be ill equipped to face the challenges of
the modern world. However, such ambiguities largely fell away when look-
ing at the overall picture of South Africa and the question of which ‘white
race’ should become the dominant colonial power in the region. To contem-
poraries, language and cultural heritage were of vital importance in this con-
nection. Although there were different opinions as to how to achieve this, it
was considered imperative that the Dutch language in South Africa be
strengthened in order to withstand the rising influence of English and to re-
tain the independence of the Boer republics. But literary products were con-
sidered of interest for other reasons, too. During the 1880s and 1890s, a vi-
sion on South African history emerged that served to lend legitimacy to the
existence of an independent Dutch entity in that region and to oppose British
imperialist expansion. The Boers were portrayed as heroic and gallant pio-
neers who brought European ‘civilisation’ to the interior of Africa and sub-
dued the black majority there in order to ‘develop’ the region. By contrast,
the British were depicted as arrogant, selfish empire-builders, who cared
about nothing other than their own interests and who achieved their goals by
whatever means necessary.
This shows how the literary depiction of South Africa did not stand on its
own but was related to the political situation in the region. Dutch contempo-
raries believed their rendering of the colonial past was an effective weapon
for defending the independence of the Boer republics. The lines of communi-
cation between the Netherlands and South Africa were vital in this exchange.
Much material became available to the Dutch public about the republics and
their history. And on the other side, publishing houses from the Netherlands
established branches in South Africa in order to circulate their publications
so that the Boers, who had a limited cultural infrastructure, could take advan-
tage of them. The views on the colonial question, although biased, were there-
fore not merely the product of overenthusiastic Dutch nationalists who pro-
jected their ideals onto the wider world but should rather be seen in the con-
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text of modern imperialism. The connection with the writings of British au-
thors added another complicating factor, because the way in which these
were valued depended on how they commented on the situation in South
Africa. Critical remarks in Dutch sources therefore cannot simply be inter-
preted as the result of chauvinistic anti-English sentiments.
It has been argued in the past two chapters that, from the very beginning,
propaganda was the most important feature of the pro-Boer movement in the
Netherlands because it was considered by contemporaries to be an important
instrument in shaping the colonial future of South Africa. When tensions
arose during the 1890s, such questions became more urgent and Dutch com-
mentators felt that they had to speak out against the increasing pressure by
the British Empire on the Boer republics. When war started in 1899, it was
seen as a direct result of the antagonism between the Boers and the British
that had been present for almost a century and which had been the subject of
studies from the 1880s onwards. In many ways, the propaganda campaign
during the South African War, which will be discussed in the next four chap-
ters, showed a clear continuity with the depiction of the colonial past that
had emerged in the previous period.
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chapter 3
A ‘factory of lies’? The lines of communication 
of the Boers and their supporters
In the early evening of 4 April 1900, a train carrying the Prince of Wales ar-
rived in Brussels. At the station, a young man jumped on the footboard of the
prince’s car and using a revolver fired two shots into it before he was arrested.
Nobody was hurt. The next day, The Times reported that the assailant had
declared that ‘he wanted to kill the Prince of Wales because his Royal High-
ness had caused thousands of men to be slaughtered in South Africa’. The edi-
tors therefore argued that the attack was incited by the pro-Boer propaganda
campaign on the continent, which was at its height at the time. Other opinion
makers too pointed out that the office of the minister plenipotentiary of
Transvaal, Willem Leyds, was located in Brussels and suggested that he was
directly involved in the assassination attempt. One of the most outspoken ac-
cusations came from the Secretary for India, Lord George Hamilton, who ad-
dressed his constituents in Acton when the news became known. He said that
‘if they had to seek for a reason for that foul attempt on the life of the heir-ap-
parent they would recollect that Brussels had been the headquarters of that
factory of lies of which Dr Leyds was the manager’.1
Historians today assert that propaganda was an important aspect of the
South African War, which was undoubtedly a ‘media war’.2 Significantly,
contemporaries were well aware of this, as is shown by the reactions to the in-
cident cited above. Sympathisers of both sides continuously accused each oth-
er of manipulations that gave a distorted view of the events taking place in
South Africa in order to corrupt public opinion. In this respect, supporters of
the Boers were no less outspoken than Lord Hamilton. In a reaction to his ac-
cusations, Leyds sent a telegram in which he described this speech as ‘new
proof that during the present war people in England do not shrink from any
means, not even the most perfidious slander, nor the most flagrant lie’.3 On
another occasion, the Dutch journalist Charles Boissevain took offence when
the Duke of Devonshire stated that Leyds had bribed the European press. Al-
though he did not deny that he had much sympathy for the Boers, Boissevain
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argued that this was the result of genuine indignation at an unjust war. In-
stead, he accused the influential London dailies – and The Times in particular
– of working together with the British government to turn the public against
the Boers in order to legitimise the conflict. ‘[T]his war is their war,’ he de-
clared, ‘This war is a newspaper war’.4
The remarks of Leyds and Boissevain show that pro-Boers on the conti-
nent were deeply concerned about the official British coverage of the conflict
in South Africa. As a result, they avidly tried to provide an alternative. This
can be considered to be their most important and successful activity.5 In fact,
Leyds and other agitators managed to gather a large amount of material that
was omitted by the British press, much of which was published in a wide
range of genres. In this way, pro-Boer coverage of the war was disseminated
throughout Europe and was received with great interest and enthusiasm by
the public. Although pro-Boer authors legimitised their work by saying that
they wanted to reveal ‘the truth’ about the war, it should be seen as a con-
scious attempt to spread a particular set of views on the war and its causes,
and as such, it was nothing less than an orchestrated propaganda campaign.
There remains, however, the question of how effective this actually was.
Leyds anticipated that the British government would yield to public pressure
from inside and outside Great Britain and halt the war, but that did not hap-
pen.6 It is therefore doubtful that his activities were of a truly ‘industrial’
scale, as the jibe by Lord Hamilton about the ‘factory of lies’ suggests. The as-
sessment of the pro-Boer propaganda campaign must take into account the
organisation of the bridgehead between South Africa and the Netherlands,
which, as has been argued in chapter one, was an informal network rather
than a solid system of information provision.
This chapter aims to investigate the lines of communication between the
Boer republics and Europe during the South African War. The main questions
will be how information supporting the Boer cause was transferred and
which groups of people were involved in this. One remarkable feature of this
network was the prominence of so-called Hollanders. Dutch emigrants had
held influential positions in the state institutions of the Boer republics, and
the Transvaal in particular, before the war. This was also the case with the
diplomatic service, which under Leyds – the most famous of Kruger’s Hollan-
ders – assumed a central role in the co-ordination of the propaganda cam-
paign. Aside from the diplomatic network, non-officials actively took part in
the efforts to generate as much pro-Boer material as possible. During the war,
thousands of Dutch-speaking people left South Africa, either as deportees or
ii. war of words (1899-1902)106
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 106
as refugees. A significant number of them ended up in the Netherlands, where
many became involved in pro-Boer activities. Private letters from the war
zone containing information about the situation there also arrived through-
out the conflict. In this way, pro-Boers in Europe had a significant amount of
information at their disposal, which fed into the propaganda campaign.
There were, however, serious hindrances. First and foremost, the neutral
position of the Netherlands limited the freedom of officials to take sides in
the conflict. Leyds respected this principle and was in close contact with
prominent politicians in the Netherlands, several of whom he knew personal-
ly. He and several prominent Dutch pro-Boers were involved in clandestine
ventures such as the recruitment of military volunteers for the republics, but
these activities were kept out of the public eye so that the government would
not be compromised. Aside from the political limitations on the pro-Boers,
there were also financial limitations. The governments of the republics, par-
ticularly the one in the Transvaal, did make money available for their repre-
sentatives in Europe to sustain the propaganda campaign. But, although
some British opinion makers accused the Boers of smuggling out huge
amounts of gold, the funds of the sar legation were not infinite. Such limits
become clear when compared to the huge sums that had been invested in the
British lines of communication, which were under the patronage of both the
government and big business. The most remarkable difference in this sense
was the British monopoly on the telegraph lines running between South
Africa and Europe, which meant that their news reached Europe first. Even
more humiliating to the Dutch was the fact that the British prohibited the
transmission of coded messages from the Dutch East Indies, which also had
to pass through the imperial network.7
Apart from the problems arising from the relatively informal organisation
of the European pro-Boer propaganda campaign and the Dutch lines of com-
munication, the most severe obstacles came from developments that took
place in South Africa.8 During the first phase of the conflict, things looked
rather good for the Boers when they took the initiative with the invasion of
Natal and the Northern Cape in October 1899. Although they did not push
very far into British territory, their position initially seemed to be solid as the
imperial armies under the command of Redvers Buller were reversed on sever-
al occasions between December 1899 and February 1900. On the Boer side,
it was hoped that these victories would have the same effect as the battle of
Majuba Hill in 1881, which had forced the government in London to back
down. The British did not retreat, however, and instead reinforced their army
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under the command of Buller’s successors Frederick Roberts and Herbert
Kitchener. The superior numbers of soldiers and arms forced a breakthrough,
and the so-called British ‘steamroller’ advanced rapidly. On 13March 1900,
Bloemfontein was occupied by Roberts’s columns, with Pretoria following
on 5 June. By September, the complete territory of the republics was occupied
and the British commander issued proclamations that announced that the
ofs and the sar – henceforward to be known as the Orange River Colony
and the Transvaal respectively – had been annexed by the British Empire.
Despite these formal declarations, hostilities continued. The Boer forces
were scattered and forced to flee into the fields in which they roamed around
in small bands for the remainder of the war. Their leaders tried to make the
best of this situation, devising a new strategy of hit and run, which led to a
guerrilla-type war that would last for almost two more years. The British
counter strategy, harshly implemented by Kitchener who took over com-
mand from Roberts, was to wear out the commandos left in the field. Huge
‘drives’ were organised during which the British force, consisting of tens of
thousands of soldiers, pursued approximately 15,000 so-called Bittereinders,
who refused to surrender. To restrict the movement of the commandos, a net-
work of fences and blockhouses was set up in the countryside. Boer combat-
ants who were captured were deported to prison camps overseas: on St. Hele-
na, Bermuda, Ceylon and the Indian subcontinent. In addition to these dras-
tic measures, the civilian population increasingly suffered. To cut off supplies
to the Boer forces, farms were burned down, cattle slaughtered and civilians
interned under dire conditions in concentration camps throughout South
Africa.
These developments had serious consequences for the lines of communica-
tion between the Netherlands and South Africa because the British gained
more control over them and imposed strict censorship.9 One of their priori-
ties was to cut off the Boers’ network, something which was already apparent
at the start of the war when the telegraph lines, all of which passed British sta-
tions in either Cape Town or Aden, were censored. None of the official cables
from the Boer republics to the outside world were transmitted, except the
lists of casualties, and even those were only allowed through after much pres-
sure from Leyds.10 Other means of communication came under increasing
pressure, too. The independent mail service of the sar, which was provided
by the nzasm and a German shipping company via Delagoa Bay, was dis-
rupted when the British began their advance in 1900. After Pretoria was cap-
tured, the new authorities censored the mail services, commandeered the rail-
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way line to Mozambique and put the press under close surveillance. More-
over, the British army command ordered the deportation of all individuals
who were not born in South Africa and who might have posed a threat to the
occupation. This led to the expulsion of many Hollanders from the Trans-
vaal, particularly those affiliated to the nzasm.11
Naturally, this was a great blow to the Boers’ lines of communication. An
unintended result of these measures was, however, that many of the people
who were repatriated became involved in the pro-Boer propaganda cam-
paign in Europe. Prominent members of the Pretoria elites headed organisa-
tions that mobilised help for their compatriots. In addition, their stories and
those of other refugees from South Africa were published at length in the
press, thereby drawing attention to British cruelty. Moreover, letters with use-
ful information for the pro-Boer propagandists continued to reach the
Netherlands via regular mail throughout the war. And at times even the Boer
commandos in the field, although they were increasingly isolated, succeeded
in exchanging letters and reports with their representatives in Europe. In this
way, pro-Boers in the Netherlands gathered a significant amount of informa-
tion that provided an alternative to the representation of the war that was put
forward by official British sources and pro-war lobby groups. Analogous
with the situation in South Africa, it can be said that, like the commandos in
the field, pro-Boers in Europe had fewer means at their disposal than their ad-
versaries but nonetheless quite successfully developed a guerrilla style of
propaganda. In this way, they were able to provide alternatives to the British
coverage of the war and create dramatic images that had strong appeal to
contemporaries.
Boer diplomats
Leyds’s legation in Brussels developed into the most important centre for pro-
Boer agitation in continental Europe. In addition to his diplomatic duties, the
minister plenipotentiary actively tried to influence the press and public opin-
ion before the war in order to put pressure on the governments of the great
powers to intervene on behalf of the republics and prevent war from breaking
out. However, during the growing crisis of 1899, he made it clear to the sar
government that, despite the widespread sympathy for the Boers, no official
steps to prevent war could be expected and that none of the European na-
tions were prepared to get involved in any conflict.12 Nevertheless, through-
out the war and thereafter, Leyds kept emphasising the importance of inform-
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ing the public on the war from a Boer perspective and of refuting the British
depiction of events taking place in South Africa. In other words, propaganda
remained the main priority of the sar legation.13When the war started, its of-
fice became inundated with a huge amount of paperwork because initiatives
were taken all over in Europe to relieve the needs of the Boer population. In
this way, the propagandistic tidal wave was both a blessing and a curse to
Leyds. On the one hand, his legation performed important tasks, gathering
and distributing material on the plight of the Boers, something that was in
great demand. On the other hand, there were great logistical problems,
which show that the campaign did not always run as smoothly as Leyds in-
tended.
The consuls of the sar proved to be a valuable network for obtaining infor-
mation from different countries, influencing opinion makers and co-ordinat-
ing activities. Arguably the most important post was the one in Lourenço
Marques, occupied by Gerard (also known as George) Pott, who was simulta-
neously consul-general for the Netherlands, the sar and the ofs. Being rela-
tively close to the war zone, he was a vital link in the lines of communication
between the Boer republics and Europe, handling everything from letters to
contraband and helping both refugees on their way out and adventurers on
their way into South Africa. These activities made the consul-general’s posi-
tion there increasingly difficult, as the Portuguese authorities were afraid to
get into trouble with the British. Pott was therefore summoned to leave
Mozambique at the end of 1900.14 This was a great blow for the Boer repre-
sentatives in Europe, severely hampering their communication with the peo-
ple in South Africa. In 1901, Leyds did send one of his agents, Bas Veth, to De-
lagoa Bay in order to investigate the possibilities of establishing a secret route
into South Africa. Veth was not able to set up anything that could replace
Pott’s activities, however.15
In Europe, one of the most important sar representatives was Johannes
Pierson, consul-general in Paris between 1896 and 1902. He had roots in the
Netherlands and was a nephew of the Dutch First Minister N. G. Pierson,
who had been one of Leyds’s professors at university.16 In addition to his con-
sular activities, Pierson was an active propagandist. He had close contact
with French journalists and, together with Leyds’s agent Edgar Roëls, re-
leased a huge number of press releases.17 Moreover, Pierson took upon him-
self the organisation of the sar pavilion at the 1900 World Exhibition in
Paris, which was one of the biggest showcases for pro-Boer agitation. Thou-
sands of people from all across Europe visited the Transvaal exhibition to pay
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homage to the embattled republics and the heroic Boers who fought for their
freedom.18
Another important sar consulate was the one in London, run byMontagu
White, a South African of British descent.19 Like the other sar diplomats, his
activities increased significantly in the run-up to the war. In particular, White
maintained close contactwith several journalists inBritainwhowere opposed
to thewar.Hisworkwas considered to be too dangerous after thewar started,
when mobs assaulted people they believed to be on the side of the Boers.20 In
December1899, itwas therefore decided thatWhite should go to theUS.21Af-
ter the removal of the formal sar consulate from London, Leyds remained in
contact with anti-war activists such asWilliam Stead and several Irish nation-
alists.22 This correspondence was kept secret because of fears that there
would be negative repercussions if the public were to find out about it. Stead
even refused to accept a reimbursement for stamps in order to avoid the im-
pression that his work was financed using secret funds from the Transvaal.23
In other countries, the situationwas quite the opposite. In theNetherlands,
sar representatives did not have to work to change public opinion because
the population was already on the side of the Boers. Leyds’s agents there did
do important work, though. R. A. I. Snethlage was consul-general in Amster-
dam and acted as a co-ordinator for providing shelter and charity to the repa-
triates and refugeeswho arrived fromSouthAfrica.Aswill be shown later, the
fate of these men and women stirred up much public anger and, as such, fed
into the propaganda campaign.24 In Germany, there were several sar consuls
but their relationship with the legation in Brussels seems to have been rather
strained.25 Leyds did, however, correspond extensively with local pro-Boer
agitators about the propaganda campaign there.26 In Russia, there was no of-
ficial consular representation of the Transvaal, but in fact theDutchCalvinist
minister H. A. Gillot acted as the Boer representative in St. Petersburg.27
In addition to the substantial correspondence with various consuls and
other semi-official representatives, the legation in Brussels was flooded with
letters from individuals offering all sorts of aid, volunteering to fight for the
Boers or giving unsolicited advice in the form of bold battle plans and extrav-
agant inventions of new weaponry.28 Although many of these letters did not
contain much that was of interest, Leyds gave his staff strict orders to reply to
every single one of them because he did not want to run the risk of losing the
goodwill of the public.29 As a result of this order, the legation office was in a
constant state of chaos during the first months of the South African War. To
help out, more than a dozen administrative assistants were employed, often
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for a few weeks only. This could not have been conducive to a consistent poli-
cy, and in addition there was a constant fear of spies.30
Permanent members of staff did not prove themselves to be very compe-
tent either. Already before the war started, Leyds made it clear that he was
not satisfied with the work of his chargé d’affaires, C. van Boeschoten. He
tried to persuade his old friend F. V. Engelenburg to come to Europe to take
over the job, but the editor and owner of De Volksstem did not want to leave
his newspaper at that time.31 Also during the war, the minister plenipoten-
tiary was troubled by doubts about the abilities of his staff. On a personal lev-
el, he liked the secretary of the legation (Lex Goldman) very much, but he
was not very confident in his abilities to run the office properly. In one letter
to his wife, Leyds complained about the sloppy handling of paperwork by his
clerks. Although he had ideas about how these matters could be improved,
Leyds himself was unable to implement them because he was constantly trav-
elling around Europe throughout the war and spent little time at the office.
‘With my constant moving around I look like the wandering Jew. The longer
it goes on, the worse it gets.’32
Aside from these administrative troubles, Leyds complained about the fi-
nances of the legation. This seems to have mainly been in response to accusa-
tions in the British press about the ‘Kruger millions’ – the huge quantities of
gold alleged to have been secretly extracted from the Rand and smuggled to
Europe in order to finance the Transvaal agitation against Britain. Leyds de-
nied these stories vigorously throughout his life, and there is no historical evi-
dence that backs up the stories about the secret gold deposits.33Nevertheless,
the legation had substantial funds at its disposal, although exact figures are
unknown. In 1898, the sar government had actually forwarded Leyds a
large sum, which was kept by the Labouchère and Oyens bank in Amster-
dam. After the occupation of Pretoria, the British government put pressure
on the bank to freeze these funds, which led to conflict with Leyds. After me-
diation by several influential Dutch lawyers, a settlement was reached and
most of the money was put into German and French accounts.34 In June
1900, Leyds was also authorised by the sar government to sell off assets of
the republic in Europe in order to finance his activities as he saw fit.35 For a
large part, these were stocks in the nzasm, which became practically worth-
less after the British seized the company’s railway lines in August 1900.
Nonetheless, the French arms factory Creusot, obviously sympathetic to the
Boer cause, accepted payments in stocks of the confiscated railway
company.36 In addition to the official funds provided by the sar government,
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individuals from all across Europe donated money to the sar legation, which
came to a sum of approximately fl. 641,000.37
The increased funds of the sar legation were quite necessary because ex-
penditures rose considerably during the war, gobbling up a large portion of
the extra money. Substantial sums were spent on ammunition and other sup-
plies for the Boer forces in the field. These items were meant to be smuggled
into South Africa via Delagoa Bay but despite great investments in modes of
transport, including the purchase of a steamboat to carry contraband, it is un-
likely that most of these goods ever reached their destination.38 In addition,
hundreds of thousands of guilders were sent to South Africa to provide hu-
manitarian aid for the Boer republics’ inhabitants.39 There were also many
other activities in Europe that required extra spending. A number of sar offi-
cials who had been extradited by the British received financial assistance, as
did the wives of some of the Boer leaders who had left South Africa.40 Last,
but certainly not least, the propaganda campaign was an expensive business.
Leyds funded several institutions that had been set up to distribute pro-Boer
material. Additionally, he provided money for individual publications.41 De-
spite these extra costs, Leyds managed to leave a sum of about £ 170,000
(around fl. 2million) at the end of the war, which he used to finance projects
to promote Afrikaner nationalism in the decades that followed.42
The activities of Hendrik Muller, the representative of the ofs in the
Netherlands, also increased significantly after the war broke out. Like Leyds,
Muller thought it of vital importance that the public in Europe was won over
to the Boer cause. He was also well connected with pro-Boer organisations
and the press in Europe and the US. In this way he became a prominent propa-
gandist for the Boer cause, and his writings were published all around the
world.43 Other activities included support to volunteers who wanted to fight
on the Boers’ side, protests against companies that supplied the British, ship-
ments of humanitarian aid to the inhabitants of the republics and help for
refugees.44 His work was overshadowed, however, by the magnitude of
Leyds’s initiatives. Muller only received a small stipend from the ofs govern-
ment, which was not enough to finance his propaganda activities. He there-
fore asked the sar legation for money on several occasions, and in 1899 and
1900 received thousands of guilders from Leyds.45
In addition to the financial problems, several diplomatic representatives of
the ofs appeared to be untrustworthy, which hampered Muller’s internation-
al campaign. The consul-general of the republic in London, William Dunn,
turned out to be an ardent jingo, something that was pointed out to Muller
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by Leyds.46 There was also a row between Muller and the consul-general of
the ofs in Paris, a certain Mr Mosenthal, which was only resolved after inter-
vention by Johannes Pierson, who persuaded Mosenthal to resign his posi-
tion.47 Despite Leyds’s assistance in Muller’s financial and diplomatic woes,
relations between the two, who had always a personal dislike of each other,
became increasingly strained. These tensions came to a head in 1900, after
the arrival of a deputation from the sar and ofs in Europe, which raised
questions about Muller’s diplomatic status.
In March 1900, the two Boer governments appointed a special deputation
to go to Europe to ask the Western powers to intervene so that peace could be
restored in South Africa without loss of independence. They travelled
throughout Europe and the US for the remainder of the conflict, and their
tour was extensively covered by the press.48 The members of the deputation
were well-known figures in Boer politics: Danie Wolmarans (sar), Abraham
Fischer (ofs) and C. H. Wessels (ofs) were prominent members of the repre-
sentative bodies in their respective homelands. When they arrived in Naples
(April 1900), Muller and Leyds met them to discuss their diplomatic tour.
The Transvaal minister plenipotentiary was in favour of going to Germany
immediately to try and win over Emperor Wilhelm II to the Boer cause, but
Muller advised that a visit to the Netherlands would be better. After some de-
liberations, the deputation decided to go to The Hague first, also because the
Boer governments preferred this.49
The good relationship between the deputation and Muller ended after an
incident during the arrival of Paul Kruger in Europe in November 1900. Jour-
nalists from all over the world had gathered in Marseilles along with thou-
sands of spectators to meet the exiled president of the Transvaal, who was to
arrive on board of the Dutch cruiser Gelderland. Although there were some
indications as to the date of arrival, there had been poor communication be-
tween the ship and the official representatives of the Boers, meaning that the
large crowd had to wait for two days. Amidst that chaos, Muller presented
himself as part of the official representation of the Boer republics, claiming
that he stood in direct contact with the Gelderland and made haphazard
statements about the delay to the press. A public relations disaster was avoid-
ed after the resolute intervention of C. G. S. Sandberg, a Hollander who had
worked for the sar government and who had returned to Europe in July
1900. He had been dispatched by Leyds to meet Kruger at Suez and after his
return to Marseilles explained to the waiting journalists there that the Gelder-
land had been caught in a storm.50 Despite the positive outcome, Leyds was
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furious about this incident and accused Muller of endangering the good rela-
tions between the Boer diplomats and the press with his vanity. Fischer and
the rest of the deputation clearly sided with the sar legate in this matter.51
The problems with Muller continued to worsen when he declared himself
to be a ‘special envoy’ (speciale gezant) of the ofs. He quoted official letters,
written in 1898, in which the government of that republic referred to him as
such.52 However, Fischer argued that these letters only referred to specific ac-
tivities by Muller in that year, for which the government had authorised him
in that capacity. The Boer politician therefore officially declared that Muller
had not been given diplomatic prerogative beyond his consular activities and
that he and Wessels were the highest representatives of the ofs in Europe.53
Later during the war there were more incidents that seem to have had reper-
cussions for the propaganda campaign. In February 1902, the deputation
went to the US, followed by Muller who travelled through the country at the
same time. He did so without consulting either Leyds or the deputation, as it
was against their wishes.54 Several pro-Boers in America wrote to the sar
legation in Brussels to complain about Muller’s embarrassing performance.
Montagu White, for example, described how his behaviour was becoming a
problem. ‘Dr Muller, with the intention of making himself a very important
person, intrigues for his own benefit, not necessarily to the detriment of oth-
ers, though that, of course, results with considerable mischief at times’.55 An-
other critic was L. K. Pook van Baggen, an emigrant from the Netherlands
who was secretary of the Transvaal Committee in California. He was irritat-
ed by Muller’s continuing pretence but decided not to intervene because a
scandal might have spoiled the work of other pro-Boers in America.56
What was considered to be even more damaging than Muller’s ego was his
opinion on relations between the ofs and the sar. Muller had been com-
plaining about overexposure of the heroic role of the Transvaal from the be-
ginning of the war. To compensate for this, he actively tried to promote the
ofs. This was not in line with the policy followed by Leyds and the deputa-
tion, who tried to emphasise the common cause of the two Boer republics in
their struggle against the British Empire.57 Pook van Baggen reported that
Muller continued to make these allegations in the US on an unprecedented
scale and advised to have him be returned to Europe.
His statements are absurd in the three speeches I have heard, he talks about
himself and his President and his government and in every lecture made in-
sinuations against the Transvaal government in comparison to his govern-
ment, that could not have been more strongly stated by an English jingo.58
3. A ‘factory of lies’? 115
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 115
Such remarks show that there were clear tensions between the diplomatic
representatives of the Boer republics. Given the scale of its activities, it can
safely be said that Leyds’s legation was by far the most important institution
to produce propaganda for the cause of the republics in Europe. Via the net-
work of sar representatives, he had access to much information and was
able to co-ordinate activities that were intended to support the Boer combat-
ants in South Africa. However, there were also many difficulties, which indi-
cate that the effect of these efforts was limited. The increased activities meant
that the office of the legation was overloaded with work, which even Leyds
himself conceded led to poor results. Moreover, his problematic relationship
with Muller suggests that it was often difficult to follow a single diplomatic
policy. The enormous egos of the two gentlemen undoubtedly lay behind
many of these tensions, but the complaints by the ofs representative that the
Transvaal received far more attention point to more fundamental issues. As
will be discussed in later chapters, the primacy of the Transvaal in pro-Boer
literature was considered to be a problem at times by other contemporaries
as well. In addition to these difficulties, the official policy of neutrality fol-
lowed by the government in the Netherlands sometimes led to embarrass-
ments.
Fraying at the edges: the Dutch policy of neutrality
The Dutch diplomatic service had ties with the pro-Boer network that extend-
ed between the Netherlands and South Africa. This inevitably led to prob-
lems, because the government in the Netherlands strictly adhered to its neu-
tral position towards the South African War in order not to antagonise the
British, which, it was feared, might have threatened the territorial integrity of
the Dutch colonial possessions in South-East Asia.59 There was, however,
great personal sympathy for the Boers amongst leading figures in govern-
ment, including Queen Wilhelmina herself. Leyds, whose former professor
was first minister when the war erupted, had warm contact with the govern-
ment in The Hague. He was discrete about these connections, however, be-
cause he did not want to compromise the policy of neutrality.60 It was often
more difficult to maintain such discretion when it came to the activities of
Dutch diplomats who had sympathies for the republics, some of whom even
helped pro-Boer organisations. The position of George Pott was the most
problematic in this sense, because he was the representative in Lourenço Mar-
ques not only of both Boer republics but also of the Netherlands. As has been
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mentioned, his involvement in the smuggling of illicit material to the war
zone eventually caused the Portuguese authorities to extradite him.
There were also other Dutch diplomats in South Africa who caused contro-
versy. As of 1888, the Netherlands had officially been represented in the Boer
republics in the form of a consul-general in Pretoria. From 1896, this post
was held by F. J. Domela Nieuwenhuis. Despite his precarious position as en-
voy of a neutral power, he warmly sympathised with the Boer cause, some-
thing he did not make a secret of. Although he was not listed as an official cor-
respondent, he was in direct contact with the executive committee of the
nzav and provided the society with ‘important information’, even before the
South African War.61 During the conflict, Domela Nieuwenhuis became
more active. He sent information about the fate of Hollanders who had been
caught up in the war to the information bureau of the nzav, which reported
to friends and family about the fate of their loved ones.62 He was also in-
volved in the distribution of Dutch aid to the civilian population of the Trans-
vaal.63 In this capacity, he and other consuls in Pretoria visited the concentra-
tion camp at Irene and wrote a highly critical account of the situation there,
which was published in the European press.64 These activities made his pres-
ence increasingly problematic to the British authorities and in September
1901, his position became untenable after he was openly accused of pro-Boer
activities. As a result, the Dutch government ordered him to leave his post.65
Back in the Netherlands, the nzav rewarded him with honorary member-
ship.66
B. H. de Waal, the consul-general to the Cape Colony, initially had a more
problematic relationship with the nzav. When he visited the Netherlands in
October 1898, he gave an interview in which he criticised the society and ac-
cused it of arrogance.67 The executive committee wrote a reply in which they
tried to persuade him of the use of the nzav by listing their activities to
strengthen the bonds between the Dutch-speaking people in Europe and
South Africa on the basis of equality.68 This appears to have eased the ten-
sions between the society and the consul-general and, like Domela Nieuwen-
huis, De Waal acted on behalf of pro-Boer organisations in the Netherlands
during the war. His main task was to co-ordinate support for prisoners of
war (pows) and other people leaving South Africa via Cape Town.69 In a let-
ter, he promised to use the funds sent by Dutch pro-Boer organisations not
only for Hollanders but ‘for all Boers’, to which he added ‘it speaks for itself
that I will do nothing for the natives and as good as nothing for the
coloureds’.70 In addition, De Waal distributed aid to pows who had been
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transported to St. Helena and Bermuda.71 This diplomat, too, was made an
honorary member of the nzav after his return to the Netherlands.72
Another person from the diplomatic service who contributed to the pro-
Boer network was the consul-general in London, H. S. J. Maas. He sent a
complete collection of British official documents about the conflict to the
nzav, which was used as a source for propagandistic publications.73 In addi-
tion, Maas was authorised by the Dutch government to look after the inter-
ests of sar citizens in London after Montagu White had left for the US. Ap-
parently, this did not make him very popular in Britain, as his house was be-
sieged by a jingo mob in May 1900.74These examples show that many Dutch
diplomatic officials had strong sympathies for the Boer and at times acted ac-
cordingly, which led to their position being compromised. There were, how-
ever, also representatives who had a different outlook on the South African
question, which brought them into conflict with the authorities of the re-
publics.
On the battlefield, the Dutch army was represented by two military at-
tachés on the Boer side – Captain J. H. Ram, Lieutenant L. W. J. K. Thom -
son.75 These two men had an ambivalent attitude towards the republican
forces, to say the least. Although they did express their sympathy for the
Boers, Ram and Thomson also criticised the way in which they fought the
war and in particular thought the lack of discipline of the commandos to be a
problem.76This kind of criticism was not exceptional in the Netherlands, but
it seems that Thomson’s personal dislike of the Afrikaners went further,
which led to an incident in July 1900. By then, the sar leadership had left Pre-
toria and was temporarily seated in Machadodorp in northeastern Transvaal,
where they were joined by the foreign attachés. There, several personal letters
from Thomson, in which he made rather undiplomatic remarks about his
hosts, were intercepted by a censor.
He basically asserted that the British pro-war propaganda was right about
the Boers. ‘Corruption, cowardice, treason, theft – that is what one runs into
here every day. A biased press has pulled the wool over the eyes of the Euro-
peans in general and us Dutch in particular!’77 He also wrote that the hate of
the Afrikaners against people from the Netherlands was still in effect and was
even greater than their aversion to the British. Although he still felt that the
war was not justified, he did not lament the fate of the Boers.
It will be a pity if England wins, a pity for us, from a selfish point of view;
because we lose a debouche for many, and the territory in which our lan-
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guage is spoken – jabbered rather – will shrink. But the large majority does
not deserve to remain independent!78
The State Secretary, F. W. Reitz, took offence at these remarks and threatened
to extradite Thomson. Despite protests by the attaché that his mail, which
had diplomatic status, had been tampered with, he decided to leave on his
own initiative and to inform the Dutch government on a strictly confidential
basis so that a public scandal could be avoided.79As a result, these statements
never reached the ears of the general public in the Netherlands.80
It can be said that, during the South African War, there were significant ties
between the diplomatic services of the Netherlands and the Boer republics.
Leyds was well acquainted with leading politicians in The Hague at that time,
and Dutch representatives in Southern Africa corresponded with pro-Boer or-
ganisations in Europe. There were, however, limits to these activities. The
Dutch government could not afford to break with its policy of neutrality, and
as a result of this Pott and Domela Nieuwenhuis were forced to return to the
Netherlands after the British accused them, not without reason, of helping
the Boers. Moreover, there were several individuals who caused controversy
and internal strife, which is evident from the departure of the Dutch attachés
following Thomson’s condescending remarks about the Boers. Although this
dispute was kept out of the press during the war, it shows that the contact be-
tween the Netherlands and South Africa was not without complications. The
informal nature of the Dutch pro-Boer movement, a result of the relatively
weak international position of the Netherlands, limited the possibilities for
effective control over the channels of information that provided them with
material for the propaganda campaign in Europe. Still, a substantial amount
of information did reach the Netherlands via contacts that existed between
individuals that bypassed the formal institutions. How that happened will be
discussed in the following sections.
Repatriates and refugees
During the course of the South African War, thousands of Dutch-speaking
people – Hollanders, Boers and Cape Afrikaners – left South Africa and
found refuge in the Netherlands. It is impossible to extract the exact number
from the sources. The majority arrived after the British army had started its
advance into the Boer republics. A substantial group of people who arrived in
the Netherlands were Hollanders, mainly officials from the sar and their
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families, who were considered to be ‘undesirables’ by the new authorities and
were forcibly repatriated. Not all of the people leaving the war zone were de-
portees, however. Many others became refugees out of fear of British brutali-
ties or because they did not think they could be of any use if they stayed put.
The fact that these people left South Africa did not mean that they could not
help the war effort anymore. A large number of individuals who left the fight-
ing zone became active in the pro-Boer propaganda campaign in Europe,
making a significant contribution to it. They managed to stay in touch with
people in South Africa and so keep some lines of communication open, along
which information about the conflict was transferred to Europe. In addition,
the experiences of refugees and deportees were an important subject of pro-
pagandistic material. Pro-Boer organisations and the press published articles
on the fate of these men, women and children which led to much public out-
cry.81 In this respect, the exiles symbolised the horrors of the war in South
Africa and the injustice inflicted upon the Boers by the British Empire.82
Gerrit Middelberg, the former director of the nzasm in Pretoria, set an ex-
ample for repatriates to become involved in the pro-Boer movement. In the
early months of 1899, he resigned his position and voluntarily returned to the
Netherlands. Middelberg had a good reputation amongst the Boers, and this
also had an effect back home. At the general meeting of the nzav on 10May
1899, he was elected as chairman of the executive committee, ‘because of his
many years’ stay in the South African Republic, [he] appeared to be the most
suitable person to lead the society’.83 Under Middelberg’s leadership, which
lasted for more than a decade, the nzav remained in touch with the develop-
ments in South Africa, from the South African War to the formation of the
Union in 1910. His diary reveals that he kept up with these events but had a
rather pragmatic attitude towards them. In October 1899, for example, he
welcomed the ultimatum issued by the Transvaal that led to the invasion of
the British colonies as ‘a practical lesson in statesmanship’.84 At a time when
public emotions ran high, Middelberg’s realism and knowledge of South
African affairs was considered to be important, and it probably contributed
to the prominence of the nzav amongst other pro-Boer organsiations. At the
same time, there was also criticism of the society’s executive committee and
its lack of reform, which in the view of some meant that the organisation was
failing to capitalise on the widespread enthusiasm for the republics.85
Another nzasm official who came to play a prominent role in the pro-
Boer propaganda campaign was J. A. van Kretschmar van Veen (1857-1931),
Middelberg’s successor in Pretoria. He had been working for the nzasm of-
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fice in Amsterdam in the 1890s and was elected as secretary of the nzav in
June 1897.86 He did not remain in this position for long, as he went to the
Transvaal the next year to take over the management of the railway company
there. His directorship was affected by the South African War. In the run-up
to the conflict, he strove to prepare the nzasm for performing auxiliary tasks
for the Boer forces. His open loyalty to the sar government worried directors
of the company in Amsterdam, because they feared this might endanger the
Netherland’s position of neutrality. Van Kretschmar van Veen reacted strong-
ly against this cautious attitude. In April 1900, at the height of the British ad-
vance, he wrote that the nzasm would probably be punished for supporting
the Boer war effort. Nevertheless, in this letter he refused to pretend that the
company had been pressured by the Boer authorities to help them, in order to
use it as an excuse later on. He did point out the fact that the concession al-
lowed the sar government to commandeer the nzasm but also raised an ob-
jection on moral grounds. ‘We are a Dutch company that strives to make
money, but we have a Transvaal railway. The first is in the position to be neu-
tral, but the second is not.’87 Apart from co-ordinating the wartime activities
of the nzasm, he also played a large role in the establishment of local chari-
ties that were to become a pivot in the distribution of humanitarian aid that
was sent from Europe.
Directly after the occupation of Pretoria on 5 June 1900, Van Kretschmar
van Veen was confined to his home and threatened with deportation. After he
had personally protested to General Roberts, he was allowed to stay in order
to handle the paperwork of the nzasm on the condition that he refrained
from intervening in the actual running of the railway company anymore. De-
spite this arrangement, the documents of the company and all the assets of
the nzasm in South Africa were confiscated by the British in August of that
year. This left the director with no other choice than to return to the Nether-
lands, where he arrived in November 1900.88 Back home, Van Kretschmar
van Veen became heavily involved in the pro-Boer propaganda campaign. He
wrote an extensive report on what in his view was the illegal liquidation of
the nzasm, which was published before the end of the war.89 In addition, he
continued his activities co-ordinating humanitarian aid to the Boers. He was
re-elected to the executive committee of the nzav in May 1901 and helped to
centrally organise the activities by the pro-Boer charities in the Netherlands.
In this capacity, he was also involved in the publication of reports on the con-
centration camps that were sent to the Netherlands by people who were dis-
tributing humanitarian aid in South Africa.90
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The fact that the nzasm sided with the Boer republics during the war also
had significant consequences for the employees of the company. The tasks
they performed for the Boers included managing the growing number of serv-
ices within the sar, running the captured railway lines in northern Natal, per-
forming special duties at the siege camp of Ladysmith and taking over the
lines in ofs, which were owned by an English company. Moreover, they act-
ed as sentries along the railways, organised ambulance trains and repaired
cannons in their workshops. After the British advance started in February
1900, nzasm engineers were also involved in the destruction of railway
tracks and bridges so that the enemy would be unable to use them.91
These activities were conducted under growing hardships. The financial
situation of the nzasm became more difficult, which resulted in cuts in
salaries and eventually in the suspension of pay when the British captured
Pretoria and took over control of the railway lines. During the British ad-
vance, nzasm employees tried to flee from South Africa via Delagoa Bay, but
many were captured. Of these men, 61 were deported to pow camps over-
seas, while the rest was moved to Pretoria.92 From there, all who had not
been born in South Africa were declared to be ‘undesirables’ and deported
from June 1900 onwards. nzasm employees and their families, a total of
3,010 persons, were put on trains to the port of East London and from there
were shipped to the Netherlands.93 These impoverished families stood to-
gether to put in a claim for compensation. This campaign attracted much at-
tention in the Dutch press, and the government was forced by public opinion
to take action on their behalf.94 It appealed to a special arbitration committee
that had been set up by the British government, which in 1902 paid a sum of 
£ 37,500which was divided amongst the destitute families.95
There were also other Hollanders whowere expelled from the sar. One of
the most prominent was NicolaasMansvelt, the superintendent of education
who had been in South Africa for twenty-five years when the war started. Af-
ter the occupation of Pretoria, he and his family were summoned by the
British authorities to leave. Back in the Netherlands, he was warmly wel-
comed by the leaders of the pro-Boer movement. The secretary of the anv,
H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge, himself a teacher, was very much impressed by this
icon of Hollander education and found it ‘wonderful to have met him’.96 De-
spite this warm welcome and an offer to stay with Kiewiet de Jonge in Dor-
drecht,Mansvelt decided to take up residence inUtrecht.97 In addition,Mans-
velt had financial concerns. Hewas deprived of an income after his departure
from South Africa, and his property in Pretoria had been confiscated by the
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British.He complained bitterly about ‘the great expenses ofmy destitute fami-
ly’ and asked Leyds for financial support.98Kiewiet de Jonge once again came
to his aid, asking him to write a pamphlet about education in the Transvaal
for the anv, which became a well-known publication. Mansvelt was also of-
fered a position as a school inspector in the Netherlands, but he declined the
offer and so a more permanent financial solution had to be devised.99
This happened early in 1901, when a substantial project for ‘this highly
meritorious fighter’ for theDutch languagewas proposedbyGerritKalff, pro-
fessor of Dutch literature at the University of Utrecht.100 The initiative was
supported by an influential committee, which raised fl. 5,000 forMansvelt to
write a book about the history of the relations between the Netherlands and
South Africa since the establishment of British rule in the Cape Colony.101Af-
ter this project was completed in November 1902, it had become clear that it
would be impossible for Mansvelt to return to South Africa, because the
British authorities would not allow him in. It was only then that he formally
became involved in various pro-Boer organisations in theNetherlands, sitting
on several committees, somethingwhichmade him an influential figure in the
1900s. In his obituary he was called ‘the heart, the soul and the spirit of every-
thing that has been done from this side [theNetherlands] to promote relations
between the Netherlands and South Africa. The heart first.’102
Hollanders who were active in the Transvaal press also experienced turbu-
lent times during the South African War. When the hostilities started, F.W. En-
gelenburg was flooded with work. In addition to his busy schedule working
for his own newspaper, De Volksstem, he was also asked to act as a corre-
spondent for the international press. He did work for the French news agency
Havas, The New York Journal of William Randolph Hearst and several
newspapers in the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies.103 Engelenburg,
however, did not remain chained to his desk at his Pretoria office and, as he
had done in the 1890s during punitive expeditions against black Africans,
joined the Boer commandos. In Natal, he was present at the battles of Elands -
laagte and Colenso, of which he wrote reports, but did not partake in any mil-
itary action. In addition to his work as a reporter, he set up and ran the mobile
state press in a railway carriage in northern Natal. This installation was used
to print official statements and memoranda but also a special field edition of
De Volksstem containing the latest news from the front lines.104 After a few
months, Engelenburg went back to Pretoria and witnessed the occupation of
the city. The journalist was arrested in June when British authorities found an
empty bandolier in his house. He was released on parole, but De Volksstem
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was closed down.105 Many years later, a business partner recounted how En-
gelenburg boldly recovered sensitive documents that were kept in his office:
he dressed himself in his finest clothes, pinned on all the medals he could find
and demanded access to the office. Legend has it that the guard was so im-
pressed by Engelenburg’s appearance that he was not only allowed in but was
also politely saluted as he left.106
After his newspaper was banned, Engelenburg went to Europe, arriving in
August 1900. Contrary to what one might expect, he did not become one of
the leading figures of the pro-Boer movement in Europe. In 1898, Engelen-
burg had already refused an offer by Leyds to join the sar legation’s staff and,
although he did do some work for his old friend, did not become an official
representative of the Boers when he came to Europe.107 To some extent, he
continued with his journalistic activities and was appointed as Lisbon corre-
spondent to De Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (nrc), a prominent Dutch
newspaper.108 Portugal was not exactly a hotbed for pro-Boer agitation, but
there he wrote reports about the Boer refugees who arrived from Delagoa
Bay. He also kept Leyds informed about the latest political developments con-
cerning the border between Mozambique and the Transvaal. Despite these
activities, it seems that his time in Europe was a welcome break from his busy
life in South Africa. Engelenburg took the time to make several trips through
the continent, during which he could really live up to his reputation of being a
man of refined taste. In letters to Leyds and his wife, he wrote extensively
about his visits to restaurants and art galleries, which led to the following ver-
dict: ‘I prefer Munich to Berlin, but Paris to all the rest.’109
By contrast, one of Engelenburg’s employees at De Volksstem, Frederik
Rompel (1871-1947), became a central figure in the Boer propaganda net-
work after his return to Europe. Rompel, who was born in Amsterdam, went
to Pretoria to work for the newspaper in 1896. It is likely that he got this job
through his wife, who was related to an aunt of Engelenburg, Marie Koop-
mans-De Wet, a well-connected lady from Cape Town who was also known
as the ‘Madame de Staël of South Africa’.110Rompel clearly liked the journal-
istic profession and he boasted that he had been the only reporter present at
the negotiations during the Bloemfontein conference, the failed attempt by
President Steyn of the ofs to reconcile Milner and Kruger.111 After that, he
became a war correspondent for De Volksstem and joined the Boer armies in
the Northern Cape, where he witnessed the battle of Magersfontein along-
side General Koos de la Rey.112Rompel and his wife, who was a nurse for the
Red Cross, left South Africa after the occupation of Pretoria, although it is
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not entirely certain whether they were forced to do so or not. When he ar-
rived in the Netherlands, Rompel became the manager of the press office of
the anv, a position he occupied until 1912. This organisation became an im-
portant link in the pro-Boer propaganda network that extended between
Africa and Europe. During the war, the press office was one of the main dis-
tributors of pro-Boer propaganda on the continent.113 After the conflict,
Rompel would become one of the most prominent liaisons of the South
African Dutch-speaking press in Europe.114
The Netherlands also became a safe haven for Afrikaner refugees from
South Africa. Even more than with Hollander repatriates, it is hard to esti-
mate the numbers, but it seems that there were at least several hundred of
them. Unlike many Hollanders, these people generally did not have family in
the Netherlands and therefore depended even more on the pro-Boer organisa-
tions that set up special committees to help them. Journalists had a marked in-
terest in their fate, and the experiences of the exiles were incorporated into
the great corpus of pro-Boer propaganda.
Without a shadow of doubt, the most famous Boer exile was Paul Kruger,
the president of the sar. The statesman, better known as Oom Paul (uncle
Paul) was already a popular figure in the Netherlands before 1899, as a result
of his heroic conduct during the Transvaal War. During a visit in 1884, for ex-
ample, he was received with much enthusiasm.115 The old man’s popularity
was at its peak at the outbreak of the South African War, and after that he
was to remain one of the most popular Boers, if not the most popular, even af-
ter he handed over his authority to Schalk Burger and left for Delagoa Bay in
September 1900. In the Netherlands, public pressure to intervene on behalf
of the republics mounted at the time and the cabinet devised a cunning plan
to calm emotions at home while at the same time not offending the British too
much. Kruger was offered passage to Europe on the cruiser Gelderland by the
Dutch government. The elderly statesman arrived in the port of Marseilles in
November and, after a triumphant tour through France and a part of Ger-
many, the party travelled to the Netherlands. There was no official reception
by members of the Dutch cabinet – although there were private meetings with
several ministers – but he was granted an audience with Queen Wilhelmina,
who expressed her personal admiration for him.116 In addition, he was con-
tinuously cheered in the streets near the royal residence. His visit to other
cities in the Netherlands also drew massive crowds, and everywhere he was
hailed as a hero by local dignitaries and pro-Boer organisations. The newspa-
pers reported extensively about these events.117 After a short stay in Utrecht,
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the former president retired to a villa in the town of Hilversum, Casa Cara.
Due to his poor health, it was impossible to stage other mass meetings and he
largely retired from public life.
Despite the limited diplomatic impact of Kruger’s arrival in Europe and his
secluded life after December 1900, he was still adored by the public. His
household was flooded with objects that were sent to honour the former sar
president.118 Moreover, a continuous stream of prominent visitors from all
over Europe stopped at Casa Cara to pay him homage. As was the case at the
sar legation in Brussels, the personal staff of the president had trouble cop-
ing with the overwhelming public interest. Frederik van Eeden, a famous
writer at the time, complained to Leyds about the lax attitude of the staff af-
ter he had had to visit the villa four times before he could arrange an appoint-
ment with Kruger for a British pro-Boer journalist.119 This kind of complaint
was not made public, however, and the former president was depicted in the
press as the embodiment of the suffering of his people, who had fallen victim
to the British hunger for gold and power. Kruger, who was forced to leave the
country he himself had helped to build during the Great Trek, pined away in
exile. As such, his presence in the Netherlands became a strong symbol in the
pro-Boer campaign.
Another place where exiles from South Africa were housed was the so-
called Afrikaner Tehuis, a building at the Nieuwe Herengracht in Amster-
dam. It started as an ad hoc solution in August 1900, when no accommoda-
tion could be found for the new arrivals. Under the supervision of the Chris-
telijk Nationaal Boeren Comité (Christian National Boer Committee, here-
after cnbc), a Calvinist pro-Boer organisation, it came to be a permanent
shelter for more than 70 people.120 Many of the inhabitants of the Tehuis
were Afrikaners from the Cape Colony who had joined the Boer forces and
did not dare return to their homes because they were considered to be rebels
by the British authorities and risked the death penalty if caught. Residents of
the Tehuis were subjected to a strict regime, with compulsory Bible reading
twice a day and a curfew.121Despite this strict discipline, there were some dis-
turbances, and three people were told to leave in 1902.122Nevertheless, there
was a lot of sympathy for the Afrikaner refugees amongst the general public,
which was illustrated by the important people who came to visit. Both
Kruger and Wilhelmina went to the Tehuis to meet the people living there per-
sonally.123 In this way the shelter generated publicity about the fate of the
Boer refugees.
A different group of refugees that caught the attention of the pro-Boer or-
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ganisations and the press in the Netherlands were people that had fled the re-
publics and had gone to Lourenço Marques in the Portuguese colony of
Mozambique. During the course of 1900 and 1901, around 1,500 refugees
were allocated to a camp there. Their circumstances were dire, which contem-
poraries thought was mainly due to the unhealthy climate. In 1901, the au-
thorities decided to transport the Boer refugees to Portugal where they were
accommodated in several camps in order to improve their situation. The
cbnc was also active in these camps, and a representative from the charity
co-ordinated the distribution of aid sent from the Netherlands. The represen-
tative’s letters gave detailed reports of his activities, with particular emphasis
on the success of the schools that were set up, allowing the young refugees to
receive a proper education. Spiritual guidance of the inmates was also consid-
ered to be an important issue.124 Engelenburg, who acted as a correspondent
from Portugal, covered the arrival of the Boers in the camps and reported on
their fortunes in the Dutch press on several other occasions.125
Most exiles in the Tehuis and the refugee camps in Portugal were illiterate,
and therefore only a few of them were able to create propaganda.126 Mem-
bers of the Boer elites who went to Europe made their voice heard more often.
One way to do so was to give interviews, and in this way their views were dis-
seminated via the newspapers. A more lively way to inform the public was by
giving lectures. With the help of Dutch organisations, several Boers toured
the Netherlands, Germany and France. This proved to be quite a lucrative en-
terprise and aside from raising money for the funds that provided humanitari-
an aid to the inhabitants of the republics, the speakers often earned a hand-
some sum themselves. This had some undesired effects, because it allowed
them to dress in the latest European fashion and thus lose some of their rough
appeal. Kiewiet de Jonge, who was an important co-ordinator of the lecture
tours, was particularly worried about the fact that they started shaving: ‘a
Boer without beard is like a lion without a mane’, he complained.127 Still,
such lectures continued to attract large crowds throughout the war.128
The return of the majority of Hollander emigrants from South Africa and
the arrival of other refugees did not mean these people were no longer useful
for the pro-Boer propaganda campaign. Members of the Hollander elites
from Pretoria such as Middelberg, Van Kretschmar van Veen and Mansvelt
did important work for the organisations that supported the embattled re-
publics. In this way, they became important middlemen in the network that
transferred information from South Africa to Europe. Arguably the most im-
portant figure in this respect was Rompel, who became the manager of the
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anv press office, a job he continued to do after the conflict ended. Other de-
portees and Afrikaner refugees were not left in obscurity either. The press in
the Netherlands wrote about their fate, which became emblematic of the un-
just war. The most famous symbol of the wrongs that the British Empire in-
flicted on the Boers was Paul Kruger; his fate appealed to many contempo-
raries, and large crowds gathered to see the heroic president for themselves
when he arrived in the Netherlands. The Boers who went on lecture tours
also made the tragedies of the war in South Africa tangible to people in Eu-
rope. There were, however, also other means to inform the public about the
drama that was unfolding in the Boer republics. Throughout the war, stories
from South Africa reached the public in the form of letters that were written
by people who were witnessing the events as they took place or had heard
about them firsthand.
Evading censorship
Although in all probability most Hollanders left South Africa, a number of
them remained behind. From the beginning of the war, pro-Boers in Europe
recognised the opportunities in using them as correspondents who could pro-
vide valuable information. Unlike British newspapers and news agencies,
which probably had at least two hundred reporters in the field, the Dutch
press had few official representatives and largely depended on the correspon-
dence of private individuals as a source of information.129 During the first
months of the conflict, newspaper editors and the anv press office called
upon the public in the Netherlands to forward all letters they received from
friends and relatives who were present at the war zone.130 This appeal was
successful: a large collection of writings was gathered not only about the bat-
tles but also about daily life in the towns of the republics. During the early
phase of the war, there were other sources of information, too. All major
Boer newspapers were available in the Netherlands, containing official state-
ments by the governments of the republics and reports that often contradict-
ed the British coverage of events. The biggest Dutch periodical from the Cape,
Ons Land, was also considered to be an important source of information in
this connection. During the first phase of the conflict, there was a large sup-
ply of such material because the republics’ mail services were able to operate
freely via the nzasm railway line and the port of Delagoa Bay. Although the
British press was a lot faster in providing news thanks to the telegraph lines,
opinion makers in the Netherlands considered such documents to be impor-
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tant sources that allowed them to not have to depend on the London dailies
only.131
Things changed after the occupation of the Boer republics, however. To
start with, the British authorities confiscated the nzasm railway line to De-
lagoa Bay, which meant an effective end to the regular mail services of the
Boers. Moreover, they started to impose censorship in the republics, which af-
fected both the press and private correspondence. It was for the first time that
such extensive measures were taken during a conflict, and Jaqueline Beau-
mont has argued that the South African War therefore represented an impor-
tant phase in the development of modern censorship. Nevertheless it is hard
to assess the effectiveness of this measure or even the guidelines used, due to
the fact that the censors left few sources.132 Although there was a general dis-
like of British censorship amongst Dutch contemporaries, they also seemed
to be largely left in the dark about the motives behind it and the true extent of
its power. Newspapers explicitly stated it when they received letters that had
passed the censors, so that the people knew they had probably been tempered
with. Despite these complaints, it should be remembered that the haphazard
organisation of the censorship clearly imposed limits to its effectiveness.
Throughout the war, documents from South Africa containing statements
that were considered to be important propaganda material still reached the
Netherlands. In fact, some correspondents tried to dodge censorship and at
times actually succeeded in doing so. In this way, private letters remained a
valuable source of information to the pro-Boer propaganda campaign.
The most obvious form of censorship was the attempt to gain control of
the press in South Africa. Beaumont has shown that the army increasingly in-
terfered in the work of correspondents, much to the chagrin of the British me-
dia, including those who supported the war.133However, the authorities were
far more aggressive towards the Boer periodicals. After the occupation of
Bloemfontein and Pretoria, newspapers that had supported the republican
governments were shut down. As mentioned above, Dutch journalists who
worked at these periodicals such as Engelenburg and Rompel from De
Volksstem were put under pressure to return to Europe or explicitly extradit-
ed. Other Boer newspapers were taken over by British journalists, who active-
ly produced propaganda for the new regime. The most famous example was
The Friend in Bloemfontein, to which the famous writer Rudyard Kipling
contributed for a period of several months.134
These measures were not only confined to the republics but also affected
Ons Land in the Cape. This periodical regularly published accounts of the
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war from the Boers’ perspective, contradicting British coverage. As such, it
was an important source for newspapers in the Netherlands, probably also
because the mail services from Cape Town were quite reliable.135 This source
of information petered out after the start of Boer guerrilla operations in the
Cape Colony just before New Year’s Day of 1901, when martial law was pro-
claimed. One of the measures taken by the Milner administration was the fur-
ther tightening of censorship, and the most obvious target was Ons Land. In
January 1901, the journalist F. S. Malan was arrested, and the authorities
prohibited the periodical from publishing editorials. After this clamp-down,
newspapers in the Netherlands largely ceased to use it as a source because
they thought it had lost its critical stance towards the authorities.136 It seems
that, in this respect, the British were quite successful in curbing the supply of
pro-Boer information coming from South Africa via the press. There were,
however, also more informal sources, which were harder to control.
Much information reached the Netherlands from the Dutch emigrants
who had settled in South Africa during the final decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury. A few weeks before the war broke out, enthusiasts amongst this group
decided to form their own commando in the Transvaal, the so-called Hollan-
dercorps. The Dutch regiment consisted of 450 men, of whom around 150
joined the Boer forces that invaded Natal. At first, newspapers in the Nether-
lands welcomed this news enthusiastically and praised their bravery in fight-
ing for their ‘kinsmen’. But disillusion soon set in when the commando was
defeated during the infamous battle of Elandslaagte, which took place ten
days after the war had started. The dramatic events became widely known in
the Netherlands thanks to many of the veterans sending in accounts of the
battle in letters, and it probably became the single most covered event by the
Dutch press during the whole conflict. One of the major national newspapers
in the Netherlands published no less than 27 accounts, a number of which
were written by members of the field force of the Hollandercorps.137 After
Elandslaagte, these men continued to send letters in which they gave ac-
counts of their adventures. Many of them were taken prisoner and so several
accounts were about their experiences in British captivity.
The most prolific correspondent amongst the Hollander pows was B. G.
Versélewel de Witt Hamer, an officer who was captured at Elandslaagte and
was initially held near Cape Town. In June 1900, he was one of the first to be
sent to the prisoner camp on St. Helena, where he became one of the main
spokesmen for the inmates. In this capacity he acted as a liaison for pro-Boer
organisations that sent aid to the pows, and he wrote extensive reports about
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daily life in the camp that were published in the Dutch press. Despite the fact
that they were read by the censors, these letters contained clear assertions
that many of the pows remained defiant and patriotic, which was discussed
extensively in the newspapers.138 But there were also complaints about cen-
sorship. One of the most notorious incidents happened when two censors
were found guilty of randomly burning letters after they had stolen the
stamps from the envelopes.139
In the camp of Diyatalawa in Ceylon, there was also censorship. One of
the Hollander inmates there, a teacher, devised a rather creative way of dodg-
ing it. After arriving there, he sent a wooden box as a present to H. J. Emous,
the man who had recruited him to go to the Transvaal in the 1890s.140 In it,
he hid a piece of paper with squares cut out and the accompanying instruc-
tion explained that this paper had to be put over the future letters, so that
only the words in the squares were visible. The general contents of these let-
ters were harmless and thus passed the censors without any trouble. The cod-
ed words, however, contained information about the situation in the camp
and the morale of the inmates, which, he asserted, was still high. One such
hidden message read: ‘Here […] there is complete […] unity […] fierce hatred
[…] the greatest […] resolve […] hope for […] revenge and […] mistrust […]
with regard to all that […] is English’.141
Another way in which authors in the pow camps tried to avoid censorship
was by smuggling out their manuscripts. One of the most noteworthy exam-
ples is the war diary of Dietlof van Warmelo. This young man was the son of
a Calvinist minister from the Netherlands who had settled in the Transvaal
and married a local girl. Van Warmelo had studied in the Netherlands, where
he became well acquainted with his uncle, the famous writer Frederik van Ee-
den. By the time the war started, Van Warmelo had finished his education, re-
turned to South Africa, joined a Boer commando and fought for almost a
year and a half. In April 1901, he was captured and sent to the Ahmednagar
camp in northern India. There he wrote an account of his personal experi-
ences during the war; which he had to do from memory because he had lost
the diary he had kept in the field. This manuscript was smuggled out of the
camp and reached Van Eeden, who immediately found a publisher for this ‘re-
markable’ book.142
Besides the accounts of those who had been captured, there were also let-
ters from civilians who had not joined the commandos and remained in the
towns of the Boer republics. During the early phases of the war, such epistles
were regularly printed in newspapers, but after censorship had been imposed
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they often ceased to contain interesting information. At times, however, con-
troversial news did come out, describing the situation in the concentration
camps and giving news from the battlefield. Although a substantial number
of the secret correspondents were female, contemporaries paid relatively lit-
tle attention to these women. This could explain why there are few sources
available that give insight into their activities. The only woman who explicit-
ly wrote about her experiences as an intelligence agent was one of Dietlof van
Warmelo’s sisters, Johanna. In 1913, she published a personal account of her
adventures as a Boer informant, in the so-called ‘kappie kommando’. After
she had served as a nurse in the concentration camp of Irene between May
and July 1901, she was recruited by a former Boer officer to help smuggle in-
formation and people in and out of Pretoria.143
In this capacity, she also sent letters and reports to the Boer representatives
in Europe, mainly about the situation in the camps. Such material was usual-
ly addressed to members of her family and to her fiancé, who lived in the
Netherlands at the time. But this sort of information was not always received
well. One report about the concentration camps that was carefully hidden in
a bottle of ‘Dr Williams’ Pink Pills’, was put away by the recipient because he,
with ‘unequalled stubbornness’, did not think it was of any value.144 Johanna
van Warmelo also experimented with short reports which she sent directly to
the sar legation. These were written in lemon-juice on the inside of en-
velopes and became visible after heating. Despite this spectacular method, it
does not seem likely that this information significantly contributed to the pro-
Boer propaganda campaign. The notes only contained rudimentary informa-
tion, and there is no evidence that they were ever published. Moreover, Leyds
himself advised her to stop this dangerous activity after one envelope arrived
with the text already visible.145
But not all of Johanna van Warmelo’s projects petered out like this, as is
shown by the Spoelstra case, which also reveals that there were significant
risks for the correspondents. At the end of 1900, the Hollander J. Spoelstra
wrote a long letter to the Dutch newspapers in which he criticised the situa-
tion in the concentration camps and the general circumstances under the oc-
cupation. The courier who tried to carry this report to Europe was caught
and Spoelstra was arrested. Despite protests from several prominent Pretoria
residents, he was convicted to one year in prison and a fine of £ 100. Al-
though the controversial letter was confiscated, the contents still became
known. During the hearings in his case, Spoelstra summoned around thirty
witnesses who corroborated the indictments he had written. Secret agents op-
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erating in the circle of Johanna van Warmelo obtained a full report of these
proceedings, hid it in a cocoa tin and gave it to a lady on her way to London.
Once there, it reached the anti-war journalist William Stead, who published
the full text in one of his pamphlets.146
Another Hollander correspondent who was arrested because of his secret
activities was Cornelis Broeksma, public prosecutor in Johannesburg and a
prominent member of the charity committee in that town. He wrote highly
critical reports about the concentration camp that had been set up at the local
racetrack, which he visited regularly. It seems likely that he was the author,
under the pseudonym ‘Pax’, of one of the first letters that complained about
conditions in the camps, which was published in a Dutch newspaper in Febru-
ary 1901.147 He continued to write about the deteriorating conditions and
also gave estimates of the death tolls, which were not mentioned in official
British sources at the time. Many of these letters, written under the pseudo-
nym ‘Charles Brooks’ were addressed to ‘Dr Williamson’, one of the aliases
of Willem Leyds.148
Broeksma was arrested by the British and charged with high treason, be-
cause he had allegedly written a pamphlet in which he had called for the mur-
der of a prominent member of the British community in the Transvaal. As a
result, he was condemned to death under the occupational law and executed
on 30 September 1901.149 In the Netherlands, the Broeksma case became em-
blematic of the way in which the British authorities tried to quell the coverage
of the tragedy that was unfolding in the concentration camps. Leaflets were
printed with a photo of him and his family, the subscript of which read: ‘Cor-
nelis Broeksma, […] executed by the English on 30 Sept. 1901. Hero and mar-
tyr for mercy, public prosecutor in the most noble way: he indicted England
before the court of humanity.’150
The fate of Broeksma shows that there were grave risks for people in South
Africa who sent documents to the pro-Boer organisations in Europe. Howev-
er, there was a substantial group of people, many of them Hollanders, who
tried to do so nonetheless. Compared with British war journalism, it was
quite a haphazard network which was not always able to provide a steady
supply of news, particularly after censorship was imposed. The main conse-
quences of the British occupation were that formal mail services were
stopped and Dutch language periodicals in South Africa muzzled. All this did
not prevent news from slipping through, however. Although private letters
were screened, at times they contained some relevant information for the pro-
pagandists about the situation in the pow or civilian camps. In addition, sev-
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Leaflet with picture of Broeksma’s family (1901).
Source: za, Emous Collection, EM 3, D5. Zuid-Afrikahuis, Amsterdam.
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eral individuals attempted to smuggle out letters with the explicit intention of
influencing public opinion in Europe. Such material did contain statements
about the situation on the battlefields, but because people in towns and
camps hardly had any contact with the commandos who continued to fight,
these descriptions were too vague to be of use in propagandistic material.
However, there were more direct sources that provided information about
the events at the front line.
Letters from the front line
The majority of people who travelled between South Africa and the Nether-
lands during the war left to find refuge in Europe. There were, however, sever-
al groups that went to South Africa to help the Boer war effort. These men
(and a few women) often saw action at the front line and reported on their ex-
periences in letters that were published in the press. The lingering war compli-
cated the position of such correspondents, mainly because the Boer comman-
dos became increasingly isolated when the guerrilla phase of the conflict
started. Still, information from the battle zone did reach Europe on several
occasions, and these heroic reports were eagerly published by pro-Boer pro-
pagandists.
During the first stages of the conflict, volunteers from all around the world
went to South Africa to join the commandos. In the Netherlands, this was a
sensitive issue because it endangered the policy of neutrality. Nevertheless, it
became common knowledge that a number of volunteers were assisted by a
clandestine organisation that was founded in November 1899 by H. J. Kie -
wiet de Jonge with the approval of the sar legation. Another prominent fig-
ure in this committee was Frans Beelaerts van Blokland, son of the late con-
sul-general of the sar, who in later life was to become a prominent states-
man.151 The members of the clandestine committee were well aware of the
sensitivity of their work and were very discrete about it while openly paying
lip service to the official policy of neutrality. Moreover, like Leyds, they were
of the opinion that only trained soldiers, preferably artillerists, were of use to
the Boers and thus carefully selected the people whom they assisted.152 A list
in the personal papers of Beelaerts van Blokland reveals that the committee
helped around twenty people to leave for South Africa between January and
May 1900.153
Lieutenant Gerrit Boldingh was probably the most well known of these
men. This 28-year-old artillery officer resigned from the Dutch army after the
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war started and arrived at the front line in March 1900. After seeing action at
different battles, he joined the commando led by the famous Boer General
Christiaan de Wet, whom he deeply admired.154 In September 1901, he died
in the saddle after he was shot while being pursued by the British army. Be-
fore Boldingh left for South Africa, he was contracted by Charles Boissevain
of Het Algemeen Handelsblad to act as a war correspondent.155 His letters
reached the Netherlands throughout his stay in South Africa and were pub-
lished in this newspaper. In 1903, his missives were collected in a book to
which Boissevain himself contributed an introduction in honour of his mem-
ory. The editor of the volume explained that it also served a higher purpose:
he held such a high view of Boldingh’s writings that he was of the opinion
that historians would in the future find it ‘a source […] of the most pure na-
ture’.156
Another group of volunteers that left the Netherlands to serve in South
Africa in the early stages of the war was the staff of the Red Cross ambu-
lances. Already during the Jameson Raid, G. W. S. Lingbeek, a Hollander
who worked as a medical doctor in Pretoria during the 1890s, set up an am-
bulance corps with the help of the nzav and the Dutch Red Cross.157 The
outbreak of the South African War led to the expansion of these activities. In
November and December 1899, three Dutch ambulances left the Nether-
lands under the leadership of Lingbeek, J. D. Koster and D. van Rijckevorsel,
respectively. Also, a joint Dutch-Russian ambulance and one that was mus-
tered in the Dutch East Indies went to the front lines in the months thereafter.
In May 1900, two additional physicians, J. H. Pameyer and D. J. E. Mac-
Leod, arrived in Pretoria.158 The total staff of these ambulances consisted of
64 people.159
Several of these men and women wrote long letters about their experiences
that were forwarded to newspapers by the executive committee of the Dutch
Red Cross. In 1901, a voluminous book was published containing the official
reports of the doctors in charge.160 In addition, the personal memoirs of sev-
eral nurses also appeared.161 In these publications, the activities of the Red
Cross were extensively described, as were the increasing problems with the
British army, who considered them to be on the Boers’ side. After the occupa-
tion of Pretoria, the staff members of one ambulance were even arrested, af-
ter which the men were sent to a pow camp on Ceylon and the women de-
ported to Europe. Such stories caused an outcry in the Netherlands.162 In ad-
dition to these problems, the changing tactics of the Boers, who started a
guerrilla war with mobile hit-and-run attacks, complicated the work of the
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Red Cross. The majority of the medical staff therefore decided to leave South
Africa, but a small number of them, including doctor J. C. J. Bierens de Haan
and male nurse H. J. Poutsma, joined the commandos in the field on their ex-
hausting journeys. During the first half of 1901, they returned to the Nether-
lands where they tried to organise new ambulances for the Boers, an initiative
which failed because the British authorities refused them access to the war
zone.163 Nevertheless, the stories of both Poutsma and Bierens de Haan did
attract considerable attention from the media in the Netherlands. The former
wrote a feuilleton in Het Algemeen Handelsblad and the latter granted a fa-
mous interview to De Nieuwe Courant in which he asserted that the Boers
would never give up.164 After these men had returned, however, no Dutch
Red Cross employees were left in South Africa to provide useful material for
the newspapers to report on.
The increasing problems of the activities of the Red Cross in South Africa
were in keeping with a general trend. As the war went on and the Boers’
chances of a military victory waned, the stream of volunteers to help the com-
mandos in the field dried up. Soldiers from Europe became less useful in the
new circumstances, because they did not know the terrain and had no experi-
ence with guerrilla warfare.165There was, however, a growing need for couri-
ers. Because the British controlled all routes to the region, communication be-
tween the Boer representatives in Europe and the commandos in the field be-
came problematic. After Pott’s expulsion from Lourenço Marques at the end
of 1900, correspondence could only be taken back and forth via couriers who
travelled all the way from the war zone to Europe and vice versa.166 At least
twenty missions consisting of either one or two people left with letters from
the Boer representatives in Europe to the leaders in the field between the be-
ginning of 1901 and the middle of 1902. Most recruits were people who had
previously fought with the Boer commandos.167 It seems that the majority of
the couriers did not arrive, either because they ran off or succumbed to the
dangers along the routes via Delagoa Bay and South-West Africa, which be-
came more and more difficult to pass.168
One of the men who attempted the hazardous journey (and that twice) was
the former Dutch resident of the sar Cornelis Plokhooy (1877-1964), who
fought with the Boers in the early stages of the war. In June 1900, he was cap-
tured by the British and deported back to the Netherlands, where he became
involved in the propaganda campaign by writing a book about his war expe-
riences, which was followed by a successful lecture tour. In addition, he vol-
unteered as a courier.169 In a handwritten report, he recounted how he had
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gone to Paris in December 1900 and there received a bundle of letters for the
Boer leaders in the field reporting on the situation in Europe and £ 10 to pay
for the journey from Johannes Pierson. By the time he arrived at the port of
Lourenço Marques, Plokhooy was penniless and fell ill with malaria. To
make matters worse, he had a quarrel with the local Boer representatives,
thereby depriving him of all support. When he heard that the journey to the
Transvaal had become very dangerous because the British were extensively
patrolling the borders with Mozambique, Plokhooy decided to call off the ex-
pedition in order to prevent the letters from falling into the wrong hands. He
was interned as a Boer refugee and deported to Portugal. There he managed
to escape from the camp, hand over his sensitive load to Engelenburg in Lis-
bon and reached the Netherlands in July 1901.170Despite this ill-fated adven-
ture, Plokhooy volunteered for another mission early in 1902. This time he
did reach the commandos via South-West Africa after an arduous journey
during which he was allegedly chased by enemy spies. However, by the time
he arrived, peace had been signed and he was once again deported by the
British authorities.171
There were also couriers who attempted to carry documents from South
Africa to Europe. Already during the early phases of the guerrilla campaign,
the Transvaal leaders considered it important that their correspondence and
reports be sent to their representatives in Europe so that papers containing in-
telligence would not fall into the hands of the British. Just before the occupa-
tion of Pretoria, C. K. Trotsenburg, aHollanderwhowas in charge of the tele-
graph department, gathered all the cables of the Boer generals from his office
and took them to the temporary republican headquarters at Machadodorp
(northeastern Transvaal). When this camp had to be abandoned, Botha or-
dered him to go to Europe and leave the collection with Leyds for safekeep-
ing. The cables contained much sensitive information about mistakes made
by the Boer commanders during the first phase of the war, so the minister
plenipotentiary kept a close eye on them. Although the Dutch government
showed great interest in the collection and even allowed them to be temporar-
ily stored in the queen’s offices, Leyds was not willing to grant permission for
their publication in the Netherlands because he feared that some negative
sides to the Boer strategy would be exposed.172
Besides concerns about the safety of some of their confidential correspon-
dence, the Boer generals also thought it important to keep the Boer represen-
tatives in Europe – mainly Leyds, the deputation and President Kruger – in-
formed about military developments in South Africa. Not all attempts to
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send reports were successful, but several of their accounts reached Europe
and were reproduced in their entirety in newspapers and pamphlets. One of
the most famous examples is a report about the failed attempt to negotiate
peace between Botha and Kitchener in February 1901, which appeared in a
Dutch newspaper the following May under the pseudonym of ‘B.ot H. Ani-
cus’. This alias would suggest that it was written by the general himself, but
the author was in fact Bierens de Haan, who acted as Botha’s personal physi-
cian during the talks and returned to the Netherlands carrying the minutes of
the proceedings.173 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Boer commander consid-
ered it to be important that this account be published in Europe.
General Jan Smuts also considered the propaganda campaign in Europe to
be of great value during the guerilla phase of the war. Smuts led a commando
that infiltrated the Cape and eventually went to the barren northwestern part
of the colony. There he wrote several reports about his activities during the fi-
nal months of 1901. In confidential letters to the Boer representatives, he ex-
pressed his doubts about the war effort, but in reports that were explicitly
marked for publication, he boasted about the high morale of his men and of
their achievements.174 One of the couriers who arrived at the sar legation
told how Smuts had ordered him to set up more regular lines of communica-
tion running through the desert into German South-West Africa. Not only
would it be easier to obtain supplies this way, but it was hoped that the posi-
tive reports coming from the Boers would influence the public in Europe, so
that the British government would come under increasing pressure to end the
war. Smuts had asked all the Boer generals to send him their reports in code
so that he could forward them.175
Conclusion
By the time Smuts’s initiative to strengthen the lines of communication be-
tween the commandos in the field and the Boer representatives in Europe be-
gan to take shape, talks had already begun that would eventually end the war
and result in the Peace of Vereeniging, which marked the end of the Boer re-
publics’ independence. In this sense, these efforts to supply material for the
propaganda campaign in Europe were too late. It does show, however, that it
was considered important to keep channels of information between the com-
mandos and the pro-Boer agitators in Europe open throughout the whole
course of the war. The main goal was to counter the British coverage of events
and so to put forward the other side of the story in order to influence public
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opinion and thus increase the pressure on the British government. This effort
was successful in that a substantial amount of material from the battlefield
reached Europe (and particularly the Netherlands), where it was used in pro-
pagandistic publications. Nevertheless, members of this network also en-
countered some serious problems that can be accounted for by the informal
nature of the pro-Boer movement.
Probably the most important institution of pro-Boer agitation in Europe
was the sar legation run by Willem Leyds. He had an extensive network of
informants and agents who helped him to gather and distribute material that
was in support of the Boers’ cause. Still, Leyds’s activities were severely inhib-
ited by the Dutch government’s policy of neutrality. In addition, he had limit-
ed means available to him and his staff was not competent enough to proper-
ly handle the huge amount of paperwork involved. Moreover, the fact that
there were conflicts, such as those with Hendrik Muller and the Dutch at-
taché L. W. J. K. Thomson, shows that there was controversy surrounding
the way in which the Boers were to be depicted. However, the greatest prob-
lems experienced by the pro-Boer propagandists resulted from the changing
situation in South Africa. Already from the beginning of the war, the mo -
nopoly on the telegraph lines was greatly to the advantage of the British in the
coverage of events there. During the course of the conflict, they expanded
their control over infrastructure in South Africa, which led to the deportation
of unwanted groups, attempts to cut off Boer lines of communication and the
imposition of stricter censorship. Despite these measures, a large amount of
information was still transferred to Europe by exiles and refugees, in private
letters from the pow and concentration camps and in reports from people
who witnessed action on the front line. In this way, a significant body of pro-
Boer literature came into being, heavily influencing the way in which the con-
flict was depicted in continental Europe.
Compared to British coverage of the war, the network that provided infor-
mation to the pro-Boer propagandists was far less extensive and far less con-
sistent. In this respect, Lord George Hamilton’s jibe referring to the sar lega-
tion as a ‘factory of lies’ was an exaggeration, because the legation was actu-
ally rather inefficient. As a result, its propagandistic activities did not achieve
Leyds’s main objective, namely to induce the great powers to intervene on be-
half of the republics. Moreover, the massive public enthusiasm at times
proved to be a burden rather than a blessing. Still, the importance of propa-
ganda during the South African War should not be underestimated. The
words of Lord Hamilton and the agitated response to them by pro-Boers re-
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veal that contemporaries were reflecting on the coverage of the conflict in the
context of the age of an emerging mass media. In this respect, the pro-Boer
propaganda campaign was successful because it managed to create gripping
images based on the sources that made their way from South Africa to Eu-
rope. In order to publish and distribute this material, Leyds sought contact
with organisations in the Netherlands, which affirms that these institutions
were closely connected to the lines of communication that have been de-
scribed in this chapter. The next chapter will further explore this link and
show how the Netherlands became an important base in the war of words
that accompanied the actual fighting in South Africa.
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chapter 4
‘A campaign of the pen’: The Dutch pro-Boer 
organisations
When the South AfricanWar started inOctober 1899, a wave of pro-Boer en-
thusiasm rippled through theNetherlands, greater than ever before and, for a
while, support for the embattled republics dominated public life. In Novem-
ber 1899, Amsterdamwas all abuzz with false rumours that the Boers had de-
feated the British army. At times, people even went out into the streets to cele-
brate this ‘victory’, infecting otherswith their enthusiasm.Onone occasion, a
huge crowd gathered at the Rembrandtplein for a spontaneous celebration:
flags of the Boer republics were everywhere and the Transvaal anthem was
sung heartily.1 Although the feverish enthusiasm cooled somewhat later, peo-
ple continued to sing songs in the streets in which they celebrated the Boers
for their heroism and denounced British cruelties throughout thewar.2Adver-
tisements from the time reveal the great popularity of the Boer leaders, several
of whom literally became brand names. Paul Kruger’s name, for instance, be-
came attached to items such as beer, lemonade, tobacco, pipes and wallets.3
These examples show that the South African War prominently featured in
Dutch popular culture, but it remains to be seenwhat effect these phenomena
had on society in general. Aswill be discussed in this chapter, this is not only a
question for historians: contemporaries also tried to grapple with it.
In historiography, much emphasis is placed on the official policy of neu-
trality that was adhered to by the Dutch government, which was pursued
with even more rigor during the war. To ensure the integrity of the Nether-
lands’ colonial possessions in the Indonesian archipelago, which bordered on
the British Empire in Asia, it was considered of vital importance that inci-
dents be avoided.4 The general public did not always share this view, and
throughout the war there were loud complaints about the cautious official
stance taken by the Netherlands. In this sense, the Dutch government was
caught between a rock and hard place. On the one hand, it was concerned
about how pro-Boer propaganda might endanger its relations with Great
Britain, but on the other hand it had to take into account the sentiments of
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the domestic population, which were exploited in Parliament by the opposi-
tion leader, Abraham Kuyper. In order to appease the public, the Minister of
Naval Affairs came up with a cunning plan in September 1900, that would al-
low the government to save face while avoiding offending the British. He or-
dered the cruiser Gelderland to set course to Delagoa Bay and pick up Paul
Kruger, who had fled Pretoria in June. The elderly president was brought to
Europe and, after a successful tour through France and parts of Germany,
went to the Netherlands, where he received a hero’s welcome and was grant-
ed asylum.5Despite this political master stroke, emotions ran high on several
occasions during the later phases of the war. In 1901, for example, a crowd
gave Edward vii a hostile welcome when he disembarked at the port of
Vlissingen; they even went so far as to sing the Transvaal anthem. One British
diplomat described it as ‘the most disgraceful scene I ever witnessed in my
life’.6
Despite such public embarrassments, the principle of neutrality was never
seriously threatened and it was clear to all political parties that it was in the
national interest to pursue a policy of careful diplomacy. Significantly, gov-
ernment policy remained unchanged on this issue when Kuyper was elected
first minister in August 1901, even though some contemporaries considered
his election victory to be a direct result of his vocal support for the Boers in
Parliament.7 Moreover, the established pro-Boer organisations respected the
cautious attitude of the government in the light of the international position
of the Netherlands. The nzav, which was the largest of these, had many
prominent politicians, businessmen and academics amongst its members,
people who fully accepted the principle of neutrality. Therefore, the leaders
of most pro-Boer organisations refrained from public protests against the
government on this point.8 The diplomatic representatives of the Boer re-
publics also understood the position of the Dutch government in this matter.
The most prominent of them, Willem Leyds, had close connections with lead-
ing politicians in The Hague through his former professors – one of whom, N.
G. Pierson, was first minister in 1899. Although they discussed the option of
the Netherlands assuming a mediating role on several occasions, the Trans-
vaal envoy was well aware that possibilities were limited due to the interna-
tional balance of power, something which he clearly communicated to the
government in Pretoria.9
Although it is obvious to historians – as it was to contemporaries – that the
Dutch government’s policy of neutrality left Dutch pro-Boer propagandists
little room for manoeuvre, there was more to the matter. The campaign in
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support of the republics and the emotions it provoked were not simply ex-
pressions of national frustration with the weak international position of the
Netherlands nor the result of a temporary collective lapse of reason. As has
been argued in previous chapters, the reporting on South African affairs was
closely linked to the lines of communication that extended between the Boer
republics and the Netherlands. Contemporaries themselves reflected on this
network, which shows that they considered propaganda to be an important
part of the struggle for colonial dominance that was taking place in the re-
gion. In the dawning age of modern media, a vital question in this respect con-
cerned how one might mobilise and use public opinion. This chapter will ex-
plore such notions by examining the structure of the pro-Boer movement in
the Netherlands during the South African War. The pertinence of these issues
is shown by the fact that the great boom in sympathy for the republics caused
problems for the organisations that advocated the ideal of stamverwant -
schap, with their leaders often having trouble directing the public agitation
along what they believed were the right lines.
In general, historians consider the nzav to be the most important pro-
Boer organisation during the South African War, because it was the oldest
and the largest.10The huge increase in membership after the conflict seems to
confirm this. In historiography, however, little attention has been given to
how the society actually functioned or how contemporaries reflected on this
question. In this sense, the primacy of the nzavwas not as straightforward as
it might seem at first glance. Internally, there was significant criticism of the
executive committee and their efforts to reach out to the public. In addition,
several other pro-Boer organisations emerged, which could point to external
competition for the nzav. Henk te Velde argues that the process of pillarisa-
tion, during which public life in the Netherlands was divided along ideologi-
cal lines, was one of the main explanations for this fragmentation.11 Al-
though the nzav’s executive committee was aware that the organisation was
considered to be a Liberal bulwark and did try to mobilise people from other
political groups, this was not as important an issue as it might seem at first.
What weighed more was the connection with the lines of communication
between South Africa and the Netherlands. Leyds was a central figure in this
network, and he worked closely with several Dutch pro-Boer organisations.
In addition, many Hollanders who returned from the Transvaal became ac-
tive propagandists in Europe. There was, however, an unchecked prolifera-
tion of other activities outside this network, and at times these caused signifi-
cant problems. There were examples of outright fraud by individuals who
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were trying to take advantage of the public’s massive enthusiasm for the
Boers. The situation was not always clear-cut, however, as bona fide initia-
tives were sometimes also considered to be harmful for the general Boer
cause.
Such issues will be further discussed in this chapter by examining three as-
pects of the propaganda campaign: the dissemination of pro-Boer coverage
of the war, the support given to emigrants and refugees and collections in or-
der to provide humanitarian aid to the inhabitants of the republics. There
was a certain degree of fragmentation in these fields, which worried many
prominent pro-Boers. In response to this, there were attempts to centralise
initiatives and encourage different organisations to co-operate more closely
in order to maximise their effect. It is difficult to assess the results of these ac-
tivities. At an institutional level, there were certain successes in streamlining
the pro-Boer organisations, but at the same time it is hard to assess the impact
on the general public. What is clear, however, is that contemporaries were
aware of the wider context of the propaganda campaign and the pitfalls of
modern media. Significantly, the main focus in this respect was not on domes-
tic issues – although these did play a role – but on the channels by which mate-
rial on the situation in South Africa was transferred and the way in which this
information was disseminated. This shows that the pro-Boer movement in
the Netherlands was not simply the result of a hysteric form of nationalism
but rather an exponent of a complex discourse on Dutch identity in the glob-
al context in the early days of mass media.
The nzav from within
The nzav undoubtedly remained the most important Dutch pro-Boer organi-
sation throughout the South African War. In August 1899, a successful ad-
dress to the British people was presented, written by J. de Louter, a professor
of law who was a member of the executive committee at the time. In 1881,
around 6,000 people had signed P. Harting’s petition against the annexation
of Transvaal; eighteen years later more than 140,000 signatures were collect-
ed to protest against the looming war. The address was sent to all major news-
papers in Europe, many of which published it, even in Britain.12Although the
address did not prevent the war, its outbreak was not unfavourable to the
nzav. The membership of the association grew from 1,663 at the beginning
of 1899 to 6,111 in December of that year. The executive committee consid-
ered this to be a result of the recruitment campaign that the society started in
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November of that year in order to increase the society’s activities in support
of the Boer republics. The willing co-operation of the national newspapers,
which published the nzav’s circular and encouraged their readers to join,
was also mentioned with much satisfaction.13 The activities of the nzav ex-
panded, too. Like the official representatives of the republics, the society con-
sidered propaganda to be an important means of helping the Boers from Eu-
rope. Moreover, a new ‘hulpfonds’ (aid fund) was started in order to provide
humanitarian aid to ‘those who suffer and those who fight’ in the Boer re-
publics.14 Before I treat these activities in more detail, this chapter will dis-
cuss the composition and character of the nzav and other organisations that
originated in the context of the burgeoning enthusiasm for the Boers during
the war.
The sharp increase of membership numbers of the nzav after October
1899, prompted questions concerning the structure of the society. The most
direct outcome of this was the establishment of local branches throughout
the country. At the beginning of 1899, the nzav had just four subdivisions; a
year later, this number had grown to 35.15 Looking at membership distribu-
tion, it can be said that the most active centres of nzav activity were urban
areas, where two-thirds of all members resided. Of these, Rotterdam, (706
members in 1900), Amsterdam (651 members) and The Hague (601 mem-
bers) were the largest.16 Branches in smaller communities mainly limited
their activities to organising lectures duringwhich newmemberswere recruit-
ed for the society and donations collected in aid of Boer victims of the war.17
Compared to branches in other cities, the activities of the one in Amster-
dam, which was established as late as March 1901, were rather limited. The
explanation for this can be sought in the fact that the executive committee
resided in the city too, which meant that there was not much left to organise.
There were also many other pro-Boer gatherings held in the city, so there was
no need to organise more lectures or meetings. The student branch in Amster-
dam struggled with the same problem, although there was a successful
fundraising campaign amongst its members in 1900.18 However, this group
did not submit any reports to the executive committee in the years thereafter.
The same problem was experienced with other student branches in Leiden
and Delft, which was explained by the fact that the committee and members
of these divisions consisted of a population that ‘by its very nature changes
completely every year’.19
Other branches were more active. The Rotterdam branch, which already
existed before the war, introduced proposals that reflected the mercantile
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character of this city. The businessman A. S. van Reesema was involved in
many of these schemes and unveiled several plans for improving commercial
ties between the Netherlands and South Africa, some of which were less real-
istic than others. During the early phase of the war, he revived a plan to estab-
lish a shipping route between Dutch harbours and Delagoa Bay. In combina-
tion with the nzasm railway, he argued, this would offer the best route for
mail services. More optimistically, he thought that it might later become an
important itinerary for Dutch emigrants, who he expected would flock to
South Africa, even if the British were to win the war.20He issued a prospectus
advertising stocks, to which 288 people subscribed a sum of fl. 88,800 and
donated fl. 3,886. Later during the war, however, it became clear that this
plan was unrealistic, and in 1903 Van Reesema informed his prospective
shareholders that the deal was off.21One of the initiatives by Rotterdam that
did materialise, however, was the establishment of an information bureau for
trade and industry with South Africa, the Bureau van Informatie voor den
Handel en Nijverheid met Zuid-Afrika.22 In 1901, plans were drawn up in
Rotterdam for a mortgage bank to help Afrikaners with reconstruction after
the war; this came into being the following year.23
In The Hague, the focus was on charity. The nzav branch there had close
ties with other local committees that helped the Boers. Frans Beelaerts van
Blokland was a central figure in this philanthropic network. As has been men-
tioned, this young gentleman joined a clandestine committee to smuggle vol-
unteers into South Africa on the invitation of H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge.24 At the
same time, however, Beelaerts van Blokland wrote a pamphlet in which he en-
dorsed the policy of neutrality followed by the Dutch government and called
upon the Dutch people to express their support for the Boers in peaceful ways
such as by making propaganda and donating money to organisations that
could relieve the needs of the Boer communities.25 In his view, humanitarian
aid was nothing less than a patriotic duty: ‘it is not benevolence that is expect-
ed of you [the readers]; now we have the opportunity to show the whole
world, what the Dutch people understand by doing their duty and supporting
their brothers in their struggle.’26 Beelaerts van Blokland himself was in-
volved in several fundraising initiatives as a member of the committee of the
nzav branch in The Hague (and later also of the national executive commit-
tee) and the Haagsche pro-Boer Vereeniging, a local charity. These schemes
included the sale of postcards with photos of picturesque South African land-
scapes and heroic Boer leaders27, a charity shop where gifts were wrapped in
special paper with a pro-Boer theme28 and an international art lottery in
1902 to which many famous artists contributed.29
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Besides an increase in activity by individual branches, there were more funda-
mental questions concerning the structure of the nzav after the great expan-
sion of 1899. Some local committees were of the view that power within the
association should be decentralised, and this was discussed often at meetings
between the executive committee and representatives from the various divi-
sions.30 At a general meeting on 26 May 1900, a lengthy dispute about
changes to the regulations took place. The Rotterdam delegates proposed
that article three, concerning the structure of the nzav, should state that the
organisation existed as the sum of its branches, meaning that the power of
the executive committee would be transferred to the larger subdivisions. Af-
ter much discussion, the meeting voted against this proposal. The executive
committee remained a body consisting of 15members, who were not allowed
to combine their positions with chairmanship of a local branch of the nzav.
The Rotterdam delegation did, however, successfully propose that the execu-
tive committee be required to meet with a council of the local presidents once
a year.31
Attempts were made to introduce greater diversity in the executive com-
mittee. During its early years, the nzav’s executive committee was dominat-
ed by members from Utrecht and Amsterdam, and the regulations initially
even stated that at least seven members were to reside in the latter city.32That
rule was abolished in the reforms that followed the meeting held in May
1900.33 All the major branches were represented in the executive committee
that was elected in 1901: Utrecht by professor J. de Louter, The Hague by
Frans Beelaerts van Blokland and Evert van Gorkom (a former resident of
Transvaal) and Rotterdam by A. S. van Reesema. Nevertheless, six of the 15
members still came from Amsterdam, meaning that members from that city
continued to exert a great deal of influence – the more so because the head of-
fice was also situated there.34 It seems that the calls for reform within the
nzav died down after 1900 or were at least no longer expressed as openly
anymore. Recruitment efforts continued, although these were unsuccessful,
which shows that the translation of public sympathy for the Boers into active
involvement remained a difficult issue for the nzav.
The most substantial attempt to attract new members took place in 1901,
when a special propaganda committee was established within the executive
committee. An open letter to the press was issued, signed by over 177 digni-
taries from all over the country, including politicians, mayors, academics,
medical doctors, journalists and businessmen. In the letter, unity was the key-
word. It was argued that the enthusiasm for the Boers should manifest itself
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in the form of strong ties between the Netherlands and South Africa that
would last after the war had ended. In order to achieve this, it was proposed,
a strong organisation was needed.
The Nederlandsch Zuid-Afrikaansche Vereeniging can be this kind of or-
ganisation, when many thousands of new members join her. […] Now she
can and must become a truly national organisation, with strong manage-
ment-structures, with branches throughout the country, in the colonies, in
Belgium and everywhere else where the Dutch live, and with an Executive
Committee in which all confessions are represented.35
In addition to this letter, the propaganda committee started a lecture tour fea-
turing Paul Schutte, a Transvaal Member of Parliament who had fled to Eu-
rope. One of the organisers described him as ‘one of the most steadfast and
civilised Boers that I know. And not unsuitable for speaking in public.’36
Despite all these efforts, the campaign was not met with much enthusiasm,
with only 234 new members joining the nzav in 1901: ‘a small increase’ ac-
cording to the annual report, and nowhere near the thousands of new mem-
bers the executive committee had hoped for.37 Most disappointing of all was
the result in the southern province of Limburg. In 1900, there had been only
twelve members of the nzav in that province, which meant that it was a pri-
ority to the propaganda committee. By 1902, however, that number had
dropped to a pitiful five.38 Discussing the plans for Schutte’s lecture tour in
the province, it was already predicted that he would experience something of
a culture shock, because the speaker would be arriving in ‘such a total strange
area, with a peculiar sort of people’. Moreover the Boer politician, who was
naturally an orthodox Protestant, needed to be prepared for the fact that the
local population was mainly Roman Catholic.39 Eventually the lecture tour
to Limburg was even cancelled, as several local officials made it clear that
there were already plenty of charities in the province at the time and that peo-
ple would not be interested in becoming members of the nzav.40
The discussion that took place within the nzav about its composition
shows that its primacy amongst the pro-Boer organisations in the Nether-
lands was not as clear as is suggested in secondary literature, despite the fact
that it was the largest and the oldest of them all. After the large increase in the
number of local branches at the beginning of the war, several of these local di-
visions developed their own activities and increasingly challenged the author-
ity of the executive committee, which was based in Amsterdam. Attempts to
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decentralise the nzav had limited results, however. This discussion should be
seen in the light of issues surrounding the ability of the society to mobilise the
public and attract new members. The campaign in 1901 did not bring the re-
sults that were hoped for, which indicates that the great increase of member-
ship during the first months of the war was a unique phenomenon. The prob-
lems that the nzav encountered trying to mobilise active support of the pub-
lic show that it, like other pro-Boer organisations, reflected on its position
within society and the changes that were taking place in domestic politics.
The question remains, however, whether such issues were the most important
considerations.
Pro-Boers and pillarisation
From October 1899, there was also an increase in pro-Boer activity outside
the nzav, which led to a variety of new organisations. One of the most no-
ticeable of these was the Christelijke Nationale Boeren Comité (Christian
National Boer Committee, hereafter cnbc). After a meeting of the Amster-
dam branch of the Anti-Revolutionary Party (the political party of the ortho-
dox Protestants) on 1 November 1899, a fund was started, which was later
converted into a society in February 1901, to become the second largest pro-
Boer organisation in the Netherlands with 4,000 members. It is tempting to
see the founding of the cnbc as being the result of pillarisation and the grow-
ing ideological divides in Dutch society. The executive committee of the
cnbc explicitly stated that it would focus on the religious ties that joined the
Netherlands to South Africa, which in practice meant that it only drew mem-
bers from the orthodox Protestant community. There were also strong con-
nections with the Anti-Revolutionary Party.41 It would be going too far, how-
ever, to see this initiative as an extension of earlier attempts by the Protestant
leader Abraham Kuyper to monopolise the pro-Boer movement, because he
was not officially involved in the cnbc.42Moreover, the executive committee
of the cnbc openly stated that it did not seek to replace the nzav but to com-
plement it. As such, it should be seen as an initiative to mobilise a sector of the
population that the nzav, which was generally seen as a Liberal bulwark,
found difficult to reach.43
The overlap between the two organisations can be illustrated by the fact
that several individuals worked for both. Significantly, one of the most active
members of the cbnc was H. J. Emous, a well-known figure in the pro-Boer
movement. This headmaster had already been active in several subcommit-
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tees of the nzav during the 1890s and continued this work throughout the
war and thereafter. In addition, although he was not elected, his name was on
the list of candidates that stood for election to the executive committee that
was chosen during the general meeting in October 1900.44 After the war, he
continued to be active for the nzav, becoming a member of the committee of
the Amsterdam branch in 1903 and finally being elected to the executive com-
mittee in 1906.45 In addition to this important personal link, the cbnc and
the nzav co-ordinated their efforts for humanitarian aid to the Boer war vic-
tims, a matter that will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. This
indicates that the two organisations overlapped significantly and cannot be
considered to have been competitors.
Apart from the good working relation with the cnbc, the issue of pillarisa-
tion was a difficult one for the nzav. The first article of the society’s statutes
stated that it was not allowed to influence the ‘moral or religious position of
the population here [the Netherlands]’.46 At the general meeting in May
1900, during which possible changes to the statutes were discussed, this topic
was not mentioned.47 It seems probable that Kuyper had found this sentence
to be a reason to once again refuse membership of the nzav when Middel-
berg had invited him to do so a few months after the war had started. The
Protestant leader felt that it did not offer enough of a guarantee that his de-
nomination would be represented in the society, and he feared that the Liber-
als would continue to dominate.48
Nonetheless, the nzav’s offer to Kuyper should be seen in the context of
further attempts by the executive committee to diversify its membership with
members of the various different ‘pillars’ in the Netherlands (although the So-
cialists were still excluded). In the spring of 1900, J. P. Moltzer announced
that he would step down from the executive committee in order to make
place for a Catholic, his colleague from the Raad van State (Privy Council), J.
P. R. M. de Nerée van Babberich.49 Despite this gallant gesture and the sup-
port of the executive committee, De Nerée van Babberich was not elected in
the general meeting that followed, that May.50 The following year the
Catholic sector of the population was represented in the leadership of the
nzav by W. H. Nolens, a Member of Parliament. This indicates that there
was an awareness amongst pro-Boers of the domestic political situation,
which should be considered in the light of attempts to mobilise the broadest
possible segment of the population. The sources reveal, however, that those
involved had other priorities.
In the historical debate on the political and ideological background of the
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nzav, the career of Gerrit Middelberg is often mentioned in order to illus-
trate ongoing Protestant involvement in the society. In 1912, he resigned as
president of the nzav to lead the Anti-Revolutionary Party in Parliament, of
which he had been a member since 1909.51 However, this account ignores
Middelberg’s earlier career, when he was a member of the municipal council
of Zwolle for the Liberals in the 1870s. It was only during his stay in Pretoria
that he gradually started to change his religious and political ideas under the
influence of the Boers and adopted more orthodox views.52 This did not
mean that he immediately enrolled in the Anti-Revolutionary Party after his
return in the Netherlands in 1899. In 1901, the nzav branch in The Hague
published a circular in which it gave advice on who to vote for when choosing
the executive committee, and Middelberg is listed there as a Liberal.53 More-
over, in his later life too, he considered himself to be more of a practical ad-
ministrator than a political or ideological heavyweight, and his career in Par-
liament was short-lived.54 This indicates that Middelberg’s political back-
ground was not an issue of vital importance to members of the nzav. Rather
it was his fame as a former director of nzasm in Pretoria and his apparent
knowledge of the situation in South Africa that were explicitly mentioned
when he was elected as chairman of the society in 1899.55 A further indica-
tion that considerations related to the local political situation were not of the
highest priority to the members of the nzav is provided by the circular from
1901mentioned above, which listed three requirements for the composition
of the executive committee. These included the desirability of including per-
sons of all political persuasions and from all the major cities. First and fore-
most, however, leaders of the nzav were to be ‘persons, who are thoroughly
acquainted with the situation in South Africa’.56
It cannot be denied that domestic politics and the process of pillarisation
were considered relevant issues by contemporary pro-Boers. In order to mo-
bilise as much of the population as possible, the nzav executive co-operated
with the cnbc and tried to broaden the composition of its membership with
people from various confessional groups and different cities. Despite these
points for attention, it seems the results were mixed and that it remained a
constant concern. The sources indicate, however, that there were other con-
cerns for the leaders of the pro-Boer organisations in the Netherlands, name-
ly keeping open the channels of information with South Africa. In this way,
people with close connections to this international network had an impor-
tant place within the pro-Boer movement. As has been mentioned in the pre-
vious chapter, Hollander emigrants who returned from South Africa often be-
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came active propagandists, and the diplomatic representation of the re-
publics also generated a lot of information. In the remainder of this chapter I
will assess how Dutch pro-Boer organisations related to these groups and the
wider propaganda campaign in order to support the Boers in South Africa.
‘A campaign of the pen’: the anv press office
The refutation of the British coverage of events in South Africa and the publi-
cation of accounts that put forward the Boers’ side of the story can be consid-
ered to be an important, if not the most important, activity of the pro-Boer
movement in Europe. Historians agree that Leyds propagated such views tire-
lessly from 1898 onwards and that his achievements on the psychological
battlefield were considerable in that his efforts helped to convince the majori-
ty of people outside Great Britain that the republics’ cause was just.57 The
widespread sympathy for the Boers also had its disadvantages, however. At
times, such as after the victories of sar and ofs forces in December 1899,
emotions became overheated and Leyds even tried to temper the euphoria.58
Another problem in this regard was that the gullible public became an easy
target for impostors who tried to cash in on pro-Boer enthusiasm. Through-
out the war, the sar legation issued warnings against men who collected
money by pretending to have fought for the republics or making false promis-
es to provide aid to the embattled Boers. Some swindlers could be easily un-
masked, like those who claimed to have been born in Johannesburg while the
town had existed for barely a decade when the war started.59 It was, however,
not always easy to distinguish between useful initiatives and harmful ones.
Leyds therefore sought contact with pro-Boer organisations to help him run
the propaganda campaign along what he considered to be the right lines.
One of the most important institutions in this respect was a press office cre-
ated by the Algemeen Nederlandsch Verbond (General Dutch Alliance, here-
after anv), a patriotic society that had been founded in 1896 and which was
based in Dordrecht.60 In terms of membership numbers – 2,002 in 1901 – the
organisation was significantly smaller than both the cnbc and the nzav dur-
ing the South African War.61 Nonetheless, its resourceful secretary H. J.
Kiewiet de Jonge succeeded in making it an important feature in the pro-Boer
propaganda network. His personal connection with Leyds, whom he met for
the first time in the 1880s, was quite important in this respect.62 When Leyds
returned to Europe as minister plenipotentiary, the two became better ac-
quainted, which was the start of a long and intimate friendship.63 In October
ii. war of words (1899-1902)154
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 154
1899, the first fruits of their collaboration became apparent when Kiewiet de
Jonge proposed to set up a press office for the Boers. Leyds thought this was a
splendid idea and went to Dordrecht at once to discuss the details.64
The press office became the most important pro-Boer activity of the anv
by far. It grew to be a well-known institution that gathered and distributed in-
formation that supported the Boer cause and countered the British coverage
of events in South Africa.65 It made Kiewiet de Jonge a prominent figure
amongst the pro-Boers, which in 1900 resulted in an invitation to join the ex-
ecutive committee of the nzav on which he was to serve for decades. Kiewiet
de Jonge’s connections illustrate that the press office of the anv was firmly
linked to both the official Boer representatives and other organisations that
propagated the concept of stamverwantschap and thus played a central role
in the network that extended between South Africa and the Netherlands.66
The co-operation between the press office and the sar legation in Brussels
remained close throughout the war, and Leyds became the main source of
funding.67 Initially, the anv took over some tasks from the overburdened of-
fice of the legation in Brussels, acting as an information bureau for people in
the Netherlands who wanted to know about the fate of their loved ones in
South Africa.68 In addition, it began distributing press releases.69 Soon it be-
came apparent that priority was to be given to the latter activity and the press
office dedicated itself to the gathering, publication and dissemination of pro-
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pagandistic material. The first, and arguably biggest, success was the produc-
tion of the pamphlet Eene eeuw van onrecht (translated as A Century of
Wrong). The original Dutch text, written by the sar State Attorney Jan
Smuts, arrived in Europe in November 1899 and was translated into English,
German and French.70 A less fortunate project, started at the end of 1899,
was the publication of an address arguing for intervention to all the nations
that had attended the Peace Conference in The Hague, the Beroep op de
natiën (Appeal to the nations). This plea was meant to be signed by digni-
taries all across Europe and to be published simultaneously in different coun-
tries. However, there were problems with the collection of signatures, which
led to the belated and uncoordinated publication of the pamphlet. As such, it
was considered to be a fiasco by those involved.71
Despite the varying results, the early activities of the press office were wel-
comed by other pro-Boer organisations. From the beginning, the nzav saw
the anv as an ally rather than a competitor.72 This was confirmed when
Kiewiet de Jonge asked for financial assistance in November 1899. His re-
quest was supported by the Utrecht branch of the nzav. The executive com-
mittee did not agree to a monthly allowance, which the anv asked for, be-
cause their contribution came from the funds of the nzav itself and not from
the money that was collected from the public, which was earmarked for hu-
manitarian aid. Nevertheless, during the course of 1900, fl. 10,000 was allo-
cated to propaganda and given to the anv press office and the Utrecht
branch.73 In addition, a further fl. 2,000 was given in 1902 after a proposal
from the Rotterdam and Hengelo branches.74
The co-operation between the nzav and the anv resulted in additional fi-
nancial support for individual pamphlets, which reached a considerable inter-
national audience. One was the publication of Abraham Kuyper’s article ‘La
crise Sud-Africaine’ which first appeared in Le Revue des Deux Mondes in
January 1900. The two pro-Boer societies provided funds for the translation
of the text into Dutch, German, English and Swedish.75Also, the distribution
of the three English pamphlets by Charles Boissevain – Open letter to the
Duke of Devonshire, Open Letter to an American Lady and A Great Crime
(an Appeal to the British Nation) – was actively supported.76 In August 1900,
a joint collection was organised to raise money for a Transvaal issue of the
magazine Hollandia, a periodical for Dutch emigrants, which drew much of
its readership from the United States.77 Another successful pamphlet was the
one about education in the sar, written by Nicolaas Mansvelt. With the help
of Kiewiet de Jonge it was published in four languages.78 By 1901, the anv
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press office had expanded considerably and in practice took over most of the
tasks from the Utrecht branch of the nzav, which ceased to be involved in the
production of propaganda.79
Kiewiet de Jonge was the driving force behind the activities of the anv
press office in its early years. There was only one permanent employee who
did editorial work: Bas Veth, a freelance journalist and artist from Dordrecht.
Otherwise, the organisation was rather unprofessional and casual. Occasion-
ally, there was money to pay for temporary staff who took care of administra-
tive jobs, but more often this was left to volunteers, whose amateurism at
times led to frustrations.80 It seems that these activities took a heavy toll on
the health of Kiewiet de Jonge, who – apart from running the press office –
was also headmaster of a grammar school, secretary of the regular anv and a
member of a secret committee to help volunteers who wished to go to South
Africa. Just before New Year’s Day of 1900, he suffered a nervous break-
down. The elderly professor J. P. Moltzer, with whom he was editing the text
of the Beroep op de natiën at that time, noted with fatherly concern how ‘it is
very good for him, such a mandatory rest, after the very busy period he has
been through.’81
But instead of slowing down, the activities of the anv press office only be-
came more frenetic during the first part of 1900. In April, problems with per-
sonnel grew when Veth left the press office to work for the sar legation.82At
the same time, activities expanded rapidly, illustrated by the fact that by
March 1900, the costs of distributing propagandistic material had risen to a
substantial sum of fl. 600 a month.83 The contributions of the nzav and the
sar legation were no longer sufficient, so funds were secured from private
donors, who Leyds suggested give their money directly to the press office.
This shows how by that time the organisation was considered to be an impor-
tant institution in the pro-Boer movement, which provided opportunities for
a more professional approach. Kiewiet de Jonge wrote to Leyds that it had be-
come desirable to find a permanent full-time editor for the press office, a pa-
triot who was fully committed to the Boer cause and, most importantly, who
was fully informed on South African affairs.84
A few months later, this wish was granted when Frederik Rompel took
charge of the anv press office. As has been mentioned, this former journalist
of De Volksstem left the Transvaal and returned to the Netherlands after the
occupation of Pretoria.85 His knowledge of the situation in the two republics
was considered a great asset by Kiewiet de Jonge, who was very satisfied
with his work.86 Rompel became a prolific author about the situation in
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South Africa and contributed to many magazines and newspapers. He also
published several pamphlets and books, including a volume of biographies
of Boer leaders that was published in Dutch, German and English and that
was to become quite famous.87 In addition, he produced the bulk of other
material as the editor of the press office. During the war, two press releases
went out to periodicals throughout Europe every day. These newsletters
mainly contained summaries of and excerpts from the most important arti-
cles that appeared in the papers. From time to time, the press office also pub-
lished original material such as interviews with refugees about their experi-
ences, letters from South Africa provided by private persons or reports from
the Boer generals in the field that had been received by Leyds’s office.88 The
anv also supplied information to journalists and authors of pamphlets on re-
quest.89
In this way, the press office gathered an extensive collection of pro-Boer
propaganda, which Kiewiet de Jonge and Rompel tried to distribute as wide-
ly as possible. To what extent they succeeded in doing this, however, remains
unanswered. Ulrich Kröll has noted that there are a number of problems in
assessing the impact of their campaign. First of all, the anv often asked the
newspapers not to mention its name when they took over news from the cir-
culars, which makes the identification of press office material difficult. It
should also be borne in mind that much of the news in the circulars was ‘sec-
ondhand’, meaning that it was taken from other newspapers. Many of the
major press offices were perfectly able to do that themselves and often had
more direct sources; as will be discussed later, it seems that this was particu-
larly the case in the Netherlands.90 Looking back on the early years of the
anv, Kiewiet de Jonge himself raised another point about the efficiency of
the press office. He argued that during the South African War the organisa-
tion was too young to cope with ‘an overwhelming amount of work’, and
that it was ‘impossible to organise and manage both internally and externally
at the same time’.91 In the following paragraphs, this complex question will
be assessed in more detail by examining the anv press office’s relations with
Dutch and international media.
Remarkably, the direct influence of the anv press office seems to have
been most limited in the Netherlands. This can be explained by the fact that
public opinion there was already firmly in the Boers’ favour.92 Another rea-
son was that Dutch newspapers received a lot of information from South
Africa independently.93 This seems to have made journalists in the Nether-
lands quite reluctant to tap into the stream of information provided by the
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anv press office, much to the disappointment of Kiewiet de Jonge. In 1900,
he tried to get more material published in large national newspapers. He
wrote letters in which he asked the nrc if they could publish more of his arti-
cles on economics and politics, while he offered Het Algemeen Handelsblad
personal accounts of war victims.94 Representatives of both papers thanked
Kiewiet de Jonge cordially for his offers but wrote that they could not guaran-
tee publication of texts provided by the anv press office. The editor from Het
Algemeen Handelsblad was the most frank, stating in his reply that the mate-
rial was often too long to publish.95
Kiewiet de Jonge’s failure to get material from the anv press office pub-
lished in Dutch newspapers should not obscure the fact that relations be-
tween the press and the pro-Boer organisations were very good in the Nether-
lands. Many journalists were members of the nzav, and newspapers already
published favourable accounts of the republics in the 1880s and 1890s.96
Also in quantitative terms, there was an upward trend throughout this peri-
od, meaning that an increasing number of articles about South Africa was
published.97 The start of the South African War led to an unprecedented
wave of news that swept the front pages of newspapers. During the years that
followed, the quantity of the material that was published dropped, which can
be explained by the fact that censorship was increased by the British and that
it became harder for correspondents to report on the guerrilla war, which was
scattered and unpredictable. Nevertheless, there seems to have been a sus-
tained interest in South African affairs in the Dutch press up to the end of the
conflict, more so than in Great Britain.98
The sustained attention for the plight of the Boers was not simply the result
of newspaper editors’ efforts to capture the issues of the day. From the start of
the war, they reflected on the broader meaning of their work, which was inter-
woven with the structure of information channels between South Africa and
the Netherlands. It was embarrassing to journalists in the Netherlands that,
because of the British monopoly on telegraph lines, they were dependent on
sources from London for the latest news about the war. Readers were there-
fore explicitly warned that these reports should not be taken at face value.
There was also an awareness that these telegrams were subject to censorship
by the British army. From the beginning of the war, news about British suc-
cesses was presented as exaggerated, while it was argued that Boer victories
were structurally downplayed by official correspondents.99 But Dutch jour-
nalists did more than that: they also published alternative accounts. Al-
though these often came from letters that reached the Netherlands weeks or
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even months after events had actually taken place, they were considered to be
important, as they enabled the public to make up their own minds about
what had actually happened in South Africa using information that was not
provided in the British sources. In the view of several newspapermen, this
was not only of significance for contemporaries but would also mean that in
the future, historians would not have to depend on British sources only.100
In this sense, the activities of Dutch journalists were compatible with the
work done by the anv press office. There were therefore many positive re-
sponses to the organisation. Already in the 1890s, some reformers within the
journalists’ union proposed the establishment of an institute that could refute
foreign newspapers who wrote about matters that harmed the interests of the
Dutch people, but this initiative did not yield any results.101The anv press of-
fice was therefore seen as a valuable contribution to public life in the Nether-
lands.102 In 1900, one editorial entitled ‘A Campaign of the Pen’ praised the
organisation for its work to ‘explain to the people the true state of affairs’.103
There was more than just praise, however, and on several occasions the press
actually did co-operate with the anv to mobilise the public for its initiatives.
In November 1899, for instance, an advertisement of Kiewiet de Jonge call-
ing on people to forward the private correspondence they received from
South Africa was published and explicitly endorsed by the editors of the
nrc.104 At the same time, there was a willingness to exercise a certain degree
of self-censorship, and at the request of the anv press office, the journalists’
union instructed its members to be careful with information that could ex-
pose Boer tactics.105 This shows that the fact that only a relatively small
amount of press office material was published in the Dutch media was not
the result of unwillingness. It was rather that newspapers in the Netherlands
on their own could acquire plenty of material that supported the Boers’ cause,
so that they needed little help.
At first sight, the situationwas quite different in other countries, so that the
anv seems to have had greater influence there. The massive number of press
releases with the transcripts of pro-Boer clippings was published not only in
Dutch but also in English, German and French. On one occasion, Kiewiet de
Jongewas quite positive about the effect of these newsletters, whichwere sent
tomajor newspapers throughout continental Europe. ‘A lot of what you read
in foreign periodicals, comes from us [the anv press office]’, he reported to
Leyds.106But here too, assessing the true impact of thework of the press office
is problematic. Besides the anonymity of the circulars and the fact that much
of thematerial was not fromoriginal sources, it seems that Leyds himself used
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othermeans to counter the British coverage of thewar in the continental press.
He was able to reach newspapers in France and Germany through his corre-
spondents Edgar Roëls and F. F. Eiffe respectively.107 Moreover, in August
1901 another press officewas establishedwith a special focus on the German-
speaking world, which can be seen as a competitor to the anv.
The plan for this organisation came from P. A. Nierstrasz, who in 1896
had started a publishing house called ,,Nederland”, which focussed on
Dutch-speaking readers outside the Netherlands and particularly in South
Africa, where he opened an office in Pretoria.108 When the war started, Nier-
strasz was forced to cease his activities in South Africa but became involved
in the pro-Boer propaganda campaign in Europe. One of his most noticeable
contributions was the Transvaal issue of Hollandia, a magazine that was
owned by the publisher. Another remarkable project was a series of postcards
featuring famous photographs of the war, which were sold to raise money for
pro-Boer charities.109On the surface, it appeared as if relations between Nier-
strasz and the anv were quite good. ,,Nederland” published the periodical of
the organisation, Neerlandia, and also the German translation of Rompel’s
book with biographies of Boer heroes. On closer inspection, however, there
seems to have been great personal animosity between Nierstrasz and the edi-
tor of the anv press office, information which reached Leyds as gossip.110
These tensions manifested themselves more clearly when Nierstrasz started
his own press office, funded by the sar legation.
In August 1901, Leyds gave Nierstrasz the green light to start with a new
press agency that would focus on the German-speaking world – Die Corre-
spondenz ,,Nederland”, a name that shows the strong link with Nierstrasz’s
publishing house.111 In a report on its first year, the publisher rubbished the
activities of the anv press office in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Rus-
sia. According to the report, the circulars from Dordrecht were amateurish
and because of their poor style and sensationalism ended up in the wastepa-
per baskets of serious newspapers without being read. ‘Evidently, being a pro-
Boer does not involve being a journalist, politician or diplomat!’, Nierstrasz
fumed.112
It is hard to discern Leyds’s personal opinion on the matter, as he barely re-
flected on the activities of the anv press office and Die Correspondenz ,,Ned-
erland”. What is clear is that he lavishly supported Nierstrasz’s initiative
from his secret funds. In April 1902, his secretary Dirk Balfourt, who co-ordi-
nated these payments, complained about the great expenses of this press of-
fice, which by then had received – and spent – fl. 26,222.113 Subsequently, a
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new agreement was signed in which Nierstrasz promised that he would cut
costs by no longer sending expensive telegrams and sticking to printed mate-
rial only.114 The war ended soon after this arrangement was made, but Nier-
strasz continued to work for Leyds, who forwarded him substantial sums of
money in the years that followed to cover his high expenses. Only in 1905,
when the ,,Nederland” publishing house went bankrupt, were these ties
cut.115
It remains difficult to get a sense of the real effects of the activities of the
pro-Boer press offices on the European continent. In the end it seems that
Nierstrasz mainly denounced the anv press office in order to obtain funding
from the sar legation. On the other hand, his report might point to more fun-
damental problems that pro-Boer organisations grappled with in their at-
tempts to get material published in newspapers. These were the result of a
lack of professionalism and the fact that their contacts were often informal.
The anv press office encountered these kinds of problems – and worse – with
its activities in Great Britain. Still, the London bureau was the only office out-
side Dordrecht that remained open after 1902. This would suggest that its ac-
tivities were considered to be the most important by those involved.
Besides trying to influence the continental press, the anv press office
aimed its arrows directly at British public opinion. To that end, contact was
made with correspondents for Dutch newspapers in London. They informed
the anv about public opinion on the war and helped them to distribute mate-
rial amongst opinion makers in Great Britain such as members of the press,
political elites and the clergy.116 More structural contacts were established in
May 1901when Kiewiet de Jonge was approached by M. van Beek, a Dutch
translator and private tutor in London, who was working for the most promi-
nent British organisation that protested against the war in South Africa, the
Stop the War Committee. In his function for the so-called ‘literature depart-
ment’, he had a close relationship with Harold Rylett, the editor of the radical
magazine New Age.117 It was arranged that the anv would start correspon-
dence with Van Beek in which they were to exchange material that could be
used in their respective campaigns. Moreover, the anv channelled a monthly
subsidy of £ 10, which was raised by a small group of people in the Nether-
lands.118 Absolute secrecy was needed because Van Beek feared that if it be-
came known that he, being a Dutch citizen, was working for the Stop the War
Committee, ‘surely they [the jingos] would have lynched me as one of
“Leyds’s or Kruger’s spies” and tried to storm our offices’.119 Despite all this
secrecy, the anv press office and Van Beek were in regular contact with one
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another, and much information about pro-Boer agitation in Britain reached
the Netherlands from this source.120
As is the case with other activities of the anv, it is difficult to assess the ef-
fects of this contact. On several occasions, the press office released public
statements that there were signs that public opinion in Britain was shift-
ing.121 In letters to Leyds, however, Kiewiet de Jonge was critical about the re-
sults, which were hampered because of the discretion that had to be observed
in contacts with anti-war propagandists in Great Britain.122Moreover, he did
not expect that the British public would be open to their views because it was
so ‘biased and partial’.123 Nevertheless, the anv press office remained active
in Britain after the war and, with Leyds’s backing, employed freelance corre-
spondents in London at least until the start of the First World War. Their
main task was to act as liaisons of the Dutch-speaking press in South Africa
by writing reports about how the British newspapers covered South African
affairs and by circulating material that supported the Afrikaner cause.124 It
therefore seems that the activities of the anv in Great Britain, although they
were performed under a cloak of secrecy, lasted the longest.
The anv press office played a central role in the propaganda campaign dur-
ing the South African War. It had close connections with both the sar lega-
tion and the nzav, and as such handled a lot of information that reached Eu-
rope via the pro-Boers’ lines of communication and turned it into publica-
tions. It remains hard to assess the actual effects of this work. On the one
hand, it led to the distribution of some of the most famous pamphlets, which
were read in substantial numbers. On the other hand, it seems that the infor-
mal nature of the office and its haphazard way of working limited its efficien-
cy considerably. Moreover, it is unlikely that newspapers depended on
Rompel’s press releases, and it remains unknown how much was actually
published from them. Nevertheless, contemporaries did express appreciation
for the activities of the anv press office. At that time, there was no other simi-
lar organisation in the Netherlands that was trying to feed the international
media with material that supported the interests of the Dutch as a race. The
case of the anv press office shows that the pro-Boer movement in the Nether-
lands actively reflected on the growing importance of mass media and tried to
develop institutions that could manage the flow of propagandistic material.
Such awareness was also apparent in other aspects of the pro-Boer campaign,
which will be discussed below.
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‘Practical support’ or ‘impractical plans’: emigration schemes
A remarkable development during the early stages of the war was the in-
crease in initiatives to promote emigration to South Africa. Before the fight-
ing started, the emigration committee of the nzav reported a sharp drop in
the number of people that wanted to go to South Africa: just 14 people
showed interest that year.125 The successes of the Boer commandos against
the British army in the Northern Cape and Natal in December 1899 led to a
wave of euphoria amongst the Dutch public, which temporarily changed this
situation. In January 1900, the emigration committee received letters from
134 people who wished to settle in the republics because they anticipated that
overall victory for the Boers would soon follow. Considering the dangerous
situation there, they were advised not to go, but seven adventurers went to
South Africa on their own accord. After the British victories of February
1900, the enthusiasm waned again and the emigration committee changed its
priorities to helping people that returned from South Africa.126 The prudent
attitude of the nzav emigration commission towards potential settlers dur-
ing the early stages of the war was in line with the policy of the Boers’ official
representatives. Willem Leyds often complained about what he considered to
be an exaggeratedly optimistic mood in the Netherlands after the first
battles.127 He advised against emigration to the republics because the majori-
ty of settlers would be hindrances to the commandos rather than useful
helpers. Only people who could contribute to the war effort, particularly ar-
tillery officers and couriers, were assisted by the sar legation.
There were, however, people who thought differently about these matters.
In December 1899, W. P. Noëls van Wageningen, the director of the Bataaf-
sche bank in Amsterdam, founded a pro-Boer organisation that promised
‘practical support’ to the Boer republics – the fonds tot daadwerkelijken 
steun. Its main aim was to recruit ‘strong young men’ who could take over
the work of ‘the housefathers, who went to war and died defending the inde-
pendence of their nation’.128 Because of the neutrality of the Netherlands,
they could not replace them on the battlefields but could take over other tasks
on the farms and in the towns. Noëls van Wageningen saw advantages for
those who went immediately, as they would have a head start on settlers from
other countries, who were expected to flock to the Boer republics when the
fighting was over. The fonds tot daadwerkelijken steun asked the public for
money to pay for the journey, equipment and a guide so that they could reach
the Boers safely.129 In a prospectus, it was announced that 500men had regis-
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tered for assistance, of which around twenty people had been selected for a
first expedition led by J. H. Junius, a former inhabitant of landlocked Trans-
vaal who claimed to be a naval officer.130 In addition to the emigration
scheme, Noëls van Wageningen published a periodical, Op! Voor Transvaal.
This magazine is known amongst literary historians for its doggerel, mainly
written by the ultra-Calvinist author Willem Zuidema.131Apart from provid-
ing its readers with mediocre rhymes, Op! Voor Transvaal also tried to mo-
bilise support for Noëls van Wageningen’s emigration scheme with fiery edi-
torials.132
From the start, the initiative of the fonds tot daadwerkelijken steun was re-
ceived cautiously by influential figures within the pro-Boer movement. After
a meeting with Noëls van Wageningen and Junius, Leyds wrote a letter to the
government in Pretoria in which he mentioned the scheme. He announced
that he had carefully expressed doubts about the Junius expedition but that
he was unable to stop it because he did not want to endanger the goodwill to-
wards the Boer cause. This, he continued, was an example of a wider prob-
lem – namely how to deal with the massive support for the Transvaal.
It is often difficult to lead the enthusiasm of the public in Europe, that ea-
gerly wants to do something for the Republic [sar], along the right lines,
and in many cases it brings forth the most impractical plans. And because
the plans are often executed before the people who know something about
the Republic are consulted, it is often difficult to answer them, as one does
not want to insult the people or pour cold water on their enthusiasm.133
The ofs Consul-General Muller also expressed his doubts when he met the
delegation of the fonds tot daadwerkelijken steun. This did not stop Noëls
van Wageningen from claiming in Op! Voor Transvaal that both of them had
been informed about the scheme from the start and pledged their full support.
Muller replied with a letter in which he complained about that statement.134
The next month, the two representatives of the Boer republics discussed
whether they should tolerate the emigration scheme any longer.135 Leyds end-
ed the silence. In an interview that appeared in the newspaper Het Vaderland
of 16 March 1900, he openly declared that neither he nor Muller had sup-
ported the foundation of the fonds tot daadwerkelijken steun. Although he
was not against the idea of emigration to South Africa in principle, he doubt-
ed whether the Boers actually needed new settlers who had limited knowl-
edge of South Africa at that time. He added that he had advised the Junius ex-
4. ‘A campaign of the pen’ 165
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 165
pedition, which by then had already left, to wait until more information was
available about the situation in the region and the prospects for settle-
ment.136 Noëls van Wageningen responded with a memorandum to the edi-
tors of all Dutch newspapers, in which he insisted that there had been sus-
tained contact between him and both Leyds and Muller, and that there had
been several meetings to discuss the details of the scheme.137
This led to growing suspicion amongst other pro-Boers not only about the
plans but also about the credibility of Noëls van Wageningen himself. The
young civil servant Frans Beelaerts van Blokland started a campaign against
the fonds tot daadwerkelijken steun. He himself was involved in many differ-
ent pro-Boer initiatives, including a committee that secretly supported volun-
teers who wanted to go to South Africa to join the republican forces. After
these activities were exposed in the press, Beelaerts van Blokland took upon
himself the task of informing the public about emigration to South Africa in
general. Via an old friend from university, he found out that Noëls van Wa-
geningen had circulated lists with names of people who he claimed were ac-
tive supporters of his scheme but in fact had only received a prospectus.138
Subsequently, Beelaerts van Blokland started to compile a dossier on the ca-
reer of Noëls van Wageningen, asking various people from the financial
world for information.
It appeared that Noëls van Wageningen’s claims that he was a banker were
true, but several of his colleagues reported that his business was moribund
and that there were persistent rumours that he had been accused of fraud on
several occasions, which had led to his dismissal from other positions. Some
informants even claimed that ‘Noëls’ had been added to Van Wageningen’s
surname recently.139 Beelaerts van Blokland did not keep this information to
himself. He wrote to several individuals who were associated with the fonds
tot daadwerkelijken steun and told them, which led to their withdrawal from
the organisation.140 He also warned them against other people involved in
the fonds tot daadwerkelijken steun, such as Zuidema, whom he described as
‘a man who had gone stark raving mad because of his hate of papists’.141
In addition, Beelaerts van Blokland undertook action to warn the general
public against Noëls van Wageningen and his plans. He did so in co-opera-
tion with Bas Veth, who at that time still worked for the anv press office.
They decided that the most authoritative statements against the fonds tot
daadwerkelijken steun were provided by Leyds’s interview in Het Vaderland.
This article was therefore published as a leaflet by the anv and sent to 568 pe-
riodicals, together with a reference to Beelaert van Blokland’s emigration
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committee in The Hague.142 In response, Noëls van Wageningen published a
circular in which he accused the anv of waging a campaign against him.143
Kiewiet de Jonge was at first alarmed by this pamphlet and asked Veth to
publish and distribute Noëls van Wageningen’s side of the story in order to re-
fute his allegations about the partiality of the anv. Veth managed to change
Kiewiet de Jonge’s mind, explaining that Leyds and Muller both agreed that
the press office fulfilled a useful task by ‘informing the public when it is at
risk, while at the same time referring to an institution where it can obtain
truthful information’.144
In April 1900, evidence from South Africa arrived that proved that the
scheme of Noëls van Wageningen was unrealistic if not downright fraudu-
lent. Newspapers published a letter by one of the men who had joined the Ju-
nius expedition. He described how, on arrival in South Africa, he and his fel-
low emigrants were forced to join the Boer forces despite the promises that
they were going to do peaceful work. Moreover, the unfortunate adventurers
had to pay the largest share of the costs of the voyage themselves.145 Another
letter from Pretoria mentioned the arrival of the ragged members of the Ju-
nius expedition, who were supported by a local charity and so wasted money
that should have been spent on the Boers themselves.146 This information ef-
fectively meant the end of the fonds tot daadwerkelijken steun, which disap-
peared from the annals of the pro-Boer movement.147Likewise, the magazine
Op! Voor Transvaal did not survive 1900, and the last issue appeared in De-
cember of that year. It appears that Noëls van Wageningen himself was 
ruined too, and in March 1902, he received a three-year jail sentence for
fraud while working as the director of a chemical factory.148 In this sense, the
campaign by Beelaerts van Blokland to warn the public against the dubious
emigration scheme of the fonds tot daarwerkelijke steun was successful. At
the same time, he was also involved in attempts to create another organisa-
tion, which became an instrument for the Boer representatives and the nzav
to inform the public about their views on the matter.
In December 1899, another new organisation to promote emigration was
founded: the Nederlandsche Emigratie-Maatschappij voor Transvaal en
Oranje Vrijstaat (Dutch Emigration Company for the Transvaal and the Or-
ange Free State, hereafter nem). It had similar goals as the fonds tot daad -
werkelijken steun – namely to support emigrants going to South Africa and
thereby help to continue the presence of the Dutch race in that part of the
world. Another similarity between the two organisations was that no mili-
tary goals were pursued: it was asserted that the Boer republics needed farm-
4. ‘A campaign of the pen’ 167
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 167
ers, artisans and entrepreneurs to keep daily life going.149 The main differ-
ence was that the nem was set up as an investment company that offered
loans and was not involved in the actual itineraries. The main initiator of this
project, the financial journalist Otto Kamerlingh Onnes, emphasised the
businesslike approach of the organisation, which tried to secure funds by sell-
ing stocks instead of asking the public for donations.150 Another difference
with the scheme of Noëls van Wageningen was that the relationship between
the nem and other pro-Boer organisations were much better. At a meeting of
shareholders on 19March 1900, Gerrit Vissering, a prominent banker from
Amsterdam, proposed that more co-operation was needed with the nzav –
of which he himself was a member. The underlying idea was that, in this way,
the emigration company would be able to work together with people who
‘possessed sufficient knowledge of Africa and enough trust in the Nether-
lands.’151
In April, negotiations between the nzav and the executive of the nem
started. Kamerlingh Onnes wanted to make arrangements for the society to
appoint two members to the board of the emigration company. Middelberg,
however, refused to approve the resolutions, which led to a delay.152 In May,
another proposal was made, but when Beelaerts van Blokland was consulted,
he was ‘not entirely positive’ either.153 This cool attitude indicates that both
Middelberg and Beelaerts van Blokland wanted to have a strong influence in
the organisation in order to ensure that no further rash adventures were un-
dertaken. Eventually this led to the establishment of a new conglomerate or-
ganisation, De Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot Handhaving van Stamver-
wante Belangen in Zuid-Afrika, which incorporated the nem. Kamerlingh
Onnes was appointed as president and Beelaerts van Blokland sat on the
board of directors as a representative of the nzav.
The prospectus of the new company indicated a radical change in its objec-
tives. It was argued that the initial foundation of the nem was to be consid-
ered the result of the ‘electric shock’ that had gone through the Netherlands
after the outbreak of war, which led to ‘[s]pontaneous manifestations of a
completely diverse nature’.154 However, further analysis led to the view that
the initial plan to help Dutch people emigrate to South Africa would proba-
bly be an extra burden on the Boers. Considering the advance of the British
army, priority was given to aid for refugees, which, it was argued, would be
far more effective for the time being. Looking at the technical aspects of the
statutes, the company retained its businesslike approach as a loans bank, but
it co-operated with the nzav in selecting the most feasible initiatives and suit-
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able individuals to strengthen the ‘rational development of Dutch inter-
ests’.155 In addition, the money was distributed by the established subcom-
mittees of the society.156 In this way, the new company was in keeping with
the policy that was laid out by the emigration committee of the nzav and the
official representatives of the Boer republics.
The cases of the fonds tot daadwerkelijken steun and the nem show that
prominent pro-Boers intervened at times in order to protect the public from
what they saw as misinformation about the situation in South Africa. It was
not always easy to assess the value of initiatives, especially during the hectic
first few months of the war, when public opinion was all ablaze. In this elec-
tric atmosphere, emigration plans were temporarily met with a strong re-
sponse, which led to some unrealistic initiatives such as the one by Noëls van
Wageningen. At first, the Boer representatives were very cautious not to in-
sult him, but he lost their goodwill by making false claims about their uncon-
ditional support. Beelaerts van Blokland took it upon himself to start a pub-
licity campaign, which eventually ruined the fonds tot daadwerkelijken 
steun. The case of the nem was different, because it had far better contacts
with the established pro-Boer organisations. Still, Middelberg and Beelaerts
van Blokland took no risks and replaced it with a new company with strong
institutional links to the nzav in order to secure control. This led to a revi-
sion of the company’s goals and instead of helping people to emigrate, it fo-
cussed on refugees coming from South Africa. This change is illustrative of
the response of the pro-Boers in the Netherlands to developments in the war
zone. Over the course of 1900, it became clear that the commandos were not
going to be able to keep the British army at bay, which was confirmed by the
occupation of Bloemfontein and Pretoria. Hopes of a swift victory melted
away, and instead priority was given to initiatives that would relieve the im-
mediate suffering of the Boer population. The following section will explore
how these humanitarian efforts were organised.
Fundraising
One of the most tangible results of the public enthusiasm for the Boers in the
Netherlands was the money that was raised for humanitarian aid to the war
victims in the two Boer republics. Looking at the figures of the most impor-
tant Dutch pro-Boer organisations, it can be concluded that they received
around fl.1.8million for that purpose. The nzav’s hulpfonds collected fl. 1.4
million of that sum, which confirms the prominence of the society in the
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Netherlands.157 On the whole, contemporaries considered the results of the
collections in the Netherlands to be a great success, and it was emphasised
that many segments of the population contributed to the efforts to relieve the
suffering of the Boers. Throughout the war, individuals from all walks of life
organised fundraising events such as bazaars, charity shops and lecture
tours.158 Even children did their bit, like the boy who collected fl. 12.50 for
the war victims at his sixth birthday party.159 Similarly, Leyds instructed his
wife not to buy their children presents for the celebrations of St. Nicolas in
December 1901 and instead to donate the money to the funds for the women
and children in the concentration camps.160
Despite the apparent satisfaction amongst those involved, the Dutch dona-
tions were dwarfed by the sum that was raised in Great Britain for war chari-
ty. There, approximately £ 6 million (at that time about fl. 72 million) was
collected by non-governmental organisations for humanitarian aid to the de-
pendents of the 22,000 fallen soldiers and 75,000 injured veterans for whom
little state care was arranged.161 Andrew Thompson demonstrates that the
success of this collection was far greater than those held during other colonial
wars, which he attributes to the great media exposure of the South African
War and the fact that an effective network of philanthropic organisations
had come into being nationwide.162 This indicates that the organisation of
fundraising was an important aspect of its overall success, something that
was keenly felt by contemporaries, also in the Netherlands. The widespread
enthusiasm of the Dutch public raised concerns amongst pro-Boers about the
proper management and efficiency of collections. One particular difficulty
was seen to be the fragmentation of the initiatives to raise and distribute mon-
ey to help the Boers. Although pro-Boer organisations tried to hide this prob-
lem behind a façade of unity, it was exposed on occasion. Prominent mem-
bers of the nzav therefore undertook attempts to centralise these efforts and
so to maximise the effects of the pro-Boer propaganda campaign.
The nzav clearly put itself forward as the dominant organisation in the co-
ordination of collecting money for the Boers in the Netherlands from the be-
ginning of the war. On 10October 1899, it published a confidential circular
about the plans for a new hulpfondswhich, amongst other things, mentioned
the need to send ambulances with the mediation of the Dutch Red Cross.163
This remark was not appreciated by the executive committee of that organi-
sation, which was about to start its own campaign to raise money for its activ-
ities in South Africa. The efforts of the nzav were considered harmful in par-
ticular, because the readers of the circular could conclude that the pro-Boer
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society was connected to the work of the Red Cross, which would give the im-
pression that its independence and neutrality, the founding principles of the
Geneva Convention, were imperilled.164 The nzav replied with a cheque of 
£ 4,000 (about fl. 48,000) and a pledge of a substantial amount of medical
supplies, which, according to another circular, were meant to remove all
doubts concerning the good relationship between the two organisations.165
Nonetheless, tensions continued to rise during the next few months be-
cause the successful collections of the nzav obscured the campaign by the
Red Cross. Some of these grudges spilled over into the pages of newspapers,
when local committees of the Red Cross complained about the dominant
presence of the pro-Boer society in the public sphere, overshadowing other
initiatives that aimed to raise money for the republics.166 In December 1899,
the conflict flared up once again when the president of the Dutch Red Cross
re-asserted its independence from the nzav in a letter to the executive com-
mittee. Furthermore, he remarked bitterly how in several places nzav mem-
bers had ‘publicly thwarted donations to the Dutch Red Cross’.167 Although
he expressed great personal sympathy for the nzav and what it stood for, he
wrote that these incidents had made it necessary for the Red Cross to distance
itself from the nzav.168 In an agitated reply, Middelberg denied the ‘improp-
er’ use of the name of the Red Cross and even threatened to withdraw the do-
nation of £ 4,000.169 This threat was not carried out, and in total the nzav
donated approximately fl. 80,000 to the Red Cross for its work in South
Africa during the war.
There remained a measure of mutual resentment, however, and relations
between the two organisations remained strained. In January 1900, there
was controversy over a donation by Dutch emigrants in the US, part of which
ended up with the nzav. The treasurer of the Red Cross published a letter in
the newspapers in which he demanded that the whole sum be handed over to
the Red Cross. Although the nzav was of the opinion that this was not in line
with the instructions from the US, the money was remitted in order to avoid
more ‘envy’.170 In a private letter, the treasurer of the Red Cross wrote that he
had not meant to cause any hard feelings but at the same time repeated the ac-
cusation that the nzav had started the trouble with the circular of October
1899.171 The harmful effects of the nzav circular were also reiterated in the
official report on the activities of the Dutch Red Cross published in October
1901.172This issue even led to an exchange of angry letters between the presi-
dents of the two organisations in the national press.173
Despite the fact that it was fought out in public at times, the polemic with
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the Red Cross did not challenge the prominence of the nzav fundraising cam-
paign for South Africa. The society also took a leading position in the net-
work that provided aid to the Boer war victims, which raised another diffi-
cult question: how was the money to be properly spent? To increase efficien-
cy, a dependable corresponding institution in South Africa was considered to
be necessary. Middelberg therefore responded enthusiastically when in Janu-
ary 1900, J. A. van Kretschmar van Veen wrote to him from Pretoria with the
proposal of starting a local organisation that could distribute money collect-
ed in the Netherlands – Het Nederlandsch Bijstandsfonds voor Zuid-Afrika
(The Dutch Assistance Fund for South Africa).174 Initially, the central com-
mittee was based in Pretoria and consisted of ten members – seven Hollan-
ders chosen by the nzav and three Boers appointed by the government of the
sar. Van Kretschmar van Veen acted as chairman. In addition, a subcommit-
tee was established in Bloemfontein which consisted of six members, includ-
ing several emigrants with roots in the Netherlands.175
The occupation of Pretoria, in June 1900, affected the Bijstandsfonds sig-
nificantly. Several Hollander members of the central committee returned to
the Netherlands, including Van Kretschmar van Veen. These new circum-
stances meant that the ties between the Bijstandsfonds and the nzav became
much closer, and delegates of the two organisations met weekly. Even more il-
lustrative of this close relationship is the fact that Van Kretschmar van Veen
joined the executive of the nzav. Members of the Bijstandsfonds in Pretoria
(eight in January 1902) implemented the policy set out by the delegates in
Amsterdam.176 The occupation of the Boer republics also caused problems
for the Bijstandsfonds because it was initially founded as a semi-official insti-
tution that had to account to the Boer governments, which by then had
moved into the field. To avoid British interference, the Bijstandsfonds
changed its constitution, making it a private charity. The subcommittee in
Bloemfontein, however, reported that the military authorities there demand-
ed more influence, and they proposed that British representatives be invited
to join the organisation in order to avoid trouble in the future. This plan was
resolutely opposed by the Pretoria committee, who even declared that they
considered the Bloemfontein subcommittee to be dissolved.177 In the end it
continued to exist, but only with two members.178
Not only the legal status of the Bijstandsfonds changed over the course of
the war, also its objectives had to be adapted. Themain purpose of the organi-
sation was to provide help to the Boer war victims, which Van Kretschmar
van Veen initially expected would not be necessary until after the hostilities
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had ceased.179 As the war lingered on, however, conditions amongst the civil-
ian population deteriorated and a large part of the collectedmoneywas spent
forthwith.With instructions fromAmsterdam, theBijstandsfonds committee
in Pretoria co-ordinated the distribution of Dutch humanitarian aid in the
whole of SouthAfrica and set up local committees in concentration camps.180
This policy was not uncontested. In 1901, B. A. P. van Dam, a former inhabi-
tant of the ofs who had returned to the Netherlands, wrote several letters in
which he complained about the lack of knowledge about his former country
of residence amongst the delegates of the Bijstandsfonds and the executive
committee of the nzav. He argued that money should be saved to help the
veterans and widows after the war instead of spending it on the people in the
camps, who were receiving enough help from the British. ‘At the moment
people are generously throwing the money into a bottomless pit.’181 Van
Kretschmar van Veen refuted these allegations, claiming that influential peo-
ple in South Africa applauded the immediate action of the Bijstandsfonds.
Moreover, he continued, the situation in the camps had made it necessary for
money to be spent there from a humanitarian point of view.182
Another complaint that came from Bloemfontein was that most of the
money went to the Transvaal, while the situation in the Orange River Colony
was at least as dramatic.183This reproach was not new to the nzav: at the be-
ginning of the war, ofs consul-general Muller already complained about the
society’s perceived favouritism.184 In 1901, he again asked the executive com-
mittee to look at this problem with reference to the letter from the Bloem-
fontein subcommittee, expressing the hope that an ‘arrangement’ could be
reached so that more money went to Bloemfontein.185 Van Dam was less
diplomatic and wrote bluntly, ‘Mr. v. Kr. [Van Kretschmar van Veen] takes
care of Transvaal. What does the executive committee [of the nzav] do for
the Free State?’186 Such remarks point to ongoing concerns by representa-
tives of the ofs that the Transvaal was eclipsing its sister republic in the
propa ganda campaign for the Boers in Europe.187 Although the nzav, to-
gether with the Transvaal representatives, argued that no distinctions were
made between the two republics, this issue seems to have caused significant
tensions throughout the war and even thereafter. In addition to these continu-
al internal problems, there were also external factors that caused concerns
amongst the leaders of the nzav about the effectiveness of their efforts to pro-
vide humanitarian aid to the Boers.
During the South African War, there was a proliferation of activities in the
Netherlands to collect money for victims of the war. Several of these initia-
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tives grew into charities that set up their own network for distributing aid to
destitute Boers all over the world. On the territory of the former republics,
the Bijstandsfonds was dominant, but there was also attention for people out-
side the war zone. In Cape Town, the Dutch consul-general B. H. de Waal co-
ordinated aid to pow camps on St. Helena and the Bermudas. Another impor-
tant agent who distributed humanitarian aid to several places inside and out-
side South Africa was Marie Koopmans-De Wet, a famous figure in the Cape
elite who also had warm ties with several prominent pro-Boers in the Nether-
lands, which had been the country of birth of her late husband.188 Inhabi-
tants of the former republics who ended up in Europe also received help. The
cnbc took care of Boer refugees who had been transported from Delagoa
Bay to Portugal. It also ran a shelter for Afrikaners in Amsterdam. There was
also much attention for the fate of the Hollanders who had been extradited
from the Transvaal by the British authorities. This group organised itself into
a committee that demanded compensation from the British, which was
awarded after intervention by the Dutch government.189 Other former ad-
ministrators received money from the sar legation. The elitist Transvaal
Comité in Amsterdam took care of the families of those fathers who had re-
mained in South Africa or had been imprisoned.190
These various initiatives and organisations made it hard to keep an
overview of all the activities that were undertaken, so further co-ordination
of the humanitarian aid to the Boers became desirable. Once again, it was
Van Kretschmar van Veen who took the lead in the efforts to centralise these
initiatives on his return to the Netherlands. In May 1901, a circular was sent
out to all known pro-Boer organisations in the Netherlands, signed by the ex-
ecutive committee of the nzav and the delegates of the Bijstandsfonds. It was
asserted that because of the great need for aid, ‘the energy and dedication of
more than a few’ were needed.191The decentralisation that had accompanied
the abundance of initiatives had clear disadvantages, however, because some
individuals received money from different sources at the same time and ‘peo-
ple who are less needy did not hesitate to make all too eager use of this’.192 It
was therefore proposed that a joint meeting with the representatives of pro-
Boer organisations be organised to discuss who would take care of what
tasks. In order not to inhibit the spontaneity, the independence of the various
organisations was guaranteed.193 This meeting came to be the so-called
Vereenigde Comités voor de noodlijdenden ten gevolge van den Zuid-
Afrikaanschen oorlog (United Committees for the needy due to the South
African war), a platform in which eleven of the most important pro-Boer or-
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ganisations participated.194 Representatives from all these organisations met
once a month, with Middelberg acting as chairman and Van Kretschmar van
Veen as secretary. These two men also had weekly meetings with the leaders
of the most important pro-Boer charities.195
It appears that the Vereenigde Comités contributed to a more effective
management of the humanitarian aid to the Boers in South Africa and else-
where. In the annual report of the nzav, it was noted that the administration
of the network was run at much lower costs.196Another effect of the centrali-
sation of the pro-Boer organisations in the Netherlands was that local chari-
ties in South Africa were asked to submit reports on how they spent their
money. In this way, a substantial number of letters about the situation in the
concentration camps was gathered. It seems that the co-ordination of this ac-
tivity was left to H. J. Emous who, as a founding member of the cnbc, at-
tended the weekly meetings of the Vereenigde Comités.197 Emous sent ex-
tracts of the reports to the Dutch press and thus tried to expose the ‘hypocriti-
cal violence on the part of England’.198 Throughout the second half of 1901,
newspapers published summaries of reports in which the hardships of the
people in the camps were mentioned; the more positive ones were left out.
When it appeared, early in 1902, that the situation in the camps had im-
proved structurally, these reports disappeared from the pages of the press.199
Encouraged by the apparent success of the Vereenigde Comités in the
Netherlands, Van Kretschmar van Veen tried to extend its activities to other
European countries. A circular was sent to the large foreign pro-Boer organi-
sations in which they were asked to join the platform and make money avail-
able for the Bijstandsfonds. Despite the fact that Leyds endorsed this initia-
tive, it did not have significant results. Some organisations donated a bit of
money and others asked for information about the situation in South Africa,
but none of them joined the Vereenigde Comités.200Another initiative to inte-
grate the pro-Boer organisations on the European continent was taken by
Kiewiet de Jonge and the French senator Louis Pauliat. In March 1901, they
organised an international conference in Paris after which the Union federa-
tive internationale pour l’indépendence des Boers (International Union for
the independence of the Boers) was founded.201 But this committee lacked
clout too, and aside from a few individual successes such as the lecture tour
by the former sar administrator C. G. S. Sandberg in France, it was not able
to co-ordinate many activities in other European countries.202 These exam-
ples suggest that the influence of Dutch pro-Boer organisations was not great
enough beyond the borders of the Netherlands to mobilise foreign funds for
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their own efforts to provide humanitarian aid to the victims of the war in
South Africa.
It has been argued in this section that the collections for the Boers should
be seen in the light of more general issues that arose from the pro-Boer propa-
ganda campaign. Contemporaries grappled with questions on how to mo-
bilise the public and how to maximise the effects of the money they spent on
humanitarian aid. From the start of the conflict, the nzav tried to assert its
position as the most prominent organisation providing aid to the Boers by
starting the hulpfonds and the Bijstandsfonds. Although there can be no
doubt that these were important institutions, there was also controversy sur-
rounding the way in which they operated. The Red Cross, for example, con-
sidered the nzav collections to be harmful to its own activities to raise funds.
Moreover, there was internal criticism on how the aid was distributed. Repre-
sentatives of the Bijstandsfonds in the ofs objected to the fact that so much
money was spent on direct aid to the concentration camps, while they felt
that it should be saved for after the war to help with reconstruction. In addi-
tion, they accused Van Kretschmar van Veen of favouring Transvaal charities.
Such tensions, in combination with the chaotic state of affairs resulting from
the proliferation of organisations that collected money for the Boers, made it
desirable to centralise these efforts. This was achieved in the Netherlands by
the Vereenigde Comités, a platform for all major pro-Boer charities. This in-
stitution succeeded in lowering administration costs during the second half
of 1901 and also provided the press with material about the concentration
camps. But the domestic success of this plan could not be repeated on an inter-
national level, which indicates that the influence of the Dutch pro-Boer agita-
tion was limited.
Conclusion
The enormous enthusiasm for the stamverwanten that resounded through
the Netherlands in the years around 1900 was apparent to contemporaries,
just as it is to historians today. But contrary to what one might think, such
public emotions were not always considered unproblematic by the leaders of
the pro-Boer movement. Established bodies such as the legation of the sar
and the nzav tried to direct public enthusiasm, claiming that they were best
equipped to take care of the needs of the Boers. They were aware of the limit-
ed options of the Netherlands as a neutral nation, a principle that they gener-
ally accepted. Moreover, domestic issues such as regional rivalry and pillari-
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sation were seen as factors that influenced the effective mobilisation of the
public for the Boer cause. It has been argued in this chapter, however, that
these considerations did not play as dominant a role in the propaganda cam-
paign as has been suggested by some historians. First and foremost, the pro-
Boers’ priority was the management of the lines of communication that ex-
tended between South Africa and the Netherlands in order to provide an al-
ternative to the British coverage of the South African War and to generate ma-
terial support for the embattled republics. At times, the massive public enthu-
siasm was considered to be problematic in this respect because the estab-
lished pro-Boer institutions lacked a clear overview of all the spontaneous
outbursts of sympathy, which made it hard to distinguish between useful ini-
tiatives and harmful ones. This is why several organisations were founded
during the course of the war in order to streamline efforts to help the Boers.
One of the most noticeable of these institutions was the anv press office,
which was closely linked to the nzav and the diplomatic representatives of
the Boer republics. As such, it handled much of the information that reached
Europe from the Boers in South Africa and turned it into propagandistic ma-
terial such as press circulars and pamphlets. Although it remains unclear to
what extent these texts were actually taken up and used by the media, there
was widespread appreciation in the Netherlands for this ‘campaign of the
pen’. Another example of how pro-Boers intervened in order to influence the
public took place after the euphoria of December 1899, when several emigra-
tion schemes emerged that were unrealistic, if not outright fraudulent. Frans
Beelaerts van Blokland – in co-operation with the anv, the nzav and Boer
diplomats – led a campaign against the untrustworthy fonds tot daadwerke-
lijken steun and took over another emigration company in order to establish
a reliable source of information for the public. A final headache for the nzav
was the organisation of humanitarian aid to the Boers. Although it ran the
most important pro-Boer charity, there was criticism on its conduct, both ex-
ternally and internally. It was J. A. van Kretschmar van Veen, a Hollander
who had returned from Pretoria, who led the centralisation of the collections
and the distribution of aid that resulted in the foundation of the Vereenigde
Comités.
The cases mentioned in this chapter reveal that the pro-Boer movement in
the Netherlands often relied on improvisation due to the haphazard organisa-
tion of its institutions, which was particularly apparent when compared to
the British lines of communication with South Africa. Significantly, contem-
poraries in the Netherlands were aware of such problems and tried to find so-
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lutions. They clearly considered propaganda to be an important feature of
the South African War, and although it is difficult to draw conclusions about
the actual impact of the campaign, this demonstrates its historical signifi-
cance. As such, pro-Boer enthusiasm in the Netherlands was not simply a
temporary fit of hysteria but should be considered in the context of the rise of
mass media and the globalisation of information in the age of modern imperi-
alism. This chapter and the previous one have described how a large amount
of information was transferred from South Africa to the Netherlands. Dutch
organisations attempted to distribute this material in order to influence pub-
lic opinion in Europe on the events taking place in the war zone and to mo-
bilise support for the Boers. Such views were published in a great variety of
genres and distributed amongst people from all walks of life. The following
two chapters provide an analysis of the contents of these sources and how the
South African War was depicted.
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Chapter 5
‘Dum-dums of public opinion’: Pro-Boer propaganda, 
October 1899-June 1900
The public outcry against the South African War is generally seen as the cli-
max of the pro-Boer movement in the Netherlands. The struggle by the Trans-
vaal and the ofs against the British Empire was immortalised on countless
pages and in many genres. Historians tend to see this dazzling amount of
source material as the result of a unique and temporary phenomenon in
Dutch history during which public opinion was captured by a form of mass
hysteria.1 Literary scholars also have trouble interpreting the enormous wave
of propaganda that flooded the Netherlands during the war. Writing in the
1910s, the Afrikaner literary critic G. Besselaar thought that only two works
of the large collection of ‘gunpowder texts’ were worth reading.2At the cente-
nary of the South African War, Ena Jansen and Wilfred Jonkheere compiled a
more substantial volume with excerpts from Dutch sources about the con-
flict, both in High Dutch and in Afrikaans. In the introduction, they rightful-
ly note how the sheer number of texts and the diverse backgrounds of the au-
thors – who ranged from well-known writers in Amsterdam to farmers’
wives in the Karoo – made this corpus quite ‘chaotic’.3
The literature on the conflict in the Netherlands was indeed a hotchpotch;
different authors wrote about different aspects of the war, expressing them-
selves in different genres. In the following two chapters, the leitmotivs in this
heterogeneous mass of historical sources will be highlighted. This chapter
will discuss the coverage of the period up to the occupation of Pretoria, dur-
ing which the largest battles took place; the following chapter will discuss the
coverage of the guerrilla phase of the war. I have argued in the preceding
chapters that the lines of communication between the Netherlands and South
Africa came under mounting pressure during the conflict but that informa-
tion from the war zone continued to trickle through.4 In this sense, there was
continuity with the avenues of information that were set up in the 1880s and
1890s. Likewise, the contents of the debate should be seen in line with the
feelings of stamverwantschap that took shape during the pre-war period.5
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First of all, there were ambivalences towards both sides in the war. The
Boers seemed to be well adapted to fighting a modern war but at the same
time showed fundamental weaknesses in their overall strategy. Likewise, de-
spite condemnation of the British military presence in South Africa, there was
a certain amount of sympathy for the common soldiers who were ordered to
fight and die in a war they did not ask for. But despite these nuances, the
South African War was fundamentally seen as being the result of the great
struggle for colonial dominance between the Dutch and British ‘races’ in
South Africa, something that was considered to be the leading theme of the
nineteenth-century history of the region. In that light, people in the Nether-
lands clearly took the side of the Boers and condemned the conflict as a delib-
erate attempt by imperialist statesmen to quash all resistance to their expan-
sionist plans, not hesitating to use the most unscrupulous means available.
Dutch commentators constantly accused the British army of atrocities on and
off the battlefield, and the war was seen as a new episode in the history of the
oppression of the Afrikaners that had started in 1806. To pro-Boers, this
showed the downsides of modern capitalism and imperialism: the ‘ravenous
hunger’ (geeuwhonger) and the arrogant cruelty of ‘perfidious Albion’ (het
perfide Albion). By contrast, the conduct of the Boers was considered to be
noble on the whole.
As with all propaganda, the Dutch account of the events that took place in
South Africa between October 1899 and June 1902, certainly cannot be tak-
en at face value. Contemporaries seem to have been aware of their biases to
some extent but did not always consider them to be a problem. On the con-
trary, many publicists saw it as their duty to disseminate material about the
South African War that highlighted the Boer perspective. British anti-Boer
propaganda was seen as being part of the effort to strangle the Transvaal and
the ofs, and the wave of pro-Boer publications that flooded the public on the
European continent should be seen as a direct response to this perceived
threat. How successful this was remains a question. On the one hand, propa-
gandists did influence public opinion outside Great Britain to a large extent,
but on the other hand they did not succeed in convincing European govern-
ments to intervene in the conflict.6 These limitations were acknowledged in
contemporary sources, but it was nevertheless argued that the agitation was
vital to the Boer cause. In this sense, propaganda in Europe was seen as an ex-
tension of the war in South Africa. At times, Dutch commentators even used
military metaphors to describe the efforts to counter the British coverage of
the war. For example, a volume with pro-Boer cartoons appeared with the ti-
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tle Dum-dums of public opinion, in reference to the expandable ‘dum-dum’
bullets that the British were accused of using against the Boers.7 The propa-
ganda was considered to be important in an even wider sense. Several publi-
cists asserted that they were providing future historians with material so that
they would not have to depend on British sources alone.8
Although contemporaries were generally aware that they stood too close
to the events that were unfolding to write a balanced account, they neverthe-
less attached much value to these efforts, which they thought might be of use
in South Africa later on. As has been shown, the sums that were collected for
the burghers during the South African War were initially earmarked for re-
construction of the republics after the conflict had ended. Similarly, the nu-
merous publications describing British atrocities and Boer heroics were seen
as an essential asset in the preservation of the Dutch cultural element in South
Africa, because these stories would help to strengthen Afrikaner identity.
This clearly shows that the interest taken by the public in the Netherlands in
the war – and the wave of publications that was resulted from it – were not
simply symptoms of collective hysteria but touched on Dutch notions of cul-
tural identity and racial kinship in a global setting. This chapter and the next
will discuss the coverage of the war in the context of these issues.
‘We know so well how you drifted into this war …’
In the run-up to the South African War, there was a lively discussion about
the causes of the conflict. The outbreak of hostilities came by no means as a
surprise to observers, both in the republics and in the Netherlands. Even
though the Boers started the war, invading the Cape and Natal after issuing
an ultimatum, it was generally seen as the result of attempts by the British to
dominate the Dutch element in South Africa and was thus aligned with events
such as the Great Trek and the Transvaal War of 1880-1881. Moreover, the
government in London had already despatched a large expeditionary force to
South Africa, which was considered by the public in continental Europe to be
a hostile act.9 Meanwhile, several Boer statesmen wrote pamphlets to reveal
the historical injustice they were facing. As tensions rose, the Boers and their
supporters in Europe did not shy away from framing the conflict in South
Africa in terms of a struggle between good and evil. At first sight at least, the
crisis seemed to obscure the ambivalences and contradictions of stamver-
wantschap.
In August 1899, Piet Joubert, commander-in-chief of the Transvaal, pub-
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lished an open letter to Queen Victoria (in English) in the Johannesburg news-
paper The Star. Despite Joubert’s reputation as one of the most prominent po-
litical enemies of Paul Kruger and his Hollanders in the sar, a Dutch transla-
tion instantly appeared in the Netherlands. Joubert’s description of the Boers
was rather exalted, comparing the Voortrekkers with the people of Israel,
chosen by God to establish their republics in the middle of the African ‘wilder-
ness’ to bring ‘civilisation’ there. He ended with a polite call upon the queen
and the people of Great Britain to stop statesmen like Chamberlain from at-
tacking the republics, thereby tarnishing the reputation of their nation.10 In
addition, a letter from sar Secretary of State F. W. Reitz to his counterpart in
the ofs, P. J. Blignaut, found its way to a publisher in the Netherlands. Reitz
lamented the aggressive strategy followed by the British, who would do any-
thing to get their hands on the goldfields of the Rand, the South African
equivalent of Naboth’s vineyards from the Old Testament. Continuing to use
Biblical terms of reference, Reitz prophesied that God would be on the side of
the Boers and help them withstand the imperial forces on the battlefield.11
The most famous – and most radical – of these pamphlets from South
Africa was A Century of Wrong by Jan Smuts, the young state attorney of the
Transvaal.12 Despite his upbringing in the Cape and his education at Cam-
bridge University, which initially made him sympathetic towards the British
cause, Smuts was deeply shocked by the Jameson Raid and opposed growing
British pressure on the Boer republics.13 In September 1899, he wrote a pam-
phlet that was intended to arouse his fellow Afrikaners to join the republics.
The sar government also thought it suitable for publication in Europe and
the US and sent it to the diplomatic legation in Brussels, where it arrived in
November of that year.14 It became one of the most famous pro-Boer publica-
tions in the Netherlands, despite the fact that Smuts, who was sceptical about
the political influence of Hollanders, did not write it with that audience in
mind. He argued, for instance, that the Prince of Orange had ‘sold’ the Cape
in 1814, which offended several Dutch critics.15
Nonetheless, there was much praise for his vivid description of the ‘wrongs’
the British had inflicted on the Afrikaners throughout the nineteenth century
as well as of the ‘native’ and the Uitlander questions. In general, the account
followed the work of historians like GeorgeMcCall Theal, which Smuts sup-
plemented with his own experiences in order to counter the allegations made
by Chamberlain concerning the ill treatment of Uitlanders by the Boers.16To-
wards the endof his historical overview, the youngpolitician lost his academic
tone somewhat. In the conclusion he sketched estranging visions, portraying
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Britain as ‘this gentle and kind-hearted Mother of Nations, […] wrapped in
all the panoply of her might, riches, and exalted traditions’, who approached
the small population of the republics, ‘the little child, grovelling in the dust’,
with a sharp knife in her hands. ‘This is no War – it is an attempt to Infanti-
cide.’17 In Smuts’s view, the violent onslaught on the Boers was not only
morally wrong but threatened the very existence of white settlement in South
Africa because the British were not capable of withstanding the black majori-
ty alone. He continued with a ghostly dream in which the onlooker saw:
Bantu children playing amongst the gardens and ruins of the sunny south
around thousands of graves in which the descendants of the heroes of Faith
and Freedom lie sleeping. […] And when the question is asked – why all
this has happened? […] An invisible spirit of mockery answers, ‘Civilisa-
tion is a failure; the Caucasian is played out!’18
Not only Afrikaner authors wrote to protest against the outbreak of the
South African War; many people in the Netherlands also could not keep their
indignation to themselves. Throughout the country, churches organised
prayer meetings for the Boers. Several of these sermons were published and
show how the ministers called upon their flocks to Continue praying for the
Transvaal!19 Prominent publicists joined these pious protests. The journalist
Charles Boissevain aimed his arrows directly at British opinion makers. In his
Open Letter to the Duke of Devonshire, he accused them of deluding the
public with anti-Boer rhetoric.20 His pamphlet was known in the Nether-
lands too, and the full text – in English – appeared on the front page of Het Al-
gemeen Handelsblad, of which he was editor-in-chief.21 Writing the text on
Christmas Day 1899, Boissevain poured out his indictment in exalted terms:
We know so well how you [the British] drifted into this war … we know so
well what this cruel unrighteousness means for each of those armed peas-
ants, those husbands and fathers, who sacrifice their lives for their inde-
pendence, that we could wish for ignorance, so that our eyes might be shut
and our hearts hardened. But we cannot … we see, we know and we ap-
peal to God Almighty for justice.22
An opinion maker on the other side of the political spectrum, the Calvinist
leader Abraham Kuyper, also wrote a famous pamphlet in defence of the Boer
cause which appeared in French on the pages of the influential international
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magazine Revue des Deux Mondes in February 1900. Soon after that, it was
translated into English, Dutch, German and Swedish and published as a sepa-
rate pamphlet.23 The publication was a great success – Kuyper received a per-
sonal compliment from Queen Wilhelmina herself; no less than sixteen edi-
tions appeared of the English translation of the pamphlet alone, and even his
political opponents in the Netherlands praised the text.24 The historian Ger-
rit Schutte has called this brochure ‘a masterpiece of propaganda’ in which
the case for the Boers was elucidated in a ‘scholarly’ fashion.25As such, it was
an important contribution to the pro-Boer campaign. Kuyper gave an
overview of the race issue that largely followed the lines of otherDutchworks
on the nineteenth-century history of South Africa, supporting ideas on the in-
feriority of black people and pointing out the machinations of British states-
men.Moreover, while writing, the author was in direct contact with represen-
tatives of the sar and the ofs, who provided him with source material and
also read the proofs.26 Chris van Koppen, however, has pointed out that the
pamphlet was Kuyper’s only contribution to the propaganda campaign and
should therefore be considered to be an exception to the otherwise troubled
relationship between the Protestant leader and the pro-Boer movement.27
This sort of unity seems to have beenwidely present during the firstmonths
of the South African War. In the heat of the moment, domestic tensions fell
away and people in the Netherlands rallied firmly behind the Boer cause.
Both Boissevain and Kuyper were attacked by Yves Guyot, editor of the
French magazine Le Siècle, and they both replied with similar indignation,
claiming that Guyot did not have the same knowledge of South African af-
fairs as authors in the Netherlands. The two Dutch opinion makers prided
themselves in the fact that they had better access to information and that they
backed their pamphlets with solid evidence based on documented research.
In his bombastic style, Boissevain accused Guyot of being ‘plus Anglais que
[les] Anglais’ and argued that he lacked the slightest knowledge of ‘the small,
free people [the Boers] that he denounced in favour of the great gobbler
[Great Britain]’.28 In a brotherly gesture, theDutch press took the side of their
two colleagues against ‘that silly Frenchman’, who had been accused of ma-
nipulating the news in favour of the British from the beginning of the war.29
The view that the South African War was the outcome of a ‘century of
wrong’ was also apparent in less elitist publications, which is another indica-
tion that it was generally accepted in the Netherlands. The popular writer
Louwrens Penning started writing a series of three books in which he de-
scribed the war as it was unfolding. The first was published in 1899, the last
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in 1903. In the first issue, he gave an overview of South African history from
Slachtersnek onwards and the ‘foolish native policy of England [in the Cape]
that pampered the Kaffers and oppressed the Boers’.30 Penning’s work cer-
tainly cannot be considered to be an unbiased or trustworthy depiction of
South Africa’s history, but it was not all made up either. His chronicle of the
war was based on sources like letters that reached Europe and were published
in newspapers.31 The fact that he received material from the anv press office,
such as press circulars and the gazettes from the republics, is further evidence
of his close connection with Boer lines of communication.32Nevertheless, his
style was emotive and he certainly did not attempt to give a balanced account
of events. In addition, his work contains many factual errors and where he
lacked information, he seems to have filled the gaps with imaginary scenes. In
addition, between 1900 and 1904, Penning wrote seven novels about the
South African War in which he placed fictitious characters in real battles.33
His varied work reflects the haphazard contents of pro-Boer propaganda: a
set of highly biased – and sometimes contradictory – views on the South
African question in which it is often hard to separate fact from fiction. De-
spite these shortcomings, or maybe because of them, Penning’s work was
massively popular. The first volume of his chronicle sold 40,000 copies,
which was quite remarkable for the Netherlands at that time.34
With due satisfaction, Penning noted that the feelings of stamver-
wantschap were at their peak at the end of 1899, both in South Africa, where
the burghers of the sar and ofs stood together, and in the Netherlands,
where domestic partisan interests seemed to melt away.35 Apart from these
apparent signs of racial unity, however, there remained tensions and ambiva-
lences that spilled over onto the pages of pro-Boer writings too. As has been
mentioned in chapter 4, the most noticeable result of the renewed interest in
the situation in South Africa was a huge rise in membership of the nzav and
the numerous initiatives undertaken to help the ‘cousins’ in the republics. But
just as the increased number of activities posed problems for the leaders of
the movement, who had difficulty co-ordinating these efforts, there was a va-
riety of different views on the war. People in the Netherlands still had ambiva-
lent ideas about their relationship with the Boers and the future of the Dutch
race in South Africa, which was clearly a continuance of the way of thinking
before October 1899. Throughout the South African War, the public in the
Netherlands oscillated between fear and hope about the outcome of the con-
flict and the question of which group of white colonists would become domi-
nant in the region, largely reflecting the fickle ideas about stamverwantschap.
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‘Afrika for the Afrikaner’?
Many pro-Boers saw a united and ‘free’ South Africa – from the Zambezi to
the Simons Bay – under Dutch rule as a possible outcome of the war. The mot-
to ‘Afrika voor den Afrikaner’ (‘Africa for the Afrikaner’) was therefore a
popular phrase at the time.36 In the light of the military and political situa-
tion, it was considered of great importance that the Afrikaners of the Cape
join the Boer cause. Most of the white inhabitants in South Africa lived there,
the majority of whom where Afrikaners, so that the combined Dutch-speak-
ing population actually outnumbered the British settlers. Moreover, if the in-
habitants of the Cape took up arms against the British Empire, this would
add greatly to the military might of the Boer republics, not only in numbers
but also because it would open a second front line. Some observers thought
that this would cause the British army so much trouble that the public at
home would force the government in London to order a retreat.37 Despite
these high hopes, only a small number of Cape Afrikaners actually joined the
commandos. Dutch commentators thought this to be the result of fundamen-
tal problems in the colony that stood in the way of unification. They argued
that because of English influences, particularly in the educational system of
the Cape, many Afrikaners there had become alienated from their kinsmen in
the republics and had developed sympathy for the imperial cause. This was a
topic of discussion in several novels and stories about families that were torn
apart by the different allegiances of family members, some joining the British
and some the Boers.38
Correspondents in Cape Town who wrote for the press in the Netherlands
also pointed to political barriers that prevented the Afrikaners from affiliat-
ing themselves with the Boers. There was a degree of disappointment about
the attitude of the nationalist leaders. Despite Jan Hofmeyr’s swing away
from Cecil Rhodes in 1896 and the electoral victory of his Afrikaner Bond in
1899, he had to walk a thin line, given the tense situation in South Africa. He
tried to find a political solution in the run-up to the war, and he openly ex-
pressed his regret for the stubbornness of the Boer governments when the
conflict started. In April 1900, an Afrikaner correspondent wrote to defend
this cautious position, saying that Hofmeyr had tried to achieve Dutch unifi-
cation through peaceful means and denounced the war that was to bring so
much grief. Not all commentators in the Netherlands found this convincing
and thought that it was unrealistic ‘to expect that they [the Boers in the re-
publics] continue to see Hofmeyr as a true friend’.39 In contrast with his polit-
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ical actions, Hofmeyr’s magazine Ons Land contained more unambiguous
pro-Boer accounts, which provided an alternative to the coverage of the war
in the British jingo press, protested against atrocities committed against the
republics, and critically assessed local politics. Because the mail services from
the Cape Colony were more reliable than from the republics, the press in the
Netherlands gratefully used this magazine as a source. Later on during the
war, Ons Land became less influential because of the increasing censorship
imposed by the British authorities, who in 1901 arrested several editors and
forbade the publication of editorials.40
Such measures were considered to be part of a wider campaign by the Mil-
ner government to quash all possible resistance in the Cape. Correspondents
wrote in similar terms about the harsh treatment of Afrikaners fighting for
the Boer commandos, who were considered to be rebels and thus risked the
death penalty.41 Despite the gravity of the situation, many pro-Boers in the
Netherlands continued to nurture the hope that the Afrikaner population
would be able to cast off the oppressive yoke of the British administration. At
the end of 1900, news about meetings by Afrikaner nationalists in the Cape –
in Paarl (women) and Worcester (men) – was welcomed as a clear sign that
their spirit had not been broken. Although their protests against the ongoing
war and their demand that the Milner administration be replaced had little
impact, their patriotism was admired.42
In pro-Boer literature, there was reflection not only on the attitude of the
Cape Afrikaners but also on the morale of the inhabitants of the two re-
publics, which was at times a controversial issue. From the 1880s onwards,
the focus of the pro-Boer movement in the Netherlands was clearly on the
sar. This republic was considered to be the most important destination for
emigrants, as it was fertile and there were many opportunities for well-moti-
vated settlers.43 It was also in the light of the political situation in South
Africa that the Transvaal received the most attention in the Netherlands. It
had been the 1880-1881 war for independence fought by the inhabitants of
this republic that had aroused interest by the Dutch in their ‘cousins’ in South
Africa, and the rapid development that took place under Kruger and his Hol-
landers was seen as highly promising for the Dutch race as they managed to
strengthen the independence of the state.
There were more concerns about the ofs, where immigrants of British de-
scent played an important role in public life, the education system and the
railways, which made it dependent on Cape infrastructure.44 In a publication
that appeared shortly after the war ended, the leader of the anv press office,
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Frederik Rompel, had another explanation for the relative obscurity of the
ofs in the Netherlands. In an effort to avoid trouble with the British, the ofs
government shied away from making propaganda in Europe, a choice that
stood in stark contrast to the campaign headed by Leyds.45 This meant that,
when the war broke out, the public in the Netherlands seemed to associate
the war with the sar, which is illustrated by numerous publications that only
mentioned the Transvaal in their titles.46To make matters worse, at the begin-
ning of the war several rumours emerged that Free State troops lacked the
motivation to fight and were considering laying down arms.47 Such indict-
ments were a thorn in the flesh to representatives of the ofs. In interviews,
Consul-General Hendrik Muller emphatically denied that these commandos
were considering surrender.48 In private, he complained that the campaign by
the pro-Boer organisations mainly focussed on the Transvaal and that he, as a
representative of the ofs, was left out of the equation. ‘They confer with
Leyds, but without me’, he lamented in a letter.49 Although Leyds and other
Boer diplomats stated that they represented the interests of both republics,
complaints about neglect of the ofs continued throughout the war. Muller
even expressed these sentiments in public while he was touring the US in
1902.50
There were, however, also efforts to brush up the image of the ofs during
the South African War. Several publications appeared that were written by
people who had lived in the republic – such as D. Aitton, a former teacher at
Grey College in Bloemfontein – or who had travelled there such as W. A. van
Ittersum. They tried to play up the heroic past of the Free Staters because they
were of the opinion that they deserved the admiration of the civilised world
for their conduct during the struggle against the British. Looking at the nine-
teenth-century history of South Africa, it was noted how they had been the
victims of the imperialists’ lust for expansion when the diamond fields of
Kimberley were taken from them.51 Moreover, it was emphasised that the
Boers of the ofs were ‘unspoiled’ descendants of the Voortrekkers.52 Their
heroic character became apparent during the Transvaal War when, despite
the official policy of neutrality, the Free Staters under President J. H. Brand
expressed explicit support for their sister republic, which was seen as one of
the reasons for the British to retreat.53 This kind of loyalty continued under
the presidency of W. F. Reitz, who signed a treaty in which both republics
pledged military support to the other if one was attacked.54
President M. T. Steyn, who was head of state when the war started, was
also considered to be a true hero. In the several biographical publications that
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appeared about him during and after the South African War, he was de-
scribed as a typical Boer with simple tastes but good instincts and much com-
mon sense: truly a member of the Afrikaner ‘aristocracy of South Africa’.55
After the Jameson Raid, which took place just after his election, he continued
to seek closer ties with the Transvaal, which to some observers was a sign that
he believed that the combined Boer forces would withstand and possibly de-
feat the British.56 Nevertheless, Steyn did his best to avoid a military conflict,
facilitating the Bloemfontein Conference between Kruger and Milner (May
and June 1899) in a bid to find a political solution for the Uitlander question.
When this effort failed, which the pro-Boers believed was Milner’s fault,
Steyn prepared to stand by the sar during the looming war.57 On 22 Septem-
ber 1899, he made a famous speech at the Volksraad in Bloemfontein in
which he accused the British of using the Uitlander question as a false casus
belli and called upon the burghers of the ofs to join the Transvaal and fight
for a just cause. When the text of this speech reached Consul-General Muller
in the Netherlands, he instantly forwarded it to a newspaper in Rotterdam
that published large parts of it, and Steyn’s words were also quoted with
much reverence in other publications.58
Despite this renewed attention for the ofs, in many ways the Transvaal re-
mained the most telling symbol of the unjust war that was forced upon the
Boers. It was this country that had been most affected by the British hunger
for land in the past, during the annexation of 1877-1881. Moreover, by the
end of the nineteenth century it had become clear that the world’s largest de-
posits of gold lay on its territory, something that was considered to be a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, authors pointed out that the capital gener-
ated by this new industry enabled the Kruger government to initiate reforms
that had led to the rapid development of the republic and had strengthened
the Dutch element in South Africa. On the other hand, it had also aroused the
greed of the British capitalists – and Rhodes in particular – who seemed to be
determined to end the independence of the sar once and for all.59
The Boers’ struggle to cope with modernity was exemplified by Paul
Kruger. The elderly president had grown up in the ox wagons of the Great
Trek, had received virtually no education except from Bible reading and was
considered to be inherently distrustful of the outside world. However, it was
argued that his innate goodness, exceptional patriotism and common sense
allowed him to accept the development of the sar and chart out his policies
accordingly. Although he did not always obtain perfect results, it was assert-
ed that he did the best he could.60 This was illustrated by his solemn but deci-
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sive preparation for war. After the shock of the Jameson Raid, he started with
an arms programme during which the sar acquired modern rifles and ar-
tillery. Still, it was said that Kruger did everything he could to save his coun-
try from war because he knew what horrors it would bring to his people. In
an intimate portrait of ‘Oom Paul’, Rompel, who had been present at the
Bloemfontein Conference as a reporter, described how the sar delegation of-
fered to reduce the naturalisation period for Uitlanders in a bid to avoid con-
flict, an offer that was arrogantly rejected by Milner. The next morning,
Rompel noticed that the elderly president had swollen eyes. His physician
suggested that he had an infection because of all the tears he shed. ‘“Yes,”
was [Kruger’s] reply, simple, very sad, “I do not sleep anymore, doctor: I cry
all night long.”’61
For many people in the Netherlands, Kruger’s tears were proof that justice
was on the side of the Boers, who had tried everything to avoid war. It was no-
ticed that even Uitlanders in the sar, mainly of non-British descent, took up
arms to defend the independence of the republic. In the Netherlands there
was particular attention for one of these foreign regiments, namely the Hol-
landercorps.62At first sight, the formation of this commando seemed the ulti-
mate expression of loyalty by the Hollanders to their kinsmen in the Trans-
vaal. However, many descriptions of the short and tragic history of the Hol-
landercorps reveal that the difficulties between them and the Boers contin-
ued. The story of Herman Coster, one of the founders of the regiment, exem-
plified this. He went to the Transvaal after he finished his doctorate in law at
the University of Leiden in 1890 and became state attorney five years later.
Coster, who was considered to be a gifted man, had a problematic relation-
ship with Kruger, a matter that was openly discussed in contemporary
sources. In a dispute in 1897, the president sneered at him that if there was to
be a war, the Hollanders would remain behind their desks while the Boers
would have to do the fighting. Coster was deeply insulted by this remark and
resigned immediately, despite apologies from Kruger himself.63 He remained
in Pretoria, though, and according to the Dutch banker Gerard Vissering, an
old friend from university who wrote the most famous contemporary biogra-
phy of Coster, he continued to be committed to the Boer cause.64 Neverthe-
less, Vissering thought that Kruger’s insult was still echoing in his mind when
he prepared to join the invasion of Natal, together with approximately 150
other Hollanders.65
On 21 October 1899, they had their baptism of fire near the train station
of Elandslaagte, which was also the last stand of the regiment. There, the Hol-
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landercorps was part of a Boer force of about 1,000men with three cannons
facing a British column of approximately 3,000 soldiers with 18 pieces of ar-
tillery.66 The dramatic battle of Elandslaagte became the most notorious inci-
dent that took place during the first phase of the South African War and was
probably the single event that was most mentioned in publications about the
conflict that appeared in the Netherlands.67 Although the outcome was dra-
matic – almost half of the Dutch troops who fought at Elandslaagte were
killed, wounded or captured – the battle was portrayed as the ultimate ex-
pression of unity in the Dutch race because Boers and Hollanders stood side
by side and shed their blood together. Coster, who died after having been shot
in the head while fighting off enemies with the butt of his rifle, became a hero,
having given his life for Holland’s glory.68 In the Netherlands he was com-
memorated: in the 1900s, streets in several cities were named after him. In ad-
dition, a committee collected money for a monument at the University of Lei-
den and a fund that supported Afrikaner students in the Netherlands.69
In addition to these signs of unity between Hollanders and Boers, Elands -
laagte also showed up the disparities between the stamverwanten. Faced with
British superiority in numbers, the Boer commandos retreated, which was in
keeping with the hit-and-run tactics that they had developed in previous con-
flicts. Instead, the Dutch tried to hold their ground, which was considered to
be a typical European way of fighting, which was brave but also prevented an
orderly retreat, causing the high casualty rate. One veteran of the battle, the
teacher Cornelis Plokhooy, described in his memoirs how at first he consid-
ered the retreat by his South African comrades as an act of cowardice. Later,
however, he realised that they had been right. ‘If all Boers had fought as hot-
headedly as the Dutch […] there would have been few left and then the enemy
would have been lord and master in South Africa, while we now [in 1901]
still see thousands of Boers in the field.’70 He also described how the Boer
commanders were furious about the madcap performance of the Hollander-
corps and decided to disband the regiment forthwith.71 In addition to these
accounts, there was a particularly embarrassing rumour that appeared about
the Hollanders and their conduct at Elandslaagte. The night before the battle,
the regiment captured a supply train at the station, which contained a 
wagonload of whisky. Some sources reported that the Hollandercorps had
spent the evening in drunken revelry and that this was the reason for their
poor performance on the battlefield the next morning. Dutch veterans fer-
vently denied these allegations. Plokhooy refuted them as ‘low’ and asserted
that the bottles had immediately been smashed.72 However, it is telling that
5. ‘Dum-dums of public opinion’ 191
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 191
these incidents were not omitted from pro-Boer propaganda, which illus-
trates the ongoing tensions surrounding the concept of stamverwantschap. In
the light of these ambivalences, authors in the Netherlands were torn be-
tween hope and fear concerning the military abilities of the Boers, which will
be discussed in the following section.
The Boer people’s army
Contemporaries considered the Boer military system to be a typical example
of the decentralised and small-scale political structure of the republics. Apart
from a small police force and a permanent artillery corps, both the ofs and
the sar had a people’s army (volksleger) that was only raised in times of need.
In principle, everyone who was allowed to vote (white adult men, mainly of
South African descent) – the so-called ‘burghers’ – were obliged to join a com-
mando when asked to do so by a local officer, the veldcornet. As a result, the
structure of the army was loose and fluid, with generals presiding over sever-
al commandos and a commander-in-chief co-ordinating the overall strategy.
These high-ranking officers had limited authority, however, because all im-
portant decisions had to be taken in consultation with lower officers who rep-
resented their men, during the so-called krijgsraad. This human aspect of the
mobilisation system was emphasised in many sources.73 In general, the re-
cruits were described as devoted fathers or loving sons, which drew on the
idea that the family was the cornerstone of the republics.
While in reality no more than 65% of the burghers who were eligible for
military service in the republics was mobilised at the outbreak of war74, it
was implied in pro-Boer propaganda that every man was prepared to do his
bit for the fatherland. Stories about young boys who eagerly wanted to fight
were placed besides descriptions of older generations, the tough, bearded
men of Voortrekker stock who took a more sober view because they knew of
the horrors of the battlefield but realised the necessity of defending their inde-
pendence. Penning used this kind of imagery in his novels. Writing about the
outbreak of war, he described a discussion between his fictitious characters,
an elderly farmer and his sons. The boys expressed great eagerness to fight
and were confident that the republics could withstand the British, while the
old man was gloomy, dreading the prospect of war. But when the hostilities
did break out, these differences fell away and both old and young fulfilled
their duty.75 In this way, the commandos were portrayed as a cross-section of
all age groups. One iconic image that symbolised this idea of total mobilisa-
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tion was a photo that depicted ‘three generations in the war’; a boy of 15, a
man of 42 and an elderly man of 65, all posing with rifles and bandoliers.76
As was the case in literature about the Voortrekkers, the wives of the Boers
were considered to be patriotic too, in their own way.77 Many letters and
memoirs contained descriptions of the emotional goodbyes that took place at
train stations as the men left for the front lines. Although the authors noted
that there was much personal grief, they also emphasised that the women
fought back their tears and kept their composure, because they knew that
their loved ones were fighting for a worthy cause. ‘A suppressed sob, a sigh, a
kiss and so the precious sacrifice to the fatherland and to freedom was
made!’, wrote one of them.78Apart from this moral support, a few correspon-
dents also described how women played an active role in the republics’ war
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effort during the early phase of the war. They wrote about how housewives
took over their husbands’ work on the farms, cultivating the land and super-
vising the black servants.79 Some women even joined the commandos in the
field, camping with their men in the laagers. Authors agreed that this was an-
other sign of female bravery, but with hindsight it was also noted that the
front line was no place for a lady. It was suggested, for instance, that General
Piet Cronjé was severely hampered in his movements by the presence of
about a hundred women in his camp, which led to his defeat.80 Despite these
examples, it should be remembered that descriptions of female bravery were
much rarer than those of the heroics of their men. In general, Boer women
were seen as onlookers to the conflict who guarded the morale of the re-
publics and urged their men to fight for independence.
Such ideas indicate that many contemporaries thought of the war in terms
of mentality and national character. In general, there was much praise for the
militia system from observers in the Netherlands because it was seen as the ul-
timate sign of patriotism. In 1897, C. B. Spruyt, who greatly admired the
Boers for their character, was already predicting that the ‘tough’ men of the
republics would be able to withstand the degenerate recruits that would be
fighting on the British side.81 In September 1899, he had not lost any of his en-
thusiasm and was one of the few authors in the Netherlands who actually
welcomed the looming war as an exciting test for the Dutch race in South
Africa: ‘a spectacle through which people come to understand that it is worth
to be human’.82Another professor, Jan te Winkel, also saw moral advantages
for the Boers over British soldiers, who were mainly professionals. He point-
ed out that the Boers fought for a just cause and to defend their families,
homes and independence. Therefore, he concluded, they were better motivat-
ed to fight.83
People with a military background were more interested in the practical as-
pects of the commando structure, and one of the most interesting features of
the war to them was to see a militia system in action. There was much discus-
sion on the advantages and disadvantages of this way of fighting, which
touched upon developing ideas about modern warfare and highlighted the
troubled relationship that the Boers had with modernity. On the one hand,
there was much praise for the technical aspects of the republics’ military sys-
tem. The swift mobilisation of the commandos in the weeks before the war
made a good impression, and it was reported with due pride that the nzasm
(the most important Dutch company in South Africa) played an important
role in the transportation of the burghers to the front lines.84 Another of the
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commandos’ skills that was widely admired was their marksmanship. This
was seen as a combined result of the typical Boer lifestyle in which boys
learned how to shoot from a young age, and the fact that Kruger had armed
his men with the latest model of Mauser rifles. Military commentators were
amazed by the efficiency of the Boer forces during the battles that took place
in the first months of the war. The burghers had entrenched and camouflaged
themselves well and shot with great accuracy without exposing their position
because they used smokeless powder, a recent invention. This combination of
increased firepower and individual skill was considered to be of vital impor-
tance in modern warfare.85
The enthusiasm about the Boer fighting methods spilled over to a wider au-
dience in the Netherlands. The news that the Boer forces had advanced swift-
ly into British territory, surprising their adversaries and laying siege to them
in Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking, was welcomed by many. The Boer
victories in December 1899 and January 1900,when they reversed the British
relief columns at the banks of the Tugela in Natal and the Modder River in
the Northern Cape were celebrated enthusiastically. The Boers became hero-
ic examples to men in the Netherlands, sometimes literally. Inspired by the
commandos, an organisation that provided military training to citizens
(Vereeniging ‘Volksweerbaarheid’) was founded in 1900 and from the start
had the support of several prominent intellectuals and politicians. Two years
later, it boasted that it had a membership of 14,000, with members going on
holiday camps and practising in field manoeuvres.86
The leaders of the pro-Boer movement also saw disadvantages to this huge
enthusiasm, however. During the last months of 1899, Leyds became con-
cerned that the public in Europe might become overconfident about the mili-
tary abilities of the Boer republics. This became apparent when he tried to
launch a petition that called upon the international community to settle the
conflict between the Boers and the British by means of diplomatic arbitration,
so that the war could end quickly. His old friend J. P. Moltzer and his new as-
sistant H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge edited the text, a draft of which had been pro-
vided by the French foreign office. The pamphlet was called For Justice and
peace. Appeal to the nations represented at Peace Conference at The Hague,
and described the principles of international justice and arbitration, ‘soaring
high above the reasons of state’.87
Meanwhile they tried to persuade prominent intellectuals from the Nether-
lands to sign the petition. However, there was much reluctance to do so, par-
ticularly in academic circles. One of the main critics was Te Winkel, who
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wrote to Leyds just before the great Boer victories in December 1899, saying
that he thought it a mistake to ask for arbitration at a time when the burghers
were doing so well on the battlefield in their ‘glorious struggle’.88 Moreover,
he did not agree with the contents of the petition, which he thought to be
‘bombastic’ and would make a ‘comical impression’ on many readers.89 Te
Winkel’s resistance to the petition led to much delay, and although 3,000 in-
tellectuals in the Netherlands eventually signed it when it was published in
March 1900, it did not have the intended effect.90 Instead, Te Winkel pub-
lished a pamphlet in which he gave his own visions on ‘the great importance
of this mighty struggle in the southern hemisphere’.91 In contrast to the care-
fully phrased Appeal to the nations, this publication can be seen as a rather
uncontrolled and rash outburst.92 Te Winkel warned his readers that the war
would probably last a long time, although there was a ten to one chance that
the Boers would win. That victory would have to be total, ridding South
Africa of all British presence, he argued. If not, the linguist predicted, peace
would be ‘no more than a truce’. Instead, he expressed the hope that the ‘per-
sistent and lengthy’ struggle would be crowned with a federal state of South
Africa under Dutch rule.93
The hangover of this bold enthusiasm followed soon after. At the end of
February, the reinforced British forces broke through the Boer positions and
relieved Kimberley and Ladysmith. At the same time, General Cronjé was sur-
rounded at Paardeberg and forced to surrender along with 4,000men. These
disasters brought to light the deficiencies of the military organisation of the
republics. When they realised they were far outnumbered, many of the
burghers took to their heels and fled, which enabled the British ‘steamroller’
to advance and occupy both Bloemfontein and Pretoria in a matter of
months. This sudden demise of the Boers came as a shock to many people in
the Netherlands. Nonetheless, some military experts had an explanation and
wrote that the loose and individualistic structure of the commandos had its
disadvantages in that it lacked a strong form of hierarchy, which made disci-
pline a problem.94 Already during the sieges, correspondents complained
about how the boring camp life eroded morale, and reported that many
burghers wanted to return home to their families.95 Initially, the views on the
lack of discipline by the Boers had been met with scepticism by the enthusias-
tic public in the Netherlands, but the more that became known about the re-
treat after February 1900, the more credible they seemed.
The so-called desire to ‘go home’ (huis toe gaan) and the reluctance to fight
an enemy that was growing in strength were recurrent themes in letters from
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the battle zone that appeared in newspapers and later in pro-Boer publica-
tions. Several of the Dutch who returned from South Africa during the war
wrote about it, because they felt that the public in Europe was mistaken on
this issue. Months after the great Boer defeats, Rompel published an essay in
which he tried to explain the conduct of ‘the Boer on the warpath’ because he
wanted to introduce some nuance to the idealised vision held by the public in
the Netherlands and the great disappointment that followed.96 The retreat,
he argued, was not cowardly behaviour but was in keeping with the character
of the Boers, who were less reckless than Europeans. Instead of holding their
ground and continuing to fight to the last man, they preferred to take cover
and retreat to fight another day.97 Likewise, Cornelis Plokhooy, who fought
in the Hollandercorps at Elandslaagte, tried to correct the view that the Boers
lacked discipline. He described how the burghers kept on going while having
to suffer hardships in the field, exposed to the elements. This to him showed
that the Boers did have discipline, which was based not on a strict hierarchy
like in Europe but on less tangible factors such as respect.98 Not all veterans
gave the Boers as much credit concerning the events taking place in the first
half of 1900. Dietlof van Warmelo was one of the most critical authors who
wrote about this issue. In his view, the main reason for the crumbling morale
of the Boer forces was the ‘leave plague’, which meant that during the sieges,
many burghers randomly took off for visits home often without informing
their officers.99 After the fall of Ladysmith, where he was stationed, this be-
came worse and the morale of the commandos collapsed altogether, he ar-
gued.100
While Plokhooy and Van Warmelo thought differently about the courage
of individual burghers, they both noted how Boer officers failed to stop the
collapse of the morale of their men during the chaotic retreat.101 This sup-
ported more general criticism on the overall strategy of the Boers. Instead of
pushing through in the early months of the war while they had the upper
hand, the republics’ forces halted to besiege towns where relatively small gar-
risons were stationed. As a result, the British had the opportunity to regroup
in the south and reinforce the relief army. In several publications, the old Boer
commanders, and Joubert in particular, were pointed out as the main culprits.
One critic in Pretoria, a certain M. Mettius, had a rather peculiar theory on
the lack of stamina displayed by him and other elderly generals of the Trans-
vaal, which he explained in a pamphlet. The author suggested that they had
been entranced by a fifth column of British hypnotists, who had infiltrated
the republic in the years preceding the South African War. According to Met-
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tius, this explained why the Boer leaders, who had fought so bravely in the
past, acted so indecisively.102
The majority of correspondents had explanations that were more down-
to-earth but often revealed contradictory feelings on the matter. This is
shown in responses to the death of Joubert in March 1900. Although there
was admiration for his role during the Transvaal War of 1880-1881, some let-
ters and reports from the sar contained explicit criticism of his political
views and personality. His dislike of Hollanders in particular was mentioned
as one of his weaknesses.103 Nevertheless, there were also people who were
more positive about Joubert’s achievements, and his admirers were at great
pains to navigate between the controversies that surrounded him. J. A.
Wormser, who had met the general in 1896, wrote a biography in which he
described him as a prime example of a Voortrekker and praised him as a great
patriot. The author conceded that Joubert did have a strong polarising effect,
but he explained this as a typical flaw in the Boer character and left out sensi-
tive issues such as the general’s hatred of Hollanders.104 Wormser also wrote
about Joubert’s strategic mistakes during the war, although he provided a
more nuanced view on this matter than other authors. He thought the mis-
takes could possibly be the result of Joubert’s miscalculation that the British
would surrender after their first defeats, just as they did in 1881.105However,
Wormser argued that it could also have been the result of the innate compas-
sion of the general, who was aware that most of his men were fathers and
therefore did not consider their lives disposable.106 In this way, Joubert re-
mained a hero, albeit a controversial one.
The failure of the old Boer generals and the hasty retreat of the republics’
forces did not mean that all hope was lost. New leaders came forward who
seemed to bewell suited to continuing the struggle. Louis Botha, who became
famous after his successes during the battles at the Tugela River such as
Colenso and Spion Kop, succeeded Joubert as commander-in-chief of the
Transvaal forces. After his surrender, General Cronjé, who in the viewof com-
mentators made serious mistakes by allowing himself to be cornered by Lord
Roberts, was replaced by Koos de la Rey, who had become famous for his
conduct at the victorious battles at the Northern Cape. Command of the ofs
forces was taken over by Christiaan de Wet, who probably became the most
legendary of all Boer heroes, establishing his reputation with daring raids on
convoys, outwitting the British army and getting the best out of his men.107
During the tense first half of 1900, these new military leaders seemed to
embody everything that was good in the Boer military system. They were
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seen as strong individuals who could inspire – or push – their men to continue
the fight against the enemy. Moreover, in their battle plans they displayed an
in-depth knowledge of the terrain and made full use of the shooting skills and
mobility of the Boer combatants. Not everybody in the Netherlands de-
spaired, therefore, when it became clear that the forces of the republics could
not hold their positions and retreated. One military commentator, for in-
stance, did not consider the relief of Ladysmith to be an important victory for
the British because the Boer forces there had not been surrounded and had re-
grouped, which was a sign that they would keep on fighting. ‘It cannot be
said enough that the war in fact only has started now.’108 Such statements did
not disappear from Dutch newspapers when the British army continued its
advance. A few days before the capture of Pretoria in June 1900, Leyds pub-
licly announced that he ‘still trusted in the courage of the Boers’ and expected
the struggle to continue.109 Another factor that gave hope to people in the
Netherlands was the state of the British army, which, despite its enormous
size, did not seem to be coping very well with the situation in South Africa.
Just as the image of the Boers was marked by a degree of ambiguity, the depic-
tion of the British military was by no means unequivocal, an issue that will be
described in the following section.
Britain’s grave
In general, most Dutch authors agreed with Smuts’s metaphor of the mighty
British Empire threatening to crush the tiny Boer republics. Schutte therefore
argues that much of the sympathy for the commandos was the result of the
Dutch public siding with the underdog, a phenomenon that can be explained
by the highly moralistic view of foreign policy held by the country at the
time.110 Many commentators of the day expressed the hope that the injustice
of the war would not go unpunished and referred, for example, to Bismarck’s
prediction that South Africa would become Britain’s grave.111 In this sense,
observers also drew parallels between the situation in South Africa and his-
torical events. The comparison between the struggle of the Boers against the
British and the Dutch war for independence against Spain in the sixteenth
century – both portrayed as a fight of small people against imperial tyranny –
remained popular in the Netherlands.112 Likewise, many people saw similari-
ties between the South African War and the American Revolution, hoping
that the Dutch population would be able to forge a ‘United States of South
Africa’ independent from the British Empire.113
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There was also much reference to the Irish question, which was considered
the outcome of more than three centuries of British colonial oppression.114
Boissevain, who had started his journalistic career reporting on the Fenian
movement in the 1860s and had an Irish wife, argued that the Dutch race was
of ‘tougher fibre’ than the Celts and predicted great trouble if the British tried
‘to make a New Ireland in the South’.115Kuyper noted how the crisis in South
Africa might have had consequences for the political circumstances in the
British Isles, where the Irish and the Welsh might have increased pressure on
the government for greater autonomy.116 In fact, Leyds stood in direct con-
tact with several figures from the Irish nationalist movement in the hope of
pressuring the government in London.117 Also in South Africa, a number of
Irish emigrants chose the side of the Boers and formed their own regiment in
the Transvaal, which became famous during the guerrilla war. Nevertheless,
a greater number of Irishmen fought on the side of the British, who, in the
eyes of many pro-Boers, used them as cannon fodder, sacrificing them in or-
der to promote the interests of corrupt capitalists and statesmen – the same
men who had oppressed their people for so long.
According to many pro-Boer propagandists, the higher echelons of the
British army were of the same mould as deceitful imperialists such as Milner
and Chamberlain. At the beginning of the war, there were a few exceptions,
though.118 The commanders who withstood the sieges of Ladysmith and
Mafeking – General George White and Colonel Robert Baden-Powell – were
praised in the Dutch press for their steadfast defence of these towns, notwith-
standing some incidents that were condemned such as the use of black troops
at Mafeking.119 The depiction of other high-ranking officers was more nega-
tive. According to many commentators, the incompetence of the army com-
mand was particularly striking during the first phase of the war, which result-
ed in the large defeats in Natal and the Northern Cape. It appeared that the
British underestimated the power of the Boers and rushed forward without a
proper assessment of the situation, after which they were repelled. The gener-
als who suffered these humiliations – Redvers Buller and Lord Methuen –
were targeted in the pro-Boer press throughout the war. The disastrous way
in which Buller commanded the battle of Spion Kop (24 January 1900) be-
came a famous example of his incompetence, which led to the butchering of
his own men. The general failed to notice that the Boers occupied higher
ground, and when the British troops reached the top of the hill they were ex-
posed to heavy bombardment. Despite the triumph of their victory, burghers
who witnessed the battlefield just after the fight described what they saw
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there as a ‘terrible spectacle’.120 Photos showing scores of dead British sol-
diers littered on the rocky ground were banned in Britain, but in the Nether-
lands they were published in several magazines and even printed on post-
cards, making them icons of the horrors of war.121
In January 1900, Lord Roberts arrived in South Africa and took over
supreme command from Buller, assisted by Herbert Kitchener. From a mili-
tary point of view, there was admiration for the way they outflanked the Boer
positions in a dazzling campaign, although it was also noted that the rapid
advance exposed the British forces to raids. Both Roberts, who had fought a
bloody guerrilla war in Afghanistan, and Kitchener, who had commanded
the violent campaign against the Mahdist army in the Sudan, were notorious
for the unscrupulous means they used to subdue their enemies. In the early
months of 1900, it appeared that they were not going to spare their own men
either, exhausting them so much that many died of hunger and disease. In her
memoirs, which appeared after the war, a farmer’s daughter from the ofs de-
scribed what she witnessed when the British army stopped at her farm. The
officers arrogantly commandeered the comfortable house and had a lavish
meal.122 By contrast, a regiment of ragged looking Scots was left out in the
field. They had to find their own food and some were so hungry they ate from
the pig’s trough. ‘Even the kaffers were surprised about that and did not un-
derstand that people could be starved to such an extent.’123
In this sense, the British servicemen were seen as victims of the war too. In
many descriptions of the large-scale battles during the first phase of the war,
there was quite a lot of sympathy for the ordinary soldiers, the ‘Tommies’.
What was most apparent was their bravery, as they kept advancing towards
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the Boer lines until the retreat was ordered, even though they came under
heavy fire. According to commentators, this sort of rigid discipline was typi-
cal of the European style of military conduct, which was developed for pro-
fessional armies. There were clear advantages to this system because the
trained soldiers were not as fickle as the undisciplined Boers.124
But observers also noted disadvantages to this strategy, because the skills
and intellect of the individual Tommies were inferior. This made them totally
dependent on orders from their commanders, who were considered to be in-
competent and careless about the fate of their men. Plokhooy described how,
at the Tugela, officers fired at subordinates if they refused to advance, which
to him proved that British pluck was born of the fear of their own leaders.125
Another example of this was the way in which the dead and wounded were
treated. It was noted in several sources that the burghers were very caring
with their casualties, showed respect for their wounded enemies and even
helped to bury those who had died with genuine respect. By contrast, the
British were ordered to leave their wounded comrades on the battlefield or
dump the corpses of those who died in battle in mass graves, which shocked
Dutch eyewitnesses.126
Another topic of discussion was the morale of the British soldiers. It was
believed that they had been misled about their adversaries by the jingo press,
which portrayed the Boers as bloodthirsty barbarians. In the Netherlands,
many stories appeared about Tommies who discovered that the Boers were
actually respectable after they met them. Plokhooy, for instance, wrote about
it in his memoirs. He recalled how during a scouting mission after a nightly
skirmish near Ladysmith he found a dying British officer. While the Boers did
their best to make the last moments of this man as comfortable as possible, he
told them that he had changed his mind about the inhabitants of the re-
publics, who had been ‘slandered’ in England and were wrongly accused of
not helping wounded men. With his last breath he asked for forgiveness.127
There were also many such stories about British prisoners of war who were
taken in large numbers during the first months of the war. Correspondents in
Pretoria reported that they were treated kindly by the Boers, a fact that was
often acknowledged by the officers, who thanked their guards.128
Besides these positive stories, Dutch accounts also described the dark side
of ‘Tommy Atkins’ that was exposed during the war. As casualties rose and
the British commanders asked for more men to subdue the Boers, the quality
of the recruits declined considerably, according to Dutch commentators.129
There was some degree of sympathy for the Yeomanry, volunteers from the
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middle classes who joined with patriotic enthusiasm but had little experien -
ce.130 It was believed, however, that the majority of the new soldiers were
dragged from the slums of London and that these men were in poor physical
condition, ill-trained and had low moral standards. The longer the war went
on, the more the degeneration of the Tommies became a topic of discussion,
and in some sources it was even suggested that England’s prisons had been
emptied in order to raise enough men.131Troops that were recruited in the do-
minions were considered more competent in military matters, but became no-
torious for their cruel behaviour. The recruits that were levied in South Africa
in particular – including Afrikaners who joined the imperial forces – were be-
lieved to have committed war crimes, as they had an innate hatred of the
Boers.132
The lack of competent and well-behaved soldiers showed a fundamental
weakness in the British military system, and after the occupation of Bloem-
fontein and Pretoria themilitary commentator of thenrcwrote that the terri-
torial gainwas just a sham victory. ‘There is something rotten in the army’, he
declaredwith a due sense of drama.133This developmentwas not only consid-
ered to be negative for the British war effort, it also threatened to destabilise
public order in SouthAfrica. Letterwriters fromCapeTownand the occupied
republics increasingly complained about the behaviour of the troops. Apart
from the systematic destructionof civilianproperty,whichwill be discussed in
the following chapter, the British had a bad reputation for their loose morale.
One problem was considered to be their preference for black prostitutes,
which was strongly disapproved of by the inhabitants of the republics.134 In
addition, accusations cropped up concerning the raping of Boer women,
which was considered a severe stain on the reputation of the British army. It
was theBritish journalistWilliamSteadwhopublished themost significant re-
port on this matter after he had received documents concerning the Spoelstra
case that had been smuggled out of Pretoria.135 Stead’s pamphletwas translat-
ed and disseminated throughout Europe by the anv press office.136
Notwithstanding the outcry against the mischief committed by white sol-
diers, the worst affront in the view of Dutch commentators was the recruit-
ment of black people to fight against the Boers. Throughout the war, there
were reports that the British government was contemplating the large-scale
transportation of coloured troops to South Africa. Citing the rumour that a
contingent of Maoris had offered their services to the British Empire, the Lon-
don correspondent of one Dutch newspaper shuddered at the very thought
that the imperialists ‘called on the help of barbarians against fellow Chris-
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tians’.137 Even more worrying was the recurring news that the British were at-
tempting to recruit local black ‘tribes’. Many historians today argue that con-
temporaries did not acknowledge this aspect of the war, which is probably
true if one only looks at British sources.138 However, it was quite an impor-
tant topic in the pro-Boer propaganda campaign. Already before the war,
Dutch authors generally argued that the British ‘native policy’ endangered
the stability of colonial rule in South Africa, while the segregation system in
the republics was praised as a means to ensure social order. After October
1899, such views reappeared in pro-Boer propaganda, which asserted that
the British recruited Africans while the Boers tried to keep them out of the
‘white man’s war’.
In most pro-Boer accounts, black people were depicted as treacherous
spies who provided the British with intelligence. But it was also noted that
they often provided inaccurate information, which was seen as an explana-
tion for the large number of mistakes that appeared in the jingo press. In
Dutch media, the exaggerated reports about British victories and Boer atroci-
ties in the London newspapers on several occasions were mocked as ‘kaffer-
stories’.139 Accusations that the British supplied black people with firearms
were considered to be far more serious. In interviews, both Leyds and George
McCall Theal warned against the dangers of this policy, predicting that the
‘tribes’ would turn against all white settlers in South Africa.140 Officially, the
British denied such allegations but from the beginning of the war, informa-
tion reached the Netherlands that indicated that this was indeed taking place.
These documents, like articles from South African newspapers and pictures,
were widely distributed.141 One of the most famous pieces of evidence from
the early phase of the conflict was a photo that was published in the London
Illustrated News of January 1900 which depicted armed blacks in Rhodesia,
with the text ‘some of Khama’s trained soldiers, now acting with us’. Leyds
ordered his staff to send a circular to all the sar consuls and the European
press to draw their attention to this publication.142 In the view of many pro-
Boer propagandists, such material exposed the moral bankruptcy of the
British Empire. But the concerns about the use of black troops and other acts
that were considered to be war crimes should also be seen in the context of
emerging ideas about international law. The following section will explore
how the pro-Boer media reflected on such matters.
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From The Hague to Derdepoort: war atrocities
In the light of the alleged atrocities committed during the South African War,
many references were made to the Peace Conference that was held in The
Hague from May to July 1899, a few months before the outbreak of hostili-
ties. The Dutch government acted as host of this meeting and Foreign Minis-
ter W. H. de Beaufort had the onerous task of inviting the participants. He
feared that the British might boycott the conference if the Boer republics at-
tended, which would have endangered the overall success of the meeting, and
so he decided to leave the sar and the ofs off the list of those invited. In addi-
tion to criticism in the newspapers, there was also a political backlash when
Kuyper, who at the time was the leader of the opposition, attacked the gov-
ernment on this matter in Parliament. Several historians consider this to be an
opportunistic move by Kuyper to discredit his political rival De Beaufort,
which eventually backfired. Initially, this attack was supported by several
members of parliament, but in the end a vote of no confidence was not passed
and De Beaufort’s decision was condoned as a solid piece of realpolitik,
which was in keeping with the overall policy of neutrality.143 Leyds also ac-
cepted this but kept in contact with the Dutch government about the proceed-
ings of the Peace Conference and its implications for the Boer republics. In or-
der to avoid controversy, he did not visit The Hague during the conference,
but he was invited by First Minister N. G. Pierson (his former tutor) and De
Beaufort to discuss the outcome shortly afterwards.144
The British government argued that because the Boers had not officially
signed the Hague Convention – which set out rules about international arbi-
tration, conduct on the battlefield, treatment of pows and civilians, and the
use of weaponry – the treaty did not apply to the South African War. While
this was officially correct, Leyds and other propagandists reasoned that the
new rules of engagement should nonetheless be implemented. The Boer re-
publics, they argued, were civilised and independent nations, and so from a
moral point of view they had the right to be treated according to European
standards.145 In addition, the British were accused of violating the Geneva
Convention which contained rules regarding the treatment of wounded sol-
diers and the conduct of the Red Cross, which had been signed by both re-
publics. In 1902, the physician E. G. A. ten Siethoff wrote a pamphlet in
which he asserted that, although there was still quite a lot of uncertainty as to
how these rules should be applied in practice and many definitions remained
vague, they represented ‘fundamental principles’.146
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In general, historians see such writings as evidence that there was great in-
terest in international law in the Netherlands, which can be explained by its
status as a small nation.147 There was, however, also a link with the South
African question. In emphasising that the Boers had a right to be treated ac-
cording to the Geneva and the Hague Conventions, it was asserted that they
were a civilising force in Africa and could not be placed on the same level as
the coloured enemies the British faced in other colonial wars. Moreover, the
British atrocities were in keeping with the idea of a ‘century of wrong’ and
were considered to be part of the violent attack on the republics, in which
every means possible was used to subdue the Boers. The press in the Nether-
lands reported extensively on these issues in order to expose these machina-
tions. In December 1899, Boissevain wrote about the atrocities that were
committed on the battlefield by both sides, which he accepted as the unavoid-
able result of the ‘merciless lust to cut and kill’ that overcame all combatants
in the heat of the moment. However, he accused the jingo press of giving a
one-sided view, portraying the Boers as ‘treacherous savages’ and so inciting
their troops to slaughter them like they did the Mahdi army at Omdur-
man.148 An editor of the nrc wrote in a similar vein, arguing that not all re-
ports from the Boer governments were necessarily true, which could be ex-
plained by the confusing situation, but that they at least acted out of good
faith while the British censors wilfully manipulated their dispatches in a ‘de-
spicable’ way.149 Despite these virtuous words, the pro-Boer media were
hardly less biased in their coverage of the alleged atrocities, and the evidence
that was put forward to support these indictments was not always unprob-
lematic.
One of the most persistent protests was against the use of expanding, or
‘dum-dum’, bullets. The Convention of The Hague banned this sort of ammu-
nition in wars between the signatory nations, and there was much pressure
on the British government not to use it against the Boers either. Already
months before the war, there were rumours that Britain was shipping dum-
dum bullets to South Africa on a large scale, which Leyds used in his efforts to
persuade the European powers to mediate.150 After the conflict had started,
many reports appeared in the press and in pamphlets that suggested that the
British actually used such ammunition. But these allusions appeared to be in-
correct at times. In June 1900, a military magazine, De Militaire Spectator,
published a photo of wrappings of Mark II bullets, made by the dum-dum
factory near Calcutta, that had been found on the battlefield at Nicholson’s
Nek. They did not provide any commentary, implying that these were the in-
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famous expandable bullets. Although they considered the use of such ammu-
nition by the British to be a fact, the editors of nrc criticised the magazine in
this case because Mark II bullets were hard-nosed and therefore not forbid-
den by the Convention of The Hague, which banned Mark IV. What ensued
was a lengthy and rather technical polemic about the exact nature of expand-
able ammunition, but at least this shows that the indictments against the
British were not always uncontested.151
In addition to this sort of material, there were many accounts of wounded
burghers who had supposedly been shot with dum-dum bullets. One male
nurse from the Dutch Red Cross graphically described how he was haunted
at night by the sight of a young man whose shoulder had been blown off by
expanding ammunition.152 But this sort of evidence was not unproblematic
either. In 1901, Leyds’s secretary sent out letters to three Red Cross doctors
who had returned from South Africa, asking them for statements that they
had seen wounds inflicted by dum-dum bullets. Most of them gave cautious
replies. G. W. S. Lingbeek, for example, replied that he had encountered large
wounds that could have been caused by expanding bullets but might also
have been inflicted by conventional ammunition fired at close range; ‘in my
opinion all this is not incontestable proof’, he wrote.153 Needless to say, this
letter was not published, but a statement by another doctor who had recently
returned from the war zone and did declare that he had seem dum-dum-in-
flicted wounds was forwarded to the anv press office, who made a press cir-
cular of it.154
British reports on dum-dum bullets that had been found at Boer positions
were assessed quite differently. Some correspondents admitted that in some
instances, they might have been used by the burghers. They argued, however,
that the Boers had not bought dum-dum bullets themselves but had taken
them from the British, using them in retaliation and in far fewer instances.155
Others insinuated that the burghers used such ammunition for hunting
only.156 In general, pro-Boer commentators preferred to discuss the ‘humane’
Mauser rifles used by the Boers. These were of a smaller calibre and fired
steel-coated bullets that barely caused tissue damage.157
Another recurrent complaint that was put forward by both sides was the
violation of the Red Cross. On several occasions, British commanders claimed
that the burghers shot at ambulances. These charges were dismissed by the
Dutch press, however. The Boer governments sent an official letter of com-
plaint to all foreign consuls in Pretoria in which they accused the British army
of using the Red Cross as a cover for military convoys, making them justified
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targets.158 Later during the war, it was even rumoured that high-ranking
British officers travelled in trains bearing the Red Cross sign so that they
would not be attacked by the commandos.159
By contrast, British acts against the Red Cross operating on the Boer side
were extensively covered in theDutchmedia, and letters frommembers of the
ambulances about these violations were published at length. One incident
that received a significant amount of attention took place in June 1900, when
Kitchener stopped an ambulance train from the Dutch Red Cross and the
nzasm near Pretoria. He ordered that the national tricolour of the Nether-
lands be removed, thereby breaking theGenevaConventionwhich stated that
Red Cross convoys should always bear the flag of their country of origin. In
letters home, the Dutch doctors reported that Kitchener had acted arrogantly,
ignoring their protests and stating that he did not ‘allow any other flag in this
country except the British’.160Another notorious incidentwas the arrest of an
ambulance team led by Dr Koster outside Pretoria, also in June 1900. The
British accused him of carrying secret documents and ammunition for the
Boers. In his official report, Koster denied these allegations, writing that the
letters in his possession were harmless, including an epistle by the wife of
Louis Botha to her husband accompanying a piece of biltong (dried meat).161
The government in the Netherlands started an inquiry, but this did not pre-
vent themalemembers of the ambulance frombeing deported to a pow camp
inCeylon, while the female nurses were shipped back to Europe. The sluggish
official response to these two cases was criticised by the president of the
Dutch Red Cross, who felt that the reports on these incidents should have led
to more decisive action because national honour had been offended.162
At issue was not only the violation of the Red Cross but also the behaviour
of the doctors. In letters from the battlefields it was asserted that the British
medical services were insufficient, and that doctors and nurses often left their
own casualties behind. By contrast, the members of the Dutch Red Cross
wrote about their hardwork and also that they treated British injured soldiers
where they could.163 To emphasise the value of these activities, the official re-
port of the Dutch Red Cross on the South African War contained several let-
ters of thanks to its medical staff, both fromBoer leaders and fromBritish sol-
diers.164 There was much pride in the Netherlands about the work of these
doctors and nurses and their compassion for all victims of an unjust war.
Moreover, such stories were in keeping with the perception that the Boer side
acted as humanely as possible because they did not ask for the conflict, where-
as the Britishwere ruthless in their corrupt efforts to conquer South Africa.
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In the view of Dutch commentators, events that occurred during actual
battles also showed that the Boers held the moral high ground. The battle of
Elandslaagte, which took place at the start of the conflict, was seen as the first
clear example of British cruelty and remained a popular subject for propagan-
dists throughout the war.165 As has been mentioned, this confrontation was
extensively covered in the Netherlands because of the last stand of the Hol-
landercorps. In addition, it became notorious for numerous incidents, which,
according to Dutch observers, were the result of the imperialist’s lust for
vengeance that had also affected the soldiers. These biases significantly affect-
ed Dutch coverage of the battle. After a large artillery bombardment, the
British troops advanced, outnumbering the Boers almost ten to one. A chaot-
ic mêlée followed. In official British reports, which reached Europe first, the
republican forces were accused of raising a white flag while they continued
shooting. This led to numerous casualties and infuriated the advancing sol-
diers, it was suggested. These allegations were questioned in the Netherlands
as a possible slander from the start. A few weeks later, letters from the Boer
side arrived that exempted the commandos from guilt. It was argued that be-
cause of the chaos in the lines, one section tried to surrender while other com-
mandos who had not noticed this continued firing. Whatever the case, this in-
cident was not a deliberate violation of the war conventions according to
these sources.166
Dutch authors were of the opinion that the fury of the British had other
reasons, namely pent up frustration provoked by jingo propaganda. Several
reports mentioned that the Highlander regiment broke through the Boer lines
with the war cry, ‘Remember Majuba!’ The reference to Colley’s defeat in
1881 was illustrative, according to pro-Boers, because it showed that the
British were not fighting for a just cause but simply to take revenge for humil-
iations they had suffered in the past.167This attitude became even clearer dur-
ing the aftermath of the battle. After the Boers’ defences had been breached, a
wild and un-coordinated retreat ensued. This gave the 5th Lancers cavalry
regiment the opportunity to charge, during which many fleeing burghers
were killed or taken prisoner. Throughout the war, numerous accounts were
published of helpless Boers who were slaughtered even after they had been
captured.168 What was even more scandalous in the view of Dutch authors
was that this cavalry attack was described in British sources as a heroic and
justified deed. The Times published a letter by an officer who wrote that it
was ‘the most excellent pig-sticking’ and boasted that he managed to spear
two men at once. These remarks became widely known in the Netherlands
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Drawing of the lancer attack at Elandslaagte. Dutch tekst reads: ‘Battlefield hyenas. The
Lancers kill defenceless Boers who surrendered – thereby breaking international law.’
Source: G. H. Priem, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika: bewerkt naar officieele telegrammen en
particuliere brieven viii (Amsterdam, 1899-1901). Collection Zuid-Afrikahuis, Amster-
dam.
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and became a showcase of the arrogant cruelty of the British. It was noted
with disgust that this sort of crime was condoned in the London press, which,
it was said, illustrated how public opinion there had been ‘blinded’.169 A
drawing depicting the charge that first appeared in the London Illustrated
News found its way to the Netherlands too. In Britain the caption described it
as an ‘incident’ that was provoked by the Boers themselves when they kept fir-
ing at the advancing cavalry.170 By contrast, Dutch authors referred to it as a
‘slaughter’ during which ‘defenceless Boers’ were ‘murdered’.171
Another event during the first phase of the war that was considered by the
pro-Boers to be a heinous crime took place at Derdepoort in the western
Transvaal on 25 November 1899. A local black ‘tribe’, the Bakgatla, raided
this Boer settlement under the command of a number of British officers. They
killed approximately twenty men and women, took eighteen of them as pris-
oners and drove them away together with their cattle.172 The impact of this
skirmish on the course of the conflict was far less than the great battles that
took place in Natal and the Cape, but it was nevertheless quite extensively re-
ported on in the Netherlands as a ‘disgraceful page from the history of this
war’.173 This can be partly explained by the Dutch concern for international
law. J. C. C. den Beer Poortugael, an expert in this field, listed Derdepoort as
one of the atrocities that should be prosecuted under the Hague Conven-
tion.174 But most concerns were regarding the impact that this event would
have in South Africa. In material that reached the Netherlands, the indigna-
tion from the Boer side about the incident was clearly present. Detailed de-
scriptions of the fight at Derdepoort and the official protest by the govern-
ments of the republics against the supposed armament of Africans were pub-
lished in full on the pages of the press in the Netherlands.175 Correspondents
from the Transvaal wrote that the white inhabitants there were shocked by
the events at Derdepoort, fearing great turmoil amongst the black popula-
tion. They also stated that the Boers would never have considered using
Africans against white opponents.176 The editors of the nrc also saw Derde-
poort as a continuation of the ‘century of wrong’. Referring to earlier colo-
nial wars, they noted that the British had not shied away from using indige-
nous troops in other conflicts either. In comparison to other atrocities during
the South African War, they noted that ‘the arousal of the black danger over
the white minority in South Africa is an outrage, which can hardly be con-
demned too sharply’.177
The skirmish at Derdepoort was followed by a punitive expedition by the
Boers, who defeated the Bakgatla in a battle on 22 December 1899, killing
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around 150 people. Several villages were burned down during the days that
followed. A report from the sar newspaper The Rand Post that reached the
Netherlands described these violent acts of revenge as a justified ‘chastise-
ment’ of the ‘barbarians’ who had committed ‘crimes’.178 The events at
Derdepoort and its aftermath also inspired Penning. In his chronicle of the
war, he provided his readers with a dramatic description of the ‘Kaffer assas-
sination’ and the fate of the women who had been captured.179 The writer
also considered the Boer expedition to be a ‘justified punishment’, and the
chapter had a happy ending. The victorious burghers joyfully celebrated
Christmas, enjoying the chickens they had taken from the smouldering huts
of the Bakgatla.180
Conclusion
The strong responses by opinion makers in the Netherlands to what hap-
pened at Elandslaagte and Derdepoort were part of the ongoing debate about
the colonial future of South Africa and the question of whether the Dutch or
the British race would dominate there. It has been argued in this chapter that
pro-Boer propaganda during the South African War was a continuation of
the debate on stamverwantschap that had started in the 1880s. At the begin-
ning of the South African War, many publications appeared that considered
the conflict to be the outcome of the ‘century of wrong’ following the British
occupation of the Cape. The debate was not without ambivalence, even dur-
ing the first months when there was much public enthusiasm for the men who
defended the independence of Transvaal and the ofs. Certain doubts about
the ‘kinsmen’ in South Africa continued to exist, for example concerning the
reluctant attitude of the Afrikaners in the Cape and the lack of discipline in
the Boer commandos. Similarly, the British military presence in South Africa
was strongly condemned, but at the same time there was a measure of sympa-
thy for the common British soldiers, who were seen as victims of a war that
had been initiated by corrupt statesmen and capitalists. When given the over-
arching colonial issue, however, propagandists in the Netherlands clearly
sided with the Boers and attempted to provide an alternative to British cover-
age of the war. Reports of the burghers’ faults were largely glossed over or re-
jected as slander, while all available evidence of the atrocities committed by
their adversaries was discussed extensively. In this regard, it was asserted that
the republics were civilised nations that deserved to be treated according to
international law.
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The longer the war continued, the more emotional the indictments by pro-
pagandists became against the British ‘cruelties’. In April 1900, H. Wefers
Bettink, professor in chemistry at the University of Utrecht, wrote a letter to
protest against matters such as the use of dum-dum bullets, the recruitment
of black soldiers and the mistreatment of Boer pows. He saw these as arro-
gant and cruel acts by the mighty British Empire, which were the result of its
unscrupulous expansionism. He summarised the British point of view as:
‘The Transvaal must be subdued; its citizens should be exterminated as far as
possible.’181 This sort of radical statement in which the British imperialists
were accused of trying to wipe out the Dutch race in South Africa became
more common after the territorial conquest of the Boer republics was com-
pleted in September 1900.
But there were also more hopeful signs. Although there was much disap-
pointment at the commandos’ retreat, letters and reports from South Africa
showed that the generals in the field continued fighting. The leaders of the
pro-Boer movement in Europe used this material to emphasise that the war
was far from over. This meant that the hope of a positive outcome for the
Boers – the restoration of their independence at least, the unification of South
Africa under Dutch dominance at best – lingered on. Many propagandists
were of the opinion that the British atrocities had backfired in this regard. A
correspondent in Cape Town wrote how the ‘racial hatred’ between the
Dutch and English-speaking white colonists increasingly took ‘concrete
shape’.182 Rompel also mentioned it as a hindrance to English dominance.
‘South Africa cannot come to rest under British rule. That has been made im-
possible by this war.’183Hence, the public in the Netherlands continued to os-
cillate between hope and fear concerning the future of South Africa from
June 1900 until the end of the war in June 1902. The next chapter will de-
scribe the contents of pro-Boer propaganda during that period.
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chapter 6
‘All will be well!’ Pro-Boer propaganda, 
June 1900-June 1902
Early in 1902, the Dutch-born P. J. Kloppers, who had been a teacher in the
Transvaal and was deported back to the Netherlands by the British, pub-
lished a volume of stories about his experiences during the South African War.
The book had the stirring title: Alles zal rech kom! (All will be well), a refer-
ence to the famous words of the former president of the ofs, J. H. Brand.1
These words were quite popular amongst pro-Boers between 1899 and 1902
and provided a glimpse of hope at a time when the future of the republics
looked increasingly grim. Kloppers did not deny the gravity of the situation
and extensively described the methods used by the British to subdue their ad-
versaries, which – as far as he could tell from his own experiences – inflicted
great suffering on the inhabitants of the republics, something he already men-
tioned in letters when he was still in South Africa.2 But he also wrote about
how, despite his sorrow, the patriotism of the Boers and particularly that of
the commandos still left in the field made him defiant. ‘No dear reader, I do
not even think about submitting myself, I will not make peace with Chamber-
lain, Milner and their band of robbers, I will continue writing: “All will be
well!”’3
Kloppers’s words reflected the general feelings amongst pro-Boer propa-
gandists during the last phase of the conflict. There was much pessimism con-
cerning the chances of the burghers after the defeat of the commandos in the
first half of 1900 and the occupation of the republics, finalised with procla-
mations by Lord Roberts announcing the annexation of the ofs (May 1900)
and the sar (September 1900). What followed were further proclamations
implementing harsh measures to end hostilities such as the deportation of
pows and other undesirables, farm-burning and concentration camps, which
led to much suffering amongst the Boer forces and the civilian population of
South Africa. But there were also reasons for optimism, according to the pro-
Boers. The governments of the Transvaal and the ofs, although they had
been severely weakened after having been forced to flee their capitals, still op-
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erated in the field and contested the annexations. Likewise, the Boer represen-
tatives in Europe continued to campaign for the restoration of independence.
News about the military situation was also used to shore up the hope that the
Boers would prevail in the end. Interviews with people returning from South
Africa and several reports from Boer generals that were brought to Europe by
couriers asserted that the commandos remained defiant, and were able to ac-
quire enough supplies to continue their guerrilla campaign.
Historians tend to see the propaganda in the Netherlands during the South
African War as a fleeting phenomenon, which ended when it became clear
that the republics would not hold out. In this chapter it will be argued that
there was a large degree of continuity in the debate about South Africa up un-
til the end of the war. To many people, the events from this period such as the
guerrilla campaign by the Boers and British proclamations that they would
counter the Boers constituted a new phase in the ongoing struggle between
the ‘white races’ for colonial dominance in South Africa. The South African
War was considered the outcome of a century of British oppression of the
Afrikaners, a notion that had become common amongst opinion makers in
the Netherlands during the 1880s and 1890s. It should be remembered that
this debate was never consistent and that there were continual ambivalences.
In this sense, the mix of melancholy and hope that characterised the mood of
propagandists between June 1900 and June 1902 was typical for the pro-
Boer movement in the Netherlands. The tone of the propaganda did become
increasingly radical, however.
The emotional reactions to events taking place in South Africa should be
seen in the context of general ideas that existed about the South African ques-
tion. To contemporaries, the struggle between the two ‘white races’ was not
only fought out on the battlefield. In the view of many, the counter-guerrilla
campaign by the British went beyond military conquest and territorial annex-
ation of the republics and targeted the Afrikaner people as a whole, which
was seen as an attempt to destroy the Dutch presence in South Africa. The
propaganda campaign was therefore an appeal to the international commu-
nity and the people in Britain to force the Salisbury government to stop this
onslaught. Moreover, it was thought that the propaganda campaign could
help the Boers in a real sense. Money that was collected was sent to relieve the
most immediate needs. In addition, publications on the atrocities were sup-
posed to preserve and rebuild Afrikaner identity after the war. In this way,
there continued to be a direct connection between the pro-Boer movement in
Europe and events in the war zone.
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In historiography, it is asserted that the Peace of Vereeniging, which sig-
nalled the formal surrender of independence by the Boers, came as a great
shock to people in the Netherlands, who were very disappointed.4 But even
this dark cloud had a silver lining to some Boer supporters, which will be fur-
ther discussed at the end of this chapter. Despite the loss of the republics, the
people who remained defiant to the bitter end showed that they possessed
moral fibre and would not accept Anglicisation, it was thought, and there
was even hope that their sacrifice would mean that the Dutch-speaking popu-
lation would still be victorious in the end. This state of mind concerning the
future of the Afrikaners in South Africa was already apparent during the war
itself.
After the British occupation
On 1 September 1900, Lord Roberts announced the annexation of the Trans-
vaal by the British Empire. Whereas the general stated that this proclamation
would officially end the war, commentators in the Netherlands had other
opinions on the matter. With regard to the legal aspects, it was noted that
none of the European powers at that time recognised the annexations of
Transvaal and the ofs.5 The diplomatic representatives of both republics of-
ficially protested against Robert’s declarations and issued an address.6 In Sep-
tember 1901, they even tried to bring it before the newly formed Permanent
Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Although this initiative came from the
Dutch foreign office and was supported by prominent members of the politi-
cal elite, the court did not hear the case on the formal grounds that it had no
jurisdiction in it.7
What was considered even more important was that the Boer leaders in the
field did not surrender. The sar authorities had moved into the northeastern
part of the country, where they set up a seat of government. Reports coming
from that region suggested that the British occupation of the towns and rail-
way lines had a limited effect on the rest of the country, where the Boers re-
mained in control.8 In addition, several proclamations by the Boer leaders in
which the annexation was rejected and the inhabitants of the sar were called
to remain loyal to the old leadership reached the Dutch press.9 Similar ac-
tions were taken by President Steyn and his men, who also remained active,
contesting the annexation of their republic. One former commando member
recounted an adventurous mission in the occupied parts of the ofs during
which he and a small band spread a proclamation by Steyn in which he de-
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clared that these lands were still under the rule of the Free State government.
This group managed to mobilise an effective force that commandeered sup-
plies and punished people who collaborated with the occupying forces.10
Such stories were presented as evidence that the British only ruled as far as
their guns reached and that the Boers who roamed the countryside were far
from beaten.
Nevertheless, the annexations made public opinion in the Netherlands in-
creasingly discontented with the official policy of neutrality that prevented
significant action. To appease these feelings of dissatisfaction, the govern-
ment offered to help Paul Kruger to leave Africa in September 1900, after
having transferred his duties to acting President Schalk Burger. Kruger’s voy-
age on the cruiser Gelderland and his tour throughout Europe were exten-
sively covered by the continental press, and great crowds of people came out
to honour him everywhere he showed himself in public. Still, there was some
controversy surrounding this masterstroke of publicity. Opposition leader
Kuyper criticised the government for the fact that the Gelderland did not sail
under the Transvaal flag. Kruger, he argued, was still head of state and should
therefore have been treated with full protocol.11 Liberal commentators dis-
missed Kuyper’s complaints as hair-splitting because the foreign minister had
referred to Kruger as being president during the debate on this topic in Parlia-
ment, which showed that the government did not recognise the British annex-
ation of the Transvaal. The motivation for helping him was humanitarian,
however, as the elderly man was in poor health. He therefore travelled incog-
nito after he had been forced to end his active service to his country. On a
more practical level, it also ensured that the Gelderland was granted safe pas-
sage.12 Eventually Kuyper accepted these arguments, which ended the
polemic about the flag on the Gelderland.13
In addition to sparking off political and diplomatic issues surrounding the
neutrality policy of the Netherlands, Lord Roberts’s proclamations were seen
as being inherently part of British efforts to subdue the Boers at any cost and
to secure dominance in South Africa – not only on the battlefield but also cul-
turally. The sense that there was a continuous struggle between the two
‘white races’ that was more than just a military conflict grew stronger during
the later phases of the war. Correspondents reported how the British regime
became increasingly brutal after the occupation of the two Boer capitals. It
was noted how people who had emigrated from continental Europe, and the
Dutch in particular, were singled out. Many of them were ordered to leave
South Africa, and from June 1900 they were actively deported.14 This
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aroused much resentment of the British in the Netherlands, and the exiles
were welcomed with compassion. Historians who have written about this
subject attribute these sentiments to offended national pride.15
There was another aspect to the protests against the deportations that ex-
posed the fear that the end of the independent Dutch presence in South Africa
was imminent. In a letter from Pretoria written just before the occupation of
the city, a correspondent predicted that the British would close Dutch schools
and dismiss Hollander administrators, as they were seen as the greatest obsta-
cles to Anglicisation of the occupied republics. ‘The Englishman will trample
us [the Dutch] wherever he can.’16 In numerous reports that reached the
Netherlands after the occupation of Pretoria, it was asserted that the British
discriminated against the remaining Dutch inhabitants, making life hard for
them by shutting down their businesses and putting them on trial for no rea-
son.17
The people who were deported also wrote about how badly they were
treated during their forced journey to the coast in open cattle wagons, during
which women and children were not sheltered from the elements. One of
them, Cornelis Plokhooy, noted in his memoirs that Britain made many ene-
mies in this way. ‘Oh, we will never forget the scandalous conduct of Eng-
land.’18The situation was not much better on the ships, he continued. The au-
thor was particularly offended by the lousy food; he suspected that tea was
made with sea water and that bread was at least one week old when served.19
During the sea journey, which took longer than expected, there was little
space to live and almost no washing facilities.20Another deportee, J. C. Kake-
beeke, wrote a feuilleton about his experiences, which were similar to those
of Plokhooy. The article was cynically titled ‘England’s interpretation of mar-
tial law’.21 In a later essay, he argued that the racial antagonism of the British
against the Dutch living in South Africa was largely the result of propaganda
by the jingo press. To prove this, he quoted extensively from the Bloem-
fontein Post, a newspaper that had been taken over by English journalists
who condoned the deportation policy, describing Hollanders in the sar as
‘parasites’ who were paying for their misbehaviour.22
Naturally, it was clear to contemporaries that not only the Dutch were be-
ing targeted. From the moment the British army entered the territory of the
Boer republics, the British high command issued dozens of proclamations
that affected the population. The first of these demanded the immediate sur-
render of the combatants who were still fighting in order to end hostilities. As
it became clear that the commandos were turning to guerrilla tactics, the tone
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of these documents became more menacing. People who did not surrender
voluntarily or pledged to be neutral were threatened with penalties such as
deportation and destruction of their property. These measures were not only
implemented against the Boers who actually fought but increasingly also
against civilians who were suspected of giving help to the commandos. By
contrast, collaborators were rewarded and were able to carry on with their
lives as normally as was possible under the circumstances. The leader of the
anv press office, Frederik Rompel, analysed these proclamations in a 1901
pamphlet. He argued that they were the result of the failure of the British mili-
tary to subdue the Boer forces on the battlefield. As a result, the army com-
mand and policymakers chose other means to try and secure victory: ‘what I
would like to point out is the ridiculousness of the policy of threats followed
by England’s government with regards to the Boers, and the cowardice of
only daring to implement this policy of threats when it affects the
vulnerable’.23Rompel continued by pointing out that the British also tried to
lure Afrikaners over to their side with all sorts of promises and rewards. But
he concluded that this policy of carrots and sticks was failing: ‘all these
threats, pleas and promises did not help: the Boers persevered’.24 As the war
went on, the commandos who continued to fight and the civilians who sup-
ported them were considered to be the only hope for the survival of the Dutch
race in South Africa, and to opinion makers in the Netherlands they became
heroic martyrs. At the same time, there was growing antipathy to those who
laid down their arms, or worse, collaborated with the British army. In the fol-
lowing section, this emerging dichotomy between the imagery of the men
who fought until the bitter end and those who surrendered will be discussed.
Bittereinders and Handsoppers
The Boers who continued fighting after the occupation of the republics be-
came known as Bittereinders.25 In the Netherlands, they were admired for
their courage, and reports of their exploits read like adventure stories.
Plokhooy, for example, wrote in his memoirs how he and a comrade outwit-
ted an enemy patrol of six men with rapid fire, which gave the British soldiers
the impression that they were being ambushed by a large group.26Another as-
pect of the guerrilla campaign that interested pro-Boer authors was the hold-
ing up of trains. Several memoirs of people who had fought with the com-
mandos included detailed descriptions of how explosive charges could be
used to derail trains or blow up locomotives.27 The British saw these attacks
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as war crimes but, although it was admitted that the railway personnel did
sometimes suffer as a result, the Boers and their supporters in the Nether-
lands condoned them as legitimate means for the commandos to try and
weaken the British army and to secure supplies for themselves.28
After the death of Piet Joubert and the capture of Piet Cronjé, a new gener-
ation of Boer generals assumed command, including Louis Botha, Koos de la
Rey and Jan Smuts who became famous for their guerrilla-style tactics. Ar-
guably the most legendary of these men was Christiaan de Wet, commander-
in-chief of the ofs forces. Both Dutch and British reporters saw him as the
main architect of the Boers’ guerrilla campaign. De Wet’s reputation made
him a target of the British military, which organised so-called ‘drives’ to hunt
him down and at times he and his commando were chased by many thou-
sands of soldiers. Despite this great superiority in numbers, De Wet managed
to escape time after time. The Dutch audience eagerly awaited news about his
adventurous exploits, and commentators cheered when it appeared that he
had outwitted his adversaries once again: ‘Bravo De Wet!’29 Reports of peo-
ple serving with him contained detailed descriptions of his bold plans.30 In
such accounts, De Wet was described as an assertive leader who at times was
a bit rash but inspired his men with patriotic speeches and commanded their
respect with strict discipline. In addition to these moral qualities that distin-
guished him from older generations of Boer leaders, he was praised for his
‘military genius’.31 In popular culture too, De Wet became an icon. He fea-
tured in a number of adventure books and in epic poems which celebrated his
abilities as a scout in the veldt.32 In several plays that were written for ama-
teur theatre, he was staged as an untouchable vigilante who punished the
British.33
In many ways, these images of the heroic Bittereinders resembled the Dutch
literature that appeared about the Boer people before the war began. It was
argued by many contemporaries that the essential skills for guerrilla warfare
– including marksmanship, horse riding and scouting – had been ingrained in
the Boer character during the pioneering days of the Great Trek. As has been
mentioned, the attitude towards the Boers in the Netherlands was ambiva-
lent in this respect. On the one hand, authors praised the individual qualities
that the Voortrekkers had developed over the years while taming the wilder-
ness, but on the other hand it was noted that they had lost touch with the out-
side world. Also during the first phase of the war, the lack of discipline in the
republics’ armies was considered a disadvantage that offset the advantage of
their tenacity.34 Negative descriptions about the Boers continued to pop up
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throughout the war but became increasingly controversial. One of the most
notorious incidents took place in January 1902, when Mrs Junius from Arn-
hem wrote an article under the pseudonym ‘Mimosa’ which was published in
the magazine Hollandia. She argued that the Boers were a petty and conserva-
tive people, deeply divided by a strong sense of partisanship and full of hatred
towards outsiders, including people from the Netherlands. Willem Leyds re-
sponded furiously to these statements, which might have been used in the
British press and were therefore harmful to the pro-Boer propaganda cam-
paign. As a result, the publisher of the magazine, P. A. Nierstrasz, even
stopped the publication of Hollandia altogether.35
Nevertheless, certain developments during the war made the majority of
observers more positive about the morale of the commandos. When Boer
forces regrouped after the occupation of Pretoria, it appeared that a much
smaller number remained. Although this was disappointing at first sight, it
was not only seen as a setback by Dutch commentators. Some argued that
only well-motivated and able Boers had decided to continue and that in that
sense the wheat had been separated from the chaff.36 The Bittereinders were
considered to be the embodiment of the positive aspects of the Boer character.
Their ability to cope with the harsh circumstances in the field was greatly ad-
mired. It was asserted in sources coming from the war zone that they were
forced to lead a primitive lifestyle as a result of the British anti-guerrilla meas-
ures and the loss of control over towns and infrastructure. The fact that they
were constantly on the move meant that they were not able to carry many
supplies with them and that they had to mainly live on what they found in the
field and captured from British convoys. Writings from commandos that
reached the Netherlands contained descriptions of a monotonous diet of
meat and corn, distasteful surrogates for coffee and tobacco, and their worn-
out clothes.37
Despite these hardships, from September 1900 onwards, the overall tone
of reports coming from the commandos becamemore andmore positive, and
correspondents wrote about improving morale. In June 1901, J. C. J. Bierens
de Haan, a Red Cross doctor returning from South Africa where he served
with the commandos, gave an interview about ‘the war and the character of
the Boers’. He admitted that he had left the Netherlands with too high a view
of the common Boers, many of whom he considered to be ‘children with a
good character, butwho have been left toomuch on their own […] andwhose
bad qualities – aside from their good ones – have sometimes grown to disturb-
ing proportions.’ However, he thought that the war had brought much im-
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provement in this respect. The Boers had set aside selfish interests and the dis-
cipline of the commandos had improved considerably, according to the doc-
tor, who predicted that they would continue to fight in the foreseeable
future.38
In letters from the war zone, this renewed fighting spirit was reiterated and
it was also stated that the commandos were able to secure enough supplies to
continue the struggle. Such information was widely published, while less pos-
itive newswas suppressed. General Smuts, for example, wrote several reports
that reached the Boer representatives in Europe via couriers. In private letters
to the diplomatic deputation, he expressed his doubts about the situation, but
he explicitly indicated that these were not for publication.39 By contrast, one-
sided official accounts, in which he mentioned the successes of the comman-
dos and the cruelty of the British, were published and distributed by the anv
press office. In these writings Smuts boasted about the morale of his men:
The mood of my burghers is splendid. Although they have, perhaps, suf-
fered more heavily than any other group of burghers in this war, today they
look toward the future with hope, convinced that no difficulty or enemy
force, whatever its size, can prevent this struggle from being continued un-
til Right triumphs over Might.40
As was the case in the Voortrekker romance, in these sources the wives of the
Boers were considered to be at least as heroic as their husbands, persevering
when all appeared to be lost. Although the fortunes of the men fighting in the
commandos were reported much more extensively, there was a certain
amount of coverage about this aspect of the war too. In several letters it was
reported how, when a number of men considered surrender after the break-
through by the British army, their wives would not accept it and sent them
back to fight.41 In other ways too, women in the Transvaal and the ofs resis-
ted the occupation of their republics. Stories appeared about how the British
were not made welcome by them. Correspondents from Pretoria mentioned
that only a few girls started affairs with soldiers from the occupying forces
and were ostracised by the community as a result.42 Several sources even re-
ported that women became actively involved in the resistance. They gathered
intelligence, which they passed on to the commandos in the field, and there
was even mention of women fighting with the commandos. Such rumours
were rare, though, and did not receive much attention in the media.43
A subject that received far more coverage was the suffering of the women
6. ‘All will be well!’ 223
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 223
in the republics, which was considered to be the most typical aspect of the
women’s experience of the war. In 1903, the publicist W. F. Andriessen wrote
an article about the ‘wives of the Boers’ in which he noted that they were far
more vulnerable to the British army than the men, who operated in the field
and were less affected by the occupation. In addition to accusations that
British soldiers and their black auxiliaries committed rape, many accounts
noted how women were forced to witness the destruction of their homes and
how they were deported to concentration camps, a matter that will be dis-
cussed later in this chapter. What matters here is that commentators like An-
driessen emphasised that even these extreme hardships did not break the
women’s spirit. ‘They have drunk the cup of sorrows that has been put to
their lips to the last drop, and even then they remained standing, they have re-
mained faithful and defiant.’44 In the view of many people in the Netherlands,
these women shared in the heroism of the Bittereinders because they kept
faith in the Boers’ cause. This sacrifice provided hope that all was not yet lost.
There were other groups, however, who did seem to falter or even break un-
der British pressure.
Of all the Dutch-speaking people in South Africa, at most 20,000 men
fought against the British until the bitter end, a small minority considering
the total population. Contemporaries were particularly disappointed about
the situation in the Cape, where the majority of the white population lived.
Even before the war started, there were doubts about the commitment of
Afrikaner nationalists there to the overall struggle against British hegemony,
as they had been subjects of the British Empire for many decades. These
doubts persisted, but there also remained hope that the various Dutch-speak-
ing groups would unify. The fact that the Cape government of Conwright
Schreiner did not take a firm stance against the war led to much irritation
among observers.45 Nevertheless, the neutral middle ground became increas-
ingly limited. The longer the war continued, the more oppressive British rule
became, which was seen by correspondents as an attempt by Milner to quell
any form of opposition. Farmers were ordered to turn in rifles and horses,
supplies were commandeered, censorship tightened and peoplewhowere sus-
pected of sympathising with the republics were locked up. But these dark
clouds gathering over the inhabitants of the colony did have silver linings as
well in the view of Dutch commentators. Several letter writers argued that
this ‘reign of terror’ had the opposite effect and undermined support for the
British.46
Thus there was continuing hope in the Netherlands that the majority of the
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Afrikaners would rise up against the imperial administration if they had a
chance. In this respect, much was expected from an invasion by the Boer com-
mandos, which, it was hoped, would arouse these men into joining the re-
publics’ forces. Plans for such an operation were developed by the Boer lead-
ership from September 1900, resulting in an expedition under the command
of General De Wet and President Steyn in February 1901. This operation
failed when they encountered a large British force, but other, smaller, com-
mandos did penetrate the border and become active in the wake of this inva-
sion. Several thousands of Afrikaners joined these troops, but it was not near-
ly the mass rebellion the Boers and their supporters in Europe had hoped for.
These disappointments were kept relatively quiet, though. In the official
despatch about his operations between October and November 1901, Smuts
maintained that the general situation in the Cape was ‘very promising’.47 In
more discrete correspondence, however, he was far less optimistic, asserting
that the number of men joining his commando was far less than he had ex-
pected, which he attributed to British tactics and a lack of co-ordination be-
tween the commandos.48 As has been mentioned, the reports in which Smuts
expressed such doubts never became propagandistic material.
Other painful matters that exposed the weaknesses of the Dutch position
in South Africa were mentioned more explicitly in the pro-Boer coverage of
the war. Also in the occupied territories of the republics, the British increased
pressure on the population to prevent them from joining the commandos.
One of their measures was an oath of neutrality. Men who had signed this
document, known as Handsoppers, turned in their weapons and promised
not to give support to the Boer forces in the field.49 In return, their farms
would be left alone. In the writings of the commandos, such men were por-
trayed as selfish misers who only wished to save their own hide. The states-
man W. F. Reitz wrote a poem about these men. He raged that while they sat
peacefully at home they were selling ‘their birth right’ by surrendering to the
enemy.50 This sort of opportunism was considered to be indicative of their
lack of patriotism. Some even criticised Boers who broke their oath of neu-
trality. In his memoirs, the veteran Dietlof van Warmelo noted that burghers
who had already surrendered to the British joined the commando of Koos de
la Rey again. According to him this showed a great ‘defect in the character’ of
these men who apparently had not only sworn the oath ‘without any
qualms’, but easily broke it again too.51 Although he believed it not to be op-
portune to discuss this sort of behaviour at length while the war still went on,
it is clear that Van Warmelo denounced such fickleness as a bad trait in his
compatriots.
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To pro-Boers, the worst opportunists were people who not only signed the
oath of neutrality but also worked for the British. In the view of Dutch opin-
ion makers, several prominent Boers betrayed their ‘brothers’ by seeking con-
ciliation with the occupying forces. They formed so-called peace committees
(vredescommissies) and wanted to broker a deal between the Boers and the
British, as they considered the republics’ cause to be lost. In the Netherlands,
these initiatives were rejected with great vehemence as a danger to the com-
mandos who continued to fight. One of the most notorious of these ‘traitors’
was Piet de Wet, who of all people was a brother of the famous general: an as-
tounding contrast, according to many commentators.52 Not only did he seek
rapprochement with the enemy, he even formed a regiment that served the
British forces. These so-called National Scouts were considered to be a great
threat to the commandos. Besides the moral blow, it was pointed out that the
Boers serving in them knew the tactics of the commandos and could therefore
be quite dangerous.53 In letters from South Africa, the National Scouts – also
known as ‘National Scoundrels’ or ‘National Scandals’ – were described as
rascals who deserved to die.54 On several occasions, Boer commanders shot
Afrikaners whom they accused of working for the enemy. The British protest-
ed against such executions, but the Dutch press argued that they were legiti-
mate.55 Meanwhile, the protests against the British policies became more vo-
cal as the war progressed.
‘Methods of barbarism’
By June 1901, there was growing concern amongst certain groups in British
society about the war dragging on in South Africa. Stories emerged about the
campaign by the army to subdue the Boers that showed the ruthlessness of
these efforts. In July 1901, Henry Campbell-Bannerman, leader of the Liber-
al opposition, attacked the government on its policies in South Africa. Dur-
ing a speech in the Holborn restaurant in London, he coined the phrase
‘methods of barbarism’. This performance was met with mixed response in
the Netherlands. Some saw it as a sign that the public mood in Britain was
changing in favour of the anti-war party, a hope that proved to be in vain.56
Others were sceptical about Campbell-Bannerman’s dedication to trying to
stop the war, as he had failed to do so when the conflict had started.57 What-
ever the motives may have been behind these words, however, pro-Boer au-
thors agreed with their meaning. In general, they condemned the counter-
guerrilla measures of the British army as ‘barbaric’.58Many wondered how a
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progressive and morally upright nation such as Great Britain could trample
their fellow Christians in such a way. One Calvinist minister expressed this in-
dictment in a dramatic sermon delivered at Flushing that was also published
in English:
If I mistake not, Great Britain is undoing the work God hath wrought in
the sixteenth century [the Reformation], and preparing the way for the An-
tichrist. […] The highest interests of humanity are at stake; faith in God, in
man, in Government, in religion, in arbitration, in international laws, in
the power of right.59
Such prophetic words did not end the war, and only few people nurtured the
hope that the rampant jingoism, which they believed had enchanted the pub-
lic in Britain, would be replaced by common sense soon.
In this respect, Britain’s military campaign was compared to notorious
conflicts of the past and present. For instance, Milner’s rule in the Cape and
Roberts’s occupation of the republics was believed by many to be similar to
the reign of the Duke of Alva, who terrorised the Low Countries in the
1560s.60 Others saw resemblances to less distant events. The measures used
to subdue the Boers were seen as the equivalent of those that were used in
Cuba by the Spaniards to quell the guerrilla uprising there.61 Some went even
further and likened the British army to the Turks and the atrocities they com-
mitted in Armenia.62
A number of contemporaries also saw a parallel with the campaign that
the Dutch colonial army was conducting in Aceh, in Sumatra. Since the
1870s, it had tried to ‘pacify’ this region, and the war had developed into a
bloody guerrilla struggle. Several military specialists noted that the British
faced similar difficulties in attempting to overcome their adversaries in South
Africa. The tone of these remarks was quite reserved because it brought up
painful memories about the failure of the Dutch military to quickly put an
end to this conflict.63 Several critics, such as the Socialist leader Troelstra,
took a less cautious approach to this sensitive issue, arguing that the wars in
South Africa and Aceh were both expansionist conflicts caused by the greed
of capitalists. Moreover, the harsh methods used by the colonial army in the
archipelago were considered to be at least as devastating as the conduct of the
British in the sar and the ofs.64 Such remarks caused an outcry, particularly
amongst Liberal opinion makers. The Boers could not be put on a par with
the inhabitants of Sumatra, one member of parliament argued, because they
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promoted ‘European civilisation and industry’, while the latter were ‘a peo-
ple […] barbaric in its actions’. One of his colleagues added that there was
also ‘a difference in skin colour’.65 Such comparative remarks should be seen
in the light of ongoing concerns about the race question in South Africa.
Many of the people in the Netherlands considered the Boers to be a kindred
developed people who had the right to be treated according to the conven-
tions of international law. The British were accused of ignoring these princi-
ples and of using every means possible to subdue their enemies in the struggle
for colonial dominance in South Africa. One of the concerns in this respect
was the use of black people, which will be discussed first.
It is asserted in recent historiography that black people performed auxil-
iary tasks – as drivers, scouts and couriers – mainly for the British army. From
the beginning of the war, the Boers and their supporters in Europe argued
that black people should be left out of a war between white men. Such com-
plaints continued to reach the Netherlands during the guerrilla campaign.
The fact that the Boers also used black auxiliaries, the so-called agterryders,
was barely mentioned in Dutch contemporary sources.66 In April 1902, a
controversy arose when the former military attaché Lieutenant L. W. J. K.
Thomson made a speech in which he suggested that Boers used black scouts
on a large scale. After he was criticised in the press for these remarks, he pub-
licly offered his apologies and stated that he had referred only to isolated inci-
dents.67 In memoirs and novels, there was more frequent mention of black
servants at farms who remained loyal to their masters, helping them to flee
from the British.68 Some observers noted how this showed that the Boers
were not as cruel to Africans as the British accused them of being.69
However, these examples should be considered the exception rather than
the rule, and in general it was asserted in Dutch sources that the Boers could
not trust black people. In his reports, Smuts repeatedly mentioned incidents
during which he or other commandos were attacked by black troops armed
with firearms.70 The commandos did not take half measures against them.
From the beginning of the war, it was announced that every black person
who was caught scouting or carrying messages for the British would be shot,
which pro-Boer commentators thought perfectly legitimate.71 At times, the
British themselves were even blamed for these harsh measures, as they had re-
cruited the black people in the first place.72 One of the most notorious inci-
dents that took place was the gruesome execution of Abraham Esau, a
coloured blacksmith from Calvinia in the Northern Cape.73 When the Boers
invaded the colony he founded a scouting regiment. When Calvinia was tem-
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porarily occupied by a commando, Esau was arrested. After several beatings
with a sjambok (bull whip), he was dragged behind a horse and shot outside
town. British opinion makers condemned this execution, which they saw as a
clear example of the deep-seated cruelty of Boers to black people. In the
Dutch press, however, this view was rejected as jingo propaganda. A corre-
spondent from Cape Town who wrote about the execution referred to a re-
port by General Smuts in which it was asserted that Esau was the ringleader
of black opposition against the Boers in the Northern Cape and was thus a le-
gitimate target. Moreover, he suggested, Esau had probably ‘taunted’ his cap-
tors and so they ‘were right to put [him] in his place’.74
According to pro-Boer propagandists, the Esau case did not stand by itself.
It was noted in many letters, reports and memoirs how British rule had cor-
rupted Africans and imperilled social order. The same letter in which the exe-
cution of Esau was condoned contained a reflection on the relations between
blacks and whites in the Cape. The author described how, in contrast to the
Boer republics, black people had more rights there, which he felt was ‘one of
the most unpleasant things here’. He continued that, unlike what many peo-
ple from Europe probably might have thought, the greater amount of free-
dom led to much disturbance in public life, as it made the black population
more rowdy, lazy and insolent.75Correspondents from the Transvaal and the
ofs also wrote about how the ‘Kaffers’ there had become more unruly due to
the British introducing a milder regime after the occupation. It was noted
how servants on farms refused to work or had ran off altogether and how the
miners had become lazy without the strict discipline previously imposed by
governments of the republics.76 What was considered to be at least as prob-
lematic, if not worse, was that black people became increasingly abusive.
Boer combatants who had been taken prisoner wrote about how they had
been mocked by Africans as they were marched down the streets, which they
considered degrading.77 Women who were brought to concentration camps
also complained about this humiliation.78 There was, however, a greater
threat menacing the Boer wives and daughters. In several letters, it was re-
ported that the numbers of white women who were being raped by black men
was rising.79
The repeated reports of involvement by black people in the war caused
much concern amongst pro-Boer commentators. In one of his writings,
Smuts predicted that it would form a grave threat to civilisation, and he con-
demned the use of armed ‘Kaffers’ as ‘the biggest crime […] that can ever be
committed against the white race in South Africa’.80 These remarks were sin-
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gled out in the press in the Netherlands, which highlights that the situation in
South Africa was first and foremost considered in terms of race.81 As had
been the case before the South African War, contemporaries did not only as-
sociate this question with relations between blacks and whites but also with
the struggle between the two ‘white races’. This issue became more important
during the guerrilla phase, because the British were accused of attempting to
exterminate the Dutch presence in South Africa using every means possible.
‘The English have a red haze before their eyes’: farm-burning
Many contemporaries considered the advance by Roberts’s army into the
Boer republics in early 1900 the first sign of the destruction that lay ahead. At
the time, the endless columns in which many thousands of soldiers marched
forward were known as the ‘steamroller’. In her memoirs, one Boer woman
described it as being a machine that literally flattened everything in its way.
From her farm in the ofs, she saw the army approaching. ‘A hellish specta-
cle! We cannot call it by any other name. With flames, fire and smoke they ap-
proach! The grass is consumed by fire and paves the way for them.’82 The
columns also confiscated livestock to supply them with food. In official re-
ports, British officers claimed that they had neatly recorded everything they
had taken so that farmers who had laid down their arms could ask for com-
pensation. Correspondents said that things happened quite differently in
practice. One member of the Boer deputation, for example, received news
from his son that a large part of his cattle had been taken by the British, and
no receipt was left.83 The devastation went beyond this sort of plunder,
though. Eyewitnesses reported the slaughter of large herds of livestock and
the destruction of crops so that the commandos could not make use of them.
To pro-Boers, this showed the contrast between the good burghers of the re-
publics who had worked hard to cultivate the lands where they had settled
and the ruin the British Empire had brought upon South Africa. One corre-
spondent described it as follows: ‘The English have a red haze of revenge and
bloodthirstiness before their eyes. They see nothing anymore, they only want
death – away with it all!’84
What was considered even more illustrative for the British appetite for de-
struction was the policy of farm-burning. The family was widely seen as the
cornerstone of Boer society, so the demolition of their homesteads was experi-
enced as a traumatic event. News of farm-burnings reached Europe soon af-
ter the British advance began. At first, these were considered ‘shameful’ but
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isolated incidents, as it seemed as if only the homes of Boer leaders were being
targeted.85 Later on during the war, it became clear that it was happening on
a much larger scale and that British generals were issuing proclamations in
which they condoned farm-burning as a legitimate means to combat the guer-
rilla tactics used by the Boers.86 In the Netherlands, many people took of-
fence at these proclamations, denouncing them as criminal acts that targeted
the Boer population as a whole. One commentator described the farm-burn-
ing as ‘a kind of system of depopulation’ which was used ‘to turn everything
into a wilderness’.87
One shocking aspect of the reports about farm-burnings was the apparent
brutality of the British troops. The daughter-in-law of an ofs general wrote a
letter in which she described how soldiers arrived after a small skirmish that
had taken place nearby. Although she explained that she had no contact with
the commandos, the men ordered her to move out her furniture and within
an hour had set fire to the farm. The woman and her elderly parents were
forced to spend the night in the open air before they could travel to the near-
est town.88 It was reported how in other cases no time was given to empty the
house, so that everything was burned. Other sources suggested that valuable
belongings were stolen by soldiers, leaving the victims completely destitute.89
There were also accounts of women who had been killed during raids on
their houses. On some occasions, their homes were bombarded, but other
sources reported how women were shot in cold blood.90
Such reports of farm-burnings were used in popular literature too, al-
though the scenes were often dramatised. In his chronicle of the war, the au-
thor Louwrens Penning mentioned the letters about farm-burnings that the
adventurous artillery officer Gerrit Boldingh sent to Het Algemeen Handels-
blad.91 He probably also used these writings as a source of inspiration for his
novels, which contained fictitious descriptions of such events. In one of his
stories, he described how a group of British soldiers ‘disgraced’ (ontwijd) the
farm of the family of Veldcornet Louis Wessels, the hero of the book. His
mother who had remained behind stood by helplessly as these men with
‘faces like bandits’ (roverstronies) stuffed their pockets with loot. What they
could not take they smashed to pieces, and furthermore they killed all the
livestock and destroyed all the supplies. ‘The Khakis danced with pleasure.
Their hooliganism had no limits anymore, and while they scooped the pre-
cious butter from the pots with their dirty hands, they threw it at each other
like snowballs.’92 In another scene he described how soldiers cheered exuber-
antly when they set fire to yet another Boer farm. ‘They joined hands and
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wildly danced in a circle as the flames rose high above the roof of the doomed
house.’93
Despite such dramatic imagery, there was still hope that the British public
would put an end to such practices. Anti-war authors like William Stead and
Alfred Marks were seen as whistleblowers who tried to expose the truth
about the farm-burnings, which, they said, was kept out of the press by the
government and jingo propagandists. Their publications about these matters
were known in the Netherlands and were discussed in the media.94 One of
the most notorious examples became the razing of the village of Dullstroom
in northeastern Transvaal. Marks wrote an article about the destruction of
this prosperous settlement, which had been founded by emigrants from the
Netherlands in 1883. In it, he contested the figures published by the British
government, which claimed that eleven houses had been burned, while mili-
tary reports seemed to indicate that this number was forty-eight at the very
least. Moreover, Marks disputed the claims by General Smith-Dorrien (who
had ordered the action) that the village was a stronghold of the Boer forces,
as there had been no fortifications. Instead, he argued, the main target of the
soldiers had been the devout inhabitants of Dullstroom. They had even de-
stroyed house organs and the edifying contents of the local library. The
Dutch translation of this article was supplemented with a statement of J. H.
Janson, one of the pioneers who had founded the village and who had re-
turned to the Netherlands. He reported that Dullstroom had been revisited
twice by the British, who had eventually blown up the local church, the last
building left standing, with dynamite. ‘Now nothing remains of Dullstroom,
the product of years of labour and struggle. It has disappeared from the face
of the earth.’95
Just as had been the case during the first phase of the war, the Tommies
were not depicted as all being evil in pro-Boer propaganda. There was materi-
al that suggested that some of them were opposed to the farm-burnings. Anti-
war activists in England published letters from British soldiers and officers
who expressed their dislike of this policy but were forced to do it, and these
documents reached the press in the Netherlands too. Their authors reiterated
that the destruction of farms did not serve any useful purpose, and that they
thought that the only result would be that the Boers would simply have noth-
ing to lose anymore and so would continue fighting.96 This kind of source re-
inforced the idea held by pro-Boers that such actions were inspired by jingo
propaganda or ordered by British high command and worsened the ‘racial
hatred’ between the Boers and the British. In their view, the destruction of the
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homes of the Bittereinders was not effective in stopping the war – quite the
contrary. It also became clear, however, that not only the material belongings
of the Boers were being targeted as a means of subduing them; the anti-guer-
rilla campaign was increasingly seen as an onslaught on the Afrikaner people
as a whole.
‘That lethal idleness’ of being locked up: the treatment of pows
The first people to suffer from these measures were the thousands of people
who had been taken prisoner by the British. There were concerns about the
treatment of captured Boers from the beginning of the South African War. In
particular, the killings following the battle of Elandslaagte caused an outcry
amongst the pro-Boers in the Netherlands. Throughout the conflict, this inci-
dent was described as one of the greatest offences by the British army.97 Ac-
counts of executions continued to emerge during later phases of the war, par-
ticularly concerning Cape Afrikaners who had joined the Boer forces. Offi-
cially, they were subjects of the British Empire and were therefore branded as
rebels by the British and faced severe punishments. A number of those who
were caught even received the death penalty. In several cases, a comparison
was made with the incident at Slachtersnek at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, when colonists were hanged for rising up against the British authori-
ties. Many authors saw this historical event as one of the earliest signs of the
wilful oppression of the Afrikaner people.98 Likewise, the executions of the
Cape rebels were seen as being excessive. In the view of commentators in the
Netherlands, they had rightfully joined their brothers in the struggle against
the British. Moreover, the acts for which they were prosecuted, such as the de-
railment of trains and the execution of black scouts, were legitimate wartime
actions according to many pro-Boer authors.99
One of the most notorious cases was the trial against Gideon Scheepers,
who led a commando in the Cape. Dutch correspondents portrayed the trial
as a farce because, for instance, Scheepers’s claim that he was a citizen of the
ofs was immediately dismissed by the court. Such reports were seen as evi-
dence that the British falsified evidence and invented charges so that they
would have a pretext to ‘get rid of him, now that they have their hands on
him’.100 The death sentence therefore came as no surprise, but according to
pro-Boers his execution was ‘a murder, nothing else; it will forever be Eng-
land’s shame’.101 In addition, a gruesome detail emerged a few months later:
Scheepers, who had been severely ill since his capture, was shot while sitting
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on a chair because he had not had the strength to stand up.102 To many, this
showed the British determination to eliminate the young commander.
In contrast to the indignation about the way in which his life was ended,
commentators praised Scheepers’s calm response and acceptance of his fate.
In an obituary, Rompel described him as a dedicated officer who inspired his
men. Moreover, his dramatic end did not diminish the hope that everything
was not lost for the Boers – on the contrary. ‘His blood, his martyr’s blood
will not have been shed in vain, because a man like Scheepers must have had
innumerable friends who just like him will want to fight until the end. He
probably will recruit more in death than in life.’103 Such eulogies underlined
the fact that men like Scheepers remained defiant to the bitter end and even
thereafter. Many pows also shared in this kind of heroism, suffering captivity
in distant and barren places.
During the first months of 1900, prisoners of war were kept in camps in
the Cape Peninsula and on ships in Table Bay. Many of them sent letters in
which they described their fate to people in the Netherlands. Although there
were some who were quite satisfied with their treatment, the majority of the
letters contained complaints about the conditions the prisoners were subject-
ed to. One notorious account of the situation was given by F. K. Kannemeyer,
a former pow who had managed to escape to Europe. In an official statement
and in interviews, he told of the poor sanitary conditions on board of the
prison ships, where the inmates barely had room to move. The camps on the
shore were better in that respect, but there was a general lack of food and
clothing, he reported.104 Commentators in the Netherlands compared these
descriptions with reports from the Boer side that described the ‘humane’
treatment of their prisoners.105 When Lord Roberts issued statements in
which he protested about the situation of captured British soldiers at Preto-
ria, these were therefore met with great scepticism. Referring to the ‘dirty, 
[…] contaminated ships’ where the Boer pows were ‘packed like sardines’, a
commentator in the Netherlands accused him of hypocrisy. ‘It seems that
there exists no other people that is more candid in accusing others of things it
is guilty of itself, than the English.’106 Just as with other issues, the treatment
of pows was seen as a sign of the contrast between the Boers, who tried to ac-
commodate their prisoners as well as possible, and the British, who tried to
break the morale of their captives. When the army command started to de-
port pows to overseas camps, this was considered in line with this policy.
After the surrender of Cronjé and his commando of 4,000men at Paarde-
berg, the locations near Cape Town were no longer sufficient for housing
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pows, and other solutions had to be found. The British authorities decided to
deport them to overseas camps, the first of which was located on St. Helena,
the barren island in the Atlantic Ocean where Napoleon had spent his final
days. Other camps were set up in Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka), northern
India and the Bermuda Islands. In the view of pro-Boer authors, this solution
was not simply a question of logistics, however: they also saw it as an attempt
to neutralise the prisoners. The response of one commentator to the news
that Cronjé and his men were to be shipped to St. Helena was quite cynical.
Reports showed that the transport ships were a hotbed of disease, meaning
that many Boers would die during the voyage, which, he argued, would be
cheaper for the British government, as the bodies could be fed to the sharks
and there would be fewer men to take care of.107 Although many correspon-
dents did complain about the sanitary conditions on board the ships, such in-
dictments were not repeated in later commentaries, because it appeared from
letters that the casualty numbers remained relatively low, particularly in the
overseas camps.108
Still, the deportation of pows was seen as a cruel act intended to break the
morale of burghers by taking them away from their homeland. First of all,
most inhabitants of the landlocked republics were puzzled by the sea, which
many of them had never seen before, let alone crossed. Correspondents noted
how these men were amazed by their journey and wondered how the ship
was able to navigate the endless ocean, which these simple minds compared
to the equally vast South African veldt.109 Having arrived at their overseas
destinations, many of them felt homesick, a feeling that was aggravated by
the fact that they worried constantly about their farms and their families.110
Moreover, it was added, a monotonous, sedentary life between barbed wired
fences was opposite to the character of the Boers, who were used to living in
open spaces and engaging in outdoor activities. ‘How must that lethal idle-
ness, that cruel dependency, that being locked up and guarded, have been ex-
perienced by the men who love their freedom, their independence as much as,
yes even more than their own lives.’111
Many contemporaries considered the deportations of pows to be part of
the attempt to rid South Africa of people opposing British rule. In a proclama-
tion, General Kitchener threatened to banish all those who continued their re-
sistance. In the Netherlands, this proclamation was described as ‘shameless’
and an ‘open acknowledgement of [England’s] incompetence and moral de-
generation’.112 In the camps an attempt was made to intimidate the inmates
in a similar way, it was argued. In letters that slipped through, inmates com-
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plained about censorship and that they barely received news about the situa-
tion in South Africa other than from the British press. As a result they felt in-
creasingly isolated.113 In addition to these measures, the camp authorities
tried to get everybody to sign the oath of neutrality in exchange for better
treatment and the promise that they would be repatriated as soon as the war
ended. These promises were also considered to be illegitimate means to sub-
due the Boers. In many accounts, however, it was asserted that most of the
pows were not susceptible to this sort of manipulation and that only a small
number of them gave in. Correspondents from several camps wrote that
these people were seen as traitors who had to be kept in separate locations –
so-called ‘Judas camps’ – to prevent them from being attacked by their fellow
inmates or being dipped in the latrines.114 The defiance evident in the majori-
ty of letters from pows reinforced the idea that a significant number of Boers,
including those who had been deported, held on until the bitter end, refusing
to give in to British machinations and retaining their Dutch identity.
Inspired by such sentiments, collections were held for the inmates of the
pow camps in the Netherlands. Prominent inmates joined committees that
corresponded about aid with Dutch pro-Boer organisations. On St. Helena,
B. G. Versélewel de Witt Hamer, an officer from the Hollandercorps, was the
main co-ordinator of such activities. In his reports, he emphasised that apart
from tobacco, which was a popular commodity amongst the Boers, there was
much need for intellectual guidance. To keep the burghers from becoming
Anglicised, choirs, libraries and schools were set up in which they were ac-
quainted with the Dutch language. These institutions, mainly run by Hollan-
ders, were actively supported with book shipments by pro-Boer organisa-
tions in the Netherlands. In some camps, it was negotiated that periodicals be
allowed too, so that the inmates might feel less isolated from the outside
world. Initially, Versélewel de Witt Hamer warned in letters that the results
would not come instantly, and he described how inmates tore out pages from
the books they borrowed from the library because ‘of a shortage of sanitary
paper’.115As time went by, the tone of his reports became more positive, espe-
cially about the schools, which were considered quite useful because many of
the Boer pows had never before received an education.116
Other fruits of these patriotic initiatives were plays and concerts that were
well attended by the inmates. The British also allowed national holidays like
the birthdays of Kruger and Queen Wilhelmina to be celebrated, with sing-a-
longs, bazaars and sporting events. The public in the Netherlands learned
about these activities from letters that reached the media and photo albums
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that depicted the daily life of the pows.117 There was even more tangible evi-
dence that the Boers retained their Dutch identity in the camps. Many of
them turned to woodwork to pass the time, and a number of objects, which
often contained patriotic symbols or slogans, found their way to the Nether-
lands, where they became quite popular. Pro-Boer exhibitions held through-
out the country displayed samples of this work, and visitors could buy them
as souvenirs from stalls, the proceeds of which went to charities that helped
people in pow and concentration camps.118 Through their handiwork, the
camp inmates were seen as kind of Bittereinders: heroes who bravely suffered
the cruel treatment by the British but clung onto their identity and resisted im-
perial dominance. Despite the outcry over the treatment of the pows, their
fate was not considered to be as bad as that of the women and children in the
concentration camps. This important topic in pro-Boer propaganda will be
discussed in the following section.
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Photo of Boer pow, working as woodcutters on St. Helena. The accompanying text 
mentions that the wooden objects that they made, were for sale in the Netherlands.
Source: De Boeren op Sint-Helena (Amsterdam, 1902), 74-75. Collection Zuid-Afrika -
huis Amsterdam.
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A ‘policy of torturing women’: concentration camps
The policy of farm-burning caused problems for the British high command,
because it left the farm inhabitants homeless. From the end of 1900, the army
set up concentration camps throughout South Africa to which these dis-
placed people were deported. In total, hundreds of thousands of white inhabi-
tants of the Boer republics were put in these civilian camps, as they were
called by the British authorities. Black farm labourers were interned in sepa-
rate camps. Because of the poor hygienic conditions, the death rate in the
camps was very high. Between 25,000 and 28,000 Boers died there, no less
than ten per cent of the white population in the republics before the war. It is
estimated that tens of thousands of people lost their lives in black camps
too.119 Although the existence of the latter was known to contemporaries, it
was the fate of the Boers, particularly that of women and children, that
caused great commotion amongst the public in Europe and the Liberal oppo-
sition in Great Britain.120 Faced with this scandal, the British authorities re-
formed the management of the white concentration camps in accordance
with the recommendations of a ladies’ committee under the leadership of Mil-
licent Fawcett. This proved to be effective, and the death rates decreased dra-
matically by the end of 1901.121 In historiography, there is much controversy
about the meaning of the concentration camps. Afrikaner nationalists de-
scribed them as an attempt to exterminate the Boers. Especially after the Sec-
ond World War, such remarks became quite contentious because some au-
thors equated the camps in South Africa between 1900 and 1902 with the
Holocaust. Recently, such comparisons have rightfully been dismissed by
aca demics such as Liz Stanley, Elisabeth van Heyningen and Iain R. Smith
who have pointed out that they are anachronistic.122 Moreover, they argue,
the deaths were not the result of a deliberate strategy, as is the case with geno-
cide, but largely ‘accidental, the unintended result of military policies that
failed to consider the likely human consequences’.123
Valuable as these assertions are, these revisionist authors overlook the fact
that the Afrikaner nationalists’ standpoint on the concentration camps was
not only constructed decades after the South African War ended but also
rooted in the pro-Boer propaganda campaign in Europe during the period
1899-1902. The condemnation of the concentration camps as an attempt by
the British to destroy the Dutch race in South Africa was evident in contempo-
rary sources. Commentators in the Netherlands had already accused the
British army of a policy of ‘extermination’ when they described alleged atroc-
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ities during the earlier phases of the South African War, before the camps
were introduced.124 Such terms became more common as the war dragged
on. For instance, when Kruger arrived in Marseilles in November 1900, he
gave a speech in which he assured his audience that the republics would only
lose their independence ‘after the two Boer peoples with their women and
children have been exterminated’.125 The Dutch response to the concentra-
tion camps must be seen in the context of this sort of rhetoric. To pro-Boers,
they formed part of the onslaught the British were unleashing on the Afrikan-
ers to wipe out all resistance to their colonial dominance, during which they
did not spare even the most vulnerable groups. The concentration camp poli-
cy did lead to protests in Britain, and there was a significant exchange of in-
formation between certain figures from the Liberal Party and the pro-Boers
in the Netherlands. The ways in which the camp system was interpreted on ei-
ther side of the North Sea differed considerably, however. Whereas British
dissidents saw it as an unfortunate excess, many Dutch observers saw it as
the outcome of the racial struggle for colonial dominance in South Africa.
This will be discussed in more detail below.
The debate about concentration camps was intertwined with the outcry
over the farm-burnings, the very reason that so many people had been dis-
placed. Besides the destruction of material goods, livestock and crops, the hu-
man costs were considered to be high too. While the men were still out fight-
ing or had been put out of combat, it was argued, their wives, children and
elderly family members were left without any means of subsistence. The
British army command initially sent away these groups to live with the com-
mandos in the field because they thought that the obligation to care for civil-
ians lay with the Boer authorities. Pro-Boers argued that this meant that the
British had chosen not only to fight the commandos in the field but also the
women and children. In this regard, Kruger remarked that he had:
often fought against barbaric African tribes; but the barbarians we now
have to fight against are much worse than the others. […] [T]hey burn our
farms; they chase away the women and children, whose husbands and fa-
thers have been killed or taken prisoner; they leave her [sic] without protec-
tion, without a roof, without bread often.126
Despite these hardships, there were accounts of women who managed to sur-
vive in the open field and who were portrayed as living the life of their heroic
ancestors during the Great Trek. The most famous example was the wife of
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General Koos de la Rey, who camped out in her ox wagon for 19months af-
ter Lord Methuen’s troops burned down her house.127 The defiance of these
women was also mentioned in other sources. In one of his reports, Smuts
wrote of an encounter with a band of destitute women roaming the country-
side. Although he lamented their fate and condemned the ‘indescribable bar-
barity’ inflicted on them by the British, he described their ‘unbreakable perse-
verance’ rooted in their patriotism and their belief in God.128
When the British set up camps to house the displaced persons, there was
not much assurance that this would improve their situation. In December
1900, one of the first accounts from a civilian camp near Port Elizabeth
reached the Netherlands via Ons Land. It was written by an Afrikaner lady, S.
Hofmeyr, who described the women and children as ‘prisoners of war’. Ac-
cording to her, the conditions in which the destitute internees were living
were shocking, suffering from disease, lack of food and want of clothes: ‘no
man however hard and strong, tears will spring from his eyes at the sight of
this, and the mothers and daughters are not capable of speaking about the sit-
uation in which they find themselves without tears rolling from their eyes’.129
After a few months, more ominous news came from camps on the territory of
the Transvaal and ofs. An anonymous correspondent who called himself
‘Pax’ wrote to Het Algemeen Handelsblad about the situation in Johannes-
burg, where he was a member of the local charity that provided aid to the in-
mates. The editors of the newspaper kept the identity of the author secret, but
it is likely that ‘Pax’ was Cornelis Broeksma, a public prosecutor who had
emigrated from the Netherlands. He sent a report of a meeting between his
committee and British authorities, who in his view did not furnish the camp
with sufficient building material and supplies. To back up these indictments,
he included letters from British doctors that had been suppressed by the au-
thorities in which they complained about the living conditions.130 In the
months that followed, Broeksma sent several secret reports about the deterio-
rating conditions in the Johannesburg camp, including mortality figures,
which were smuggled to the Transvaal legation in Brussels and published by
the nzav.131 Such accounts were supplemented by an increasing amount of
material, especially from the committees that were established to provide aid
to the internees of various camps throughout South Africa. Pro-Boer organi-
sations in the Netherlands regularly published such letters, which were repro-
duced in newspapers. Also, letters from private individuals were occasionally
smuggled past the censors and reached the press in Europe.132
However, the most influential account of the concentration camps was
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provided by an English author: Emily Hobhouse. In October 1900, she estab-
lished contact with the anv press office via a mediator in London. In prepara-
tion for her journey to the camps on behalf of the Distress Fund for South
African Women and Children, between December 1900 and April 1901, she
asked for information about the humanitarian situation from people who
had recently left the war zone and stayed in the Netherlands.133 There was
not much information available at the time, and during her tour of the Cape,
Transvaal and ofs she visited many different sites, being the first to give a sur-
vey of conditions in all the camps. When the report of her journey reached the
anv press office, it was considered ‘too important not to use’ and was imme-
diately translated and distributed in the Netherlands and continental
Europe.134 In addition, one of her photos depicting a starving girl named
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Postcard with a picture of Lizzie van Zyl. The Dutch text on the back of the card
reads: ‘Lizzie van Zyl, a starved girl, 8 years old, from the women camps. The Chris-
tian work of the English’ (1901).
Source: za, Emous Collection, EM 3, D1. Collection Zuid-Afrikahuis, Amsterdam.
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Lizzie van Zyl became an icon for the suffering children in the camps. In the
Netherlands, it was published in many magazines and pamphlets and printed
on postcards, which were greatly in demand.135 H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge en-
sured that a lanternslide was made of it that could be used during lectures
about the camps: ‘[t]hat image, during a meeting, enlarged on a screen, […]
would have an enormous effect, more than a thousand books.’136
What made the Hobhouse report so important was that it provided a gen-
eral overview of the state of affairs because she had been able to travel
around, whereas other correspondents only focussed on the locations where
they were. Although the situation differed per camp, such accounts con-
tained similar explanations for the high death rates, and one Dutch author
who had been an inmate himself praised the Hobhouse report as ‘unbiased’,
‘dignified and true’.137 One point of concern was the lack of food and clean
drinking water. In addition, there was almost no soap available, which made
hygiene problematic. Other complaints concerned housing. The inmates
were mainly accommodated in tents, which left them exposed to the bitterly
cold South African winter nights. Moreover, there were few beds, so that
many had to sleep on the bare floor, and there was hardly any fuel. All these
factors meant that disease was rife in the camps, and the medical facilities
were too limited to provide adequate help. Correspondents wrote that it was
painful to see how the prosperous women of the republics had fallen to such
poverty.138 Just as the pows were described as men who desperately longed
for their lost freedom, the misery in the concentration camps was considered
to be a stark contrast with the comfortable life the Boers had enjoyed before
the war.
The Fawcett committee also noted deficiencies but concluded that the Boer
women were responsible for the situation themselves to a large extent. The re-
port described a terrible lack of hygiene and primitive remedies for illness,
which was considered to be the result of the underdevelopment of the re-
publics. These remarks were used by the jingo press and members of the
British government such as Chamberlain.139 Before the war, several Dutch
authors who wrote about South Africa did mention the primitive housing
and bad hygiene conditions of Boer families.140During the war, however, pro-
Boers opposed such indictments. Together with Hobhouse, they emphasised
the cleanliness and the moral strength of the Afrikaner women, who were
portrayed as devoted mothers. The high death rates, they argued, were solely
the fault of the British authorities, who did not provide adequate means to
keep the inmates healthy.141To highlight this, an international campaign was
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started in October 1901. Charts with the death rates of the camps were taken
from the British opposition paper The Morning Leader by the anv press of-
fice and made into leaflets that were distributed throughout Europe. In addi-
tion, huge posters were hung on walls in cities on which the death rates in
South Africa were compared to the mortality figures in the respective
cities.142
Besides these joint actions, there were also great differences between the
protests by British activists and the pro-Boers in the Netherlands. Paula
Krebs has shown that Hobhouse believed that the camps were beneficial in
principle because they protected Boer women and children from the dangers
of the open field, especially black men and their untamed sexual lusts. As
such, her protests were directed against the mismanagement of the camps
rather than their actual existence.143 Dutch authors had a fundamentally dif-
ferent outlook on this matter. In several letters, claims by the British that they
were protecting the women and children in the camps because the Boers
failed to do so were branded as ‘hypocritical’.144 Instead, the camps were
seen as a means to target the civilian population of the Boer republics and par-
ticularly the most vulnerable groups. Rompel saw the proclamation policy as
a sign that the British army in South Africa had failed to subdue the comman-
dos, which was a reason for soldiers to take out their frustrations on the fami-
lies of their adversaries with a ‘policy of torturing women’.145 In addition, he
and others argued that the British used the camps as a means to force the Boer
men to lay down their arms, which was confirmed by a Reuters report that
stated that the families of men who were still fighting were put on half ra-
tions.146
The outrage at the concentration camps also touched upon another aspect
of the race question in South Africa. In many Dutch texts it was suggested
that the camps were used to deliberately wipe out the Boer population by
killing the women so that reproduction was made impossible. In this context,
the word ‘murder camps’ was used in several sources.147 The lack of food in
particular was seen as the result of an orchestrated attempt by the authorities
to starve the inmates.148 In the Netherlands, one of the most outspoken au-
thors on this subject was H. J. Emous, a leading figure in the network that
provided aid to the camps, who forwarded letters about the situation there to
newspapers in the Netherlands. In a series of essays that were published in
Het Algemeen Handelsblad in July and August of 1901, he stated his views
on the matter and tried to convince the public to donate money.149 He de-
scribed the poor conditions suffered by the Boer camp internees as an exam-
6. ‘All will be well!’ 243
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 243
ple of ‘hypocritical wickedness’ that was unprecedented in world history. The
British, he argued, starved and exhausted women and children so that they
did not have to kill them. He therefore coined the word ‘strangling camps’.150
The consequences of the British lust for power were perfectly clear according
to Emous: the Boers were being exterminated. He even went so far as to call it
‘volksmoord’, which is a word that had no equivalent in the English language
at the time but can be considered to be an early form of the term genocide.151
Of course, the meaning of this word was very different from the meaning it
has acquired since the Second World War, and the radical statements made by
Emous should be seen in the light of contemporary ideas on the South
African War that were held in the Netherlands. In the heated atmosphere af-
ter the Hobhouse report, it seemed to some that the British were prepared to
use any means possible to subdue their rivals during the struggle for colonial
dominance and were even capable of mass murder.
The propaganda campaign against the camps reached its climax between
July and November 1901, when death rates were the highest. The most tangi-
ble results were collections for women and children, which resulted in a
steady flow of aid. In addition, several plans were developed to try and per-
suade the British to put the concentration camps under an international man-
date so that the internees could be better taken care of.152 However, when
news reached Europe that the number of casualties was dropping (around the
New Year of 1902), this all came to an end rather quickly. The rapidly declin-
ing mortality rates were not only seen as the result of the changing policy of
British authorities but were also interpreted in Darwinian terms. Some com-
mentators argued that the weakest groups such as young children had largely
died out, so that only the strong survived.153 Others saw it as evidence that
the Boers were a stubborn people. The Dutch press welcomed a Reuters re-
port that stated that there had been thirty-eight births and twenty-seven
deaths in the Bloemfontein camp in March 1902. ‘Bravo! The Afrikaner race
is not easily exterminated.’154 In the view of contemporaries, the women who
survived the camps showed a feisty defiance against the British and in this re-
spect shared in Bittereinder heroism, which made people in the Netherlands
confident about the future of the Dutch race in South Africa. The declining
death rates were probably not the only reason that the protests against the
concentration camps dwindled, however. At the beginning of 1902, persist-
ent rumours appeared about peace negotiations – news that started to domi-
nate the coverage of the war.
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The Peace of Vereeniging
At several points during the war, news emerged about possible peace negotia-
tions between the British army command and the Boer leadership in South
Africa. In February 1901, for instance, the commander-in-chief of the Trans-
vaal forces, Louis Botha, met Herbert Kitchener, acting commander of the
British army in South Africa. The Dutch press was suspicious about the
British reports of this encounter, and at first commentators dismissed them as
jingo propaganda or a trick to stall for time.155 After a few months, however,
it became clear that the meeting truly had taken place when a newspaper in
the Netherlands received a Dutch account of the negotiations, written by
someone with the remarkable pseudonym ‘B.ot H. Anicus’.156 According to
this report, the men had met on Kitchener’s initiative and Botha had boldly
stated that the restoration of independence to the republics was a prerequisite
for peace. Although the British commander tried to make other offers, the
Boer general refused to settle for anything less, and the negotiations were
promptly ended. It was emphasised that the leaders of both the sar and the
ofs agreed with Botha on this point.157 In other sources that reached the
Netherlands, it was emphasised that the Boer leadership in South Africa
would never have accepted peace without the annulment of Lord Roberts’s
annexations. President Steyn in particular was outspoken in this matter.158
This kind of report was in keeping with the romantic image of the Bit-
tereinders held by Europeans. Accounts of the destruction of farms and the
fate of the internees of pow and civilian camps caused much outcry and de-
spondency. By contrast, official missives from Boer generals like Smuts that
stated that things were going well, militarily speaking, and that the morale of
the remaining Boer commandos was high fed the hope that the republics
might somehow be restored. Even in May 1902, less than a month before the
peace was signed, a Dutch veteran who recently had returned from South
Africa declared that the situation at the time actually looked better than in
June 1900.159 Such sentiments were used by the Boer deputation in Europe
and their propagandists. When in December 1901 and January 1902 several
continental newspapers reported on rumours that new peace talks had start-
ed in South Africa, Leyds issued several statements. He declared that he had
no information that supported these claims, that no serious negotiations
would take place without the involvement of the deputation in Europe and
that the restoration of independence to the Boer republics remained a condi-
tio sine qua non for peace.160 These stout denials were soon made redundant
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by the actions of the newly elected government in the Netherlands, headed by
Abraham Kuyper.
In August 1901, great political change took place when Kuyper’s Protes-
tant party won the elections and he came to head a government in the Nether-
lands for the first time. Some contemporaries were of the opinion that his at-
tacks on the previous cabinet on issues related to the South African War con-
tributed to his victory at the ballot box. As first minister, he made clear that
the Netherlands would remain neutral but did state that he would do his best
to end the war should he get the opportunity.161 This happened in January
1902, when he secretly offered the British government to mediate in the con-
flict in South Africa. Although the British government refused the Dutch of-
fer, it instantly forwarded this memorandum to the Boer generals in South
Africa. As a result, secret talks including representatives of the Transvaal and
ofs forces were started.162
During the aftermath of the mediation attempt, the strained relations be-
tween Kuyper and the pro-Boer movement in Europe came to a head. In Feb-
ruary, the Dutch government published a memorandum containing confiden-
tial correspondence with the British government. Kuyper had only consulted
one member of the Boers’ diplomatic deputation, Danie Wolmarans, who
supported the initiative. In his memoirs, Leyds recounted how he, Kruger and
Abraham Fischer were kept in the dark about this contact between the Protes-
tant leader and the ‘weaker brother’ in the deputation, and how they had had
to learn of the initiative from the newspapers.163 Even more painful was the
fact that the memorandum stated that peace should be negotiated between
the British army and the Boers who were left in the field in South Africa,
thereby bypassing the envoys in Europe, who were demanding the restora-
tion of independence.
Kuyper’s sudden move received much attention from both international
and domestic media. There was appreciation for his peace initiative. In the
Netherlands, Protestant authors described the action as a prime example of
philanthropy. Penning, for instance, praised the ‘humanitarian motives’ of
the Dutch government that, as he saw it, had wanted to end the suffering of
the Boer population during this ‘terrible war’.164 Protestant journalists wel-
comed the memorandum as a diplomatic victory, arguing that it would force
the British authorities to abandon demands of unconditional surrender.
Moreover, it was argued that Kuyper’s initiative had been very good for the
international reputation of the Netherlands, providing a reminder of the
country’s glory days as a world power in the seventeenth century.165These ar-
ii. war of words (1899-1902)246
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 246
guments could also be found on the pages of other newspapers.166 But there
was also severe criticism about Kuyper’s mediation attempt, particularly
from Liberal journalists such as Charles Boissevain. He argued that Kuyper
had given the British exactly what they wanted: a pretext to start negotiations
that excluded the Boer diplomatic deputation, during which the independ-
ence of the republics would not enter the discussion. Moreover, he did not
think the mediation attempt would improve the international reputation of
the Netherlands as Kuyper’s supporters argued – on the contrary. ‘Such
pompous and absurd self-glorification is particularly suited to making us
look completely ridiculous in Europe.’167
Boissevain’s castigation of Kuyper undoubtedly had to do with the domes-
tic political situation. After the victory of the orthodox Protestants, the Liber-
als were in the opposition.168 But this sort of criticism should also be consid-
ered in the light of the public debate about the South African War itself. Al-
though he refrained from commenting at the time, Kuyper later defended his
actions by stating that he had tried to broker a peace deal ‘to at least prevent
the massacre of the Boer race’, so that the possibility remained that it would
‘revive even stronger in the future’.169 This analysis of the situation in South
Africa was clearly connected to the fear that the Dutch race in South Africa
would be exterminated. At the same time, it went against the propaganda
campaign by the pro-Boer movement, which tried to emphasise the positive
as well by celebrating the perseverance of the Bittereinders. Leyds was of the
opinion that nothing disheartening should come from Europe, so that the
Boers would remain motivated to fight on. Although he did not openly con-
demn Kuyper’s move at the time, he later made it clear that he was of the opin-
ion that it undermined the position of the commandos, who were wearing
out the British army with their guerrilla tactics.170
With the knowledge of hindsight, Kuyper’s memorandum can indeed be
seen as the event that launched negotiations between Kitchener and the Boer
leaders that led to the Peace of Vereeniging, which finalised the annexations
of the republics.171 These talks were held in secret, though, and there was
very little coverage of them at the time. A myriad of rumours reached the
press in the Netherlands, often via English newspapers, but there was no
clear picture of the proceedings. In the meantime, reports from the comman-
dos that had been sent in February, before the negotiations had gotten under-
way, expressed confidence that the struggle would continue, so even during
this uncertain period there was lingering hope that the Boers would be able to
win back their independence. This explains the fact that when the news came
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on 2 June 1902, that peace had been signed and that the independence of the
republics had been irrevocably lost, it hit the public in Europe like a lighten-
ing bolt. In their memoirs, several pro-Boer activists recounted that they had
had no idea that it would come so soon and under those terms. Subsequently,
the propaganda campaign was immediately suspended.172
After a few days, the dust started to settle a bit and the full implications of
the treaty became known in the Netherlands. The primary feeling that domi-
nated the initial response was one of disillusion at the loss of independence.
All commentators extensively lamented this aspect of the treaty, and the
Boers were not spared of criticism. Editors of newspapers spoke ‘a few harsh
words’ to the burghers who had given up ‘something so valuable’.173 At first
sight, it seemed that the Handsopper mentality had prevailed over Bitterein-
der heroism. Historians today argue that it was as a result of this setback that
the interest in the Boer cause by the public in the Netherlands, which had
been so strong during the course of the South African War, suddenly seemed
to evaporate.174
These sentiments, although they signalled a significant change, do not tell
the whole story, however. There were also positive responses to some of the
articles of the treaty, particularly those that guaranteed amnesty for the Cape
rebels and suspended political rights for black people. And some chose to
highlight the fact that the surrender had at least not been unconditional and
that the position of the white inhabitants of the former republics was protect-
ed to some extent. It was also emphasised that the Boers had shown them-
selves to be morally superior compared to the mighty British army which had
lost all standing in the world. Moreover, there was sympathy for the condi-
tions under which the commandos had surrendered in the end. In addition to
the growing menace of black groups armed by the British, they had had to
witness how their families pined away in the concentration camps. These
views were confirmed in a declaration that the Boer leadership issued after
they had signed the treaty, which was published in the press as soon as it
reached the Netherlands.175
These glimmers of hope came forth from the general ideas that existed
about the South African question. Many authors predicted that the peace
would only be temporary. Boissevain, for example, refused to call the treaty
of Vereeniging a surrender. He thought that the devastation of the old re-
publics had caused so much resentment amongst the Boers and the Cape
Afrikaners that the two groups had been ‘forged into the race that eventually
will civilise and rule South Africa’.176 This once again shows that the war in
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South Africa was not seen in military terms only but was also considered to
be part of a larger struggle for colonial dominance in the region, which
touched upon ideas about race and culture. Even though the republics had
been lost as political entities, such ideas continued to exist. Many of the peo-
ple who were involved in the pro-Boer movement remained defiant and pre-
dicted that the end of the war did not rule out Afrikaner dominance.
A few days after he heard about the news of the peace treaty, Leyds wrote
to his brother. ‘I am glad to read in your letter that you believe that the Boers
in South Africa will be victorious in the long run. I agree completely.’177 As a
result of these hopes, he devoted the rest of his life to assisting in the develop-
ment of intellectual life amongst the Afrikaners.178 The same sentiment can
be found in several Dutch publications from that time, and some people in
the Netherlands were still prepared to do their bit in the racial and cultural
struggle for colonial dominance in South Africa. Just as before, such senti-
ments were couched in belligerent terms, referring to Bittereinder heroism.
The executive of the cnbc, for example, compared themselves with a sentry,
a brandwacht: ‘to guard and to wait, to stare into darkness perhaps, but
thereby training the eye and serving our kindred nation’.179
Conclusion
The coverage of the South African War in Dutch pro-Boer propaganda dur-
ing the last phase of the conflict showed great continuity with ideas that exist-
ed about the rivalry between the Boers and British during previous periods.
The unilateral annexations of the republics and the proclamations issued by
the British army command were seen as renewed attempts to crush the Dutch
race in South Africa. Although some of the responses in the Netherlands can
be accounted for by offended national pride and frustration about the policy
of neutrality, the main concern was the apparent imminent destruction of the
republics. In this heated atmosphere, the perception of the Boers became po-
larised, which was also the result of the fact that propagandists left out pas-
sages from reports that they considered to be in contradiction with their over-
all message. Those who continued to fight, the Bittereinders, were celebrated
as heroes, while those who surrendered, the Handsoppers, were denounced
as traitors to their people. This dichotomy also influenced the description of
the so-called ‘methods of barbarism’ that the British used against their adver-
saries such as the armament of black people, farm-burning, the deportation
of pows and the introduction of concentration camps. Although these meas-
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ures caused great anxiety – some even saw it as an attempt to exterminate the
Boers – there remained a glimmer of hope that was kept alive by reports of on-
going perseverance by the burghers and their wives. Even when the peace ne-
gotiations were well underway, propagandists in Europe boldly proclaimed
that the Boers would never abandon their claim to independence.
It cannot be denied that the Peace of Vereeniging signalled a new phase in
relations between the Dutch and the Afrikaners. The end of the Boer re-
publics meant that the hopes for a colony in South Africa that would flourish
and become a ‘New Holland’ were definitively dashed. To contemporaries,
however, the question went beyond these geopolitical considerations. From
the 1880s onwards, the Dutch pro-Boer movement strongly emphasised cul-
tural relations. The network that was set up by administrators, engineers,
journalists, clergymen and teachers transferred information to the Nether-
lands, which provided public opinion there with a biased view on the situa-
tion in South Africa. It has been argued in the last few chapters that these
lines of communication, although severely hampered by the hostilities, pro-
vided the material that furnished the pro-Boer propaganda campaign in Eu-
rope with material during the South African War.
The contents of such publications were never without ambivalences. Even
before the war, authors from the Netherlands wrote about both the positive
and the negative sides of the Boer character. These ambiguities continued in
the depiction of many commandos during the war, who showed much brav-
ery when things were going well but who lost discipline after the British start-
ed their advance. This attitude of ambivalence deepened during the later
phases of the war and became polarised in the light of the worsening humani-
tarian situation. In historiography, it is asserted that despondence prevailed
after the war suddenly ended, which appears to be true at first sight. Howev-
er, many contemporaries within the Dutch pro-Boer movement were of the
opinion that all was not lost.
The ongoing defiance of the propagandists should be seen in the context of
the struggle between the Boers and the British for colonial dominance in
South Africa. To contemporaries, this issue was fought out not only on the
battlefield but also in books, pamphlets and classrooms. Pro-Boer propagan-
da from the 1880s onwards, had the explicit aim of countering British claims
on the region and providing the sar and the ofs with material to justify their
independence. When the republics were formally annexed by the British,
however, the views that were put forward in such publications were not seen
to have lost their relevance. Indeed, some thought they were more important
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than ever, especially when it became clear that self-governance could be ex-
pected for the white population (it was granted in 1906). The Dutch-speak-
ing population outnumbered the English-speaking population and so could
potentially achieve a majority in government. Both parties were aware that
language represented a crucial divide between them that could be used to mo-
bilise public opinion, making it a politically charged issue. In addition, South
African history was a hotly debated issue because both sides tried to appro-
priate it for their own agenda. In this sense, the war of words about the coun-
try’s colonial past and future continued after the fighting had ended in 1902.
The next chapters will explore how the pro-Boer movement in the Nether-
lands was connected to this ongoing struggle.
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chapter 7
‘Whoever wants to create a future for himself cannot
lose sight of the past’: Willem Leyds and Afrikaner 
nationalism
On 14 July 1904, Paul Kruger, the former president of the Transvaal, died in
exile in the spa town of Clemens, Switzerland. His death can be seen as the
symbolic end of the era of Boer independence after both the sar and the ofs
had been added to the British Empire. This was not the only way in which
contemporaries interpreted the situation in South Africa, however. Despite
the fact that they were officially citizens of the British Empire, there remained
hope that the white Dutch-speaking inhabitants of South Africa would be
able to unite and so become politically and culturally dominant. This opti-
mism was also apparent in Kruger’s political will, a document that was edited
by one of his closest assistants, Willem Leyds. The text was addressed to all
Afrikaners, calling upon them to take their future in their own hands and re-
build South Africa. In order to do so properly, it was argued, they should con-
nect to their history, which was poured into the following famous words:
Because whoever wants to create a future for himself cannot lose sight of
the past. Therefore: look into the past for all good and beautiful things that
can be found there, and thereafter shape your ideals and attempt to realise
those ideals for the future.1
The fact that Leyds was closely involved in the publication of this document
prompts questions about the ties between the pro-Boer movement in the
Netherlands and the Afrikaners in South Africa after 1902. Several historians
who have written about this topic emphasise that these ties lost much of their
significance after the Peace of Vereeniging. The most substantial study of the
post-1902 ties between the Dutch and the Afrikaners is written by Bart de
Graaff, who believes that the ideas about stamverwantschap became increas-
ingly marginalised due to domestic and international developments. In the
Netherlands, he argues, the heroic image of the Boers suffered greatly after
they stopped fighting. In addition, the loss of independence by the republics
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meant that the opportunities for trade and emigration disappeared, with the
public’s interest also fizzling out.2 In South Africa, furthermore, the develop-
ment of Afrikaner nationalism led to increased xenophobia and isolation,
which led to a hostile response to influences from the Netherlands and vice
versa. The most prominent feature of the Afrikaner nationalist movement
was the development of Afrikaans as an independent language. Many lead-
ing nationalists considered the complicated grammar of High Dutch to be an
impediment to their own efforts to make Dutch the language of the Volk.3 In-
grid Glorie also signals this latter phenomenon and even describes it as a
‘double process of decolonisation of the Afrikaans language and culture with
regard to the English as well as the Dutch cultural dominance that occurred
during the first three decades of the twentieth century’.4
Other historians notice less change after 1902. Gerrit Schutte writes how
in the Netherlands, ‘factual interest’ in South Africa ‘quickly ebbed away’ but
there remained a ‘general feeling of sympathy’.5 It is doubtful whether there
was simply a growing dichotomy between the Dutch and Afrikaners up until
the Second World War, and it seems that tensions climaxed over the language
law of 1925 in South Africa, which declared Afrikaans to be independent of
Hoog-Hollandsch. Afterwards, relations improved, which resulted in an in-
crease in emigration to South Africa in the 1930s and a plan for the establish-
ment of a cultural treaty, which was endorsed by the Dutch government.6 Lit-
erary scholars also point to a lingering sympathy for the Afrikaner cause in
the Netherlands after the end of the South African War. Siegfried Huigen ar-
gues that there was a lasting relationship between the literary establishment
in the Netherlands and Afrikaner nationalism, at least up until 1925.7
This indicates that Dutch views on South Africa and its colonial history
continued to exist. From the 1880s, this kind of imagery was connected to
the transnational network between the Netherlands and South Africa, and
this seems to have also been the case after 1902. Isabel Hofmeyr has argued
that Afrikaner propagandists successfully used the heroic vision of the past to
mobilise support, focussing on the Great Trek and the South African War.8
Significantly, ideas about folklore that originated in the Netherlands and Ger-
many were quite influential in this connection.9 Huigen points out that some
works about South African history that were written and published in the
Netherlands have been categorised as specimens of Afrikaner historio -
graphy.10 Some even argue that influences from the Netherlands contributed
to the development of ideas about racial segregation that resulted in the
apartheid system that was introduced by the Nasionale Party after it came to
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power in 1948. T. D. Moodie describes the apartheid ideology as a Calvinist
‘civil religion’, which was inspired by the Dutch Protestant party of Abraham
Kuyper.11 Schutte refutes this view and emphasises that Calvinism in South
Africa and the Netherlands were very different from each other.12He does ac-
knowledge, however, that certain Dutch authors (of various political persua-
sions) helped the Afrikaners to redefine their own history.13 These remarks
show the importance of looking at the interaction between the Netherlands
and South Africa in order to assess the aftermath of the pro-Boer propaganda
campaign.
This issue will be discussed by examining the activities of one of the most
important pro-Boer propagandist who continued to be active after 1902:
Willem Leyds. The most important priority for him remained the influencing
of public opinion in the hope of mobilising support for the efforts to counter
British attempts to Anglicise South Africa. As was the case during previous
periods, these efforts were not always successful, and Leyds continued to
have an ambivalent view of his ‘kinsmen’ in the former Boer Republics. Still,
he propagated a heroic vision of South Africa’s past that was meant to mo-
bilise the white Dutch-speaking population over there. Although the results
of his efforts were mixed and he often became entangled in controversies,
Leyds was instrumental in transferring several collections of historical mate-
rial from the Netherlands to South Africa in order to bolster Afrikaner identi-
ty. To a certain extent, the flow of information along the lines of communica-
tion that had fed the European pro-Boer propaganda campaign during the
South African War was reversed after the conflict ended.
(Re)building Afrikaner nationalism
In 1902, High Commissioner Alfred Milner embarked on a policy to Angli-
cise South Africa. The main rationale behind this policy was that it was not
enough to annex the Boer Republics in order to make the region a solid part
of the British Empire; also the cultural and political might of the main colo-
nial rivals, the Afrikaners, had to be broken. In order to do that, Milner’s ad-
ministration set out to implement several schemes to boost British influence.
There was an attempt to mobilise more emigrants from the British Isles to
combat the numerical majority of Afrikaners, who significantly outnum-
bered white English-speaking inhabitants of South Africa. Another priority
was to make English the dominant language at official institutions so that
Dutch would be kept out daily life as much as possible and the Afrikaners
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would submit to British rule more quickly. Particular attention was given to
schools, with the aim of Anglicising the future generations of white South
Africans. These plans mainly failed, as immigration from Britain did not seri-
ously rise and Milner left South Africa in 1905, which was a blow to his sup-
porters in the South African administration. Moreover, after the Liberals
came to power in Britain after the landslide election of 1906, the executive
power of the colonial government was significantly curtailed, and the South
African territories acquired a large measure of self-government under white
tutelage, which resulted in the Union of South Africa (1910).14
This situation thus meant that the Afrikaners had the opportunity to have
a serious say in the government of the newly formed Union. In the 1900s, this
gave rise to a second wave of Afrikaner nationalism, which aimed to mobilise
the Dutch-speaking white population during the elections. This resulted in
great victories and from the start of the twentieth century onwards, Afrikan-
ers dominated South African politics. The rise of the nationalist movement
can largely be explained by its successful opposition to Milner’s policies by re-
building the Dutch language education system and the Dutch press, which
forged a new sense of Afrikaner identity.15 But there were also significant
problems for the Afrikaners in the 1900s. During the South African War, the
British had implemented harsh censorship laws and had largely destroyed the
Dutch infrastructure in the region. In the economic depression that hit South
Africa after the war, the Afrikaners lacked the financial means to build their
institutions.
This problem was also recognised by the pro-Boers in the Netherlands,
who made it their priority to provide aid to the Afrikaner nationalists. Dur-
ing the 1900s, the most substantial Dutch fund that could be used for these
projects was kept by Leyds, the former minister plenipotentiary of the sar,
who had been in full control over the republic’s assets in Europe since 1899.
At the end of the war, there was an amount of around fl. 2million left in the
fund.16 During negotiations between the Boer generals and the British gov-
ernment concerning the implementation of the Treaty of Vereeniging that
took place in the months after it was signed, Chamberlain demanded on sev-
eral occasions that this money be handed over to the British authorities.
Botha considered giving in to these demands, but Leyds maintained that the
sum did not fall under the terms of the treaty as they had been transferred to
him before the Boer surrender, and he refused to hand over the money. Mean-
while, he was prepared to act as a trustee for a committee of prominent
Afrikaners who would decide on projects that should be funded using the
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money on the condition that the British authorities would not have any say in
how it was spent.17
It seems that the majority of this sum went to the press.18 Leyds, for in-
stance, provided funds to help re-establish Dutch language newspapers in
South Africa. In 1903, he was contacted by his old friend F. V. Engelenburg,
who asked him for money to restart his newspaper De Volksstem.19Together
with Jan Smuts, who considered an independent Dutch language press ‘the
foundation of a steady national policy in future’, they made a scheme in
which £ 30,000 (approximately fl. 360,000) of the sar assets in Europe were
transferred to South Africa via middlemen to conceal the source of the money.
With this sum, several periodicals were bought, amongst which De
Volksstem in Pretoria, The Friend in Bloemfontein and De Afrikaner in
Pietermaritzburg.20 In this way, the Transvaal’s former treasure chest was
used to build up the political and intellectual infrastructure of the Afrikaners.
In addition, Leyds and other pro-Boers continued to be interested in the in-
ternational network of the South African press, wanting to provide a counter-
weight to British influences. There was ongoing distrust of the news agency
Reuters, which dominated the news supply from and to Europe and was sus-
pected of jingoistic tendencies. In 1902, the most important pro-Boer organi-
sation that worked in this field was the press office of the anv. After the war
ended, H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge and F. Rompel decided to continue its activities.
The idea was to make the press office the European representative of the
Dutch language press in South Africa. On the one hand, it acted as a corre-
spondent, providing news to those South African periodicals, while on the
other hand it acted as an agent for distributing Afrikaner views in the Euro-
pean press.21 In this way, the anv press office was an intermediary between
South Africa and Europe up until the First World War. Rompel did complain
that it was hard to compete with Reuters, which had a far more advanced net-
work and much more money at its disposal, and that it was not always possi-
ble to counter their coverage of South African affairs.22 In addition, the press
office asked newspapers not to mention it as a source. These factors make it
difficult to determine the actual impact of these activities, but they do show
continuities with the period before 1902.
Besides the main office at Dordrecht, the anv employed several correspon-
dents in London. This bureau was founded in 1901, when the Dutch transla-
tor M. van Beek offered his services as a liaison between the anv and the Stop
the War Committee and the radical magazine New Age.23 After the war, Van
Beek continued to send propaganda to members of the press and politi-
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cians.24 He was joined by E. B. Rose, a former journalist from Johannesburg
and future MP for the Labour Party, and they both edited a pro-Boer news
bulletin. However, the two men constantly argued about money, which led to
several fallouts and even deteriorated into physical violence. After a failed
mediation attempt by Rompel in 1905, all contact with both brawlers was
ended.25 Their work was continued by the London correspondent of the
Dutch newspaper Nieuwe Courant, C. Thieme. He wrote to newspapers if
they reported in a way that could harm Afrikaner interests. But also this jour-
nalist became a liability because of his huge debts, as a result of which he de-
manded pay rises.26
In 1908, Thieme was replaced by J. E. A. Reyneke van Stuwe, who had
served as Botha’s secretary between 1900 and 1902. In London, Reyneke van
Stuwe pretended that he was accredited as a correspondent by the Dutch
newspaper Het Vaderland, but in reality he was acting as an agent for the
anv. 27 In his extensive correspondence with Rompel, he explained that he
kept up his ties with the well-known pro-Boer organisation a secret, as he
was afraid that his writings would be refused by editors otherwise.28 In addi-
tion to his work of ‘correcting’ newspapers with letters, Reyneke van Stuwe
wrote circulars to the Afrikaner press about the British coverage of South
African affairs. Reyneke van Stuwe reported regularly on his activities for the
anv in London. He often relayed that his texts were published in various
newspapers, and in a letter to Botha he boasted that his influence was grow-
ing. Because he constantly sent corrections to the London press, he reasoned,
it made journalists ‘more careful and fewer follies about South Africa appear
in the newspapers’.29 The anv executive committee also praised Reyneke
van Stuwe as a talented writer with a valuable network.30
It is hard to assess to what extent these remarks can be taken at face value,
but there was a growing interest in the activities of the press office in both the
Netherlands and South Africa. There were positive reactions from the nas-
cent Afrikaner movement to the weekly circulars written by Rompel for the
South African press, but in the end there was too little financial compensa-
tion to make this initiative feasible. Gustav Preller (who worked for De
Volksstem at the time) reported that they were published and were greatly ap-
preciated by the public.31Nevertheless, there was a reluctance to pay for such
services. Engelenburg did pay a sum for Rompel’s letters, but this was far too
little to cover the costs of all the activities of the anv press office, leaving
Leyds as the most important financier.32 When he ran out of funds in the
1910s, Kiewiet de Jonge unsuccessfully tried to acquire capital from Afrikan-
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er publishers. In a letter, he mentioned that, besides the fact that no money
had come from South Africa to reward the anv for its loyal services, there
had ‘not even [been] a small token of gratitude’.33
After Rompel emigrated to South Africa in 1912, the press office was se-
verely weakened, and at the start of the First World War, the anv saw itself
forced to largely suspend these activities because of a lack of money.34 But
this was not the definitive end of the efforts to try and influence South
African journalism. Both Leyds and Kiewiet de Jonge were involved in an at-
tempt by the nzav to set up a new press office in 1917. Like its predecessor,
one of its main activities was to provide the Afrikaner press with weekly
newsletters, written by J. Visscher, who had been a journalist in Bloemfontein
in the 1890s. As was the case with the anv press office, Visscher was not able
to acquire enough income with these activities to act independently and he re-
lied on money from organisations in the Netherlands. The most tangible
traces of Visscher’s activities in the Afrikaner press were the columns that ap-
peared regularly in De Burger. After this newspaper stopped using this serv-
ice in 1923, the nzav press office ceased to exist.35
Pro-Boer propagandists also attempted to transfer information to the
Afrikaners via other channels than the press. As had been the case before the
SouthAfricanWar, languagewas of vital importance for the nationalists, unit-
ed in the so-called Tweede Taalbeweging (Second LanguageMovement). Just
like its predecessor, this movement aimed to develop Afrikaans as a written
language.36 But the relationship with the literary establishment in the Nether-
lands was different than in the late nineteenth century. Whereas previous lan-
guage nationalists such as S. J. du Toit were notorious for their aversion to
High Dutch, the members of the Tweede Taalbeweging seemed to accept
more influences fromoutside, if only for the practical reason that they needed
money from external sources.37 In 1905, a simplification of spelling was
passed by all Dutch language organisations in South Africa, which had been
judged by linguists in the Netherlands and Belgium as ‘not unscholarly’.38 A
leading figure from the Tweede Taalbeweging, Gustav Preller, thought it nec-
essary to keep the development of Afrikaans linked toHighDutch.He argued
in several essays that thiswas the onlyway to keep the language ‘civilised’ and
save it from English and ‘coloured’ influences.39 In correspondence with
Leyds and Rompel, Preller reiterated that the Netherlands remained a source
of inspiration.40 In several letters, he emphasised the difference between the
Tweede Taalbeweging and the movement led by Du Toit, which was illustrat-
ed by the new motto, ‘so na molik aan Nederlands’; ‘as close as possible to
Dutch’.41
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There were groups within the post-1902 Afrikaner movement that were
more negative about High Dutch. The leaders of the Nasionale Party, D. F.
Malan and J. B. M. Hertzog – who themselves had studied in the Netherlands
– publicly declared that it could never become the language of the Volk in
South Africa.42 Such opinions became stronger, particularly after the First
World War. In the 1920s, there were several incidents during which fanatical
Afrikaners expressed their dislike of High Dutch. The most notorious took
place when a teacher in Rustenburg publicly burned all the books from the
Netherlands that he could find in his school.43 Despite these events, it would
be going too far to say that the Afrikaner nationalist movement was by defini-
tion hostile to High Dutch. Many of the tensions ebbed after Afrikaans was
proclaimed as an official language of South Africa in 1925, which led to clos-
er cultural ties in the 1930s.44One reason was the revival of the idea amongst
Afrikaners that they could make use of their ties with the Netherlands to
counter the influence of English.45 Moreover, after initial hesitations about
the 1925 language law, people in the Netherlands accepted it, which greatly
helped to improve the relationship.46 This suggests that the intellectual gap
between Afrikaner nationalists and the Dutch was not as wide as may seem at
first sight.
This is illustrated by the attitude of some important members of the Dutch
pro-Boer movement, who changed their ideas on the relationship between
High Dutch and the language of the Afrikaners in the light of the new politi-
cal situation after 1902. Nicolaas Mansvelt, the former superintendent for
education in the sar, is probably the most prominent example.47 During his
period in office (1892-1900), his policy was aimed at promoting High Dutch
at schools in the Transvaal as much as possible, as he thought that this was
the best way to protect Dutch cultural domination against English influences.
After his return to the Netherlands, he started to propagate quite another
view on the matter. In several lectures during the 1900s, he supported the de-
velopment of Afrikaans as a written language, which would be accessible to a
large part of the population in South Africa. He therefore called upon the peo-
ple in the Netherlands not to consider the Tweede Taalbeweging as hostile be-
cause they had ‘the same goal’ as the protagonists of High Dutch – namely to
strengthen Dutch influences.48
After it became clear that he would not be allowed to return to South
Africa, Mansvelt devoted his life to assisting in the development of the
Afrikaners. He fulfilled many tasks within the nzav and affiliated organisa-
tions.49 One of his most famous projects was the compilation of a volume of
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popular Dutch songs to counter the growing popularity of English music hall
tunes. This plan had existed for a long time: already in the 1890s, Mansvelt
and the nzav discussed the possibilities for such a publication, but the South
African War intervened. In 1904, Mansvelt restarted the project. He set out
to gather rhymes – in Afrikaans vernacular and in High Dutch – and select
those that suited Afrikaner tastes, which proved to be a difficult task. Corre-
spondents in South Africa were not co-operative, and it took a long time to
collect material of sufficient quality. Moreover, most of the texts in Afrikaans
had not been put to music, and so the director of the Dutch opera was called
in to provide the arrangements.50 When the book finally appeared in 1908,
Mansvelt emphasised in the introduction, which was written in simplified
spelling, the importance of patriotic songs for national identity. ‘The song
that has become communal property of a people’, he argued, ‘teaches the peo-
ple to share their joy and sorrow, teaches them to feel one with their forefa-
thers and with each other, it binds the hearts together and strengthens
through unity’.51 He included a great variety of songs in order to make the
book appealing for the largest audience possible.
Despite the tedious process of compiling the book, it was enthusiastically
supported by Rompel. The managing director of the anv press office was an
outspoken adherent of the Tweede Taalbeweging and in many of his reports
to the Afrikaner press he pointed out the need to promote the Dutch lan-
guage. Rompel noted how many Afrikaners were embarrassed to sing in their
language, which he thought was a shame, as it was poetic and well-suited to
putting to music. In one essay, he explained how French had been culturally
dominant in the Low Countries in the middle of the nineteenth century, but
that folksongs had quickly become popular amongst the Dutch-speaking au-
dience after patriotic authors published volumes similar to that of Mansvelt.
He expressed the hope that the same would happen in South Africa in order
to replace English as the dominant language.52 The Afrikaner press shared
these views. There were critical remarks about some of the choices Mansvelt
had made, but the general consensus was that his volume was a valuable con-
tribution to the development of Dutch cultural life in South Africa.53 This
was reflected in sales: within a few months, the first two editions of the song-
book had been sold out.54
The examples mentioned above show that there was a significant measure
of continuity in the lines of communication between the pro-Boers in the
Netherlands and the Afrikaners in South Africa before and after 1902. Al-
though the political situation changed fundamentally with the official annex-
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ation of the Boer Republics and the formation of the Union, the cultural
struggle between the English and Dutch elements continued. Like before,
Dutch pro-Boers tried to influence this struggle by providing the Afrikaners
with the means to strengthen their institutions and the material to bolster
their identity against attempts to Anglicise them. These efforts were not al-
ways successful, and some groups of Afrikaners at times reacted in quite a
hostile way. But this also represented a continuity with previous periods, as
relations between the people in the Netherlands and their ‘kinsmen’ in South
Africa had been ambivalent from the 1880s onwards. These continuities are
also clearly present when looking at the activities of one of the pivots in the
network between the Netherlands and South Africa: Willem Leyds.
Willem Leyds and Afrikaner historiography
After the sar had officially ceased to exist, the legation in Europe was closed
and Leyds, who had become stateless, successfully re-applied for Dutch citi-
zenship. Although he was offered several prestigious jobs in the diplomatic
service and academia, he refused these in order to focus on South Africa and
help to (re-)build Afrikaner identity. Lynette van Niekerk provides the most
extensive overview of these efforts in her biography about Leyds, quoting his
words from 1929with approval: ‘I had devoted my life to South Africa; I did
not want to give up that task’.55 Considering the results of his work, it re-
mains to be seen whether this elevated view really is justified, but it cannot be
denied that Leyds did expend much effort in fulfilling this task, which was
mainly meant to awaken the historical awareness of the Afrikaners. The
main source for the following sections is the enormous archive of Leyds’s
legation that is kept in the National Archives of South Africa in Pretoria. As
will be explained, the transfer of these documents from the Netherlands to
South Africa was meant to give a boost to Afrikaner identity and, as such, can
be considered to be an act of propaganda in itself. Historians therefore have
to be careful not to take this material at face value. Still, it will be argued that
this extensive collection gives us a taste of how attempts were made to use
pro-Boer propaganda for the development of Afrikaner nationalism after
1902. Such initiatives were not uncontroversial and more often than not end-
ed in failure. Although Leyds did try to leave a record that depicted him in a
positive light, such frustrations are clearly present in his papers.
The most tangible aid Leyds provided to the Afrikaners was in the form of
money coming from the remnants of the Transvaal state assets to rebuild cul-
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tural institutions. These activities should be seen in the light of ideas about
the ongoing struggle for colonial dominance between the white Dutch-speak-
ing and white English-speaking communities. These efforts were a clear con-
tinuation of the ideals that Leyds propagated in the 1880s and 1890s. He did
accept the political changes that took place in South Africa after 1902, how-
ever, and did not argue in favour of the restoration of the Boer republics. In
his view, the Afrikaners would be able to wrestle power from the English-
speaking population in the Union and eventually gain independence from the
British Empire. For the time being, he accepted South Africa’s position within
the imperial sphere of influence. This became clear during the First World
War, when Leyds was asked by the German government to become the politi-
cal leader of the rebellion in South Africa. Although he opposed Botha’s poli-
cy to pledge allegiance to Britain, he immediately refused this offer.56
Nonetheless, Leyds was quite a radical supporter of Afrikaner nationalism
and one could say that, in a reversal of the famous phrase by Carl von Clause-
witz, he considered South African politics after 1902 as a continuation of the
war by other means.57 In this respect, the way in which the colonial past was
depicted was essential for him.
Leyds’s best-known activity after the South African War was history writ-
ing. He published two ample works about the relations between the Boer re-
publics (mainly the Transvaal) and the British Empire up until the outbreak
of the South African War.58 As he himself had played a part in the last period
of that history as state secretary of the sar, the question is whether these
works can be considered to be proper academic studies. Although it can be ar-
gued that they have some historical significance because of his close involve-
ment and his in-depth knowledge of the subject, there is a general consensus
amongst historians from the 1900s to the present day that they are too subjec-
tive to be serious historiography.59 Leyds himself claimed that his aim was to
provide a factual account of events, but it is clear that he also saw the political
significance of his work.60 His main source was an almost complete collec-
tion of British blue books (official government publications) on South Africa,
to which he lovingly referred as his ‘arsenal’. Extensive reference to this col-
lection made it hard for English critics to dispel his views, Leyds argued.61 In
a letter replying to a review of the proofs for his second publication, he de-
scribed it as follows:
[It] is a mine that others must draw from. I only wanted to provide materi-
al. I have silenced my own indignation. But they who announce the book,
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it is up to them to flog the British, in the light of the facts that I teach. I
would also wish these facts to be acknowledged by our enemies, but the
only chance of that happening is if I present it without passion, and with-
out my own commentary.62
It can be argued that some of Leyds’s motives for writing his historical works
were personal, justifying his own decisions in the 1880s and 1890s. It certain-
ly is likely that one of his goals was to exonerate the conduct of the Boer gov-
ernments, and particularly that of Kruger, as is shown by the reaction of
Leyds’s successor as state secretary, F. W. Reitz who hailed the two books as
‘an irrefutable defence of the politics of the Transvaal from its beginning’.63
This quote also suggests that there was a deeper meaning to Leyds’s historical
work – namely to rewrite the history of South Africa in order to dispel British
views of the recent past. In this way, these activities were a continuation of
the work by Dutch authors before 1899 and many propagandists during the
South African War, who wanted to do much the same. It can therefore be ar-
gued that Leyds’s work was primarily intended for the Afrikaner people to
help them develop their own identity. In a somewhat dated but otherwise ex-
cellent critique, the South African historian F. A. van Jaarsveld shows that
Leyds thus contributed significantly to the development of Afrikaner nation-
alism.64
Remarkably, Leyds himself did not attempt to write a complete history of
the South African War, which was considered to be the most important event
in modern South Africa. Eventually, he did edit four volumes of material
from the archives of the sar legation concerning his own activities. These
books were more personal than his works about the rivalry between the Boer
republics and the British Empire in the nineteenth century. To start with, they
were only published for private use, with Leyds sending them to individuals
and institutions he thought would be interested. The first volume, which ap-
peared in 1919, was intended as a refutation of the accusation in many
British publications that he had advised the sar government to initiate hostil-
ities in 1899.65 When it appeared that the volume attracted a great deal of in-
terest, Leyds decided to publish selected correspondences about his activities
up until 1902, the last volume of which appeared in 1934. In contrast with
the first book, the former minister plenipotentiary provided introductions in
which he discussed some of the leading themes. In 1930, this resulted in a
polemic with Hendrik Muller, the former consul-general of the ofs, who
wrote his own account containing a biting criticism of the activities of the
iii. the aftermath of pro-boer propaganda (post-1902)266
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 266
sar legation.66 This text stirred up the old animosity between the two Boer
representatives. Leyds wrote to influential Dutch academics and diplomats
about the document, arguing that it was full of ‘untruths, gibes and low insin-
uations’.67 In addition, he wrote a pamphlet to counter Muller’s views and in
the third volume of his diplomatic correspondence published an appendix in
which he accused the ofs representative of almost ruining the arrival of
Kruger in Marseilles in 1900.68
Such personal vendettas must not obscure the fact that Leyds had more
profound motives with his writings about the South African War. While he
himself did not discuss the situation on the battlefields, he certainly was of
the opinion that it was an important topic that merited publication. In the
1900s, he was involved in several publications of accounts of people who had
experienced the South African War firsthand, either in the field or in the
camps. Because the inhabitants of the former Boer republics lacked the
means to publish such works themselves, many were printed in the Nether-
lands and distributed in South Africa by bookshops like J. A. Wormser, J. H.
de Bussy and haum. These firms had established branches in South Africa be-
fore the war, and these were revived after 1902.69 The demand for their
books was rather limited, however, and the publishers complained about the
lack of support from the Boer leaders for their activities, which led to serious
financial problems.70 Nevertheless, contemporaries considered the memoirs
of veterans to be important source material for later historians because they
presented a Boer perspective on the South African War. Such views were of-
ten expressed by authors. None of them, however, claimed to give a complete
account of the conflict and instead emphasised that their writings were strict-
ly personal. Moreover, they often admitted that their personal diaries and
notes had been lost during the fighting so that they wrote down their impres-
sions from their own memories.71
Leyds was aware of the fragmented nature of this corpus of literature and
considered it to be a problem. Already during the South African War, he start-
ed thinking about how the Boer side could be presented in an effective way.
This was an urgent matter because the first books supporting the British im-
perialists’ point of view started to appear before the end of the conflict, such
as Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Great Boer War (1900) and The War in South
Africa: Its Cause and Conduct (February 1902). Pro-Boers in the Nether-
lands dismissed these works as blatant jingo propaganda that exposed a mis-
placed sense of superiority on the British side.72 Nevertheless, Leyds took
them seriously and worried about the influence they could exert in future.
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This was particularly the case with The Times History of the War in South
Africa, a project started by Leo Amery, a young and ambitious reporter from
The Times. In 1900, a volume about the causes of the conflict appeared, with
the second part covering the first few months of the fighting following in June
1902. The thorough approach by Amery and his co-authors meant that it
took many years before the whole series (seven bulky volumes in all) was
completed, in 1909. Because Amery had access to a wide range of sources
from the British side through his remarkable network, which included many
members of the imperial elites, his work was considered to be the most impor-
tant historical publication about the war for many decades, despite the fact
that it gave a biased and pro-British view.73 The Times History is a prime ex-
ample of a so-called official history, an account mainly based on government
and military sources. Contemporaries attributed great educational value to
this genre and it can therefore be seen as an exercise in nation-building.74
This was certainly the case with Amery’s project, whose main objective was
to point out the worrying state of the British military and agitate for army re-
form in order to ensure the survival of the empire into the twentieth centu-
ry.75
Although Leyds did not have such a concrete agenda focussed on one par-
ticular lesson that could be learned from the war, he did have similar ideas
about the value of such histories. His goal was to provide the Afrikaner peo-
ple with building blocks for a new vision of their past that would make them
proud of their heritage and strengthen their self-awareness. One of the people
Leyds discussed this issue with quoted him as follows:
that [an] accurate record of the war, the refutation of misrepresentations,
will be to the benefit of the Afrikaner people also at a later point in time, as
this work will erect an everlasting monument for them as a nation, that
people today and in posterity will look at with respect and admiration,
through which the preservation and elevation of the Boers as an independ-
ent nation will be stimulated.76
On several occasions in the 1900s, Leyds tried to organise the publication of
a work that could compete with The Times History but never succeeded. Still,
the failures show that the attempts to rewrite the history of the South African
War were a direct extension of the propaganda campaign between 1899 and
1902.
The first plan to publish an integrated history of the war from a Boer per-
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spective emerged just after the fighting had ended, when it became clear that
Generals Botha, De la Rey and De Wet were going to visit Europe. They
wrote to F. V. Engelenburg that they wanted to publish a book simultaneous-
ly in different languages across the world. Besides the political significance,
the generals also saw commercial opportunities and anticipated that a book
with such a famous line-up of authors would generate much money. It was
proposed that Kruger and Steyn would sign the introduction. Part one would
be a ‘histoire politique’, with three chapters about the pre-war situation in
the Transvaal (by Engelenburg himself), the ofs (by Abraham Fischer, a
prominent politician from the republic) and the Cape (by F. S. Malan, an
Afrikaner journalist). This would be followed by three chapters on the events
during the war in South Africa, a ‘histoire-bataille’ written by the three Boer
generals. Finally, Leyds was asked to write a ‘histoire diplomatique’ about his
activities as minister plenipotentiary.77
At first, Leyds was positive about the plan but he soon saw how it crum-
bled. After three weeks he replied to Engelenburg that ‘this matter has com-
pletely been spoiled’, which he thought was the fault of Kruger and De Wet.
Both men had decided to publish their own books without consulting the oth-
ers, and this narrow-mindedness harmed the overall cause, he argued. Kruger
had dictated his memoirs to his personal secretary, and because the memory
of the former president was somewhat clouded, Leyds feared that the book
would be nothing more than ‘a collection of anecdotes, while it could have be-
come a monument of history’. In addition, he accused Kruger’s family of ex-
ploiting the elderly man: in their lust for profit, they had sold all the rights to
a German publisher, who had gained complete control over the text. De Wet
made similar mistakes, said Leyds, because the famous general had sold the
rights to his memoirs before he left South Africa in order to compensate for
the losses he had suffered during the war; ‘it is thus a private speculation’.78
Ironically, Leyds was asked to act as an agent for the war memoirs of De Wet,
a truly international enterprise, appearing almost simultaneously in Dutch,
French, German, Russian and English. Its popularity is illustrated by the fact
that it even sold well in Britain; in the Netherlands no less than twenty-three
editions appeared within a year.79 The failure of this plan for an integrated
history of the South African War shows that it was no easy matter to publish
such a work, requiring a lot of co-ordination and organisation.
During later attempts, the authors Leyds worked with were of a lesser
stature than the Boer generals. One of them was P. A. Nierstrasz, who had
been an active propagandist during the South African War.80 Several contem-
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poraries thought that the publisher was ‘an untrustworthy person’ and
warned Leyds against him.81 Nevertheless, the former sar diplomat kept
paying for his services after June 1902 and Nierstrasz initially wrote a huge
number of reports on the South African press.82 After a while, the two men
started discussing plans for a military history of the war. Nierstrasz, a former
artillerist, had already been asked by the Russian army to write such a book
in 1901. Nevertheless, Leyds was the main supporter of this project and it
seems that the Russian assignment was used to cover up his involvement.83
As it turned out, in fact, Leyds provided all the funds, amounting to some 
fl. 40,000.84
In a letter explaining his plan for a standard book about the South African
War, Nierstrasz recounted a discussion he and Leyds had had about the use of
such a work for the Afrikaners. He argued that the authors of official British
histories ignored many facts, provided a wrong impression of the Boer side
and glorified their own deeds in order to create a vision of the past that suited
their political purposes. None of the accounts that were written by Boers pro-
vided a coherent refutation of these views, however: ‘[they] are more like
episodes, personal experiences, which are placed in the foreground by the au-
thor’.85 Other accounts, published by the French and German military, did
not solve this problem either, as they focussed on the first months of the war
only and also used unreliable British sources.86 Nierstrasz therefore wanted
to write a synthesis of all the Boer sources, which would ensure more ‘objec-
tivity’ because it would be comparable to the British accounts. Apart from
the political advantages to the Afrikaners, the publisher added, this work
would also be of importance to European powers, as it would give a pro-
found insight into the nature of colonial warfare.87
Leyds wanted the book to be written as quickly as possible, but there were
some delays caused by a conflict between Nierstrasz and one of his employ-
ees.88 Still, the printing proofs, amounting to ten volumes (more than 1,600
pages), were handed over to Leyds after a little over two years, in March
1906.89 The first part, which consisted of two volumes written in French, de-
scribed the geography of South Africa and the structure of the British
colonies and the Boer republics. This was followed by a detailed account of
the political history of South Africa up until 1899, including short biogra-
phies of the most important generals and statesmen and an analysis of the
‘Boer character’ and the Boers’ attitudes to warfare. The second part, seven
volumes in German, provided an overview of the military system of both par-
ties, followed by a chronology of the course of the conflict from day to day be-
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tween October 1899 and June 1902. The third part was one volume with an
index of 3,000 geographical names and 51 maps depicting the general geo-
graphical features, the course of particular battles, troop movements and the
blockhouse system.90 For further illustration, there were 706 photos scat-
tered throughout the work, coming from Nierstrasz’s personal archive.91
There are no sources that reveal how Leyds judged these magnificent-look-
ing proofs printed on high-quality paper. But his archives contain two re-
views by Dutch military officers. They both agreed with Nierstrasz that it
was the most complete account of the South African War from the Boer per-
spective up to date, and as such considered it to be an important text that mer-
ited publication. In comparison with The Times History, they noted that
Nierstrasz gave a better, although at times somewhat biased, description of
the run-up to the war, in which the role of the republics was extensively dis-
cussed. His use of Boer sources for his chronology of the war was also seen as
an important addition to existing literature. Although the account of the
combat situation itself was not elaborate enough to serve as an academic mili-
tary exposition, they considered it to be a good historical text that provided
important ‘building material’ for a standard work that could be written by fu-
ture historians.92 Looking at both the contents and the reviews of Nier-
strasz’s history, it looks as if the proofs lived up to Leyds’s expectations, of a
‘monument’ to honour the Boer combatants. Nonetheless, the book was nev-
er published.
The sources do not make it exactly clear why Leyds decided not to publish
this history of the war. The most probable reason is that the costs would be
too high to publish it in South Africa. To make the work accessible to the
Afrikaners, it would have to be translated into Dutch and also into English to
provide an alternative to The Times History. Another problem was the high
printing costs of the elaborately illustrated book, because it was expensive to
publish photos and maps at the time.93 From other correspondences, it ap-
pears that Leyds thought it important that cheap editions of history books be
available to reach the widest audience possible.94 It is unlikely that the proofs
were suitable for such a popular publication. Another, and possibly decisive,
reason could have been the increasing financial problems of Nierstrasz. De-
spite the substantial sums Leyds provided him with, his publishing house
,,Nederland” went bankrupt in 1905.95 Decades later, a former associate, L.
Simons, remembered Nierstrasz as an unreliable person.
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That Mr N. and his brother were – as it later became clearly apparent to
me – not entirely trustworthy, and I am left with the impression, that they
used the Boer cause to ensure a temporary position here in this country
[the Netherlands] that they barely deserved and that has, I fear, not done
all that much good to the cause of the Boers in our country.96
Nierstrasz did not only offer the printing proofs to Leyds, however. In No-
vember 1907, he contacted the Ministry of War in The Hague. In a confiden-
tial report, the director of the military archive recommended it for publica-
tion.97Nevertheless, the minister declined the offer, deciding that the publica-
tion of such an elaborate text would cost too much.98 In the 1920s, the text
was dusted off again when Engelenburg announced that he had plans to write
a history of the South African War. Leyds offered him the printing proofs,
and his old friend considered recommending it for publication by the Suid-
Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns.99 This initiative also failed,
and it looks as if Leyds once again consulted the Ministry of War. In 1929, a
final report was written by a retired major who largely agreed with earlier re-
ports about Nierstrasz’s history. In his conclusions, he reiterated the need for
an ‘Afrikaans standard work about the 1899-1902 war’.100 Although these
recommendations did not lead to an actual publication, it shows that there
was continual interest by officials in the Netherlands in publishing an official
history of the South African War. This also became apparent in another at-
tempt to publish an account of the conflict in the Netherlands.
After their return in 1900, Captain J. H. Ram, Lieutenant L. W. J. K.
Thomson and Lieutenant C. J. Asselbergs – three Dutch military attachés
who had been assigned to the Boer forces – set out to write a report about
their findings. On the same ship that Ram returned on, a large collection of
war telegrams gathered by Botha was brought to the Netherlands under the
supervision of the head of the Transvaal telegraph department, C. K. van
Trotsenburg. On arrival in the Netherlands, Ram asked for permission to
have access to this archive and to use it in the attachés’ report. Leyds, as the
representative of the sar government, was apprehensive because of an inci-
dent that had taken place in South Africa after letters had been intercepted in
which Thomson expressed his personal dislike of the Boers.101 In addition,
Van Trotsenburg reported how Ram had already been denied access to offi-
cial archives, because the sar authorities thought that several of the cables
were unsuitable for publication. Still, he advised Leyds to allow the attachés
to see the telegrams as it could mend the strained relationship between them
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and the sar officials. Moreover, he argued, a publication based on these
sources could contribute to the Boer cause, as it would provide an alternative
to the British historical accounts of the war. He also noted, however, that it
would be important to keep an eye on the project because there was a chance
that the attachés might submit the documents to an ‘incorrect reading’.102
Subsequently, Leyds set several conditions: the attachés should ask for the ap-
proval of the sar authorities to publish texts that used the telegram collec-
tion as a source.103
In subsequent years, Van Trotsenburg kept Leyds informed about the
progress of the report. He and three other former Transvaal administrators
were given a room in the offices of the queen in The Hague where they super-
vised the attachés.104 The Dutch government feared, however, that its in-
volvement in the project would be exposed, which might have compromised
the policy of neutrality. Leyds therefore paid fl. 400 a month for another of-
fice and for the salaries of the assistants. The first version of the report was
completed in October 1901 and circulated amongst several members of the
government, including Queen Wilhelmina. Despite the fact that the report
contained some passages that might have damaged the image of the Boers,
Van Trotsenburg was of the opinion that it should be published nonetheless.
He thought that the attachés would remove these remarks, considering pub-
lic opinion and the desires of the queen of whom they knew that ‘where there
is a choice between various different depictions, the one that is good for us
will be most welcome to her’. Moreover, Van Trotsenburg thought that it was
a valuable addition to pro-Boer literature because it served as an ‘encyclopae-
dia for future historians’.105 At first sight, the report by the Dutch attachés
seemed to fit Leyds’s ideas for an official history of the South African War
based on Boer sources. Looking at the contents, however, it becomes clear
that the perspective of the Dutch attachés made this impossible.
First of all, the manuscript only deals with the first few months of the
South African War, up until the occupation of Pretoria, as the attachés left the
war zone after that.106The limited scope of the report seems not to have been
the most important problem, however. Being strong advocates of the militia
system in the Netherlands, the attachés’ main aim was to extract lessons from
the war that could be of use to the Dutch army and in particular to examine
the value of the ‘people’s army’. At times, they were quite positive about the
performance of the Boer commandos, who they considered to be excellent
shots and well-adapted to outdoor life. But they also noted fundamental defi-
ciencies, which they expounded in a whole chapter devoted to ‘the character
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of the Boers’. They thought that the public in the Netherlands was under the
wrong impression about the inhabitants of the republics in thinking they
were good patriots. They argued that, apart from a few exceptions, the major-
ity of the Boers had a strong sense of individual freedom, which made it im-
possible for them to make sacrifices for their country.107 In the descriptions
of the battles, this bold assertion was supported by extracts from the war
telegrams. They showed, for instance, that even during the famous battle of
Colenso, many tactical errors were made due to the fact that the commanders
had little authority.108 It seems likely that Leyds read the report (or at least
part of it) and that he did not think it to be of value for his main goal – namely
to strengthen Afrikaner identity in South Africa.109 Besides the assertion by
the attachés that patriotism was virtually absent in the Boer republics, the ex-
cerpts from the telegrams did not contribute to the heroic image of the com-
mandos and might have been embarrassing for the generals, some of whom
had important political positions after the war.
It seems likely that this was the reason for Leyds to withhold his approval
in 1905, when Ram wrote to him saying that the Dutch government was
wondering whether now, three years after the South African War had ended,
it would be possible to publish the full report, including the parts that were
based on the sar telegrams.110 By that time, Van Trotsenburg had handed
over the collection to Leyds, thereby giving him full control over the source
material. The former minister plenipotentiary forwarded Ram’s letter to
Botha requesting a formal reply, but he added in a personal letter that he ad-
vised him not to comply with the request. ‘Many of the telegrams are com-
pletely unfit for use and in my opinion the attachés Ram and Thomson are
not suitable people for making a selection from them.’111 Botha followed this
advice and wrote a formal letter in which he made it clear that he could not al-
low the report’s publication in the light of the political situation in South
Africa and that permission should also be requested for publication in
future.112 In a separate confidential letter, he made it clear that he completely
agreed with Leyds’s objections.113
In the end, all of Leyds’s efforts to turn the material he gathered during the
South African War into a historical work that would strengthen Afrikaner
identity failed. Nevertheless, the sources show the importance that contem-
poraries attached to the idea behind an official history, which was seen as an
important exercise in nation-building. There were practicable problems,
however, that made it hard to organise such an endeavour. These problems
exposed a fundamental weakness in the pro-Boer movement in the Nether-
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lands, which lacked an effective structure. Although Leyds was in a relatively
authoritative position because of his control over the sources from his exten-
sive collection and his good contacts with the Boer generals, he could not ex-
ert influence over the individuals that were involved in the actual writing of
the manuscripts. Some of them, like De Wet and Nierstrasz, seemed to have
prioritised personal gain over the higher goal of nation-building. Others, like
the attachés, had opinions that were considered to be harmful in the light of
the political situation in South Africa. Despite these setbacks, Leyds did not
give up on finding a purpose for the archives that he considered himself to be
a trustee of. Eventually, he succeeded in moving several collections to South
Africa, where he thought they would have the greatest effect on the continual
struggle between the British and Dutch races.
From Dordrecht to Pretoria: the collection of the Zuid-Afrikaansch 
Museum
One of the most remarkable collections of pro-Boer propaganda came into
being in the Dutch town of Dordrecht. On 1 July 1902, barely a month after
the Peace of Vereeniging, the Zuid-Afrikaansch Museum (South African Mu-
seum, hereafter zam) was opened there. The founder of this museum was
Hidde Nijland, a wealthy merchant and well-known art collector who had
accumulated a large number of objects of propagandistic value during the
South African War and wanted to exhibit them. Although the conflict had al-
ready ended when the museum opened, Nijland explained in the opening
speech, he still thought it of use to show this collection to the public in order
to highlight the ongoing struggle of the Afrikaners against British dominance.
Moreover, he added, he had become the ‘owner [of the objects] not to possess,
but to save and, if desirable, send everything back [to South Africa] later
on.’114The implication of these words was later a source of great controversy
and became the subject of a legal battle between Nijland and Leyds that was
to last for more than a decade. In order to place this conflict in perspective,
something has to be said about the previous history of the collection, which
was intertwined with the propaganda campaign during the South African
War.
In 1897, the Transvaal government decided to participate in the Paris
World Exhibition of 1900. In the years that followed, a committee of promi-
nent administrators co-operated with Johannes Pierson, a Dutch business-
man who acted as consul-general of the sar in Paris. Due to the war, only a
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limited number of objects could be sent from South Africa, early in 1900. The
shipment contained stuffed animals, plant specimens, gold nuggets, a collec-
tion of mineral specimens, a painting of the Kruger government, booty from
an expedition against an African chief and large billboards with facts and fig-
ures about the growth of the education system of the sar.115 Pierson man-
aged to gather enough material to fill the Transvaal pavilion with the assis-
tance of a special committee of the nzav, which confidentially asked collec-
tors in the Netherlands whether they could spare objects relating to the (nat-
ural) history of the Transvaal and its inhabitants. Even the ‘original’ interior
of a model Boer farm was made by a furniture maker in Dordrecht.116 Al-
though strictly speaking, this was against the rules of the exhibition, the jury
turned a blind eye, taking the circumstances into consideration. Indeed, the
Transvaal government was honoured with 15 certificates and 12 medals, in-
cluding two Grand Prix for the education exhibition.117 In addition, the pub-
lic showed great interest, which was undoubtedly the result of the general dis-
may at the war in South Africa. The most tangible expression of these senti-
ments was the entrance hall, where two columns were covered with pro-Boer
and anti-British slogans. A bust of Kruger was buried in flowers.
Despite the great propagandistic success of the pavilion, there were con-
cerns about what would happen to the collection after the World Exhibition
had ended. To avoid the British from getting their hands on the objects, a plan
was made to secure them. A secret agent from the sar legation, Bas Veth, es-
tablished contact with Nijland, who was prepared to take the collection on
loan. In order to avoid suspicion, this was arranged in a rather roundabout
manner. In August 1900, Nijland and Pierson signed two contracts. One con-
cerned the gold nuggets for which the businessman from Dordrecht paid
10,000 francs, thus becoming their rightful owner. The second document
stated that the rest of the objects from the pavilion would be sold for 30,000
francs. However, it was verbally agreed that Nijland would not pay this latter
sum and so did not really become the owner of these objects but rather a kind
of temporary guardian with the purpose of the objects being returned to
South Africa when circumstances allowed for it.118 At that point, there
seemed to be no end in sight to the South African War, so the objects were
transported to Dordecht.119
The continuation of the war probably was the reason that the objects were
exhibited permanently in a special museum, the preparations for which start-
ed in 1901.Meanwhile, the collection grew considerably, not only due to pur-
chases by and gifts to Nijland but also with the help of representatives of the
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Boer republics and pro-Boer organisations. One of the main sources was the
household of Paul Kruger inHilversum. The exiled president received an end-
less stream of tributes to the bravery of his people from all around the world.
His family arranged with Nijland that these objects be given on loan so that
he could exhibit them.120 In addition to the popular bust of Kruger from the
Transvaal pavilion at the World Exhibition, which was displayed with the
wilted garlands from Paris, one of the most eye-catching items was the so-
called ‘Bratina’, a two metre-high silver ceremonial cup covered with dia-
monds andmounted on amarble foot: a gift from 70,000Russians to honour
General Piet Cronjé.121Other special items in the collectionwere a number of
portraits of Boer leaders made by famous contemporaryDutch artists such as
Thérèse Schwartze and Jan Toorop. Besides the impressive homage to the em-
battled republics, which took up three galleries, therewere seven other rooms.
These contained itemsmade by Boer pows, material used by theDutch ambu-
lances, photos, ethnographical objects, education statistics, African crafts
and a library with pro-Boer literature. In the courtyard, there were models of
a rondavel (African hut), a Voortrekker farm and an ox-wagon.122
In 1903, a committee from Dordrecht that included Kiewiet de Jonge and
Rompel announced that it wanted to take over the management of the zam
to ensure that the collection was available to the Afrikaners at all times. Their
initiative was supported by the nzav and by Leyds. The draft statutes explic-
itly stated that ‘the executive committee shall always consider itself as
trustees and the Museum as property of the SA people.’ The next article desig-
nated the so-called ‘foremen’ as the representatives of the people’s will. These
were the leaders of the Afrikaner political parties in South Africa at the time,
including Botha.123 Initially, Nijland agreed to these proposals, which would
have meant that his personal authority over the museum would have come to
an end.124 But soon disputes arose between him and the committee concern-
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Afrikaansch Museum (zam) in Dordrecht.
Source: ‘Afrikaner’, De Zuid-Afrikaan-
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Amsterdam.
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ing the poor conditions in the museum and the ownership of some of the ob-
jects that came from Kruger’s family.125 This conflict eventually led to Nij-
land’s refusal to sign the draft statutes and hand over control of the zam.126
Initially, Leyds acted as a mediator and he had several meetings with both par-
ties, but the differences could not be resolved and the provisional committee
disbanded itself in March 1905.127
Leyds’s later attempts to persuade Nijland also failed, and he started to
look for other ways to solve the problem. After South Africa had been grant-
ed self-government in 1906, Leyds saw an opportunity to do just that. In let-
ters to Boer leaders and the president of the nzav he proposed that, consider-
ing the political developments, it was time for the Afrikaners to ask for the
collection, as by then they were able to keep it out of British hands them-
selves.128During a European tour, Botha wrote a letter to Nijland, asking for
the objects from the zam in order to exhibit them in a new national museum
that would be housed in Kruger’s former official residence in Pretoria.129 Nij-
land agreed to discuss this plan with Leyds, but due to severe illness the latter
sent a former official of the sar legation, G. J. Bolman, to represent him. Dur-
ing their meeting, Nijland mentioned several conditions for handing over the
collection, the most important of which were that the museum in Pretoria
should carry his name and that he would be paid fl. 24,000.130 Leyds, who
had barely recovered from his illness, was not prepared to give in to these de-
mands and started to prepare a court case. In 1908, the Afrikaner leaders in
the Transvaal, who called themselves ‘Boeren voormannen’, formally accred-
ited him to act on their behalf.131
After lengthy preparations during which Leyds was assisted by the lawyer
H. J. F. Heijmans, the case started in December 1909. Almost eighteen
months later, the court reached its verdict. In the meantime, some fundamen-
tal issues were covered. The plea of the ‘Boeren voormannen’, as formulated
by Leyds, was that they were the rightful inheritors of the collection that had
been the property of the former republic of the Transvaal and its late presi-
dent. Nijland’s lawyer argued that the legal status of the ‘Boeren voorman-
nen’ was flawed and that they could hardly be considered to be the sole repre-
sentatives of the people in South Africa. Moreover, he continued, the inhabi-
tants of the former republics had become subjects of the British Empire and
had thus lost their rights to previous possessions.132To counter the first point
of the defence, Heijmans produced the document signed by the Transvaal
leaders in which they claimed the zam collection, accompanied by a notarial
statement from Pretoria that these men were recognised as the Boer ‘fore-
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men’.133 These weighty-looking documents failed to persuade the court,
which did not accept the status of the ‘voormannen’ as the representatives of
the Boers. Still, the judges ruled that the inhabitants of the former republics
did not cease to be members of ‘a Boer people’, despite the fact that they had
been conquered by the British, and so had a right to the remaining assets of
the Transvaal. Leyds was recognised as their representative and so his claim
was awarded.134 The practical effect of this interesting verdict was rather
small, however. The court gave the two parties eight days to agree on the val-
ue of the collection, a sum that would have to be paid by Nijland in case he re-
fused to hand it over. If that did not succeed, a committee of external media-
tors would have to be appointed. And that is indeed what happened.
After a failed attempt by Nijland to bring this matter to the High Court in
1913, mediation started in 1915. The first two attempts to settle the differ-
ences between the two parties failed. These were conducted by E. C. Godée
Molsbergen (lecturer in colonial history at the University of Amsterdam) and
J.W. Pont (professor in Utrecht and president of the nzav) respectively.135 Fi-
nally, a committee under the chairmanship of J. C. vanOvervoorde, president
of the Oudheidkundigen Bond (Archeology League), reached a compromise
thatwas signed on 7 July 1917. The collectionwas to be given to a foundation
that was to carry Nijland’s name in its official title, and he was to be awarded
fl. 3,000 as compensation. Nevertheless, Leyds finally got his way when the
members of the executive committee of the foundation, which included him-
self, Kiewiet de Jonge, Pont and theAfrikaner professor in SouthAfrican Law,
H. J. D. Bodenstein, decided that the collection of the museum in Dordrecht
was to be transported to Pretoria.136 After many years of legal battles, the
matter had become a sort of personal vendetta against Nijland, which is un-
derlined by Leyds’s actions after the transaction was made. In a letter to his
old friend Engelenburg, he explained that the collection would not have to be
associated with Nijland’s name anymore after it had arrived in South Africa.
Moreover, he tried to erase all traces of his opponent’s association with the
collection: a portrait of Nijland was removed from it and sold.137
Due to the First World War, the zam collection could not be moved to
South Africa immediately. In the meantime, Bodenstein, who was responsible
for its transportation, catalogued the objects together with a group of
Afrikaner students in the Netherlands. They made a selection of items based
on what would be most valuable for the Afrikaner nation, which meant that
some of the stuffed animals, ethnographic material and pow crafts were
sold.138 Botha supported these plans and immediately provided the necessary
7. ‘Whoever wants to create a future’ 279
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 279
funds for shipping the collection to South Africa.139 By the end of 1920, it
had arrived in Pretoria where it was later exhibited in the Kruger House Mu-
seum in Church Street. Despite the long and tedious process required to get it
there, it would prove to be a lasting monument – most of the objects are still
on display there today.140
By the time the zam objects were transported to South Africa, Leyds start-
ed to make plans for the future of his own archive. In 1920, he offered his ex-
tensive collection of pro-Boer publications to the University of Stellenbosch,
an offer that was gratefully accepted.141 Leyds did not consider that to be the
most important part of his archive, however. The most important in his opin-
ion was the archive of the sar legation, which had been stored at several ad-
dresses in The Hague and at the nzav office since 1902. Leyds managed to
solicit some money from the society to hire a larger office in which to organ-
ise the archive and prepare it for shipment to South Africa.142 He also con-
tributed a considerable sum himself and put in a lot of his own time to select
the most important documents, which proved to be a colossal task, as he had
ordered that all incoming letters be preserved.143 The archive also contains
material about his terms as state secretary of the Transvaal and correspon-
dence from after he resigned as minister plenipotentiary. In addition, he gath-
ered and catalogued the archives of the Transvaal consulates in the Nether-
lands (Amsterdam and The Hague), London, the US, Portugal and Lourenço
Marques.144 Finally, the papers of the anv press office, which remained up
and running until 1913, were added to the collection.
In 1930, the archive was ready for transport to South Africa, but despite
all the preparatory work, it did not receive a very warm welcome. In letters to
correspondents in Pretoria, Leyds complained about the lax attitude of the
government regarding his offer to transfer the collection to the South African
National Library in the Union Buildings. After a few months of silence, the
Minister for the Interior, D. F. Malan, agreed to cover the costs of shipment
but refused to provide Leyds with any form of financial compensation which
he had asked for in recognition of the time and money he had invested.145
The former minister plenipotentiary was greatly grieved at the course of
events and expressed his frustration in a letter to his old friend Engelenburg,
who was an influential member of the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Weten-
skap en Kuns at the time. In it, he complained that the inhabitants of South
Africa barely showed an interest in their own country and past. ‘The Afrikan-
ers know little of their history nor do they care about it. Little stories that flat-
ter their vanity, that is the only thing that goes down well with them’.146
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Leyds also grumbled about party politics that prevented effective co-opera-
tion. Like in the Netherlands, he wrote, ‘public life [in South Africa] has been
politicised. It is the curse of the Dutch race that people prefer to argue
amongst each other instead of working together.’147 Despite these com-
plaints, the collection arrived in Pretoria, where it remains today. It is consid-
ered to be an important collection, and several Afrikaner historians who have
written about the South African War have used it as a source.148
Despite all the difficulties that Leyds encountered during his efforts to
transfer historical source material to South Africa, he did receive praise for
these activities. In the Netherlands he was awarded with the Ridderkruis in
de Orde van de Nederlandse Leeuw for the publication of the volumes with
his correspondence between 1899 and 1902. Leyds himself was very happy
with this knighthood, which can be considered to be a reward for his academ-
ic work.149 In South Africa this was also the case. In the late 1930s, Leyds re-
ceived honorary doctorates, both in absentia, from the University of Pretoria
and the University of Stellenbosch. Despite his own non-attendance, these
were prestigious events that drew an audience of leading politicians and aca-
demics. In the speeches, delivered by Jan Smuts and Professor E. C. Pienaar,
Leyds’s contribution to South Africa was mentioned not only as an adminis-
trator but also as a historian. In Pienaar’s words, his ‘monumental’ work af-
ter 1902 made him ‘one of the builders of the temple of Afrikaner national-
ism’.150 Leyds was granted another honour when he was invited to address
the South African people in a special radio broadcast for his 80th birthday in
May 1939. During this speech, he once again called upon the Afrikaner peo-
ple to pay more attention to their past.151Despite his self-confessed dislike of
party politics, he also spoke about his concerns about the sympathies of cer-
tain sections of the Afrikaner movement for the Nazis. This publicity made
Leyds nervous in the light of the impeding invasion of the Netherlands by
Germany, and he feared prosecution. He therefore made preparations to flee
to Britain, the country of his former arch enemies. He was spared this ironic
twist of fate when he died on 14May 1940 in a hospital in The Hague, with
the sound of Nazi bombers approaching the city of Rotterdam overhead.152
Conclusion
Leyds’s dramatic end fitted his life’s work, which was dedicated to the ad-
vancement of Dutch influences in South Africa. As a well-educated and cul-
tured man of the world, he had an ambivalent relationship with the Afrikan-
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ers from the start. This makes it hard to assess the actual effect of his activities
after 1902. His outspoken views (partly a result of his own vanity) undoubt-
edly made him a controversial figure amongst several groups in South Africa.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that his books contributed significantly to
the re-interpretation of the colonial history of South Africa, which was an im-
portant aspect of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism. His attempts to make the
records of the pro-Boer propaganda campaign in Europe available to the pub-
lic in South Africa had the same purpose. Due to practical problems and per-
sonal controversies, he failed to publish an integrated history of the South
African War that could serve as a monument to the Transvaal and the ofs.
Nonetheless, he was instrumental in transferring important collections from
the Netherlands to South Africa, which became lasting places of remem-
brance of the Afrikaner past.
Leyds’s activities should be seen in a wider context. He was clearly an ex-
ponent of the ideal of stamverwantschap that took shape after the Transvaal
War of 1880-1881; he was a leading administrator of the Kruger regime and
played an essential role in the pro-Boer propaganda campaign in Europe dur-
ing the South African War. His work – along with that of several other Dutch
pro-Boers – did not end in 1902. While most historians who have written
about this topic rightly point out that the annexation of the republics was a
great blow to contemporaries, they tend to overlook the fact that there was a
fair amount of continuity too. During the first decade of the twentieth centu-
ry, pro-Boer organisations contributed to the survival of Dutch institutions
that Milner tried to close down in a drive to Anglicise South Africa. Such ac-
tivities show that propaganda remained the main priority of the pro-Boer
movement, but that it was also problematic. The institutions mainly drew
from the funds that had been accumulated during the South African War and
when these ran out, they were not able to generate their own capital because
they lacked professionalism.
Nonetheless, the sources reveal ongoing attempts to help mobilise the
Dutch-speaking population in South Africa. Looking at the work of Leyds,
one could say that the lines of communication that existed between the
Netherlands and South Africa were reversed. Before and during the South
African War, the media in the Netherlands served as a cache for material that
came from the war zone, which was used to provide an alternative to the
British coverage of the situation. After 1902, it appeared to Leyds that such
material was mostly needed in South Africa in order to counter the policy of
Anglicisation. In addition to the money that was made available for the re-
iii. the aftermath of pro-boer propaganda (post-1902)282
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 282
construction of the Dutch language press, the support largely took the form
of intellectual ammunition. Looking more closely at these activities, it ap-
pears that there were many problems in executing such projects, with many
of them ending in failure. But this, too, was a continuation of the period be-
fore and during the South African War. From the start, the relationship of the
pro-Boers in the Netherlands with the Afrikaners in South Africa was fraught
with ambivalences and contradictions, which made it hard to mobilise the
support of the public for initiatives to strengthen the ties between these ‘racial
kinsmen’. These problems were characteristic of the feelings of stamver-
wantschap, which was not an uncontested or unchangeable concept that was
embedded in a solid system of official institutions but rather a set of views on
Dutch identity that were communicated through an informal network.
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chapter 8
From stamverwantschap to anti-apartheid: 
the significance of the pro-Boer movement in
the Netherlands
In January 1984, the century-old library of the nzav housed on the Keizers-
gracht in Amsterdam was stormed by anti-apartheid activists. They broke
into the premises and threw part of the library, which includes an important
collection of historical Africana and the archives of the society, into the water
of the canal and sprayed the reading rooms with paint. This was one of the
most radical actions undertaken by the Dutch anti-apartheid movement,
which tried to break off all ties – including cultural – between the Nether-
lands and South Africa, where white supremacy rule continued. At the time,
the nzav was one of the few organisations that tried to maintain contact
with the Afrikaners out of a feeling of kinship. Dutch society, however, had
largely abandoned its sympathy for the ideal of stamverwantschap and in
general supported the fight against apartheid, although the attack on the
nzav library was widely criticised as an act of vandalism.1 This raises the
question of how historically significant the pro-Boer movement was in the
Netherlands and what its long-term effects were on Dutch society. The promi-
nence of the anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s would suggest that these
were quite limited and that, in the course of the twentieth century, the ties be-
tween the Netherlands and South Africa had steadily declined.
This view is clearly reflected in the work of those historians who argue that
1902marked a great discontinuity in the history of the Dutch pro-Boer move-
ment. In general, it is argued that there was a significant drop in Dutch inter-
est in South African affairs. As indicated in the previous chapter, Bart de
Graaff identifies a growing gap between the Dutch and the Afrikaners, as
both sides became disinterested in the concept of stamverwantschap.2 Mar-
tin Bossenbroek describes a more general trend. He argues that during the
first decade of the twentieth century, overall interest of the Dutch public in
overseas matters (including South Africa and the Dutch East Indies) declined.
He uses the metaphor of the ‘hop-skip-jump’: the take-off took place in the
1870s and 1880s, the jump reached its peak during the 1890s and the in-
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evitable ‘landing’ occurred in the 1900s.3 These views would suggest that the
great enthusiasm for the Boers in the Netherlands was a temporary phenome-
non, an early example of how mass media could whip up mass hysteria
amongst the general public, which ended with the Peace of Vereeniging.
Others discern more continuity in the way Dutch public opinion reacted to
South African affairs after 1902. Gerrit Schutte acknowledges the decline in
actual support for the pro-Boer movement in the Netherlands, but he argues
that the idealised image of the Afrikaners continued to exist to some extent.4
His view is supported by the literary historian Wilfred Jonckheere, who notes
that ‘praise for the Afrikaner’ in Dutch poetry and novels continued up to
1960.5 Looking at the public perception of South Africa in the Netherlands,
it could well be argued that this date marked a more significant discontinuity
than 1902. From 1960, the image of the Afrikaners, who clung on to their
ideal of white supremacy, seems to have swung to the opposite extreme as a
result of the growing protest against the apartheid regime, which was particu-
larly strong in the Netherlands. Schutte has argued, however, that even then
there was a significant measure of continuity. Although the attitude towards
the Afrikaners underwent an about-face, activists tried to exert their influ-
ence on South African society just as their predecessors from the pro-Boer
movement did. Schutte therefore argues that the anti-apartheid movement in
the Netherlands was a form of Dutch ‘cultural imperialism’ which shared a
great degree of continuity with previous periods.6
This notion of continuity will be further explored in the last sections of this
book. In the previous chapter it was argued that the main purpose of the
Dutch pro-Boer movement after 1902,was to help the Afrikaners withstand
the attempts by the British to Anglicise South Africa. On these pages the
meaning of this purpose in the Netherlands itself will be examined. In this re-
spect it is important to remember that the Netherlands was a major colonial
power up until the second half of the twentieth century. Therefore we have to
consider not only domestic politics and social change but also the debate
about the role of the Netherlands in the wider world and the feeling of Dutch-
ness that was a result of its international position. In this respect, major
change did occur after the Second World War, which led to a new moral hori-
zon after the great traumas of the Holocaust and decolonisation. The chang-
ing debate about South Africa must be seen as part of this transformation.
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Pro-Boers and public opinion in the Netherlands
After the Peace of Vereeniging was signed, pro-Boers in the Netherlands con-
tinued to try to sway public opinion in order to collect money for the ‘kins-
men’ in South Africa. The nzav executive made it clear that the Dutch-speak-
ing people in South Africa needed help from the Netherlands more than ever,
because the British were trying to top off their territorial control of South
Africa with political and cultural dominance, while Afrikaner institutions
had largely been destroyed during the war. At the same time, they noted with
regret that many members did not see this necessity, arguing that after the an-
nexations of the Boer republics, ‘England should take care of the new sub-
jects itself now’.7 As a result, the society started losing members: from 6,632
in December 1901 to 5,364 in December 1903.8 The decline continued dur-
ing the years that followed, and by 1920 the nzav had just 1,523members.9
Despite this downturn, the organisation survived and still exists today. One
possible reason for this might have been the fact that in 1909 the remainder
of the financial assets of the nzasm was turned into a fund (the Zuid-
Afrikaansche Stichting Moederland) that structurally provided the nzav
with money.10 Other pro-Boer charities were less fortunate. The cnbc,
which counted 4,000 members during the last phase of the war, suffered an
exodus. After years of marginal existence, the organisation finally ceased to
exist in 1911.11 The anv was the only organisation affiliated with the pro-
Boer propaganda campaign that did not suffer such losses, but its member-
ship never exceeded 6,000.12
De Graaff considers these dwindling numbers as evidence that the interest
of the Dutch public in South Africa was in steady decline. This had a direct
impact on the results of the activities that were organised to help the Afrikan-
ers, he argues. In September 1902, the famous Boer Generals Louis Botha,
Koos de la Rey and Christiaan de Wet visited the Netherlands. A deputation
of the nzav, headed by the prominent journalist Charles Boissevain who had
become a member of the executive committee, visited the generals and dis-
cussed a plan for a national collection to raise money for the reconstruction
of South Africa. However, the generals decided to form their own charity, the
Generale Boerenhulpfonds, and independently issued an ‘address to the
civilised world’ in which they announced the collection.13 In the Netherlands,
the organisation was co-ordinated with the municipalities. The results were
found to be disappointing by contemporaries. The total amount collected
was fl. 1.2million – a smaller sum than had been anticipated.14
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It remains the question, however, to what extent this result should be at-
tributed to disinterest on the part of the public. At least this was the question
asked by contemporaries. In the Dutch cities they visited, the Boer generals
were welcomed by large crowds, who cheered for them like true heroes.15 It
was therefore noted in the press that the failure of the collection could hardly
have been caused by a lack of public interest. Several newspapers blamed the
nzav for not being able to capitalise on the enthusiasm of the people in the
Netherlands. According to the editors of the newspaper De Amsterdammer,
it had waited too long and as a result lost the opportunity to work together
with the generals and encourage the people to give money during the collec-
tion. In their view, the nzav was nothing more than ‘the tail of a little club’
and not a ‘living organism’ that reached out to the people.16 One of the main
targets was Boissevain, who had to be restrained from writing a furious reply.
Eventually it was Botha himself who managed to calm down the famous jour-
nalist with a personal letter. Boissevain made it clear that this was sufficient
for him to put the ‘hateful writing’ of his colleagues behind him.17 Neverthe-
less, it seems that the dispute about the collection drained his enthusiasm for
the nzav and he resigned from the executive committee. In a private letter, he
wrote that he was tired of the ‘waffling’ and the lack of effective action.18
This example shows that the relation between pro-Boer organisations and
public opinion in the Netherlands remained problematic, which resulted
from the informal nature of the movement. These problems resembled those
from earlier periods when the nzav was criticised for its elitism which pre-
vented the successful mobilisation of public opinion.19 It would go too far,
however, to conclude from these organisational woes that the Dutch public
had lost all interest in South Africa and the Afrikaners. Although events in
South Africa at times caused controversy in the Netherlands, there are clear
indications that some aspects of the idealised vision of the Afrikaners that
came into being between 1880 and 1902 remained quite popular up until the
Second World War and beyond.
Dutch views on Afrikaner nationalism
Although there was a marked decline in the coverage of South African affairs
after 1902, newspapers continued to write about important events taking
place there. However, the relationship between pro-Boer supporters from the
Netherlands and Afrikaner nationalists became more problematic: severe
tensions arose over certain issues, and there was more explicit criticism than
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in previous periods. One controversial issue was the political situation and
the issue of the extent to which South Africa should accommodate British
rule. Another was the development of Afrikaans into an independent lan-
guage. At times, there was open hostility between certain groups in the
Netherlands and South Africa over these two issues, but there are indications
that the dichotomy was not as absolute as it might first appear. This indicates
that a certain view of South Africa continued to exist in the Netherlands,
which reveals the survival of ideas about racial kinship.
In general, Dutch opinion makers were quite positive about the granting of
self-government to South Africa in 1906 and the formation of the Union in
1910.20 The Afrikaners outnumbered white inhabitants of British descent
and so became politically dominant. There were, however, increasing con-
cerns about the strategy of the moderate South African Party (sap), under the
leadership of Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, to co-operate with British adminis-
trators, the same people they had fought against less than a decade before.
The founding of the Nasionale Party (1914), which was more outspokenly
opposed to British influence, was therefore welcomed by the press in the
Netherlands. These sentiments deepened after the start of the First World
War.21 In South Africa, there was growing controversy surrounding the ques-
tion of whether the government should give military support to Great Britain.
When it appeared that Botha was preparing an invasion of German South-
west Africa in 1914, some radicals formed a commando and went to the deso-
late parts of the Northern Cape. Botha and Smuts sent in the army and
crushed the rebellion. In the Netherlands, there was widespread resentment
of these measures and several petitions were sent to the South African govern-
ment, including one from the nzav, to plead for amnesty for the captured
rebels.22
The pro-Boer society received unwanted media attention when the editor
of its monthly magazine, M. P. C. Valter, wrote several articles and pamphlets
in which he denounced Botha as a traitor who had already failed during the
South African War. In addition to these embarrassing remarks, Valter also
took an openly pro-German standpoint, which caused resentment at a time
when the Dutch government was desperately trying to remain neutral.23 The
nzav dismissed Valter, and H. D. J. Bodenstein, the Amsterdam professor of
law and an Afrikaner by birth who opposed Botha’s policy during the First
World War, wrote a pamphlet to defend the historical reputation of the prime
minister.24
Not all publications about the political situation in South Africa or its re-
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cent past caused such controversy, however. On the contrary, the Afrikaners
and their history were still admired by several well-known authors. At the
time, the most popular writer of novels about South Africa was undoubtedly
Louwrens Penning. It can be argued that he was very influential in shaping
the image of South Africa in the Netherlands, despite the fact that he only
ever visited the country once, a few years before his death in 1927.25The nov-
els Penning wrote during and directly after the South African War remained
popular with young readers until the 1950s, but after 1904, he turned to oth-
er topics. During the next two decades, he wrote just one book about South
Africa in 1915, describing the rebellion of the previous year. This novel was
probably influenced by the general dissatisfaction in the Netherlands about
the course of events, and the negative characteristics of the Boers such as par-
tisanship are more explicitly mentioned than in previous works. The story is
about a father and son who grow apart because of their opposing political
views and even fight each other on the battlefield. Despite this drama, Pen-
ning did not break with his usual style and the story has a happy ending in
which the two reconcile to end the suffering.26
Penning’s interest in South Africa was renewed in 1923, when his publish-
ers asked him to travel to the archives in Cape Town and Pretoria to gather
material for new novels about the history of the Afrikaners. The writer, who
was nearly 70 years old, stayed in the country for five months and, apart
from doing archival research, travelled around to visit his brothers who had
settled in the Transvaal during the 1880s. Looking back on the trip, Penning
wrote that his ‘greatest wish’ had been fulfilled.27 He met the Afrikaners, vis-
ited their homes and travelled to some of the places where their ancestors had
fought for their freedom during the Great Trek, which made a great impres-
sion on the writer. ‘My heart has danced during all this, and once again my
great love for the “Boers” has been revived.’28 Despite these intense experi-
ences, Penning asserted that meeting the Afrikaner people in the flesh had not
altered his views on South Africa. ‘It was all exactly as I had expected. With
the eye of love I had already seen Africa and had seen it correctly.’29
The journey resulted in four novels about the history of South Africa, in
particular about the Great Trek, which appeared just before Penning’s death.
The emphasis in these works was on race relations and the dangers that the
black majority posed to the white minority. Moreover, the conservative and
patriarchal lifestyle of the Afrikaners was explicitly celebrated.30 At the time,
Penning was positive about their position in South Africa and thought that
they had become politically dominant in their country. Looking at the out-
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come of the turbulent periods of their history, he concluded that ‘the blood,
spilled for freedom and peace, has not been shed in vain. The path led
through the most sorrowful depths to the heights of victory.’31
Another successful project Penning started after his journey to South
Africa was a lecture tour, which lasted up until his death. The elderly writer
spoke about his beloved Afrikaners to sold-out crowds, sometimes six times
a week.32 Local newspapers praised Penning’s performance as an attractive
mix of knowledge and entertainment. During the first half of the lecture he
gave a general introduction to South Africa, illustrated with slides, during
which he talked about famous people and places from the past and present.
The second part was filled with anecdotes about his travels and the peculiari-
ties of the people he encountered. Typically, these lectures were positive and
lucid, emphasising the unity of the Afrikaners and their ability to take the
lead in South Africa, which, he told his audience, opened up opportunities for
people in the Netherlands as well. Even when explaining the political situa-
tion and the tensions between the sap and the Nasionale Party, Penning man-
aged to steer away from controversy and declared that he admired the
Afrikaner people as a whole.33 This image clearly appealed to his audience,
who on one occasion even welcomed him with a thunderous version of the
national anthem of the Transvaal, a country that had ceased to exist two
decades previously.34 The writer himself explained this enthusiasm by the
fact that the people in the Netherlands still felt a ‘warm love and strong sym-
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Louwrens Penning working in South
Africa, 1924.
Source: L. Penning, Uit mijn leven (Zwolle,
1927[?]). Collection Zuid-Afrikahuis, Am-
sterdam.
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pathy’ for the Boers. ‘Their history is one continuous struggle for freedom
and justice, a mighty fight of blood and tears. That struggle has found reso-
nance in the hearts of our [Dutch] people.’35
Although such emotions were clearly based on a biased and idealised im-
age of South Africa and its past, they cannot simply be dismissed as mis-
placed nostalgia.36 It shows that there was significant continuity with the
way in which such matters were depicted earlier. For people in the Nether-
lands, the key question remained whether the white Dutch-speaking popula-
tion would be able to withstand the imperialists’ attempts to submit them to
British rule. In that respect, there was disappointment at Botha’s support for
the British Empire during the First World War, something that was even re-
flected in Penning’s novel from 1915. But the popular writer also extensively
referred to the more heroic episodes from the Afrikaner past to mobilise sup-
port for his ideal: a South Africa ruled by the white Dutch-speaking popula-
tion. Such discrepancies reveal the ambivalences that surrounded the concept
of stamverwantschap at the end of the nineteenth century and continuing
into the twentieth century. These ambivalences were also apparent in the de-
bate about the development of Afrikaans as a separate language and cropped
up in everything from popular culture to government policy.
The cultural ties between the Netherlands and South Africa
In the Netherlands, the responses to the development of Afrikaans by the
Tweede Taalbeweging were varied. The simplification of grammar and
spelling that was proposed by intellectuals in South Africa was already a top-
ic of discussion at the end of the nineteenth century. There had been criticism
from linguists in the Netherlands such as Jan te Winkel who thought such
changes imperilled the very foundations of Dutch as a language.37This scepti-
cism still existed at the beginning of the twentieth century, and at times the
tone of literary critics was quite condescending. In 1910, for example, C.
Scharten wrote a cynical article about Afrikaans in the influential journal De
Gids. Reviewing the work of J. F. E. Celliers, one of the most famous Afrikan-
er writers of the time, he ridiculed it as a failed attempt to make something
out of ‘this little deaf-and-dumb language […]. Will it ever be possible to
make beautiful music on this broken violin?’38 Such vicious attacks seem to
have been the exception rather than the rule, however. Other critics chose
more conciliatory words to express their doubts about the rapid develop-
ment of Afrikaans. The publisher L. Simons was against spelling reforms be-
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cause he thought it affected the purity of Dutch, and he was of the opinion
that linguists in the Netherlands should not give in to the ‘urge’ from South
Africa. ‘We can best maintain the mutual friendship, by each doing what we
think is necessary for ourselves, and furthermore learning to appreciate each
other’s point of view.’39
Besides the critics, there were also intellectuals who supported the efforts
of the Afrikaners to simplify the spelling and grammar of written Dutch.
There had been an organisation that lobbied for such reforms in the Nether-
lands for decades, the Vereniging tot vereenvoudiging van onze schrijftaal,
which included many prominent pro-Boers amongst its members.40After the
South African War, this association watched the development of the Tweede
Taalbeweging in South Africa closely and showed great interest in the
spelling reforms of 1905, which largely coincided with their own proposals.
During an annual meeting in 1906, it was noted that ‘there [in South Africa]
the movement proceeds with great power, so that they are much further than
we are.’41 In 1908, the society appealed to the Dutch government to promote
a new system designed by R. A. Kollewijn. In their petition, they stated that
linguistic developments in South Africa, and also Flanders, made it necessary
to follow suit in order to preserve the unity of Dutch spelling around the
world.42 In 1909, this petition was discussed in Parliament and an official
committee was appointed to investigate the possibilities of a new law, but sig-
nificant language reforms were introduced only after the Second World
War.43 Despite the lack of concrete results in the short term, this does show
that the debate about the global position of the Dutch language resurfaced af-
ter 1902 and continued to attract attention.
There was also appreciation for the Afrikaans lingual heritage amongst the
Dutch public. Folksongs, for example, proved to be quite popular. When
Mansvelt published his songbook, the press complimented him for this proj-
ect and noted that it could also have a positive effect in the Netherlands, stim-
ulating patriotism.44 In addition, Rompel and his wife organised a few con-
certs during which these songs were performed. Their main goal was to pro-
mote the Tweede Taalbeweging and to show that it was different from the
movement headed by Du Toit.45 In the reports about these evenings, Rompel
noted with satisfaction that they were a great success and that the audiences
learned to appreciate the sweet sound of Afrikaans poetry.46 In this way, sev-
eral rhymes and tunes in Afrikaans became part of popular culture in the
Netherlands. One of the most tangible results was that they were widely sung
at schools. Evergreens such as Sarie Marais remained part of the curriculum
until the 1950s.47
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The ongoing undercurrent of sympathy for the Afrikaners and their cultur-
al heritage amongst the general public in the Netherlands found an expres-
sion in actual government policy when the political situation allowed it.
From 1910 onwards, the Dutch government had been tied to a policy of strict
neutrality towards the Afrikaner government in order not to offend the
British imperial authorities. After the Union obtained Dominion status in
1926, however, South Africa was allowed to start its own foreign service. In
1929, Prime Minister Hertzog decided that the Netherlands should be the
first country with which South Africa established official diplomatic ties.48
The tone of policymakers in The Hague remained cautious and, as had been
the case before, much emphasis was put on the cultural and historical ties of
the Dutch and the Afrikaners rather than on political alliance. The concept of
stamverwantschap remained important in this respect. More concretely,
plans emerged for a cultural treaty. Schutte points out the informal nature 
of this initiative that was taken in 1936 by a group of prominent academics 
in South Africa, who founded a committee that sought contact with the 
nzav and the Dutch government. The plan was welcomed in the Nether-
lands, which led to the establishment of the Commissie tot bevordering van
de culturele betrekkingen tussen Nederland en Zuid-Afrika. It consisted of
representatives of the most important organisations that argued for closer
ties with South Africa and university professors that distributed money 
that was made available by the government, mainly to promote academic
ties.49
The committee was presided over by Frans Beelaerts van Blokland, former
foreign minister and at the time vice president of the Raad van State (Privy
Council), which made him a close advisor to Queen Wilhelmina. This ap-
pointment shows the continuity with the pro-Boer movement around 1900,
as Beelaerts van Blokland had been very active in the propaganda campaign
during the South African War.50 It seems that he remained an important pivot
in Dutch-South African relations. In 1938, he travelled to Pretoria to be pres-
ent at the celebrations for the centenary of the battle of Blood River at Preto-
ria where a re-enactment of the Great Trek ended with a mass gathering. Also
in the Netherlands there was attention for this event in the press, and in sever-
al cities the nzav organised celebrations to honour the Voortrekkers.51 At
the eve of the Second World War, ties between the Netherlands and South
Africa were closer than they had been in the preceding decades, and stamver-
wantschap remained an important concept.52 The cultural treaty was to be
the crown to this process, but the plan was put on hold when Nazi Germany
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invaded the Netherlands in May 1940. It turned out that the Second World
War was not only disruptive in the short run, it also left its marks on Dutch-
Afrikaner relations in the decades that followed.
Dutch-South African relations after the Second World War
The Second World War stands out as one of the most important discontinu-
ities in Dutch history, which had lasting effects. The trauma of Nazi occupa-
tion has left a deep mark on national identity in the Netherlands. One of the
most painful issues in that respect is the high percentage of Dutch Jews that
were deported and exterminated during the Holocaust. After the war, the
general public developed an aversion to racism, a concept that was increas-
ingly associated with the Nazi atrocities. Another great trauma was the occu-
pation of the Dutch East Indies by Japan in 1942. At the end of the war, In-
donesian nationalists seized the opportunity and declared independence. The
Dutch government considered the colonial possessions to be vital to the coun-
try’s post-war recovery and therefore started two military expeditions to re-
store authority – without success. This, in combination with international
pressure, forced the government to acknowledge Indonesia’s independence in
1949. Although the Netherlands kept some possessions in the West (Surinam
and the Antilles) for some time thereafter, it effectively meant the end of its
status as colonial power. This brought about a change in thinking about colo-
nialism. Whereas the ‘civilising mission’ once had been a source of national
pride, the historical ‘exploitation’ of Indonesia increasingly became a source
of guilt and shame.53
In South Africa, the experiences of the war and decolonisation were quite
the opposite. It did not suffer occupation by the Axis forces and, indeed, there
seems to have been a large measure of sympathy for the Nazis amongst cer-
tain groups of radical Afrikaners. In 1939, Prime Minister Jan Smuts pledged
allegiance to Britain and provided troops. But there was great opposition
against this decision from the Nasionale Party, who argued that South Africa
should stay out of the war. This attitude was quite disappointing to many
people in the Netherlands after 1945. During the South African War, they
had protested vehemently against the occupation of the Boer republics, while
radical Afrikaner leaders refused to criticise the invasion of the Netherlands
by the Nazis.54When the Nasionale Party won the South African elections in
1948, there were therefore quite some negative reactions from the Nether-
lands. Also the policy of the new government seemed to be the opposite of
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what was happening in the Netherlands. While the Dutch lost their most
prized colonial possession, the Afrikaners started to install the first apartheid
laws which were meant to bolster white supremacy in South Africa. This poli-
cy was widely condemned by the international community, leading to the iso-
lation of South Africa. The anti-apartheid movement in the Netherlands was
particularly strong.
Looking at these developments, it is tempting to see the Second World War
as marking a great discontinuity initiating domestic developments that un-
avoidably enlarged the gap between the Netherlands and South Africa. But
there are indications that there was continuity as well. The psychological ef-
fects of the Second World War and decolonisation were not directly apparent
in Dutch society, and the anti-apartheid movement would only gain momen-
tum after 1960. Moreover, it would be wrong to see the resentment against
apartheid as a result of the traumas of the Second World War and decolonisa-
tion only. Although domestic politics undoubtedly played a role in the Dutch
anti-apartheid movement (which grew during a period of great social tur-
moil), it also was based on a view of what South Africa should look like in the
future. This also constitutes a significant continuity with the ideal of stamver-
wantschap, which was aimed at helping the ‘kinsmen’ to bolster their institu-
tions in order to shape the colonial order in the region.
Looking at the 1950s, the continuity with the pre-war period is clearly
present. The Dutch government did not send an official committee to the
opening of the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria in 1949, but it allowed a
private delegation to go. They turned out to be the only foreign representa-
tion at this event, which became a massive rally of radical Afrikaners. One of
the delegates even addressed the 200,000 attendants, emphasising the special
ties between the Dutch and the Afrikaners.55These feelings also seem to have
had an effect on emigration from the Netherlands to South Africa, which rose
to unprecedented levels after 1948 (some 48,000 people left). The Dutch gov-
ernment even provided financial support to emigrants who went to that part
of the world.56 And the plans of Beelaerts van Blokland were at last imple-
mented: a cultural treaty between the Netherlands and South Africa was
signed in 1951. At this occasion also diplomatic ties were reinforced and the
legations of both countries were upgraded to embassies.57The position of the
nzav was greatly strengthened by these policies, and the society became a
pivot in Dutch-South African relations. It was appointed by the government
to distribute subsidies to emigrants, and the organisation also had a perma-
nent seat in the committee that oversaw the implementation of the cultural
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treaty.58 The executive committee considered the treaty to be an important
document that would greatly strengthen existing ties.59
Also in other ways, the ongoing popularity of the concept of stamver-
wantschap in these years can be detected. In 1952, there were widespread cel-
ebrations in both South Africa and the Netherlands to mark the 300th an-
niversary of the landing of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape of Good Hope.60 In
October of that year, Prime Minister Willem Drees made an official visit to
South Africa. The main reason was to celebrate the new route to Johannes-
burg operated by the Royal Dutch Airways. But Drees seems to have had
more personal reasons as well. During a speech in Pretoria on the occasion of
Kruger Day, he told his audience that his interests in politics had been roused
as a small boy when he was present in the huge crowd when the Transvaal
president arrived in Amsterdam.61 Two years later, Prince Bernhard made a
three-week visit to South Africa in order to stimulate business ties.62With his
trip he actively contributed to the general image that South Africa could be
very profitable for Dutch enterprise, which he reiterated in an interview he
gave after his return.63
On these occasions, Dutch officials focussed on the cultural and historical
ties and business opportunities but refrained from comments on the policy of
apartheid. But an increasing number of Dutch opinion makers did comment
on this issue. There was appreciation for the segregation policies amongst
some conservatives and former colonials, who argued that it was the only
way for white men to control the black majority.64 In general, however, there
was growing discomfort about the racist policies of the Nasionale Party,
which spilled over into the press and Parliament. After a stay of three months
in South Africa, the progressive reverend J. J. Buskes published an influential
book in which he condemned the apartheid system. He not only had moral
objections but also foresaw practical dangers, as he thought the suppression
of the black majority would inevitably lead to a race war.65 In addition, repre-
sentatives from Surinam and the Antilles demanded more outspoken protests
against the segregation laws, which made it difficult for the Dutch govern-
ment to remain neutral on this issue. This became clear in the United Nations,
where the Dutch delegation as a rule refrained from voting on resolutions
against apartheid but explicitly condemned the system in its address to the as-
sembly.66This led to increasing tensions with the Afrikaners in the late 1950s.
The Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960, where the South African police
killed 69 black demonstrators protesting against the pass laws, was in many
ways a turning point in Dutch-South African relations. As in other countries,
8. From stamverwantschap to anti-apartheid 297
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:23  Pagina 297
there was widespread outrage against this bloodbath in the Dutch press.67 In
Parliament, the government was put under pressure to condemn the events
openly. Although the confessional parties blocked a resolution forwarded by
the left-wing parties that compared Sharpeville to Nazi atrocities, a more
moderately worded official protest was adopted that was sent to the South
African Parliament. The text invoked the ideal of stamverwantschap in an at-
tempt to persuade the Afrikaners to change their ways.68 This indicates that
some of the old reflexes of the old pro-Boer movement were still in effect to a
certain extent.69 But even within the nzav, it was noticed that attitudes were
changing after the Sharpeville Massacre. The annual report of 1961 men-
tioned that there was growing public criticism of the society because of its
non-political stance. The executive committee stated, however, that it re-
mained committed to strengthen the historical, cultural and economic ties be-
tween the Netherlands and South Africa, regardless of the political situation
in either country.70
This facade of neutrality became increasingly problematic in the years that
followed. The reactions to the Sharpeville Massacre marked a fundamental
shift in Dutch policies towards South Africa. Whereas before this event the
government had tried to remain neutral, after the massacre it started to put
pressure on the Afrikaner regime. In 1961, the Netherlands was the only
Western country to vote in favour of an anti-apartheid resolution in the UN,
and in 1965 Foreign Minister Luns allocated fl. 100,000 to the Defence and
Aid Fund that provided legal assistance to anti-apartheid activists. These ac-
tions were openly condemned by the Afrikaner government.71 In the 1970s, a
progressive coalition greatly increased the funds it provided to the African
liberation movement and eventually took direct sanctions against the
apartheid regime. In reaction to the death of anti-apartheid activist Steve
Biko while in police custody in 1977, the cultural treaty was unilaterally
frozen and later revoked.72 The Netherlands also joined international sanc-
tions, although it refrained from imposing boycotts on its own accord, de-
spite public pressure to do so.73The nzav strongly protested against these ac-
tions. Particularly the end of the cultural treaty was a painful blow, as it had
been a cornerstone of the society’s influence since the 1950s. In its annual re-
port of 1977, one prominent member accused the left coalition of ‘short-
sightedness’ because the treaty had been a means to open a ‘dialogue’ with
the Afrikaners in order to persuade them to end the apartheid system.74
The nzav became more isolated in other ways too. In the 1960s, there was
a substantial growth in the number of anti-apartheid organisations. At first,
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these groups were quite moderate, publishing texts against the apartheid
regime and collecting money for the liberation movement. In the early seven-
ties, several groups emerged that argued for more decisive action. Some of
them focussed on public opinion in the Netherlands, calling for a boycott on
South African products, which started with a successful ban on oranges from
Outspan in 1971. These new organisations also led demonstrations against
companies who traded with the apartheid regime.75 In the 1980s, a few radi-
cal groups thought this was even too limited, and there were several bomb at-
tacks on companies that continued their activities in South Africa. The storm-
ing of the nzav library was also part of this violent campaign.76 In an inter-
view, the activists declared that they had vandalised the collection as a sym-
bolic act against ‘an organisation that makes propaganda for a fascist and
murderous regime’.77 Although the destruction of books was widely con-
demned, also by many anti-apartheid organisations, there was little sympa-
thy for the nzav itself. In a comment, the author Adriaan van Dis lamented
the attack on the library, which according to him had great historical value.
But he also took a swipe at the nzav, describing it as a ‘calcified society’
whose members clung on to the outdated ideal of stamverwantschap.78
Despite the widespread resentment against the Afrikaners in the 1980s, it
can be questioned whether this was such a great discontinuity with previous
periods. The Dutch anti-apartheid movement can partly be seen as an ele-
ment of the social revolution that took place in the West during the 1960s.79
But there was also a more direct link with the situation in South Africa. Al-
though the word stamverwantschap increasingly became a politically incor-
rect anachronism, several groups of anti-apartheid activists in the Nether-
lands continued to consider the Afrikaners to be akin, and their motivations
can be explained to some extent from a sense of shame.80The ongoing feeling
of connectedness explains why South Africa has been such a sensitive topic in
the Dutch public debate from the late nineteenth century onwards. There was
a sense of historical responsibility towards that part of the world, with the
Dutch wanting to influence the way society took shape there.81This points to
a strong measure of continuity, despite the fact that pro-Boers around 1900
had based their view on an ideology of white superiority that was completely
different from the anti-racism of anti-apartheid activists eighty years later.
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General concluding remarks
At the end of the nineteenth century, Dutch pro-Boers set up a transnational
network that greatly influenced relations between the Netherlands and South
Africa in the following century. As is asserted in historiography, this initiative
was undoubtedly a form of nationalism. To a certain extent, the Boers were
idealised in order to serve as an example to the population of the Nether-
lands. Although these effects cannot be denied, the pro-Boer movement was
also an informal and cultural form of imperialism. There were structural at-
tempts to enlarge Dutch influence in the region, and feelings of kinship with
the Boers – stamverwantschap – were clearly connected with ideas about the
global position of the Dutch race. It has been argued in this volume that these
international components had a profound influence on the pro-Boer move-
ment in the Netherlands from the 1880s onwards. It was not merely an isolat-
ed and unique phenomenon in Dutch history, it was also connected with the
shaping of modern South Africa and as a result there was a clear interaction
with both Afrikaner nationalism and British imperialism.
The enthusiasm for the Boers in the 1880s led to the establishment of sever-
al durable institutions that aimed to strengthen the ties between the Nether-
lands and South Africa. Although emigration numbers remained low, an in-
fluential group of so-called Hollanders settled in the Transvaal where they
contributed significantly to the modernisation of the republic that took place
under Paul Kruger. Moreover, these individuals became mediators, transfer-
ring information that supported Boer independence from South Africa to the
Dutch media. During the South African War, this network was considered to
be of great value in the propaganda campaign that was set up to support the
fight of the Boers against British expansionism. Dutch pro-Boer organisa-
tions played an important role in distributing this information in Europe in
order to counter British coverage of the war. Although the British army was
increasingly successful in cutting off the official lines of communication as
the conflict progressed, information continued to reach the Netherlands via
more informal channels. This made it hard, however, to keep an overview
and to distinguish useful initiatives to help the embattled Boers from those
that were fraudulent. The nzav, in co-operation with the Boer representa-
tives and the anv, therefore actively tried to streamline the propaganda cam-
paign by creating new institutions.
Despite the feverish activism of this network during the South African War,
how much effect these efforts actually had remains an open question. The
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main purpose of the propaganda campaign was to put pressure on the British
government by mobilising public opinion. Although there was widespread
enthusiasm for the Boers in continental Europe, it yielded few political results
because none of the governments abandoned its policy of neutrality. This gulf
between public enthusiasm and government inertia was probably most ap-
parent in the Netherlands itself. In other ways too, the pro-Boers were con-
fronted with the volatility of public opinion. Although at first sight the huge
wave of enthusiasm might have been positive for the propagandists, they also
had problems coping with the huge amount of work this entailed. The source
material shows that the pro-Boer movement in the Netherlands was quite
haphazard and relied on improvisation. This points to a more fundamental
flaw in the Dutch press system at the time: its international connections were
quite underdeveloped. It seems that the government’s policy of neutrality and
the reluctance of businessmen to invest money in global lines of communica-
tion were the main explanations for this limitation.
On the other hand, contemporary pro-Boers did actively reflect on these
deficiencies, which indicates that to them the propaganda campaign fitted in
with broader issues associated with the rise of mass media taking place at the
time. The press office of the anv in particular fulfilled a pioneering role in the
Netherlands because it was the first organisation that tried to propagate
Dutch interests in the international media. There was much appreciation for
these activities, but they did not receive any structural support and the press
office depended on funds from pro-Boer organisations. It is also difficult to
assess how much of the anv material was actually published in newspapers
inside and outside the Netherlands. Still, it can be said that despite these limi-
tations, several gripping images were distilled from the material that was
transferred from South Africa, which was used to propagate a vision of the
past and future of the region that legitimised the existence of an independent
Dutch entity there. This corpus was the most important result of the pro-Boer
propaganda network.
The general content of the pro-Boer literature that emerged in the 1880s
and 1890s, was based on a view of the history of colonial South Africa that
celebrated the supremacy of the white Dutch-speaking people. Although the
tensions between the modern Dutch and the traditional Afrikaners were men-
tioned, opinion makers in the Netherlands generally supported Kruger’s
ideas on the Transvaal’s independence. The imperial dreams of stamver-
wantschap at times overlapped with the ideals of certain groups of Afrikaner
nationalists. Their common goal was to prevent the British from ending the
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independence of the Boer republics and gaining complete dominance over the
region. Contemporaries did not reflect on this issue in terms of high politics
and economics only but also believed that cultural differences were of impor-
tance. In their words, the two ‘white races’ were mainly separated by their
heritage and language. Many of the efforts by Dutch pro-Boers were there-
fore aimed at strengthening national identity in the Boer republics.
In the pro-Boer propaganda during the South African War, the cultural as-
pects of the struggle between the republics and the British Empire was the
leading theme. This led to a biased coverage of events on the battlefield as
they were unfolding. From the beginning of the war, British atrocities were
enumerated extensively. Although initially there was some sympathy for the
‘Tommies’ who were forced by their superiors to fight a war they did not ask
for, reports also mentioned their atrocities which were seen as being emblem-
atic of the injustice of the war. The tone used in publications about these ‘war
crimes’ became more radical as the war continued. The measures taken by
the British to counter the Boers’ guerrilla tactics – such as farm-burning, the
deportation of prisoners of war and the concentration camps – were depicted
as barbaric. Although emotions ran high at times, it should be remembered
that most Dutch opinion makers considered British statesmen and empire
builders to be responsible for the war and did not blame the British nation as
a whole.
The image of the Boers in Dutch publications also remained ambivalent. In
the early phase of the war, there was a euphoric mood in the Netherlands
which to some extent turned into disillusion when the British started their ad-
vance in 1900, exposing the shortcomings of the Boers’ informal military sys-
tem. After the start of the guerrilla war, the atmosphere of hope and fear po-
larised. Those who surrendered, the ‘Handsoppers’, were seen as the embodi-
ment of the negative traits in the Boer character such as selfishness and stub-
bornness. By contrast, those who continued to fight, the ‘Bittereinders’, were
seen as true patriots. Prisoners of war and women in the camps who opposed
British tyranny and did not give up hope shared in the same kind of heroism
and were depicted as martyrs. Letters and reports about such defiance bol-
stered the hope that the Afrikaners would remain defiant against British at-
tempts to Anglicise South Africa in the future.
Remarkably, such optimism to a certain extent continued to exist after the
Peace of Vereeniging (1902), which brought a definitive end to the Boer re-
publics. As a result, the interaction with Afrikaner nationalism entered into a
new phase after 1902. One of the main priorities of the pro-Boer organisa-
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tions was to help rebuild Afrikaner cultural infrastructure in order to with-
stand Milner’s policy of promoting English. These efforts could not be sus-
tained after the pro-Boers’ funds ran out, but they did contribute to the sur-
vival of these institutions during the difficult years immediately after the
South African War. In addition, there were ongoing attempts to provide
Afrikaner nationalists with intellectual ammunition, particularly with mate-
rial that could help sustain the heroic vision of the past that would mobilise
grassroots support. With this goal in mind, Willem Leyds tried to make avail-
able to the Afrikaners the huge amount of propagandistic material that he
had gathered during the South African War. Although his attempts to publish
an integrated history of the conflict failed, he did succeed in moving several
important collections to South Africa, which became lasting places of memo-
ry for Afrikaner nationalists. Such activities show that, to a certain extent,
the old lines of communication were reversed and used to transfer pro-Boer
propaganda back to South Africa.
In the Netherlands, there was also more continuity following the 1902
peace treaty than might appear at first sight. There was a clear drop in the ac-
tivities of pro-Boer activists, but they continued to try to mobilise support for
their efforts to keep Dutch influences in South Africa as strong as possible.
The institutions that were used to do this originated in the previous periods
and were mainly financed from the remnants of the money that was generat-
ed then. Attempts to set up new institutions that could operate independently
failed, however, which limited the effects of these efforts. Even more than be-
fore, there were tensions and controversies, which highlights the complex re-
lationship between the pro-Boer movement and public opinion in the Nether-
lands. Nonetheless, certain views on South Africa that originated in the
1880s remained in vogue until after the Second World War. In this way, the re-
flexes of stamverwantschap continued to influence the relationship between
the Netherlands and South Africa. Even at the height of the anti-apartheid
movement, feelings of connectedness with that part of the world continued to
exist.
The Dutch primary sources that have been presented in this volume match
the views about imperial culture that have been developed in recent British
historiography quite well. One fundamental premise is that concepts of na-
tionalism and imperialism were not necessarily opposed to each other and
sometimes overlapped, although there were often contradictions and ten-
sions. In this way, Britishness resembled its Dutch counterpart stamver-
wantschap, even though the political context was obviously very different, as
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the former concept was embedded in a formal empire. Still, there are parallels
regarding identity formation. In the dominions, imperialistic and nationalis-
tic sentiments held by English-speaking groups existed side by side. At first
sight, it might seem that Afrikaner nationalists were more wary of outside
meddling, even if it came from people who claimed to be closely related. Hol-
landers, however, did contribute significantly to the development of their cul-
tural institutions and helped to strengthen them against English influences.
There was a reciprocal effect too, as propaganda in favour of Boer independ-
ence and against British expansion was quite popular in the Netherlands pre-
cisely because it fed into Dutch nationalism again. In this sense, the propagan-
da campaign during the South African War can be seen as a confrontation be-
tween ideas of Britishness and stamverwantschap.
Significantly, contemporaries were aware of this intricate interaction and
often used military metaphors to refer to this war of words. Pro-Boer propa-
gandists in the Netherlands actively tried to refute the views that were put for-
ward by British advocates of expansion who wrote negatively about the
Boers. Already in the 1880s and 1890s, they tried to provide an account of
nineteenth century South Africa in which the existence of the Boer republics
was legitimised. Attention shifted to current events during the South African
War, but the goal was the same: to promote the concept of an independent
Dutch-speaking entity in the region. Although the propaganda was quite neg-
ative about the British at times, this dichotomy was not as absolute as it
might seem. In general, it was argued that jingoists had corrupted public
opinion and politics and had thus provoked the war. In addition, there were
people in Britain that opposed the conflict who were seen as allies, and pro-
Boers in the Netherlands exchanged information with them. This had its lim-
its, however, because even though both groups were appalled by some of the
events taking place in the war zone, they had fundamentally different views
on the colonial future of South Africa.
When looking at the institutional aspects, more differences become appar-
ent. At the start of the war, the British media were represented by hundreds of
journalists. Because of the British monopoly on telegraph lines, their news
reached Europe first. By contrast, Dutch newspapers depended on informal
correspondents who initially sent their letters via Delagoa Bay. When the
British authorities tightened censorship after they had occupied the republics,
these lines were increasingly disrupted. This points to fundamental differ-
ences between British and Dutch imperialism. As a small country, the Nether-
lands clearly lagged behind in establishing its own global communication
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lines. This can partly be explained by international power relations at the
time which forced the government to adhere to a strict policy of neutrality. In
addition, there seems to have been a great unwillingness amongst the busi-
ness community to invest in institutions that could help to improve the situa-
tion. These problems were clearly apparent to the Dutch pro-Boers, and they
tried to improve the situation by setting up organisations such as the anv
press office. These efforts were successful in the sense that a large amount of
information that supported the Boer perspective was gathered and distrib-
uted throughout Europe. Analogous to the situation in South Africa, one
could say that the pro-Boers developed a guerrilla style of propaganda that
created powerful images which the British found hard to refute.
A final comparison can be made concerning chronology. Despite the fact
that the public in Britain became increasingly demoralised, the South African
War was not the beginning of the end of the British Empire. Many supporters
of expansion were shocked by the inefficiency of the army and made plans to
reform imperial institutions. Although the actual effects of these initiatives
were probably rather limited, it shows that contemporaries reflected on such
matters, which means that historians need to take them seriously. In 1902,
the loss of independence by the Boer republics caused a far greater shock in
the Netherlands and, compared to their British counterparts, the Dutch or-
ganisations that propagated stamverwantschapwere much weaker. Attempts
to professionalise them after the South African War failed, in contrast with
the ever-developing British press system. Nevertheless, the ongoing populari-
ty of the heroic past of the Afrikaners, which lasted until after the Second
World War, shows a parallel with the enduring appeal of popular imperialism
in Britain.
To properly assess the long-term effects of the pro-Boer propaganda cam-
paign in comparison to British imperial culture, one should also take into
consideration the situation in South Africa. After they had secured territorial
dominance, British administrators failed to Anglicise the white population,
the majority of which took pride in their Dutch heritage and language. Al-
though their attitude towards their cultural motherland, the Netherlands,
was ambivalent and sometimes even openly hostile, to a large extent Afrikan-
er nationalists appropriated the views on South African history that had been
written by Dutch authors. Some individuals actively tried to reverse the exist-
ing lines of communication and stimulate this process. It would be going too
far to assert that this was the only factor that shaped Afrikaner nationalism,
but it does dispel the views of those who argue that transnational feelings of
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Dutchness were simply a myth. From the 1880s, stamverwantschap had dif-
ferent meanings to different groups of people in the Netherlands and South
Africa and as such became a mixture of nationalism and ideals of transnation-
al brotherhood, laced with racism and colonialism. This ideology undoubted-
ly reached its climax during the propaganda campaign from 1899 to 1902,
but the cannon fire of this war of words clearly resounded far into the twenti-
eth century.
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Wat is er dan van verspreide pogingen te verwachten?’. za, nzav Jaarverslag 1895-1896,
8-9.
117 M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 177; Bossenbroek, Holland op zijn
breedst, 252-253.
118Van Berne, ‘Het Algemeen-Nederlands Verbond 1985-1995’, 40-41.
119M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 117.
120 Bossenbroek, Holland op zijn breedst, 252.
121Houwers, Nationalistische commotie in Nederland, 33.
122 Ibid. Shortly after the war started, however, the nzav grew exponentially and the
anv lagged behind.
123 Bossenbroek, Holland op zijn breedst, 253.
124 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1896-1897, membership list.
125 See chapter 4.
126 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1896-1897, 33-37. This intensive relationship would remain
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intact, and in 1907 and 1908 it was even proposed by some executive members that the
nzav be merged with the anv, which by that time had outgrown its sister organisation.
This did not happen. See circular of a meeting of executive committee and local represen-
tatives of the nzav, December 1907. za, nzav archive, VIII/16; De Graaff, De mythe
van de stamverwantschap, 113.
127 See chapter 4.
128Van Niekerk, Krugers se regterhand, 205.
129 Ibid. 192 and 197.
130 Ibid. 195-196 and 198; Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling I, 45-46. Because it was un-
clear if the terms of the London convention (1884) allowed the sar to have ambassadors,
Leyds was appointed as minister plenipotentiary in order to avoid controversy. In prac-
tice, all European powers except Britain treated him with full diplomatic protocol.
131 Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 215-217. Van Niekerk argues that Roëls con-
tributed to this shift, but she neglects to mention the influence of the Fashoda crisis
(1898). Ulrich Kröll points out that this event contributed greatly to the dislike of the
British by the French public. Kröll, Die internationale Buren-Agitation, 198.
132 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1895-1896, 39-40.
133 Schutte, ‘Muller, Hendrik Pieter Nicolaas (1859-1941)’.
134M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 121.
135 ‘die rooi doekie voor die Britsche bull’. Quoted in: Rompel, Marthinus Theunis
Steyn, 48.
136 Ibid. 47-50.
137 Schutte, ‘Muller, Hendrik Pieter Nicolaas’. See chapter 2.
138Du Toit Spies, ’n Nederlander in Diens van die Oranje-Vrystaat, 85.
139 See chapters 3 and 7.
140 Potter, ‘Webs, Networks, and Systems’, 635. See introduction.
Chapter 2
1 Schutte, Nederlandse publicaties over Zuid-Afrika, 9-10. Schutte has calculated that
the number of publications (books and articles) went up from an average of four per year
in the period 1806-1880 to 14 in the period 1885-1895. After reaching a peak of 50 in
1896 as a result of the Jameson Raid, the number fell to 25 in 1897 and 1898.
2 It was only in the mid-nineteenth century that Van Riebeeck’s journal was rediscovered
in the Cape archives and published, but at the end of the century it had achieved an iconic
status. Ledden, Jan van Riebeeck, 37. For a reappraisal of this journal, see Jansen, ‘Eva,
wat sê hulle?’.
3 Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de letterkunde; Conradie, Hollandse skrywers uit Suid-Afri-
ka II. Conradie’s second book appeared posthumously and was edited by Anna de Vil-
liers.
4 Steyn, Tuiste in eie taal; Zietsman, Die taal is gans die volk.
5 Huigen, De weg naar Monomopata; Jonckheere, Van Mafeking tot Robbeneiland;
Jansen and Jonckheere, Boer en Brit.
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6Huigen, De weg naar Monomopata, 13-14 and 17-18.
7Nasson, The South African War, 283.
8 Dubow, Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa, 17; Krebs, Gender, Race, and the
Writing of Empire, 114.
9 In 1911, the white population of the Union of South Africa was around 1.25 million
and the black population 5million. Marks, ‘Southern Africa’, 547.
10 Schutte, ‘The Place of Dutch Historians in South African Historiography’, 26.
11 Porter, ‘Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899’; MacKenzie, Propaganda and
Empire, 153; Thompson, ‘Imperial Propaganda during the South African War’. Simon
Potter has shown that the relationship between the press and politicians who supported
expansion was not unproblematic, however. Potter, News and the British World, 36-55.
12 For use of that phrase, see C. B. Spruyt, ‘De exodus der Boeren’, in De Gids, vol. 51,
no. 4 (1887), 162-77, 175. He referred to Stratham, Blacks, Boers, and British.
13 Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 15-16.
14 ‘Behalve laf, zijn zij valsch, huichelachtig, meinedig, onredelijk, ongastvrij, lui, vuil en
ondankbaar.’ Tromp, Herinneringen uit Zuid-Afrika, 146; quoted in Schutte, Nederland
en Afrikaners, 18.
15Van Koppen, De geuzen van de negentiende eeuw, 60-61.
16 Ibid. 56-62. Lion Cachet was in the Netherlands between 1873 and 1875, after which
he went to the Transvaal for another five years. He returned to the Netherlands in 1880.
17 The struggle of the Transvaalers. Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de letterkunde, 64-65;
Conradie, Hollandse skrywers II, 362-366; Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 52; M.
Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 118-119; Van Koppen, De geuzen van de ne-
gentiende eeuw, 62-63.
18 ‘uit de aard der zaken’. Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 7.
19 Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 4-5, footnote; Bosman, Dr. George Mc. Call
Theal, 121; Conradie, Hollandse skrywers II, 365.
20Van Koppen, De geuzen van de negentiende eeuw, 59-61.
21 Ibid. 61-63.
22 ‘taaiheid’. Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 28 and 40-41.
23Van Koppen, De geuzen van de negentiende eeuw, 163-164.
24 Jorissen, Transvaalsche herinneringen, 7-9. In 1884, Jorissen had already written a
pamphlet in which he gave an account of the negotiations between the Boers and the
British. It formed the basis for his book from 1897, supplemented with personal observa-
tions that were too sensitive to include in the 1880s, including his controversial dismissal.
25 Blink, Britsche koloniale politiek in Zuid-Afrika, 32-33; Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de
letterkunde, 68.
26 Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 125-126.
27 Jorissen, Transvaalsche herinneringen, 72-73. He even claimed to have coined the
motto: ‘Afrika voor den Afrikaner!’ This phrase is usually attributed to Kruger. Ibid. 144.
28 ‘Voor hem draait de zon om de aarde.’ Jorissen, Transvaalsche herinneringen, 17.
29Rompel, ‘Dr. E. J. P. Jorissen’, 165.
30 ‘lui, gulzig, onbeschoft en onbehouwen’. Quoted in M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en
de opkomst, 126.
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31 For example, see Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 13-24, 43 and 107-109. In 1894, Muller re-
ceived his PhD from the University of Giessen (Germany) on an ethnographical study of
the Limpopo region. Schutte, ‘Muller, Hendrik Pieter Nicolaas (1859-1941)’.
32Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 118-122 and 376-378.
33 Ibid. 108-109.
34Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 110. For differences in tone between the de-
scriptive Muller and more spirited Wormser, see Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de letterkunde,
51-52.
35Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 108.
36Te Velde, Gemeenschapszin en plichtsbesef, 98 and 101-102.
37 ‘ziekelijke opgewondenheid’. Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, vi; Te Velde,
Gemeenschapszin en plichtsbesef, 101.
38C. B. Spruyt, ‘Uit Zuid-Afrika’, in: De Gids, vol. 55, no. 3 (1891), 1-15, 15.
39Conradie, Hollandse skrywers, 151-152.
40 Mansvelt, In memoriam: prof. dr. C. Bellaar Spruyt; Mansvelt, De betrekkingen tus -
schen Nederland en Zuid-Afrika, 158-159. Mansvelt was a known Calvinist, while
Spruyt was an outspoken Liberal, but this seems not to have mattered to either of them.
There was also praise for Spruyt by the Protestant pro-Boer organisation cnbc. Voor de
Boeren, Orgaan der Vereeniging: Het Christelijk Nationaal Boeren-Comité, no. 1 (4
May 1900), 5.
41 Bossenbroek, Holland op zijn breedst, 18-19.
42 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1900, 132; nzav Jaarverslag 1901, 131.
43 Blink, Transvaal en omliggende landen, 5-17; Te Velde, Gemeenschapszin en plichts-
besef, 77. The work of Theal will be discussed later in this chapter.
44 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1888-1889, 23.
45 Cutting from a newspaper describing a meeting in Amsterdam organised by Patrimo-
nium, not dated. hdc, collection Wormser, 258, doos 15.
46 ‘geen prentenboek […] voor een Hollandsche kinderkamer.’ Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in
de letterkunde, 51.
47Gerraets, Dijkstra’s ondervindingen in Zuid-Afrika.
48 Jonckheere, Van Mafeking naar Robbeneiland, 46-54.
49 Penning, Uit mijn leven, 134-135.
50Van der Elst, ‘Die Anglo-Boereoorlog: ’n vertekende beeld vanuit die vreemde’, 150.
51 Penning, Uit mijn Leven, 136.
52 In De helden van Zuid-Afrika about the Great Trek, he refers to a work by Pieter Hart-
ing, founder of the nzav and to De worstelstrijd der Transvalers by Lion Cachet. Pen-
ning, De helden van Zuid-Afrika, 58, 163 and 198.
53 Elst, ‘Die Anglo-Boereoorlog: ’n vertekende beeld vanuit die vreemde’, 151.
54 Penning, Uit mijn Leven, 137-138.
55Colenbrander, De afkomst der Boeren, 7. Colenbrander took the situation in 1806 as
a benchmark, because he argued that the genetic make-up of the Boer had not changed
since then. In 1971, J. A. Heese published his findings on the geneaology of the Afrikan-
ers, which differed significantly, arguing that 36% of the Afrikaners had Dutch ancestry,
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35% German, 14% French and 7% black. Heese, Die herkoms, 21.
56 ‘nieuw ras’. Ibid. 123.
57 Ibid. 121.
58 ‘opvliegendheid’. Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 419.
59 Ibid. 21; Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 387-389.
60 ‘Men scheen daar liever door den “ridderlijken” Franschman, dan door de botte Hol-
lander beschaamd.’ Colenbrander, De afkomst der Boeren, 9.
61 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 23-27.
62 Ibid. 28.
63 ‘de geuzen van de negentiende eeuw’. For examples, see Fruin, A word from Holland
on the Transvaal question, 14; Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 95-99. In secondary
literature, see Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 40; M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en
de opkomst, 119; Te Velde, Gemeenschapszin en plichtsbesef, 77; Van Koppen, De
geuzen van de negentiende eeuw, 61-62.This analogy was also made in several English
sources, for example the influential work by George McCall Theal. See Bosman, Dr.
George Mc Call Theal, 124-125. Gueux, the French word for ‘beggars’, was used to refer
to the Dutch who opposed Spanish rule in the sixteenth century.
64Compare Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 407, and Wormser, Van Am -
sterdam naar Pretoria, 137; and Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 109.
65 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 115-117.
66 Ibid. 159-161.
67 ‘aardsvaderlijk’. Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal, 9.
68 ‘de rechte Boeren; breedgeschouderde, langbebaarde, ronde rechte kerels, die een ges-
lacht voortbrengen zoo stout en flink als ze zelf zijn’. Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pre-
toria, 108.
69 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 427; Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal, 8;
Rovers, De Transvalers en hunnen heldhaftige vrouwen, 14-15.
70 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 178-181. For a general description of
women during the Great Trek, see W. F. Andriessen, ‘De vrouwen der Boeren’, in: De
Gids, vol. 21, no. 1 (1903), 64-88, 69-76.
71 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 115-117.
72 Ibid. 140-141, 181 and 428; Rovers, De Transvalers en hunnen heldhaftige vrouwen,
15.
73 For an account of women during the war against Dingane, see Lion Cachet, De wor -
stelstrijd der Transvalers, 192-193 and 212-213. On women during the Transvaal War,
see Andriessen, ‘De Vrouwen’, 77-78; Rovers, De Transvalers en hunnen heldhaftige
vrouwen, 17. In chapters 5 and 6, the depiction of women during the South African War
will be treated.
74Rovers, De Transvalers en hunnen heldhaftige vrouwen, 15-16.
75 Lion Cachet,De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 428-429; Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 178.
76 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 207-209 and 297-299.
77Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 172; Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 128.
78Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 117-124.
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79 ‘Vele deugden bezit de bevolking hier zeker, maar niet in hooge mate die der zin-
delijkheid.’ Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 110. For poor hygiene, see Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd
der Transvalers, 348-349.
80 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 289-290.
81 Jorissen, Transvaalsche herinneringen, 20-21.
82 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 436.
83Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 172.
84 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 405-407; Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 116
and 176-177; Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 93 and 210.
85 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 407 and 576-567; Muller, Zuid-Afri-
ka, 141-142; Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 209 and 212; Junius, De koloniën
en staten van Zuid-Afrika; Blink, Transvaal en omliggende landen, 98-108. Despite these
warnings, many people that went to South Africa were still disillusioned by their experi-
ences. Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 120-122.
86Te Winkel, Het Nederlandsch in Noord-Amerika en Zuid-Afrika, 4-9.
87 Fredericq, De toekomst van den Nederlandschen stam, 4-6 and 13-14; Te Winkel, De
Nederlandsche taal in Zuid-Afrika, 3.
88 Nimocks, Milner’s Young Men, 19-21 and 55-56. These concerns continued to exist
in the twentieth century. Darwin, ‘A Third British Empire?’, 72.
89Te Winkel, Het Nederlandsch in Noord-Amerika en Zuid-Afrika, 23.
90 ‘Inderdaad, de strijd voor de taal is de strijd voor het ras.’ Muller, De Zuid-Afrikaan-
sche Republiek, 48.
91Conradie, Hollandse skrywers II, xxv.
92 Conradie has argued that he was not opposed to cultural influence from the Nether-
lands. Ibid. 83-95. Compare with Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 125-126. Du
Toit’s reputation in the Netherlands was very poor, however.
93 Jorissen, Transvaalsche herinneringen, 126-130. Despite his anger, Jorissen continued
to work in the sar as a lawyer and was made high court judge in 1890, after Du Toit had
fallen from grace. He considered this to be a full rehabilitation. Conradie, Hollandse
skrywers II, 339; Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 125-126.
94 Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 177-180; Van Koppen, De geuzen van de negen-
tiende eeuw, 119-132 and 135-137.
95M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 173.
96Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 377; Te Winkel, Het Nederlandsch in Noord-Amerika en Zuid-
Afrika, 60.
97 Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 99-100 and 101-102; Te Winkel, Het Neder -
landsch in Noord-Amerika en Zuid-Afrika, 61-66.
98 Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 140-146.
99Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 268.
100Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 92.
101 Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 261-268; Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 91-94; Te
Winkel, Het Nederlandsch in Noord-Amerika en Zuid-Afrika, 59. Particularly the elec-
toral victory of Steyn over a British candidate, J. G. Fraser, in 1895was considered impor-
tant.
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102Van Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders II, 70-72; Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikan-
ers, 105-107; M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 173. A noticeable exception
is Lion Cachet, who was a personal friend of Du Toit and in 1882 praised his education
reforms. Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 407.
103Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 205; W.F. Andriessen, ‘Het onderwijs in de
Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek’, in: De Gids, vol. 60, no. 4 (1896), 284-299; Spruyt,
Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 112; ‘Transvaler’, Transvaal, 51; Te Winkel, Het Neder-
landsch in Noord-Amerika en Zuid-Afrika, 61.
104 ‘Moge het Afrikaansche volk hoe spoediger hoe liever begrijpen dat het Engeland, ’t
welk met Henri-Martins geweren kan wegdrijven, voor geen honderdste deel zoo gevaar-
lijk is als de Engelsche invloed, aan welke bestrijding mannen als Dr. Mansvelt hun leven
wijden.’ Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 205.
105 Spruyt, for example, extensively quoted from Ons Land in an essay from 1896.
Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 140-146. Another indication is that during the first
part of the South African War, newspapers in the Netherlands used Ons Land as a source
until British censorship became too strict in 1901. See chapter 3.
106 For Van Oordt, see Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de letterkunde, 63-64; Conradie, Hol-
landse skrywers II, 173-202; Huigen, De weg naar Monomopata, 96-124. For Jan Lion
Cachet, see Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de letterkunde, 81; Conradie, Hollandse skrywers
II, 115-135.
107Huigen, De weg naar Monomopata, 17-18.
108 Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de letterkunde, 137-179.
109 Ibid. 140.
110 Reitz, Vijftig uitgesogte Afrikaanse Gedigte; Reitz, Sestig uitgesogte Afrikaanse
Gedigte.
111Te Winkel, Het Nederlandsch in Noord-Amerika en Zuid-Afrika, 52-54.
112 Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de letterkunde, 140. During the South African War, many
schools gave performances during which children recited Afrikaner songs. Also the
Transvaal anthem, which was written by the Dutch Catherine F. van Rees in 1875, was
widely known amongst the Dutch public. Kloppers, ,,Alles zal rech kom!”, 76-77; M.
Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 187.
113 Compare Te Winkel, Het Nederlandsch in Noord-Amerika en Zuid-Afrika, 15-22
and D. C. Hesseling, ‘Het Hollandsch in Zuid-Afrika’, in: De Gids, vol. 61, no. 1 (1897),
138-162. The first attributed the most influence to French, the latter to Malay.
114 ‘Onder de Hottentotten zou hij er een soort van litterair leven mee kunnen wekken,
de beschaafden zouden er zich van afkeeren.’ Te Winkel, De Nederlandsche taal in Zuid-
Afrika, 9-10.
115 Van Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders II, 72; Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners,
105-107; M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 173 and 175.
116 N. Mansvelt, ‘De Hollandsche taal en het onderwijs in Zuid-Afrika, van 1874 tot
October 1899’, in: De Gids, vol. 65, no. 3 (1901) 504-517, 505.
117 Ibid. 511. Still, Mansvelt was considered a hardliner by many of his critics. Schutte,
Nederland en de Afrikaners, 139-140.
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118Mansvelt, ‘De Hollansche taal’, 509.
119Winkel, De Nederlandsche taal in Zuid-Afrika, 12. Wormser, who attended the first
conference about language simplification in Cape Town (January 1897), noted however
that there were not many attendants. Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 202-204.
120Wallach, Die Volmaakte ,,Gentleman”, 29.
121 ‘den groei der Hollandsche taal dit werelddeel groot nadeel wordt berokkend.’ F. V.
Engelenburg, ‘De spellingskwestie met het oog op Zuid-Afrika’, in: De Gids, vol. 61, no.
1 (1897), 357-365, 361.
122 See chapter 1.
123 ‘Wij gevoelen ons één met den Zuid-Afrikaan, omdat wij weten, dat hij bloed is van
ons bloed, omdat zijn voorgeslacht is uitgegaan van ons land, omdat zijn karakter nader
staat tot het onze dan van eenig ander volk, omdat wij begrijpen wat hij schrijft in zijne
eigene taal, ook al hebben wij die niet opzettelijk aangeleerd, omdat wij hem volkomen
verstaan, wanneer hij tot ons komt en ons in eigen woorden als zijne broeder begroet.’
Winkel, De Nederlandsche taal in Zuid-Afrika, 15-16.
124 See chapter 7.
125 Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 15-16. For an early Dutch refutation of the ac-
cusation that the Boers in the Transvaal kept slaves, see Veth, Onze Transvaalsche broe -
ders, 21-38 and 61-62. P. J. Veth was the father of Daniël Veth, who, as mentioned before
in this chapter, died during an expedition to Angola. After the death of his son in 1884,
Veth largely retired from public life and did not publish about South Africa anymore.
Van der Velde, Een Indische liefde, 300-301.
126 Veth, Onze Transvaalsche broeders; Fruin, A Word from Holland; Lion Cachet, De
Worstelstrijd der Transvalers; Address to the Members of the Anti-Slavery and Aborig-
ines Protection Societies. The Address was officially published by the Transvaal deputa-
tion that visited London in 1883-1884, but Schutte argues that Kuyper wrote it. Schutte
De Vrije Universiteit I, 50-52.
127 ‘hoe klein een groot man kan zijn’. Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers,
111.
128 George McCall Theal provided documents that supported the Boer version of this
story, which was taken over by authors in the Netherlands. Theal, History of the Boers,
337-338; Bosman, Dr. George McCall Theal, 84. For contemporary references to this
source, see Spruyt, ‘De exodus der Boeren’, 168-170; Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlan-
ders, 18-25; Wormser, ‘Petrus Jacobus Jourbert’, 41-86, 51. For authors who used differ-
ent sources, see Veth, Onze Transvaalsche broeders, 56-60; Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd
der Transvalers, 413.
129 Compare Jorissen, Transvaalsche herinneringen, 23-33 and Lion Cachet, De wor -
stelstrijd der Transvalers, 459-461. Jorissen thought Foreign Secretary Lord Canarvon
and High Commissioner Sir Bartle Frere ordered Shepstone, who acted out of what he
thought best for South Africa, to provide them with skewed information. In contrast,
Lion Cachet thought Shepstone manipulated the policymakers.
130 Boissevain, Van dag tot dag, 129.
131 Several articles in: ibid.
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132 Boisevain, ‘The Case for Holland’, 96; Boissevain, The Struggle of the Dutch Re-
publics: Open Letter to the Duke of Devonshire, 12-13.
133Van Koppen, De geuzen van de negentiende eeuw, 18-19; Te Velde, Stijlen van leider-
schap, 59.
134 Compare Te Velde, Gemeenschapszin en plichtsbesef, 70 and M. Kuitenbrouwer,
Nederland en de opkomst, 120. Kuitenbrouwer argues that there was significant resent-
ment against Gladstone in 1881. However, he does not make it clear whether that was
against his person as such or against British policy in general. For an example of an in-
stance where Gladstone’s personality was praised but the policy of his government criti-
cised, see Veth, Onze Transvaalsche broeders, 79-80.
135 Froude, Oceana, 42-46. See also Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 13; Spruyt, Afrikaners en
Nederlanders, 3-4; Kolstee, Transvaal album, 13. Concerning Froude’s genuine respect
for the Afrikaners and troubled relations with British expansion in South Africa, see
Dubow, A Commonwealth of Knowledge, 126-131.
136 Froude, Oceana, 48.
137 Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 5-6.
138 For example, see correspondence in the Leyds archive in Pretoria. nasa, Leyds col-
lection, ley 86, 315, 318, 324, 327 and 811.
139Hobson, The War in South Africa, 33 and 74.
140 There is evidence in the archives I have used that indicates that there was some con-
tact between Dutch pro-Boers and Hobson, but this seems to have been limited. In one
letter to Boissevain (which was probably written in the summer of 1901), Hobson men-
tioned that he had stayed with the Dutch journalist. J. A. Hobson to C. Boissevain, not
dated. gaa, collection C. Boissevain, toegangsnummer 394, inventarisnummers 457-
494. There are also indications that Hobson received material from the anv press office,
although he used middlemen in order to conceal his ties with this prominent pro-Boer or-
ganisation. C. Thieme to F. Rompel, 16 March 1901. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 811;
[F. Rompel] to C. de Wilde, 26April 1902. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 818.
141 Stead’s introduction to Rompel, The Heroes of the Boer War, ix; Thieme, ‘William
Stead’, 125; Davey, The British Pro-Boers, 83.
142 For correspondence about the publication of the English translation of the pamphlet
Een Eeuw van Onrecht (A Century of Wrong) by J. Smuts, see Leyds ed., Tweede verza-
meling I.
143Thieme, ‘William Stead’, 116.
144 ‘het geweten […] van zijn volk’. Ritter, De Courant: haar opbouw en beteekenis/W.
Stead, 60.
145 Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de letterkunde, 115; Bosman, Dr. George McCall Theal,
32-35, Saunders, The Making of the South African Past, 10-12.
146 Bosman, Dr. George McCall Theal, 7-8 and 35-40; Saunders, The Making of the
South African Past, 13-15.
147 It is hard to get a good overview of Theal’s exact bibliography. Christopher Saunders
asserts that eleven volumes of the History appeared throughout Theal’s life. Saunders,
The Making of the South African Past, 16. Bosman and Besselaar only mention five vol-
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umes that appeared during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Besselaar, Zuid-
Afrika in de letterkunde, 115; Bosman, Dr. George McCall Theal, 44. I have not used lat-
er editions for this chapter because Theal revised his work continuously, and therefore
this went beyond the scope of this chapter.
148 Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de letterkunde, 115; Bosman, Dr. George McCall Theal,
48-52.
149 Bosman, Dr. George McCall Theal, 119; Saunders, The Making of the South African
Past, 22.
150 Saunders, The Making of the South African Past, 24.
151 Ibid. 25.
152 Bosman, Dr. George McCall Theal, 120-129.
153 Ibid. 139-143.
154 For example, see Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 315 footnote; Blink,
Transvaal en omliggende landen, 5; Aitton, Geschiedenis van Zuid-Afrika, x; Spruyt,
Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 92; Spruyt, ‘The case for the Boers’, 61; Spruyt, Engeland en
Transvaal. Also Dutch authors in South Africa like Van Oordt were inspired by Theal.
Conradie, Hollandse skrywers II, 180; Huigen, De weg naar Monomopata, 104.
155 Aitton, Geschiedenis van Zuid-Afrika, x. After Theal declined, D. Aitton, who had
been a teacher in the ofs, was asked to write the textbook. Although Aitton did do some
research himself, his work was mainly inspired by Theal. Theal’s History of South Africa
was translated into Dutch with the support of the nzav. See Theal, De geschiedenis van
Zuid-Afrika.
156 Theal noted how the Afrikaners were racially closely linked to the British, but this
could not prevent the growing resentment about bad colonial government. Theal, Histo-
ry of the Boers, 59-60; Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal, 6.
157 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 39 and 395-397; Theal, History of
the Boers, 357; Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 49-50; Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria,
217-218; Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 10-13 and 52-56; Spruyt, Engeland en
Transvaal, 22.
158 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 45, 55-73 and 126-127; Theal, Histo-
ry of South Africa I, 343-348; Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 185-186; Wormser, Van Amsterdam
naar Pretoria, 216; Spruyt, ‘The Case of the Boers’, 63; Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal,
14-16 and 28.
159 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 85-86, 462-463 and 558-559; Muller,
Zuid-Afrika, 248 and 335-336; Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 25-30; Spruyt, ‘The
Case for the Boers’, 68.
160Theal, History of the Boers, 21; Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 18.
161 ‘negerliefde’. Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal, 11; Spruyt, ‘The Case for the Boers’,
61-62; Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 215.
162Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 6; Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 10 and 18.
163Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 42-54; Theal, History of South Africa
I, 187-196; Aitton, Geschiedenis van Zuid-Afrika, 203; Penning, De helden van Zuid-
Afrika, 7-8. For secondary literature about the depiction of Slachtersnek, see Huigen, De
weg naar Monomopata, 121-123.
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I, 374-378; Aitton, Geschiedenis van Zuid-Afrika, 213-219.
165Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 73-79; Theal, History of South Africa
I, 409-425; Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 184; Aitton, Geschiedenis van Zuid-Afrika, 211-213;
Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 215.
166 ‘het zesde zintuig der Boeren. […] Maar wel met de overtuiging, bewust of onbe-
wust: Wij Afrikaners moeten trekken opdat Afrika beschaafd en de heidensche natiën
voor het Christendom gewonnen worden: indien wij niet trekken, wordt Zuid-Afrika
niet beschaafd.’ Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 40.
167 Ibid. 128-131, 134-138 and 163-166; Theal, History of the Boers, 29-41 and 73-74;
Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 190-5; Aitton, Geschiedenis van Zuid-Afrika, 219-220; Spruyt,
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views that the lands of South Africa were depopulated is flimsy. Saunders, The Making of
the South African Past, 40.
168 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 138-144, 151-153 and 165-204;
Theal, History of the Boers, 103-119; Aitton, Geschiedenis van Zuid-Afrika, 222-240;
Penning, De helden van Zuid-Afrika, 130-165.
169The most notorious of these incidents took place in Kimberley in 1872. Muller, Zuid-
Afrika, 249-250. See also Spruyt, ‘Uit Zuid-Afrika’, 538; Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal,
26-27.
170 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 462-463; Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 181;
Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 25-27.
171 ‘talrijk als het zand der zee en vruchtbaar als de konijnen’. Spruyt, Afrikaners en
Nederlanders, 13. Spruyt referred to Theal, History of the Boers. Compare with Saun-
ders, The Making of the South African Past, 29.
172Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 154-155, 230-232, 285, 395-397 and
463-465; Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 180-182; Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 216;
Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 4-5.
173 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 462-463; Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 127;
Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 218, Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal, 26, 32
and 35. Saunders argues that Theal largely ignored these conflicts, which is a sign that he
approved of them. Saunders, The Making of the South African Past, 26.
174 For Zulu War, see Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 500-501; Muller,
Zuid-Afrika, 248; Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 18-25. For Matabele War, see
Muller, De Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, 37 and 39; Spruyt, Engeland en Tranvsaal, 22.
Spruyt even used the term ‘war of extermination’ to describe this conflict: ‘verdelgings -
oorlog’.
175 Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 15-16, 127, 179-80 and 226-227; Spruyt, Engeland en Trans-
vaal, 12-13; Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 187-188.
176Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 113-114. Despite Muller’s assertion that Afrikaners would nev-
er touch a black woman, of which he approved, his travelogue contains several photos of
a naked Zulu girl and a long passage in which he expresses his own sexual attraction to a
black girl. Ibid. 235-241.
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177 ‘vloek van Natal’. Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 162. Muller also de-
scribed the indecent behaviour, in his eyes, of black people in the streets of Natal. Muller,
Zuid-Afrika, 64-65.
178 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 459-485; Jorissen, Transvaalsche
herinneringen, 23-33.
179 Jorissen, Transvaalsche herinneringen, 21-22.
180 ‘vrijheid en recht’. Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 28 and 488.
181 Ibid. 505-506; Jorissen, Transvaalsche herinneringen, 19-20.
182 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 538.
183 Jorissen, Transvaalsche herinneringen, 84-85 and 113.
184 De Louter, La Question du Transvaal, 8-12; Leyds, The First Annexation of the
Transvaal, 334-346.
185Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 144; Wormser, Van Amsterdam naar Pretoria, 160-162.
186Muller, Zuid-Afrika, 114-115.
187 Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 122-141.
188 Andriessen, Jameson’s rooftocht gerechtvaardigd?; Louter, La Question du Trans-
vaal, 16; Muller, De Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, 43-44.
189 Muller, De Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, 45; Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders,
64-65.
190 Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 63-64; Andriessen, Jameson’s rooftocht
gerechtvaardigd?, 4.
191 ‘rassenhaat’. Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 50; Spruyt, Engeland en Trans-
vaal, 37; Louter, La Question du Transvaal, 20-21.
192 Spruyt, ‘The Case for the Boers’, 65-67; Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal, 38-39.
Blink, Britsche koloniale politiek in Zuid-Afrika, 56-57; Te Winkel, Waar het om gaat in
Zuid-Afrika, 11-13 and 17-19.
193Van Gogh, Weestaat den Rhodesgeest, 15 and 22.
194Muller, ‘Oom Paul’, 216; Van Gogh, Weerstaat den Rhodesgeest, 15.
195 ‘inval van Boekaniers in de Transvaal’. Quoted in: M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en
de opkomst, 176. See also Andriessen, Jameson’s rooftocht gerechtvaardigd?, 2; Spruyt,
Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 132-140; Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal, 40-43. In 1899, a
play appeared in which it was described how a meeting chaired by Rhodes decided to exe-
cute the raid. ‘Antibull’, De inval in Transvaal of de ware grieven der Uitlanders.
196 Jorissen, Transvaalsche herinneringen, 135-142. As high court judge, Jorissen was
closely involved in this matter.
197 Spruyt, Afrikaners en Nederlanders, 133; Andriessen, Jameson’s rooftocht gerecht-
vaardigd?, 2; Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal, 4. There was also praise for British opinion
makers who protested against the failure of the parliamentary inquiry. A speech by the
Liberal MP Sir William Harcourt was translated, for example. Harcourt, Een banier-
drager der gerechtigheid.
198 F. V. Engelenburg, ‘Zuid-Afrika “up to date”’, in: De Gids, vol. 60, no. 2 (1896), 10-
24, 16-19.
199 Boissevain, The Struggle of the Dutch Republics: Open Letter to the Duke of Devon-
shire, 18-20 and 80.
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Chapter 3
1The Times, 5April 1900.
2 Badsey, ‘The Boer War as Media War’, 70-83; Potter, News and the British World, 38.
3 ‘une preuve nouvelle que dans la guerre actuelle on ne recule pas en Angleterre devant
aucun moyen, pas m me la calomnie la plus perfide, ni le mensogne le plus flagrant’.
Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling I, 523.
4 Bossevain, The Struggle of the Dutch Republics: Open Letter to the Duke of Devon-
shire, 12.
5 Kröll, Die internationale Buren-Agitation, 323; Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand,
215.
6Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 217-218.
7 Bossenbroek, Holland op zijn breedst, 201-202; Van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and
the Great War, 12-14.
8 For good historical accounts of the war, see Pakenham, The Boer War; Nasson, The
South African War. Chapters 5 and 6will discuss the contemporary coverage of events in
more detail.
9This also affected British journalists. Beaumont, ‘The British Press and Censorship’.
10 Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling I, viii; Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 214.
11NZASM in memoriam, 146-147; M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 184-
185; De Jong, Die Lewensomstandighede en Kulturele Bydrage, 218-222.
12 Leyds ed., Eenige correspondentie, 79 and 82-83; Kröll, Die internationale Buren-Ag-
itation, 161. Leyds was accused in various British publications of advising the sar gov-
ernment differently, provoking the Boer ultimatum of October 1899. In later life, Leyds
tried to dispel this view. See chapter 7.
13Van Nierkerk, Kruger se regterhand, 297.
14 Leyds ed., Derde verzameling I, xiii; Leyds ed., De Vierde verzameling I, xlii-xliii.
Pott’s papers are kept in nasa, Leyds collection, ley 455-481.
15 Letters from Bas Veth from Lourenço Marques, June-September 1901. nasa Leyds
collection, ley 314.
16 The archive of the Paris consulate of the Transvaal was not included in the Leyds col-
lection but can be found in the National Archives in Pretoria. nasa, Pierson collection,
KGP.
17 Kröll, Die internationale Buren-Agitation, 198. Compare with Van Niekerk, Kruger
se regterhand, 217.
18 For the Paris exhibition and its aftermath, see chapter 7.
19The papers of Montagu White – from his time both in London and the US – are kept in
nasa Leyds collection, ley 483-515. After Montagu White left London, the documents
were secretly transferred to Amsterdam by the vice-consul, the Dutch-born A. G. Baron
Quarles de Quarles. Leyds ed., Derde verzameling I, 148-149.
20Meetings of British pro-Boers were disrupted by jingo rioters who attacked the partic-
ipants. Koss ed., The Pro-Boers, xxiv and xxx; Davey, The British Pro-Boers, 85 and 88.
21White was not particularly successful there either. Changuion, Uncle Sam, John Bull
en Oom Paul, 204-205.
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22 These letters can be found in nasa, Leyds collection, ley 191 and 326; NL-HaNA,
Leyds, 2.21.105, inv.no. 57. See also Davey, The British Pro-Boers, 86-87, 119 and 140-
141.
23 Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling I, 174.
24The archive of Snethlage is kept in nasa Leyds collection, ley 516-547.
25 There were sar consulates in Berlin, Frankfurt and Hamburg. Leyds ed., Tweede
verzameling II, 209. There were problems with Consul-General M. Winterfeldt in Berlin,
who even gave his documents to the British. Leyds ed., Derde verzameling I, xx.
26 For example, see Kröll, Die internationale Buren-Agitation, 111.
27Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 212, 217 and 227.
28 Ibid. 229-231.
29 Leyds ed., Tweede Verzameling I, vii-viii; Van Winter, Dr. Leyds in Zuid-Afrika, 16.
30 The secret archive of the legation contains 14 sworn oaths of ‘tijdelijke assistenten’
(temporary assistants) between October 1899 and April 1900. nasa, Leyds collection,
ley 317.
31 F. V. Engelenburg to M. Koopmans de Wet, 19March 1899. nasa, Engelenburg col-
lection A 140, file 42.
32 ‘Met mijn voortdurend verplaatsen lijk ik wel de wandelende jood. Het wordt hoe
langer hoe erger.’ Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, 310.
33 Ibid. xxix; Van Hoek, ‘The Leyds Memoirs’, 13. In June 1900, a shipment of gold ar-
rived from the sar with the German vessel Bundesrath, earmarked for the Nederland-
sche Bank en Crediet Vereeniging voor Zuid-Afrika. Another notorious incident took
place in November 1900when 30 boxes of gold were confiscated at the port of Hamburg
by the German authorities on request of the British government. Leyds admitted that this
money came from the Boers but that it had been payment for supplies that European
firms had delivered at Delagoa Bay. Leyds ed., Derde verzameling I, xv-xvi.
34 Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling I, xvii, 144-145, 183-184 and 192-193; Van Niekerk,
Kruger se regterhand, 269-270.
35 Leyds ed., Derde verzameling I, 138-139.
36 Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, xxvii.
37Approximately £53,500. Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 223.
38 Leyds ed., Derde verzameling I, xiv-xv; Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, xxvi-xxvii.
39Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 223.
40 Ibid. 224-225.
41 Ibid. 212-3. See chapter 4.
42 Ibid. 274. See chapter 7.
43Du Toit Spies, ’n Nederlander in Diens van die Oranje-Vrystaat, 99.
44 Copy of report by J. W. J. Wessel Roux and A. E. Mackay (not dated), iii-vii. za, anv
collection, anv II/29.
45 R. W. J. C. van der Wall Bake to Willem Leyds, 10 March 1900. nasa, Leyds collec-
tion, ley 321; Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 273.
46 Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling I, 359-360.
47 Ibid. 360-361; Du Toit Spies, ’n Nederlander in Diens van die Oranje-Vrijstaat, 111.
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48 For an overview of the activities of the deputation, see Scholtz, Europa en die tweede
vryheidsoorlog, 97-111; Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 289-296.
49 Leyds ed., Derde verzameling I, 8-20. Leyds considered this decision to be a mistake,
because the Dutch government was bound to its neutrality, while there were indications
at the time that Wilhelm II was willing to meet them. This opportunity was lost later on.
50 Sandberg, Twintig jaren onder Krugers Boeren, 329-338.
51 Leyds ed., Derde verzameling II, 150-151; Du Toit Spies, ’n Nederlander in Diens van
die Oranje-Vrijstaat, 193-195. In the 1930s, a polemic started between Leyds and Muller
about this incident. See chapter 7.
52H. P. N. Muller to W. J. Leyds, 26November 1900. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 257.
53W. J. Leyds to H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge, 20 January 1917. nasa, Leyds collection, ley
257; Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling II, 37. I have not recovered the original letter by Fisch-
er but Leyds’s account is supported by the fact that the relationship between the deputa-
tion and Muller deteriorated.
54 Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, xv and 642.
55 Ibid. 667.
56 Ibid. 729; Du Toit Spies, ’n Nederlander in Diens van die Oranje-Vrijstaat, 217.
57 Du Toit Spies, ’n Nederlander in Diens van die Oranje-Vrijstaat, 189-190. See chap-
ters 4 and 5.
58 ‘Zijn verhalen zijn absurt in de drie speeches die ik gehoord heb, hij praat over zichzelf
en zijn President en zijne Regeering en maakte in elke rede insinuaties tegen het Trans-
vaalsche Gouvernement in vergelijking met zijn Gouvernement, die niet sterker van een
Engelsche jingo konden komen’. Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, 746.
59M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 183-184.
60 This might be the reason why he did not publicly reflect on the Dutch position during
the South African War or thereafter. The only reference I have found to the neutral posi-
tion of the Netherlands, which Leyds thought to be the result of the precarious position
of the colonial possessions, is Van Hoek, Gesprekke met Dr. W. J. Leyds, 31.
61 ‘belangrijke informatie’. za, nzav Jaarverslag 1896/1897, 7.
62 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1899, 7 and 24.
63 Letters F. J. Domela Nieuwenhuis to H. J. Emous. za, Emous collection, EM 11, G3.
64 nrc, 24August 1901. The report was published two months after the account of Emi-
ly Hobhouse appeared, and although the findings were similar, it did not attract as much
attention. See chapter 6.
65 nrc, 29October, 9 and 14November 1901.
66 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1902, 7.
67Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 8October 1898.
68 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1898, 7 and 45-51.
69 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1900, 8.
70 ‘voor alle Boeren’; ‘het spreekt vanzelf dat ik voor de imboorlingen niets en voor de
kleurlingen zoo goed als niets doe’. B. H. de Waal to the executive committee of the nzav,
11December 1899. za, nzav collection, VI/130.
71 Those on Ceylon were assisted by Consul P. A. Wennink. za, nzav Jaarverslag 1900,
43-45.
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72 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1902, 7.
73 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1900, 8.
74 Leyds ed., Derde verzameling I, 148-149.
75 There were also two attachés from the colonial army in the Dutch East Indies – Lieu-
tenants C. J. Asselbergs and M. J. Nix. Nix died of wounds he sustained during the battle
of Sannah’s Post (March 1900). Asselbergs left South Africa thereafter. For his diary, see
Schultz ed., Dagboek van C.J. Asselbergs.
76 J. H. Ram, ‘Report meeting Vereeniging ter beoefening van de krijgswetenschap
(1901-1902)’, 154. Leyds collection, University of Stellenbosch, PAM 2; Pretorius, Kom-
mandolewe tydens die Anglo-Boerenoorlog, 206. For doubts about the discipline of the
Boer army, see chapter 5.
77 ‘Corruptie, lafheid, verraad, diefstal, dat is wat men hier dagelijks ontmoet. Wel heeft
een partijdige pers de Europeanen in algemeen, ons Hollanders in de eerste plaats een rad
voor de ogen gedraaid!’
78 ‘Het zou jammer zijn, als Engeland overwint, jammer voor ons, uit egoisme [sic];
want we verliezen een debouche voor velen, en het gebied waar onze taal gesproken –
liever gebrabbeld – wordt, zal inkrimpen. Maar de overgroote meerderheid verdient niet,
zelfstandig te blijven!’ Typed extract of letter from L. W. J. K. Thomson to [unknown ad-
dressee], 26 June 1900. nasa Leyds collection, ley 328.
79 L. W. J. K. Thomson to F. W. Reitz, 4 July 1900; F. W. Reitz to Willem Leyds, 14 July
1900. nasa Leyds collection, ley 328.
80 Despite the fact that this incident was kept quiet, there was a significant aftermath.
See chapter 7.
81M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 185.
82 See chapter 6.
83 ‘door zijn jaren-lange verblijf in de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, de aangewezen per-
soon scheen te zijn de leiding der Vereeniging op zich te nemen’. za, nzav Jaarverslag
1899, 5.
84 ‘een practische les in staatkunde’. Diary, 11 October 1899, page 113. NL-HaNA,
Middelberg, 2.21.232, inv.no.15. The view that the Boers had been right to invade Natal
and the Cape was common in Europe. It was argued that this would not leave time for
Britain to send reinforcements. Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling I, 23-24.
85 For further discussion about the effectivity of the nzav, see chapters 4 and 7.
86 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1897-1898, 5.
87 ‘Wij zijn een Nederlandsche Maatschappij om geld te verdienen, maar wij hebben een
Transvaalschen spoorweg. De eerste kan neutraal zijn, maar de tweede niet.’ Quoted in:
Van Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders II, 343-347.
88 In Memoriam: nzasm, 140-142.
89Kretschmar van Veen, Rapporten van den directeur J.A. van Kretschmar van Veen. Af-
ter the war, shareholders of the nzasm started a legal procedure and in 1908were award-
ed with approximately fl. 2.67 million by the British government. De Graaff, De mythe
van de stamverwantschap, 75-87.
90 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1901, 6. For Van Kretschmar van Veen’s activities as co-ordina-
tor of aid, see chapter 4.
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91 For an overview, see In memoriam nzasm, 105-130; Van Winter, Onder Krugers Hol-
landers II, 340-343; De Jong, Die Lewensomstandighede en Kulturele Bydrage, 202-208.
92De Jong, Die Lewensomstandighede en Kulturele Bydrage, 208-209.
93 Smit, Hoogtij der neutraliteitspolitiek, 26; De Jong, Die Lewensomstandighede en
Kulturele Bydrage, 210.
94NZASM in memoriam, 146-147; M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 184-
185; De Jong, Die Levensomstandighede en Kulturele Bydrage, 218-222.
95 Smit, Hoogtij der neutraliteitspolitiek, 26. This suit was separate from the compensa-
tion that was paid to the shareholders of the nzasm in 1908 that was mentioned in foot-
note 89 of this chapter.
96 ‘heerlijk hem te hebben leeren kennen’. H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge to W. J. Leyds, 17 Sep-
tember 1900. NL-HaNA, Leyds, 2.21.105, inv.no. 51.
97 N. Mansvelt to H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge, 14 September 1900. nasa, Leyds collection,
ley 826.
98 ‘de groote uitgaven van mijn berooide gezin’. N. Mansvelt to W. J. Leyds, 1November
1900. NL-HaNA, Leyds, 2.21.105, inv.no. 55.
99H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge to W. J. Leyds, 17 September, 10December 1900 and not dated
[probably January-February 1901]. NL-HaNA, Leyds, 2.21.105, inv.no. 51.
100 ‘dezen zoo hoogstverdienstelijken strijder’. G. Kalff to H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge, 27 Jan-
uary 1901. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 812.
101Circular, March 1901. nasa, Leyds collection , ley 808. The circular was signed by
the foreign minister, the president of the Upper Chamber of Parliament, leading business-
men and prominent members of the nzav. It enabled the publication of: Mansvelt, De
betrekkingen tusschen Nederland en Zuid-Afrika.
102 ‘het hart, de ziel en de geest van alles, wat aan deze zijde is gedaan om de betrekkin-
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Chapter 5
1 Bossenboek, Holland op zijn breedst, 351.
2 ‘buskruitlektuur’. Besselaar, Zuid-Afrika in de letterkunde, 69-70.
3 ‘onoverzichtelijk’. Jansen and Jonckheere, Boer en Brit, 35.
4 See chapter 3.
5 See chapter 2.
6 Kröll, Die Internationale Buren-Agitation, 10-11; Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand,
215-218.
7Dum-dum’s der publieke opinie.
8 Editorial by Charles Boissevain, Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 8 December 1899; Van
Harpen, Nederland Zuid-Afrika, introduction. N. van Harpen was editor-in-chief of the
Amsterdamsche Courant.
9 Leyds ed., Eenige correspondentie, 186; Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling II, 25; Van
Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 280.
10 Joubert, Transvaal.
11Brief van den heer F. W. Reitz.
12The pamphlet appeared in the Netherlands as Een eeuw van onrecht. I will refer to the
English translation. [Smuts], A Century of Wrong.
13Hancock, Smuts. The Sanguine Years, 109; Marks, ‘Jan Christiaan Smuts’.
14 Editions from that time bear the name of W. F. Reitz on the advice of the British jour-
nalist William Stead, who thought the name ‘Smuts’ would not attract enough readers.
The solution was found in the following formulation: ‘issued by W. F. Reitz’. Leyds, ed.,
Tweede verzameling I, xv-xvi. However, it was widely known in the Netherlands that
Smuts wrote the brochure after Kiewiet de Jonge made a statement to that effect in the na-
tional press. nrc, 20 January 1900. For the involvement of the anv in the publication,
see chapter 4.
15 Introduction by H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge in: [Smuts], Een eeuw van onrecht, i; biogra-
phy of Smuts by Rompel. Het Algemeen Handeldsblad, 15 July 1901. The controversy
was about a treaty from 1814, in which Great Britain handed back all Dutch colonial ter-
ritories it had occupied during the Napoleonic Wars, except for the Cape of Good Hope
and several other stations in the West (Ceylon had already been annexed by the British in
1802). In the 1880s, some authors in the Netherlands and South Africa held that the
Dutch had the opportunity to restore all her colonies and argued that Prince William of
Orange willingly abandoned the Cape in exchange for money and thus ‘sold’ it. In 1898,
Professor J. E. Heeres of the Colonial Institute in Delft published a pamphlet in which he
argued that the Prince of Orange had had no choice in the matter because the British had
risen to world dominance after they had defeated France, which was underlined by their
strong position in the overseas territories. Given this situation, he argued, the Dutch
prince had to give in to their demands for the colony in South Africa, where they were al-
ready in full control. In addition, British support was needed to rebuild the Netherlands
after the French occupation. By 1899, Heeres’s view had become common opinion in the
Netherlands. Heeres, Heeft Nederland de Kaap verkocht; Muller, Is de Kaapkolonie
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verkocht. For Smuts’s dislike of Hollanders, see Hancock, Smuts. The Sanguine Years,
69.
16Hancock, Smuts. The Sanguine Years, 108-110. Rompel pointed out that Smuts made
some inaccurate remarks about the war between the Boers and the Zulus under Dingane.
Biography of Smuts by Rompel. Het Algemeen Handeldsblad, 15 July 1901. For these
topics, see chapter 2.
17 [Smuts], A Century of Wrong, 55.
18 Ibid.
19Rudolph, Houdt aan in het gebed voor Transvaal.
20 Boissevain, The Struggle of the Dutch Republics: Open Letter to the Duke of Devon-
shire, 12.
21Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 7 January 1900.
22 Boissevain, The Struggle of the Dutch Republics: Open Letter to the Duke of Devon-
shire, 9.
23 The anv press office co-ordinated the publication, with financial assistance from the
nzav. See chapter 4.
24Van Koppen, De geuzen van de negentiende eeuw, 178-180. For praise from Liberals,
see Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 3 and 4 February 1900. Kuyper’s pamphlet was translat-
ed from French into Dutch by an editor of this Liberal newspaper, C. K. Elout.
25 ‘een meesterwerk van propaganda’, ‘wetenschappelijk’. Schutte, De Vrije Universiteit
I, 82.
26 Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling I, 211-212, 220 and 310. A file with information pro-
vided by Leyds can be found in nasa, Leyds collection, ley, 103.
27Van Koppen, De geuzen van de negentiende eeuw, 180.
28 ‘het kleine, vrije volk dat hij afvalt ten gunste van den grooten slokop’. Algemeen Han-
delsblad, 16 January 1900. In his reply to Guyot, Kuyper used similar terms. De Stan-
daard, 3April 1900.
29 ‘dien gekken Franzoos’. nrc, 16 January 1900; letter of Paris correspondent, nrc, 29
October 1899.
30 ‘dwaze Kafferpolitiek van Engeland, die de Kaffers vertroetelde en de Boeren verdruk-
te’. Penning, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika I, 3. Another popular chronicler of the war was
Priem ed., De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika.
31Van der Elst, ‘Die Anglo-Boereoorlog’, 150. See chapter 3.
32Address list anv press office. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 889.
33 For the most comprehensive bibliography of Penning during the South African War,
see Jonckheere, Van Mafeking tot Robbeneiland, 45-46.
34 Interview with L. Penning in Arnhemsch Dagblad, 24November 1924. hdc, Penning
collection, 87/3; Jonckheere, Van Mafeking naar Robbeneiland, 44.
35 Penning, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika I, 82.
36 Penning, De Leeuw van Modderspruit, 29. See chapter 2 for the origins of this motto.
37De militaire Gids, vol. 19, no. 1 (1900), 25.
38Kloppers, “Alles zal rech kom!”, 81-93; Boer en Brit.
39 ‘verlangen, dat zij in Hofmeyr een waren vriend blijven zien’. Editorial, nrc, 21April
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1900; letter from Afrikaner correspondent, Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 20April 1900.
40 Editorial, nrc, 19 February 1901. See chapter 3.
41 Letters from Cape Town, nrc, 12March and 5 June 1900. See chapter 6.
42 For reactions to Paarl, see ‘Van dag tot dag’ in: Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 13 De-
cember 1900. For Worcester, see nrc, 7 December 1900 and 1 January 1901; De
Telegraaf, 17 and 18December 1900.
43 Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 372-5; Junius, De koloniën en staten
van Zuid-Afrika, 9.
44 W. F. Andriessen, ‘De rol van den Oranje-Vrijstaat in den oorlog in Zuid-Afrika’, in:
De Gids, vol. 65, no. 2 (1901), 401-440, 431; Aitton, De Oranje-Vrijstaat, 16.
45Rompel, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, 48; Van Ittersum, De Vrijstaters en hun geschiede-
nis, 37.
46 See for example ‘Etine’, Voor Transvaal; Hartlooper, Transvaal A-B-C-; Kolstee,
Transvaal album; Dordrecht-Transvaal album.
47 Editorial, nrc, 24October 1899; editorial, nrc, 30December 1899.
48 Interview of H. P. N. Muller, nrc, 31December 1899; excerpt from letter by H. P. N.
Muller to Morning Leader, nrc, 9 February 1900; excerpt from interview of H. P. N.
Muller in Dordtsche Courant, nrc, 29March 1900.
49 ‘Men confereert met Leyds, maar zonder mij’. H. P. N. Muller to A. S. van Reesema,
22October 1899. za, nzav archive, VI/129.
50 Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, xv and 389-390. For complaints on neglect of the
ofs, see chapters 3 and 4.
51Aitton, Eene bladzijde uit de geschiedenis; F. A. G. Beelaerts van Blokland, De Oranje-
Vrijstaat, 18-19; Van Ittersum, De Vrijstaters en hun geschiedenis, 26-29.
52 ‘onbedorven’. Andriessen, ‘De rol van den Oranje-Vrijstaat’, 402; Van Ittersum, De
Vrijstaters en hun geschiedenis, 2.
53 Andriessen, ‘De rol van den Oranje-Vrijstaat’, 425-428. See also earlier publications:
Lion Cachet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 514 and 553; Jorissen, Transvaalsche
herinneringen, 71 and 87-92. Compare with F. A. G. Beelaerts van Blokland, De Oranje-
Vrijstaat, 21-2. F. A. G. Beelearts van Blokland, librarian of the ministry of war in The
Hague, argued that Brand was reluctant to help the sar but was forced to do so by public
opinion.
54 Van Ittersum, De Vrijstaters en hun geschiedenis, 32-34; Andriessen, ‘De rol van de
Oranje-Vrijstaat’, 428-431.
55 ‘adel van Zuid-Afrika’. Rompel, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, 5; F. A. G. Beelaerts van
Blokland, De Oranje-Vrijstaat, 23-30; Van Ittersum, De Vrijstaters en hun geschiedenis,
35-7; Andriessen, ‘De rol van de Oranje-Vrijstaat’, 432-440; Reitz, ‘President Steyn’,
199.
56 F. A. G. Beelaerts van Blokland, De Oranje-Vrijstaat, 23; Andriessen, ‘De rol van de
Oranje-Vrijstaat’, 434-436.
57 For European public opinion on the Bloemfontein Conference, see Leyds ed., Eenige
correspondentie, 50.
58 nrc, 5 February 1900; Van Ittersum, De Vrijstaters en hun geschiedenis, 46-60; An-
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driessen, ‘De rol van de Oranje-Vrijstaat’, 436-439. For later references, see Reitz, ‘Presi-
dent Steyn’, 203-204; Andriessen, Gedenkboek van den Oorlog in Zuid-Afrika, 86-88.
59 [Smuts], A Century of Wrong, 26; Kuyper, De crisis in Zuid-Afrika, 27; Van Gogh,
Weerstaat den Rhodesgeest. Compare with Te Winkel, Waar het om gaat in Zuid-Afrika,
11. Te Winkel argued that the perception of Rhodes as a perfidious capitalist menace was
unfair and that he also deserved respect as a worthy adversary to the Boers.
60 [Smuts] A Century of Wrong, 26-27; Kuyper, De crisis in Zuid-Afrika, 27.
61 ‘“Ja,” was het antwoord geweest, eenvoudig, diep treurig, “ik slaap niet meer nie,
dokter: ik huil die heelen nacht.” Rompel, Uit den tweeden (Transvaalschen) vrijheid-
soorlog, 18.
62 For the establishment of this regiment, see chapter 3.
63 Vissering, ‘Een Hollander in Zuid-Afrika’, in: De Gids, vol. 64, no. 1 (1900), 46-72,
63-4. For other obituaries of Coster, see: Leiden Zuid-Afrika album; ‘P.v.D.’, ‘Mr. H. J.
Coster’, in: Elsevier’s Geïllustreerd Maandblad vol. 9, (July-December 1899), 550-558.
‘PvD’ probably was the journalist L. J. Plemp van Duiveland, who also knew Coster from
his student days.
64Vissering, ‘Een Hollander in Zuid-Afrika’, 67-68.
65 Ibid. 70.
66 Pakenham, The Boer War, 135.
67 See chapter 3. Later in this chapter it will be shown how the British were accused of
war crimes after the battle.
68 This was emphasised in poems that appeared about his death. J. B. Scheepers, ‘Dr. H.
J. Coster. Ter gedachtenisse (sonnet)’ in: Neerlandia, vol. 4, (January 1900), 2; A. Verwey,
‘H. J. Coster’, in: nrc, 1March 1900. See also historical accounts Vissering, ‘Een Hollan-
der in Zuid-Afrika’, 71; Penning, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika I, 135; ‘P.v.D.’, ‘Mr. H. J.
Coster’, 558.
69 Gerard Vissering was one of the instigators of these initiatives. za, hcf collection 1.
Coster’s portrait can be found in many publications about the war. In South Africa he
was also remembered as a hero. Interview, nrc, 3November 1900; Hofmeyr, Zes maan-
den bij de commando’s, 90-91; Meijer, Dr H. J. Coster, 179-187.
70 ‘Als alle Boeren zoo doldriftig gevochten hadden als de Hollanders […], dan waren er
maar weinig overgebleven, en dan was de vijand bepaald al heer en meester in Zuid-Afri-
ka, terwijl we nu nog duizenden Boeren in het veld zien.’ Plokhooy, Met den Mauser, 33.
For Plokhooy see chapter 3.
71 Plokhooy, Met den Mauser, 32; letter from Pretoria, nrc, 30November 1899. In the
chaos after the occupation of Bloemfontein in March 1900, a new Hollandercorps was
founded, consisting of 60 men and incorporated into a large Uitlander commando,
which met its Waterloo under the command of the French commander Villebois de
Marieull at the battle of Boshof on 5April 1900.
72 ‘min’. Plokhooy, Met den Mauser, 13-14. See also ‘Met het Hollandsche korps te
velde’, nrc, 7December 1899; excerpt article from Volksstem, nrc, 2 January 1900.
73 ‘war council’. For contemporary descriptions of the Boer military system, see Lion Ca-
chet, De worstelstrijd der Transvalers, 397-399; Rovers, De Transvalers en hunnen held-
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haftige vrouwen, 6-10; De Militaire Gids, vol 19, no. 1 (1900), 22-24. For the most ex-
tensive description of the military structure of the Boer republics in Afrikaner historio -
graphy, see Breytenbach, Die geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog I, 29-76.
74Grundlingh, Die ‘hendsoppers’ en ‘joiners’, 7.
75 For a dramatised version, see Penning, De leeuw van Modderspruit, 95-97.
76 Neerlandia, vol 4. (April 1900), 46. The picture was also used for a postcard series
published by P. A. Nierstrasz.
77 See chapter 2.
78 ‘Een onderdrukte snik, een zucht, een kus en daarmede was het dure offer aan vader-
land en vrijheid gebracht!’. Kloppers, “Alles zal rech kom!”, 106. See also letter from Jo-
hannesburg, nrc, 25 October 1899; Hellemans, Met het Roode Kruis, 148-149; Jeltes,
Uit het dagboek van H. Jeltes, 4; W.F. Andriessen, ‘De vrouwen der Boeren’, in: De Gids,
vol. 21, no. 1 (1903), 64-88, 79.
79 Letter from Pretoria, nrc, 26 June 1900. See also Andriessen, ‘De vrouwen der
Boeren’, 80-81.
80 Van Everdingen, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika, 272; Andriessen, ‘De vrouwen der
Boeren’, 80.
81 ‘stoere’. Spruyt, Engeland en Transvaal, 45. For Spruyt see chapter 2.
82 ‘een schouwspel, waardoor men er toe komt te begrijpen dat het toch de moeite waard
is mensch te wezen’. C. B. Spruyt, introduction to: ‘Ratane’, Vrede in Zuid-Afrika, viii.
83Te Winkel, Waar het om gaat in Zuid-Afrika’, 21.
84 Steinmetz, De Nederlandsch Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg-Mij.; Van Kretschmar van
Veen, Rapporten van den directeur J. A. van Kretschmar van Veen, 87-130; In memori-
am NZASM, 101 and 104-108.
85De Bloch, Wat wij uit den Transvaalschen oorlog leeren kunnen; De Bloch, Wat er uit
den oorlog in Zuid-Afrika te leeren valt; Ram, and Thomson, Lessen uit den Zuid-
Afrikaanschen oorlog, 329-332.
86 M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 143; Te Velde, Gemeenschapszin en
plichtsbesef, 171-174; Bossenbroek, Holland op zijn breedst, 252.
87 ‘hoog boven de redenen van staat […] stijgen’. Voor gerechtigheid en vrede. Beroep
op de natiën vertegenwoordigd bij het Haagsche vredescongres ([no place], 1900). Draft,
not ready for publication. za, nzav library, P14. This pamphlet was rewritten several
times and several versions can be found in different archival collections. Moreover, the
translations show great disparities, so it is difficult to establish which text was read by the
public.
88 ‘roemrijke strijd’. Leyds, ed., Tweede verzameling I, 182-183.
89 ‘bombastische’, ‘komieken indruk’. Ibid. 202.
90 Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling I, xi; Kröll, Die internationale Buren-Agitation, 179-
184; Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 236-238.
91 ‘de groote beteekenis van dezen machtigen worstelstrijd in ons Zuidelijk halfrond’. Te
Winkel, Waar het om gaat in Zuid-Afrika, 3.
92Te Velde, Gemeenschapszin en plichtsbesef, 166.
93 ‘niet meer dan een wapenstilstand’, ‘hardnekkig en langdurig’. Te Winkel, Waar het
om gaat in Zuid-Afrika, 24-25.
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94Analysis C. de Wit, nrc, 19April 1900.
95 Letter from Pretoria, nrc, 23 January 1900. For more extensive descriptions of life in
the siege camp, see Van Warmelo, Mijn commando en guerrilla-commando leven;
Plokhooy, Met den Mauser, 32-78. Van Warmelo was negative about the situation
around Ladysmith, while Plokhooy described it as quite adventurous.
96 ‘den Boer op oorlogspad’. Rompel, Uit den tweeden (Transvaalsche) vrijheidsoorlog,
11-12.
97 Ibid. 1-3. For a similar analysis, see essay by F. V. Engelenburg. nrc, 27 February
1900.
98 Plokhooy, Met den Mauser, 62-64.
99 ‘verlofplaag’. Van Warmelo, Mijn commando en guerrilla-commando leven, 29. For
the publication of this book, see chapter 3.
100 Ibid. 42.
101 Ibid. 42-3; Plokhooy, Met den Mauser, 100-101.
102 Mettius, Het hypnotisme in den oorlog. The pamphlet was initially written for the
public in South Africa, but in the introduction the publisher wrote that it might have
more effect in Europe. In nrc it was described as ‘an eccentric pamphlet’ (‘een zonderling
geschrift’). nrc, 19 June 1900.
103 Letter from Pretoria, nrc 13 May 1900; letter from Pretoria, nrc, 26 June 1900;
Jeltes, Uit het dagboek van H. Jeltes, 7.
104Wormser, Drie en zestig jaren in dienst der vrijheid, 99 and 106.
105 Ibid. 120.
106 Ibid. 75-76 and 119.
107 For early biographies of this new generation of Boer generals, see Rompel, Uit den
tweede (Transvaalsche) vrijheidsoorlog, 24-43. See chapter 6.
108 ‘Het kan niet genoeg gezegd worden, dat de oorlog eigenlijk nu eerst begonnen is.’
Analysis C. de Wit, nrc, 7March 1900.
109 ‘nog steeds vertrouwen had in de dapperheid van de Boeren’. Statement Leyds. nrc,
2 June 1900; interview with Leyds, Algemeen Handelsblad, 8 June 1900.
110 Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 209.
111 Een sensationeele brief uit Zuid-Afrika, 26; De Boeren op Sint-Helena, 78; editorial
from Le Petit Bleu, nrc, 15October 1901.
112 Boissevain, The Struggle of the Dutch Republics: Open Letter to an American Lady;
Simons, Stambelangen, 26-30.
113Kuyper,Decrisis inZuid-Afrika,3-5,7 and11; Boissevain,The Struggle of theDutch
Republics: Open Letter to an American Lady, 7; ‘Buitenlandsch overzicht’, in: De Gids,
vol. 64 no. 1 (1900), 190-194; Essay inHet Algemeen Handelsblad, 23 January 1900; let-
ter by the London correspondent, nrc 18 December 1900; editorials, nrc, 1 February,
21May, 6 and 20 September 1901; article fromNew Age,nrc, 12October 1901. For the
term ‘Vereenigde Staten van Zuid-Afrika’, see TeWinkel, Waar het om gaat in Zuid-Afri-
ka, 25. The same comparison was made in many English contemporary sources.
114 See cartoons in ‘Korpl. Archilles’, Aanleiding tot den Engelsch-Transvaalschen oor-
log, [3]; Kras and Ponten, Kronings-idylle, [7].
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115 Boissevian, The Struggle of the Dutch Republics: Open letter to the Duke of Devon-
shire, 45.
116Kuyper, De crisis in Zuid-Afrika, 60.
117 nasa, Leyds collection, ley 191, 326 and 615. The Irish movement was quite frag-
mented, however, and there were quite a lot of internal tensions. The relations of the Eu-
ropean pro-Boers with the various fractions was therefore complicated and often
strained. Davey, The British Pro-Boers, 143.
118 For an exception, see ‘Britsche aanvoerders in Zuid-Afrika’, De Militaire Gids, vol.
19 (1900), 26-31. The anonymous authors of this article argued that also the British gen-
erals were victims of the greed of the capitalists.
119 For White, see editorial, nrc, 4 March 1900; nrc, 30 March 1900. For Baden-
 Powell, see nrc, 17 May 1900; Kloppers, “Alles zal rech kom!”, 43; Andriessen,
Gedenkboek van den oorlog in Zuid-Afrika, 151-154 and 173-178. The appreciation for
Baden-Powell might have been the reason why the Scouts movement was so popular in
the Netherlands in later decades.
120 ‘verschrikkelijk schouwspel’. Letter from a veteran of Spion Kop, nrc, 20 March
1900; report, probably by an officer who was present at the battle. nrc, 10March 1900;
Jeltes, Uit het dagboek van H. Jeltes, 9.
121 Neerlandia, vol. 4, (April 1900), 47-48. The photos were taken by a Hollander, Jan
van Hoepen (1856-1922), who had a studio in Pretoria. Zweers, De Boerenoorlog, 19
and 26.
122Van Helsdingen, Vrouwenleed. 33-34.
123 ‘De kaffers zelfs waren daarover verbaasd, en konden het maar niet verstaan, dat
menschen zoo uitgehongerd konden zijn.’ Ibid. 36.
124Analysis C. de Wit, nrc, 19April 1900.
125 Plokhooy, Met den Mauser, 96-97.
126 Ibid. 92-93; Hellemans, Met het Roode Kruis mee, 106; Jeltes, Uit het dagboek van
H. Jeltes, 24.
127 ‘belasterd’. Plokhooy, Met den Mauser, 73. For a similar account, see letter from
Dutch veteran of Spion Kop, nrc, 20March 1900.
128 Letter from Pretoria, nrc, 28November 1899; editorial, nrc, 29November 1899;
Wormser Jr., Een der oorzaken van den oorlog in Zuid-Afrika, 8. One of the most fa-
mous prisoners was the young Winston Churchill, who also wrote that he was treated
well by his captors, which was appreciated in the Netherlands. Kuyper, De crisis in Zuid-
Afrika, 45-46. After his famous escape from Pretoria, however, he fell in the pro-Boers’
esteem. nrc, 31 January 1900.
129 Te Winkel, Waar het om gaat in Zuid-Afrika, 212; Kuyper, De crisis in Zuid-Afrika,
60.
130 Editorial, nrc, 30December 1899.
131 Feith and Van Ponten, Pillen voor Joe, [21]; analysis C. de Wit, nrc, 8 November
1901.
132 Editorial based on anv report, nrc, 6October 1900; report of a skirmish involving
the Imperial Light Horse, nrc, 12 January 1901. In 1902, reports emerged on unlawful
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executions by the Australian Bushfield regiment. Several officers from this regiment were
put on trial and executed, and the Dutch press gave detailed accounts of the court pro-
ceedings in order to show the cruelty of these men. nrc, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 19April 1902.
133Analysis C. de Wit, nrc, 27 July 1900.
134 Kuyper, De crisis in Zuid-Afrika, 47; interview with former inhabitant of Bloem-
fontein, nrc, 8May 1900.
135Krebs, Gender, Race and the Writing of Empire, 99-100. See chapter 3.
136 nrc, 21May 1902.
137 ‘de hulp van barbaren in te roepen tegen mede-christenen’. nrc, 30December 1900.
See also nrc, 28December 1900, 1 and 3 January 1901, 29 January and 9April 1902.
138 In recent decades, however, there has been a marked interest in black participation in
the South African War. See Warwick, Black People and the South African War; Nasson,
Adam Esau’s War; Nasson, ‘Africans at War’.
139 nrc, 14 November 1899; Letter from Cape Town in Zwolsche Courant, nrc, 12
March 1900; nrc, 13 April 1900; interview of Dr Poutsma, nrc, 11 June 1901; editori-
al, nrc, 18 January 1902.
140 Excerpt from interview with Leyds in Le Matin, nrc, 24December 1899; interview
with Theal, nrc, 1 February 1900.
141 For such material, see za, collection anv/II, file 1.
142 Leyds ed., Tweede verzameling I, 337. It was mentioned in several newspapers in the
Netherlands. Editorial, nrc, 1 February 1900; Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 2 February
1900; De Telegraaf, 4 February 1900.
143 M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 178-180; Van Koppen, De geuzen
van de negentiende eeuw, 150-161. Compare with Schutte, De Vrije Universiteit I, 82,
who argues that Kuyper won over public opinion.
144 Leyds ed., Eenige correspondentie, 83-87.
145Voor gerechtigheid en vrede.
146 ‘les principes fondamentaux’. Ten Siethoff, La convention de Genève, 3.
147M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 209.
148 ‘medoogenlooze lust om te kerven en te dooden’, ‘verraderlijke wilden’. Editorial C.
Boissevain, Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 12December 1899.
149 ‘verachtelijk’. nrc, 29November 1899 and 28April 1900.
150 Leyds ed., Eenige correspondentie, 58-60, 62 and 63-65.
151 nrc 19, 23 and 27 June 1900. In addition, a rectification was published that had
been sent by the British ministry of war. Militaire Spectator, vol. 69 (1900), 628.
152 Jeltes, Uit het dagboek van H. Jeltes, 8.
153 ‘m.i. [mijn inziens] zijn dit alles geen zekere bewijzen’. G. W. S. Lingbeek to L. Gold-
man [?], 13April 1901. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 92.
154 F. Rompel to sar legation, 6 July 1901. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 92; za, collec-
tion anv/II, file 14. I have found no references to this circular in other sources.
155 Editorial, nrc, 3 March 1900; excerpt from letter by T. J. Krogh to his daughter,
nrc, 16March 1900; editorial, nrc, 6August 1900; speech Dr E. C. van Leersum, mem-
ber of Russo-Dutch ambulance, nrc, 29 November 1900; letter from C. de Wet deliv-
ered by German doctor, nrc, 27April 1901.
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156 Excerpt from letter by Dr Romeyn to Militair Geneeskundig Tijdschrift, nrc, 16Au-
gust 1900.
157 Jeltes, Uit het dagboek van H. Jeltes, 8; nrc, 7 February 1900.
158 Kuyper, De crisis in Zuid-Afrika, 45. For a similar explanation, see Plokhooy, Met
den Mauser, 83.
159 nrc, 21April 1901 and 23 February 1902; Kloppers, “Alles zal rech kom!”, 97-99.
160Letters of Red Cross doctors in nrc, 28 June 1900 and 26 July 1900; De Vereeniging
Het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis, 293-296; Templeman van der Hoeven, Gevangen op
Ceylon, 18-19. Templeman van der Hoeven’s letters first appeared in the Utrechtsch
Nieuwsblad.
161 De Vereeniging Het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis, 201-207. For an account of a fe-
male nurse who was also arrested and subsequently deported to the Netherlands, see
Hellemans, Met het Roode Kruis mee, 188-221.
162 nrc, 4 January, 28 February and 14 March 1902; Templeman van der Hoeven,
Gevangen op Ceylon.
163 For examples, see letter Lingbeek. nrc, 15May 1900; Jeltes, Uit het dagboek van H.
Jeltes, 8 and 24.
164 De Vereeniging Het Roode Kruis, 372-283; essay by J. C. Kakebeeke, nrc, 12 Sep-
tember 1900. For praise from Boer side, see excerpt from Volksstem, nrc, 30 June 1900.
165 For more recent descriptions of the battle, see Breytenbach, Die geskiedenis van die
Tweede Vryheidsoorlog I, 245-258; Pakenham, The Boer War, 138-141.
166 Editorial based on official report by P. Joubert and letter from an Irish chaplain, nrc,
18November 1899; ‘Met het Hollander Corps te velde’, nrc, 23 January 1900. For indi-
rect accounts, see despatch by Steyn to Kruger. nrc, 19 January 1900; Kloppers, “Alles
zal rech kom!”, 37. Throughout the war, both Boer and British sources accused each oth-
er of misusing the white flag.
167 Editorial commentary on letter from a Dutch veteran who was at Elandslaagte, nrc,
23November 1899.
168 Excerpt from letter by veteran of Elandslaagte, nrc, 28November 1899; letter from
pow ship Penelope, nrc, 5 December 1899; excerpts from letter by J. C. Kakebeeke,
nrc, 19 December 1899; interview of F. Kannemeyer, Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 30
May 1900; Penning, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika I, 138-142. In a footnote, Penning re-
ferred to British accounts published by William Stead, and he also used Kakebeeke’s sto-
ry. See Rompel, Uit den tweede (Transvaalsche) vrijheidsoorlog, 94; Plokhooy, Met den
Mauser, 28-31.
169 ‘verblind’. Editorial by Boissevain, Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 17December 1899;
Kloppers, “Alles zal rech kom!”, 39.
170 Cartoon from London Illustrated News, 2 December 1899. nasa Leyds collection,
ley 801.
171 ‘slachting’, ‘weerlooze Boeren’, ‘vermoorden’. Penning, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika I,
136-137; Priem, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika II, [2]; Kolstee ed., De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika,
coverpage and [5].
172 The prisoners were released soon afterwards. Mbenga, ‘The Role of the Bakgatla of
the Pilanesberg’, 91.
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173 ‘schandelijke bladzijde in de geschiedenis van dezen oorlog’. Letter from Pretoria,
nrc, 23 January 1900.
174 Letter by J. C. C. den Beer Poortugael to the Institute for International Law at
Neufchatel, nrc, 13 September 1900. In the actual text of the Hague Convention, no ref-
erences can be found to the use of black warriors against white people, but several con-
temporaries considered it to be a formal breach of the rules of engagement. See An-
driessen, Gedenkboek van den oorlog in Zuid-Afrika, 181-182.
175 Eyewitness accounts, nrc, 27 January 1900; interview by the Volksstem with offi-
cers Kirsten and Stoffenberg, nrc, 22 February 1900; protests by sar and ofs govern-
ments, nrc, 14April 1900.
176 Letter from Pretoria, nrc, 11 January 1900; letter from Pretoria, nrc 23 January
1900; letter from J. Kiewit in De Standaard, nrc, 1March 1900.
177 ‘het oproepen van het zwarte gevaar over de blanke minderheid in Zuid-Afrika is een
wandaad, waarvoor men moeilijk zijn afkeuring te scherp kan uitspreken’. nrc, 11 Janu-
ary 1900.
178 ‘tuchtiging’, ‘barbaren’, ‘wandaden’. Report from the Rand Post, nrc, 22 February
1900. For secondary literature see Mbenga, ‘The Role of the Bakgatla of Pilanesberg’, 91-
92. Mbenga argues that, looking at the entire war, the Bakgatla thrived from the cattle
they took from the Boers but also suffered heavy losses in terms of human life.
179 ‘Kaffer-Sluipmoord’. Penning, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika I, 342.
180 Ibid. 351.
181 ‘Transvaal moet onderworpen worden; zijn burgers moeten zooveel mogelijk wor-
den uitgeroeid.’ Letter H. Wefers Bettink, nrc, 6April 1900.
182 ‘rassenhaat’, ‘vaste vormen’. Letter from Cape Town, nrc, 6March 1900.
183 ‘Zuid-Afrika kan niet tot rust komen onder Britsch bestuur. Dit heeft deze oorlog on-
mogelijk gemaakt.’ Rompel, Uit den tweede (Transvaalsche) vrijheidsoorlog, 94.
Chapter 6
1The original citation is: ‘alles zal recht komen als elkeen zijn plicht doet’ (all will be well
if everyone does his duty), but it was the shortened version that became popular. In addi-
tion, it should be noted that Brand wrote these words in the 1880s and used High Dutch.
Kloppers made some sort of Afrikaans version of it.
2 Schutte, Van Amsterdam naar Krugersdorp, 44-45.
3 ‘Neen lezer, ik denk er niet aan, mij te onderwerpen, ik sluit geen vrede met Chamber-
lain, Milner en hun rooverbende, ik blijf schrijven: “Alles zal rech kom!”’ Kloppers,
“Alles zal rech kom!”, 6. Eventually Kloppers’s pessimism prevailed and after the war he
ended his affiliation with the pro-Boer movement. Schutte, Van Amsterdam naar
Krugersdorp, 57-58.
4 M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 189-190; Te Velde, Gemeenschapszin
en plichtsbesef, 163; Bossenbroek, Holland op op zijn breedst, 352; De Graaff, De mythe
van de stamverwantschap, 9.
5 Editorial, nrc, 9 September 1900.
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6Address by the Boer deputation, nrc, 16 September 1900.
7 Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, xxxiv-xxxvi and 378-379; nrc, 13 September 1901;
statement by the Dutch clergy (all denominations), nrc, 25October 1901; Hoedemaker,
A Plea on behalf of Equity and Truth, 21-26.
8 Excerpt from letter by correspondent of the Laatste Nieuws (Belgium) in Nelspruit,
nrc, 18 October 1900; map showing territory ‘under control of the Boers’, which was
bigger than the British Isles, nrc, 10 January 1901.
9The text of a proclamation issued in October by Botha, nrc, 12December 1900.
10 J. C. Kakebeeke, ‘Brazelle’, nrc, 15 September 1900.
11 Editorial by A. Kuyper, De Standaard, 22 September 1900; Jager, ‘De vlag op de
Gelderland’. I would like to thank Jouke Turpijn for providing me with this paper, which
brought this topic to my attention.
12 Letter by J. C. C. den Beer Poortugael in Het Haagsch Dagblad, nrc, 28 September
1900. See chapter 3 for the reception of Kruger in The Hague.
13 Editorial by A. Kuyper, De Standaard, 2October 1900.
14 See chapter 3.
15M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 185.
16 ‘Den Engelschman zal ons vertrappen waar hij kan.’ Letter from Pretoria, nrc, 27
June 1900.
17 Letters from nrc correspondent in Pretoria, nrc, 23 August 1900, 21 April, 13 Sep-
tember and 1October 1901.
18 ‘O, nooit vergeten zullen wij de schandelijke handelswijze van Engeland.’ Plokhooy,
Met den Mauser, 135-136.
19 Ibid. 137-138.
20 Ibid. 137.
21 J. C. Kakebeeke, ‘Engelands opvattingen van het oorlogsrecht’, nrc, 28 August - 2
September 1900.
22 ‘parasieten’. J. C. Kakabeeke, ‘De haat tegen Hollanders’, nrc, 5 September 1900.
23 ‘[…] waar ik op wil wijzen is op het bespottelijke der dreig-politiek van Engeland’s
regeering tegenover de Boeren, op het laffe om alleen deze dreig-politiek te durven uit -
voeren wanneer zij weerlozen geldt’. Rompel, Een studie in proclamaties, 4.
24 ‘al deze dreigingen, smeekingen en beloften mochten niet baten; de Boeren hielden
vol’. Ibid. 15.
25The term referred to the fact that these men continued to the bitter end (bitter eind).
26 Plokhooy, Met den Mauser, 121-123. This story was also published in a feuilleton: C.
Plokhooy, ‘Een reis met hindernissen’, Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 5 and 6 July 1901.
27 Jeltes, Uit het dagboek van H. Jeltes, 30 and 32; Kloppers, “Alles zal rech kom!”, 97-
102; Speech VerLoren van Themaat, nrc, 2 June 1902; Reitz, De dochter van den Hands -
opper, 66-70 and 86-88; Viljoen, Mijne herinneringen, 327-333.
28 Editorial, nrc, 24May 1901; Letter of Smuts to Steyn, nrc, 23 June 1901; Editorial,
nrc, 19October 1901; editorial, nrc, 25 January 1902.
29 Editorial, nrc, 18August 1900.
30 Boldingh, Een Hollandsch officier in Zuid-Afrika; feuilleton by ‘Si Omong’, nrc, 15
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and 24October, 7, 9, 10 and 13November 1900.
31 ‘militair genie.’ Editorial, nrc, 18August 1900.
32 Mijnssen, De depecherijder van De Wet; Penning, De verkenner van Christiaan de
Wet.
33 Reineker, Lord Kitchener en De Wet; Hogeweg, Een Engelsche spion in de knel, of,
hoe Generaal De Wet trakteert.
34 See chapters 2 and 5.
35 See correspondence in nasa, Leyds collection, ley 95; H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge to W. J.
Leyds, 27 January 1902. NL-HaNA, Leyds, 2.21.105, inv.no. 51.; W. J. Leyds to P. A.
Nierstrasz, 23 January 1902. NL-HaNA, Leyds, 2.21.105, inv.no. 73. For Mr Junius, see
chapter 4.
36 Analysis C. de Wit, nrc, 22 July 1900; Van Warmelo, Mijn commando en guerrilla-
commando leven, 50.
37 For example, see excerpt from a diary found at Roodewal, nrc, 19 September 1901;
Boldingh, Een Hollandsch officier in Zuid-Afrika, 88-89.
38 ‘De oorlog en het volkskarakter der Boeren’; ‘kinderen met een goed karakter, die
echter te veel aan zich zelf overgelaten zijn geweest […] en waarvan de slechte eigenschap-
pen – naast de goede – tot soms aanstootelijke proportiën zijn gegroeid.’ De Nieuwe
Courant, 9 June 1901.
39 Report by Smuts, not dated. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 94; Hancock, Smuts: The
Sanguine Years, 140.
40 ‘De stemming mijner burgers is prachtig. Hoewel zij misschien zwaarder geleden
hebben dan eenig ander klompje burgers in deze oorlog, zien zij vandaag met blij-
moedigheid de toekomst tegemoet, overtuigd dat geen moeilijkheid of vijandelijke over-
macht, hoe groot ook, zal kunnen verhinderen dat deze strijd zal worden voortgezet tot
Recht zegeviert boven Macht.’ Report by Smuts, not dated, nasa, Leyds collection, ley
94; Ambtelijke verslagen van generaal J. H. De la Rey en generaal J.C. Smuts, 33; nrc,
20 April 1902. English version of this text quoted in Hancock, Smuts. The Sanguine
Years, 140.
41Articles from De Volksstem, nrc, 27April and 8 June 1900; Rompel, Uit den tweede
(Transvaalsche) vrijheidsoorlog, 50-51; W. F. Andriessen, ‘De vrouwen der Boeren’, in:
De Gids, vol. 67, no. 1 (1903), 64-88, 81.
42 Letter from Pretoria, nrc, 23 April 1901; letter from Pretoria, nrc, 1 December
1901; Rompel, Uit den tweede (Transvaalsche) vrijheidsoorlog, 60. It was the central
theme in a novel by Hjalmar Reitz: Reitz, De dochter van den Handsopper.
43 For women gathering intelligence, see Andriessen, ‘De vrouwen der Boeren’, 84. An-
driessen referred shortly to Blackwood Magazine. For women fighting, see article from
Advertentieblad, nrc, 15 September 1901. Only years later did significant publications
appear on this subject. Brandt-Van Warmelo, Die Kappie kommando; Raal, Met die
boere in die veld. For Brandt-Van Warmelo, see chapter 3.
44 ‘Den lijdensbeker, die haar aan de lippen werd gezet, hebben zij tot den laatsten drup-
pel leeggedronken en toen ook nog hebben zij pal gestaan, zijn zij gebleven trouw en on-
bezweken.’ Andriessen, ‘De vrouwen der Boeren’, 65-66.
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45 Editorial, nrc, 20 June 1900; interview of Mrs Reitz by Het Algemeen Handelsblad,
nrc, 6August 1900; article from Ons Land, nrc, 13November 1900.
46 ‘terreur bewind’. Letters from Cape Town, nrc 31 July, 17 and 25 September 1901;
Elout and Rompel, ‘Olive Schreiner’, 113-114.
47 ‘zeer gunstig’. Report by Smuts, not dated. nasa Leyds collection, ley 94; Ambtelijke
verslagen van generaal J. H. De la Rey en generaal J. C. Smuts, 33; Hancock, Smuts. The
Sanguine Years, 140.
48 Report by Smuts, not dated. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 94; Hancock, Smuts. The
Sanguine Years, 140.
49The term Handsopper, orHendsopper, is derived from the phrase ‘hands up’.
50 ‘zyn geboorte reg’. Quoted in: Reitz, De dochter van den Handsopper, 5-6. This novel
by W. F. Reitz’s son Hjamlar after the war was about the love of a young Bittereinder for
the patriotic daughter of a Handsopper, which represented the love for the Afrikaner na-
tion prevailing in the end.
51 ‘karakterfout’, ‘zonder eenige gewetenswroeging’. Van Warmelo, Mijn commando en
guerrilla-commando leven, 71.
52 Editorial about speech Piet de Wet, nrc, 1 April 1902. See letter from Christiaan de
Wet’s wife, nrc, 24March 1901.
53Analysis C. de Wit, nrc, 7 February 1902; editorial, nrc, 17April 1902.
54 Letter from German lady in Alldeutscher Blätter, nrc, 26March 1902; letter from Jo-
hannesburg, nrc, 21May 1902.
55 Editorial, nrc, 9 June 1901; interview Leyds, nrc, 21December 1901.
56 Letter London correspondent, nrc, 23 June 1901.
57 Editorial, nrc, 28 July 1900.
58The words of Campbell-Bannerman reached the Boers in South Africa. In an article in
State Gazette of the ofs, Steyn declared that he agreed with the term ‘methods of bar-
barism’. nrc, 12March 1902.
59Hoedemaker,A Plea on behalf of Equity and Truth, 20.
60 Letter P. J. Blok, nrc, 3 September 1900; Letter prof. Wefers Bettink, nrc, 23Novem-
ber 1900; Boissevain, A Great Crime, 14-15; letter from Cape Town, nrc, 29 September
1901; analysis C. de Wit, nrc, 16October 1901 and 25May 1902. For British references
to the Dutch revolt, see speech by Frederick Harison, nrc, 10October 1901.
61 Letter P. J. Blok, nrc, 3 September 1900; London correspondent, nrc, 9 December
1900; Boissevain, A Great Crime, 14-15; Boldingh, Een Hollandsch officier in Zuid-Afri-
ka, 52. One correspondent reported that the people of Cuba supported the Boers. Letter
from Havana, nrc, 27 January 1900.
62 Editorial, nrc, 6October 1900; Boissevain, A Great Crime, 47; Kloppers, “Alles zal
rech kom!”, 147.
63 Interview of Lieutenant M. J. Nix (military attaché) in the sar press, nrc, 7 June
1900; analyisis by C. de Wit, nrc, 2 February 1901; editorials, nrc, 31December 1901
and 30 January 1902.
64 M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 192. For a similar comparison, see
Bastings, Brochure contra Leyds, 5. Bastings was a Belgian radical Catholic author.
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65 ‘Europeesche beschaving en industrie’, ‘een volk […] barbaarsch in zijne handelin-
gen’. ‘verschil in huidskleur’. Quoted in: M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst,
191. The journalist Charles Boissevain also attacked Troelstra. Het Algemeen Handels-
blad, 31October, 1, 4, 15 and 16November 1901.
66 Fransjohan Pretorius estimates that there were at least 14,000 agterryders. Pretorius,
‘Boer Attitudes to Africans in Wartime’, 104-120.
67 nrc, 20, 22 and 27April 1902. Thomson wrote his letter of apology on the advice of
his fellow attaché Captain J. H. Ram, who believed that the remarks about black scouts
had been harmful to their public image. J. H. Ram to C. J. Asselbergs, 23April 1902. NL-
HaNA, Asselbergs, 2.21.013, inv.no. 12. For Ram and Thomson, see chapters 3 and 7.
68Memoirs: Kloppers, “Alles zal zal rech kom!”, 146-147; Kestell, Met de Boeren-com-
mando’s, 210-211; Helsdingen, Vrouwenleed, 40-41. Novels: Penning, De overwinnaar
van Nooitgedacht, 121-136; Reitz, De dochter van den Handsopper, 14.
69 Letter from Cape Town in Nieuws van den Dag, nrc, 25 November 1900; speeches
by H. D. van Broekhuizen, nrc, 1 and 16December 1900.
70 Report by Smuts to Steyn, nrc, 24 June 1901; report by Smuts, nrc, 20 May 1902.
Ambtelijke verslagen van generaal J. H. De la Rey en generaal J. C. Smuts, 9, 16-17 and
27-31. Novels: Penning, Vredeburg, 93 and 119; Reitz, De dochter van den Handsopper,
56 and 199-201; Penning, De overwinnaar van Nooitgedacht, 10.
71Letter from Johannesburg in Zwolsche Courant, nrc, 21March 1900; nrc, 5August
1901; nrc, 19 September 1901; editorial about Lotter case, nrc 19October 1901; edito-
rial about Scheepers case, nrc, 25 January 1902; editorials about Kritzinger case, nrc,
16 February and 9April 1902; Boldingh, Een Hollandsch officier in Zuid-Afrika, 187.
72 Interview of Leyds, nrc, 21 December 1901; editorial about Kritzinger case, nrc, 7
March 1902.
73 For an excellent discussion on this incident and its effects on Cape identity, see Nas-
son, Abraham Esau’s War, 120-140.
74 ‘getard’, ‘gelijk hadden met […] op zijn plaats te zetten’. Letter from Cape Town in
Arnhemsche Courant, nrc, 16March 1901.
75 ‘Een der onaangenaamste dingen hier’. Letter from Cape Town in Arnhemsche
Courant, nrc, 16March 1901. See also article from Advertentieblad (Cape Town), nrc,
16April 1902.
76 nrc, 5 July 1900; letter by Dr Rijckevorsel, nrc, 12 July 1900; letter from ofs in Ons
Land, nrc, 16 December 1900; diary from Pretoria, nrc, 7 March 1900; article from
Advertentieblad (Cape Town), nrc, 13March 1900.
77 Feuilleton by H. Oost, nrc, 22 September 1901; Kloppers, “Alles zal rech kom!”, 40.
78 Letter by a prominent woman in the ofs, nrc, 31August 1901; Hobhouse, Report to
the Committee, 37-39. For secondary literature see Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing
of Empire, 64; Jansen, ‘“Ek ook het besluit om van my bittere lydingskelk te vertel”’,
174-176.
79 Letter from Pretoria, nrc, 20 September 1900; article from Advertentieblad, nrc, 16
April 1902. For the contemporary fear of black male sexuality, see Krebs, Gender, Race,
and the Writing of Empire, 65 and 78.
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80 ‘de grootste misdaad […] die ooit tegen het blanke ras in Zuid-Afrika gepleegd kan
worden’. Report by Smuts, nrc, 20May 1902.
81 Editorial, nrc, 22May 1902.
82 ‘Een helsch tooneel! Met geen andere naam kunnen wij het bestempelen. Met vlam-
men, vuur en rookdamp naderen zij! Het gras wordt door het vuur verteerd en baant hun
den weg.’ Helsdingen, Vrouwenleed, 32.
83 Editorial about a letter from the son of C. H. Wessels to his father, nrc, 9 December
1900.
84 ‘t Wordt den Engelschen rood voor de oogen van wraakzucht en bloeddorst. Ze zien
niets meer, ze willen maar dood hebben – weg met alles!’ Letter from Cape Town corre-
spondent of Zwolsche Courant, nrc, 21November 1901.
85 ‘schandelijk’. Editorial, nrc, 28 April 1900; interview with C. de Bruin, nrc, 8May
1900; excerpt from letter by Blignaut, nrc, 10 June 1900; letter from Cape Town, nrc,
27 June 1900.
86 Excerpt from proclamation by Colonel Beauchamp Duff, nrc, 8 December 1900;
Rompel, Een studie in proclamaties, 10-11.
87 ‘een soort van ontvolkings-systeem’, ‘om alles tot een woesternij te maken’. Editorial,
nrc, 19October 1900. See also letter by Smuts to Steyn, nrc, 23 June 1901.
88 Letter Mrs Cronjé, nrc, 10 December 1900; Boldingh, Een Hollandsch officier in
Zuid-Afrika, 45.
89 Letter from a Welsh soldier, nrc, 14November 1900; letter from Ons Land, nrc, 11
December 1900; letter from Alldeutsche Blätter, nrc, 21 February 1902; Boldingh, Een
Hollandsch officier in Zuid-Afrika, 46.
90 Letter from Pretoria, nrc, 22 January 1901; Ambtelijke verslagen van generaal J. H.
De la Rey en generaal J. C. Smuts, 6; nrc, 8April 1902.
91 Penning, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika II, 959, footnote. For Boldingh, see chapter 3.
92 ‘De Khaki’s dansten van plezier. Hun baldadigheid kende geen grenzen meer, en ter -
wijl hun vuile handen de kostelijke boter uit de potten klauwden, gooiden zij er elkander
mee, alsof het sneeuwballen waren.’ Penning, De overwinnaar van Nooitgedacht, 108-
110. For another dramatised account of the brutality of the British soldiers, see Reitz, De
dochter van den Handsopper, 58.
93 ‘Zij grepen elkaar bij de hand en maakten een woeste rondedans, terwijl de vlammen
hoog uitsloegen uit het dak van het ten ondergang gedoemde huis.’ Penning, De held van
Spionkop, 74.
94 Reference to letter by Leonard Courtney in which he protested against farm-burning,
nrc, 29November 1900; reference to protests by Dillon MP, nrc, 1March 1901; Lon-
don correspondent about protests in British press, nrc, 17 May 1901; references to
protests by Marks, nrc, 23May and 8 June 1901.
95 ‘Van Dullstroom het product van jarenlangen arbeid en worsteling bestaat thans niets
meer. Het is alles van de aarde verdwenen.’ Janson jr. ed., Het verbranden van hoeven in
Zuid-Afrika.
96 Review of Hell let loose, nrc, 17 and 18 November 1900. This pamphlet was fol-
lowed by Stead, How not to make Peace. In it, all the material on which Hell let loose was
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based was published in full. See also Stead, ‘Methods of Barbarism, 56-66, in which he re-
ferred to eyewitness accounts from both soldiers who condoned and condemned farm-
burning. For a review, see nrc, 20 July 1901.
97 Editorial in Frankfurter Zeitung, nrc, 17 July 1901; editorial, nrc, 31 July 1901; let-
ter by S. van Lier, nrc, 3August 1901; editorial, nrc, 15December 1901; editorial, nrc,
7March 1902. See also Penning, De verkenner van Christiaan de Wet, 14-16.
98 See chapter 2.
99 Report of execution of J. P. Coetzee, nrc, 19March 1901; editorial, nrc, 22March
1901; analysis by C. de Wit, nrc, 26March 1901; letter by Smuts to Steyn, nrc, 23 June
1901; editorial, nrc, 9August 1901.
100 ‘uit den weg te ruimen, nu zij hem in handen hebben.’ Editorial based on Reuters
telegrams, nrc, 22 December 1901. See also editorial based on Reuters telegrams, nrc,
15October 1901; editorial based on Reuters telegrams, nrc, 31December 1901; editori-
al based on report in Petit Bleu, nrc, 1 January 1902.
101 ‘een moord, niets anders; zij zal Engeland altijd tot schande zijn’. Editorial, nrc, 25
January 1902.
102 Question in the British parliament, nrc, 10 March 1902; abstract of report in the
Manchester Guardian, nrc, 26 March 1902; Penning, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika III,
1251-1253.
103 ‘Zijn bloed, zijn martelaarsbloed, zal […] niet noodeloos hebben gevloeid, want een
man als Scheepers moet oneindig veel vrienden hebben gehad die nu beslist als hij, zullen
willen strijden tot het einde. Bij zijn dood maakt hij wellicht meer recruten dan bij zijn le -
ven.’ Obituary Scheepers in Het Algemeen Handelsblad, nrc, 22 January 1902. See also
editorials, nrc, 23 and 25 January 1902; statement Hobhouse, nrc, 25 February 1902.
104 Statement by F. K. Kannemeyer to J. Pierson, nrc, 29 May 1900; interview of F. K.
Kannemeyer, nrc, 1 June 1900.
105 See chapter 5.
106 ‘vuile, […] besmette schepen’, ‘als haringen in een ton’. ‘Er lijkt geen ander volk te
bestaan, dat met grooter vrijmoedigheid anderen verwijt waaraan het zelf schuldig is, als
het Engelsche.’ Editorial about Roberts, nrc, 16May 1900. See also editorial about re-
port by Lieutenant-Colonel Hunt, nrc, 15 September 1900.
107 Editorial, nrc, 30March 1900.
108 Excerpt from a camp periodical on St. Helena, De Krijgsgevange, nrc, 22 August
1901; letter from St. Helena, nrc, 24October 1901.
109 Letter from St. Helena, nrc, 11 June 1900. See also Van Warmelo, Mijn commando
en guerrilla-commando leven, 213-214. Van Warmelo was sent to India.
110 Letter from St. Helena, nrc, 26 October 1900; letter from a visitor in a Ceylon
camp, nrc, 16December 1900; letter from St. Helena, nrc, 2May 1901.
111 ‘Hoe moet die doodende werkeloosheid, die wreede afhankelijkheid, dat opgesloten
zijn en bewaakt, wel worden gevoeld door mannen die hun vrijheid, hun onafhanke-
lijkheid zoo liefhebben als, ja liever dan hun leven.’ De Boeren op Sint-Helena, 50.
112 ‘onbeschaamde’, ‘openlijke erkenning van onvermogen en zedelijk verval’. Editorial,
nrc, 10August 1901.
war of words360
War of Words_bw  17-04-12  13:24  Pagina 360
113 For example, see letters from St. Helena, nrc, 2 August 1900, 13 June, 28 July and
20 September 1901.
114 ‘Judaskampen’. Letter from St. Helena, nrc, 28 July 1901; letter from Ceylon, nrc,
2May 1901; letters from Bermuda, nrc, 5 February and 10March 1902; letters from In-
dia, nrc, 25March, 12April and 18May 1902.
115 ‘bij gebrek aan saniteitspapier’. Letter by Versèwel de Witt Hamer, nrc, 31 July 1900.
116 Letters by Versèwel de Witt Hamer, nrc, 24November and 30December 1900.
117 Letter from Ceylon, nrc, 8October 1901; Ihle, Dagelijks leven van de Boeren krijgs-
gevangeven; De Boeren op Sint-Helena; Douwes Dekker, Wilhelmina-dag op Ceylon.
118Zuid-Afrikaansche tentoonstelling; De Boeren op Sint-Helena, 74.
119 After the war, Botha commissioned an inquiry, which yielded the number of 27,927
Boer casualties. Recently, the historians Iain R. Smith and Elizabeth van Heyningen have
compiled a databank in which they counted ‘around 25,000’ deaths. Van Heyningen,
‘Costly Mythologies’, 496 and 507. There are far fewer sources left about the black
camps, so it is even harder to establish those figures. The official number was 14,000, but
Smith and Van Heyningen estimate that the number of deaths there might have been as
high as in the white camps. Ibid. 496, footnote 5.
120 For reference to black camps, see Hobhouse, Report to the Committee, 13. Compare
with Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire, 79. Paula Krebs argues that Hob-
house did not mention the black camps at all, while in fact she did note, albeit briefly,
how there were similar problems in these camps, and recommended that these be taken
into consideration too.
121 Pakenham, The Boer War, 553-554.
122 Stanley, Mourning becomes, 3-4; Heyningen, ‘Costly Mythologies’, passim.
123 Stanley, Mourning becomes, 7.
124 Letter by H. Wefers Bettink, nrc, 6April 1900.
125 ‘nadat de twee Boerenvolkeren met hunne vrouwen en kinderen zullen zijn uit-
geroeid’. Waszklewicz-Van Schilfgaarde ed., Paul Kruger’s tocht, 14.
126 ‘meermalen tegen barbaarsche Afrikaansche stammen moeten strijden; maar de bar-
baren, met wie we nu moeten vechten, zijn veel erger dan die anderen. […] zij verbranden
onze hoeven; zij jagen de vrouwen en kinderen weg, wier mannen en vaders gedood of
krijgsgevangen zijn; zij laten haar [sic] zonder bescherming, zonder dak, zonder brood
vaak.’ Waszklewicz-Van Schilfgaarde ed., Paul Kruger’s tocht, 13-14.
127 After the war, her memoirs were published by J. A. Wormser. De la Rey, Mijne om -
zwer vingen en beproevingen. See also Ambtelijke verslagen van generaal J. H. De la Rey
en generaal J. C. Smuts, 5; anonymous letter, nrc, 20March 1902.
128 ‘onbeschrijfelijke barbaarschheid’, ‘onbreekbare volharding’. Letter by Smuts to
Steyn, nrc, 23 June 1901.
129 ‘geen mensch, al is hij ook hoe hard of sterk, tranen barst hem uit de ogen bij het aan-
schouwen van dit, en de moeders en dochters zijn niet in staat om te spreken van den toe -
stand waarin zij verkeeren zonder dat de tranen hun uit den oogen rolden’. Article from
Ons Land, nrc, 23December 1900.
130 Letter by ‘Pax’, Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 21 February 1901.
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131His reports addressed to ‘dr. Williamson’ and signed with ‘Chr. Brooks’ (codenames
for respectively Leyds and Broeksma) can be found in the secret files of the sar legation.
nasa, Leyds collection, ley 315. In September 1901, Broeksma was executed by the
British after he was convicted of high treason. See chapter 3.
132 For an overview of these sources, see chapters 3 and 4.
133Correspondence between W. Roosegaarde Bisschop and the anv press office, 20Oc-
tober, 6 and 19November 1900. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 811.
134 ‘te belangrijk om niet te gebruiken’. F. Rompel to H. Tiedeman, 20 June 1901. nasa,
Leyds collection, ley 811.
135 Correspondence about photograph Lizzie van Zyl, July 1901. nasa, Leyds collec-
tion, ley 811.
136 ‘Dat beeld, in een vergadering, vergroot op een scherm, […] zou een geweldige
uitwerking hebben, meer dan duizend boeken’. H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge to W. J. Leyds, 21
June 1901. NL-HaNA, Leyds, 2.21.105, inv.no. 51. For use of this photo in later Afrikan-
er nationalism, see Stanley, Mourning becomes, 127-131.
137 ‘onbevooroordeeld’, ‘waardig en waar’. Statement by H. A. Cornelisse, who lived in
a camp for several months. nasa. Leyds collection, ley 809. See also editorials, nrc, 21
and 22 June 1901.
138 Letter by nurse H. Broers from Norvalspont, nrc 4 July 1901; letter from Irene,
nrc, 30August 1901.
139Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire, 73-76.
140 See chapter 2.
141 Editorial, nrc, 28 July 1901; editorial, nrc, 17 December 1901; editorial, nrc, 22
February 1902; letter in Daily News, nrc, 9 March 1902; letter by German lady, nrc,
26March 1902. See also Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire, 70 and 74.
142 Letters anv press office to ofs consul-general’s office, 23October and 8November
1901. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 809. The leaflets can be found in za, Emous collec-
tion, EM 13.
143Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire, 64-66.
144 ‘schijnheilig’. Letter from J. C. Pretorius, nrc, 22 January 1901; editorial, nrc, 20
December 1901.
145 ‘vrouwenmartel-politiek’. Rompel, Een studie in proclamaties, 12.
146 Ibid. 10 and 15; letter by J. C. Pretorius, nrc, 22 January 1901; letter in Adverten-
tieblad, nrc, 12 February 1901; letter by German lady in Alldeutscher Blätter, nrc, 26
March 1902.
147 ‘moordkampen’. De Boeren op Sint-Helena, cover page; Janson jr. ed., Het verbran-
den; Penning, De oorlog in Zuid-Afrika III, 1195; Penning, De kolonist van Zuid-Afrika,
15.
148 Letter from visitor Potchefstroom camp, nrc, 17 September 1901; interview with
refugee, nrc, 18 January 1902; letter by Mrs Joubert, nrc, 22 January 1902.
149 Letter H. J. Emous to anv press office, 16August 1901. nasa, Leyds collection, ley
809. For Emous’s work during the war, see chapter 4.
150 ‘huichelachtige snoodheid’, ‘worgerkampen’. Letter by H. J. Emous, Algemeen Han-
delsblad, 6 July 1901.
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151 Ibid. For similar term ‘volkerenmoord’, see Penning, De kolonist van Zuid-Afrika,
17. This book was originally published in 1904.
152 Waszklewicz-Van Schilfgaarde, Plea for the grand of a neutral territory. A Socialist
Member of Parliament proposed to move the camps to Europe and even received support
from orthodox Protestant pro-Boers. See Voor de Boeren, 14December 1901, 3.
153 Letter by Commissie voor de Vrouwenkampen, nrc, 19 March 1902; editorial,
nrc, 21March 1902.
154 ‘Bravo! Den Afrikaander stam wordt niet licht uitgeroeid.’ Editorial, nrc, 16 April
1902. The question of who fathered the children, after almost two-and-a-half years of
war, was not mentioned. For illegitimate children in concentration camps, see Stanley,
Mourning becomes, 134-137, 147 and 162-163.
155Analyses by C. de Wit, nrc, 27 February and 12March 1901.
156 J. H. Bierens de Haan, the former physician of General Louis Botha, wrote the ac-
count. See chapter 3. It was first published in nrc, 29May 1901. Later it appeared as a
separate pamphlet. ‘B. ot H. Anicus’, De onderhandelingen van Lord Kitchener en Louis
Botha.
157 Ibid. 12.
158 Proclamation by Steyn and Schalk Burger, nrc, 24 August 1901; letter by Steyn to
Kitchener, nrc, 30 October and 11 November 1901. The former letter was also pub-
lished as a pamphlet by the anv press office.
159 Interview of H. VerLoren van Themaat, nrc, 15May 1902.
160W. J. Leyds to H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge, 5December 1901; correspondence between W.
J. Leyds, A. Fischer and P. A. Nierstrasz, 24-26December 1901. nasa, Leyds collection,
ley 103.
161 M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 187-188; Van Koppen, De geuzen
van de negentiende eeuw, 183-185.
162 For an overview of this mediation attempt and its effects, see Van Koppen, De
geuzen van de negentiende eeuw, 185-197; M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de op-
komst, 188-189.
163 ‘zwakke broeder’. Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, xlvii-xvliii. The role of the third
member of the deputation, C. H. Wessels, is not clear.
164 ‘menschlievende beweegredenen’, ‘schrikwekkende […] oorlog’. Penning, Den oor-
log in Zuid-Afrika III, 1282.
165De Standaard, 6 February 1902; Voor de Boeren, 15 February 1902, 2.
166 For responses in domestic and international press, see De Standaard, 6 and 8 Febru-
ary 1902; nrc, 7 and 8 February 1902.
167 ‘Zulke hoogdravende onzinnige zelfverheerlijking is buitengewoon geschikt om ons
volkomen belachelijk te maken in Europa’. Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 7 February
1902. Similar criticism was heard from the Socialists. See Van Koppen, De geuzen van de
negentiende eeuw, 198-199. Other Liberal newspapers were less critical. The nrc ex-
pressed its concerns about the memorandum, but De Nieuwe Courantwas very positive.
168Also the Socialist leader Troelstra was sceptical about Kuyper’s actions, probably for
similar reasons.
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169 ‘althans de uitmoording van de Boerenstam verhinderd werd […] in de toekomst het
krachtiger weer opleven’. Quoted in: Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling, xlvii. Leyds referred
to a publication from 1917. See also M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 188;
Van Koppen, De geuzen van de negentiende eeuw, 201.
170 Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, xliii-iv; Van Winter, Dr. Leyds en Zuid-Afrika, 18-
19; W. H. de Beaufort, ‘De Zuid-Afrikaansche republieken en de vredesconferentie van
1899’, in: De Gids, vol. 80 (1916), 465-478.
171 Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, xlix; Van Koppen, De geuzen van de negentiende
eeuw, 199. Compare with M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 189.
172 Leyds ed., Vierde verzameling I, l; Sandbergen, Twintig jaren onder Krugers Boeren,
365.
173 ‘een enkel hard woord’, ‘kostbaar goed’. Editorial, nrc, 3 June 1902.
174 M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst, 189-190; Te Velde, Gemeenschaps -
zin en plichtsbesef, 163; Bossenbroek, Holland op zijn breedst, 352; De Graaff, De
mythe van de stamverwantschap, 9.
175 nrc, 11 June 1902. This version was taken from The Standard and seems to have
been censored, as it did not contain the passage in which the armament of black people
and the concentration camps were described as reasons to surrender, matters that were
mentioned in the original document. These quotes can be found in other publications.
See Transcript Boer statement, 31May 1902. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 869; publica-
tion of letter Boer leaders to former inhabitants of the Republics, 31 May 1902. nasa,
Leyds collection, ley 206; Reitz, De dochter van den Handsopper, 276.
176 ‘gehamerd tot het ras dat Zuid-Afrika ten slotte beschave [sic] en regeeren zal’. Het
Algemeen Handelsblad, 2 June 1902. See also Scholtanus, De reakties in Nederland op
het einde van de Boerenoorlog, 77-78.
177 ‘Ik ben blij in je brief te lezen dat naar je meening, op den duur het Boeren-element in
Zuid-Afrika zegenvierend zal zijn. Daarmede stem ik volkomen in.’ Leyds ed., Vierde
verzameling I, 757.
178 Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, preface. For an extensive discussion of these ac-
tivities, see chapter 7.
179 ‘te waken en te wachten, in het duister staren wellicht, maar daardoor het oog te oe-
fenen en onze broedernatie te dienen’. Voor de Boeren, 14 June 1902, appendix.
Chapter 7
1 ‘Want wie zich een toekomst scheppen wil, mag het verledene niet uit het oog verliezen.
Daarom: zoekt in het verledene al het goede en schoone dat daarin te ontdekken valt,
vormt daarna Uw ideaal en beproeft voor de toekomst dat ideaal te verwezelijken.’ Quot-
ed in: Van Niekerk, Kruger se regterhand, 329-330; Bossenbroek, ‘Geschiedschrijving
als hoger beroep’, 191.
2De Graaff, De mythe van de stamverwantschap, 299-303.
3 Ibid. 304-308.
4 ‘dubbele dekoloniseringsproces van de Afrikaanse taal en cultuur ten opzichte van de
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Engelse zowel als de Nederlandse culturele dominantie dat zich in de eerste drie decen-
nia van de twintigste eeuw…’. Glorie, ‘“…Een reuze taak, die bijna ’t onmogelijke
vordert…”’, 42.
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36 For this view, see De Graaff, De mythe van de stamverwantschap, 55.
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40 See chapters 1 and 2.
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onze schrijftaal, vol. 10 (15 July 1906), 11-13, 12; Press circulars by F. Rompel, not dated
[May 1906?] and 1 June 1909. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 870 and 871.
42 ‘Ons adres’, in: Vereenvoudiging. Orgaan van de Vereniging tot vereenvoudiging van
onze schrijftaal, vol. 12 (30November 1908), 47-52, 47 and 51.
43 Press circular by F. Rompel, 25 June 1909. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 871. The
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Orgaan van de Vereniging tot vereenvoudiging van onze schrijftaal, vol. 12 (30Novem-
ber 1908), 1-2.
44Newspaper cuttings from the Netherlands, za, nzav archive, XI B/2.
45 Press circular by F. Rompel, 27April 1906. nasa, Leyds collection, ley 870.
46 Press circulars by F. Rompel, 6 September 1907, not dated [October 1908?]. nasa,
Leyds collection, ley 870 and 871.
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Klöters, In die grote stad Zaltbommel, 229.
48Hendricks, Die Betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 7.
49 Schutte, ‘De organisatie van de Stamverwantschap’, n.p.
50 See chapter 4.
51Hendricks, Die betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 13-14.
52Hemstra, De culturele betrekkingen tussen Nederland en Zuid-Afrika, 21 and 49.
53M. Kuitenbrouwer, De ontdekking van de Derde Wereld, 249-250.
54Hendricks, Die betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 31-32 and 36; Schutte,
Stamverwantschap onder druk. Jan Smuts, however, was welcomed as a war hero when
he visited the Netherlands in 1946. Ibid. 47-50; Buis, Verre vrienden, 32.
55Hendricks, Die betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 123-125.
56 Ibid. 220-222; M. Kuitenbrouwer, De ontdekking van de Derde Wereld, 213-214.
Canada and Australia, however, were more popular destinations.
57Hendricks, Die betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 138-139.
58 Schutte, Stamverwantschap onder druk, 126-138.
59 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1951, 1.
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60 Ledden, Jan van Riebeeck, 56-98.
61Hendricks, Die betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 175.
62 Ibid. 181-182. Queen Juliana refused to go in protest against the apartheid regime.
63R. Rozenburg, De Bloedband Den Haag-Pretoria, 15-16.
64M. Kuitenbrouwer, De ontdekking van de Derde Wereld, 214.
65 Buskes, Zuid-Afrika’s apartheidsbeleid, 286; M. Kuitenbrouwer, De ontdekking van
de Derde Wereld, 215.
66Hendricks, Die betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 185-190 and 200-202.
67De Boer, Van Sharpeville tot Soweto, 81-85.
68 Hendricks, Die betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 213-217; Schutte, De
roeping ten aanzien van het oude broedervolk, 11-24.
69Hendricks, Die betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 248.
70 za, nzav Jaarverslag 1961, 3.
71 Hendricks, Die betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 240; Schutte, De
roeping ten aanzien van het oude broedervolk, 25-32; M. Kuitenbrouwer, De ont-
dekking van de Derde Wereld, 217; De Boer, Van Sharpeville tot Soweto, 134-154.
72 Schutte argues that this was meant to avoid having to make a decision about econom-
ic boycotts. Schutte, De roeping ten aanzien van het broedervolk, 51. Compare with 
M. Kuitenbrouwer, De ontdekking van de Derde Wereld, 222-223; De Boer, Van
Sharpeville tot Soweto, 349-353.
73M. Kuitenbrouwer, De ontdekking van de Derde Wereld, 224-225.
74 ‘kortzichtigheid’; ‘dialoog’. za, nzav Jaarverslag 1977, 4-14; De Boer, Van
Sharpeville tot Soweto, 360.
75M. Kuitenbrouwer, De ontdekking van de Derde Wereld, 220-221.
76 Ibid. 227.
77 ‘een organisatie die propaganda maakt voor een fascistisch en moorddadig regime’.
za, Scrapbook with newspaper excerpts about the attack on the nzav library.
78 ‘verkalkt gezelschap’. za, Scrapbook with newspaper excerpts about the attack on
the nzav library.
79 Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 66; Schutte, De roeping ten aanzien van het
oude broedervolk, 48-52.
80De Boer, Van Sharpeville tot Soweto, 370.
81 Schutte, ‘Stamverwantschap als imperialisme’, 19.
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